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In recent decades, scholars in both Digital Humanities and Critical Media Studies have 
encountered a disconnect between algorithms and what are typically thought of as “cultural” 
concerns.  In Digital Humanities, researchers employing algorithmic methods in the study of 
literature have faced what Alan Liu has called a “meaning problem”—a difficulty in reconciling 
computational results with traditional forms of interpretation.  Conversely, in Critical Media 
Studies, some thinkers have questioned the adequacy of interpretive methods as means of 
understanding computational systems.  This dissertation offers a historical account of how this 
disconnect came into being by examining the attitudes toward algorithms that existed in the 
three centuries prior to the development of the modern computer.  Bringing together the 
histories of semiotics, poetics, and mathematics, I show that the present divide between 
algorithmic and interpretive methods results from a cluster of assumptions about historical 
change that developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and that implicates attempts 
to give meaning to algorithms in the modern narrative of technological progress. 
My account organizes the early-modern discourse on algorithms into three distinct 





peak in the mid-seventeenth century, held that the correspondence between algorithm and 
meaning was guaranteed by divine providence, making algorithms a potential basis for a non-
arbitrary mode of representation that can apply to any field of knowledge, including poetics as 
well as mathematics.  A second tradition, most influential from the last decades of the 
seventeenth century to around 1800, denied that the correspondence between algorithm and 
meaning was pre-ordained and sought, instead, to create this correspondence by altering the 
ways people think.  Finally, starting in the Romantic period, algorithms and culture came to be 
viewed as operating autonomously from one another, an intellectual turn that, I argue, 
continues to inform the way people view algorithms in the present day. 
By uncovering this history, this dissertation reveals some of the tacit assumptions that 
underlie present debates about the interface between computation and culture.  The reason 
algorithms present humanists with a meaning problem, I argue, is that cultural and technical 
considerations now stand in different relations to history: culture is seen as arising from 
collective practices that lie beyond the control of any individual, whereas the technical details 
of algorithms are treated as changeable at will.  It is because of this compartmentalization, I 
maintain, that the idea of progress plays such a persistent role in discussions of digital 
technologies; similarly to the Modernist avant garde, computing machines have license to break 
with established semantic conventions and thus to lead culture in new directions.  As an 
alternative to this technocratic arrangement, I call for two complementary practices: a 
philology of algorithms that resituates them in history, and a poetic approach to computation 
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        /* 
         * If the new process paused because it was 
         * swapped out, set the stack level to the last call 
         * to savu(u_ssav).  This means that the return 
         * which is executed immediately after the call to aretu 
         * actually returns from the last routine which did 
         * the savu. 
         * 
         * You are not expected to understand this. 
         */ 
        if(rp->p_flag&SSWAP) { 
                rp->p_flag =& ~SSWAP; 
                aretu(u.u_ssav); 
        } 
 
—Lions’ Commentary on UNIX 6th Edition, with Source Code 
 
Beyond Reading and Writing 
 
In 1677, a British mathematician named John Peter published a short pamphlet titled Artificial 
Versifying or, the School-Boy’s Recreation: A New Way to Make Latin Verses.1  In this pamphlet, 
which went through four editions in the late 1670s and was reprinted in the eighteenth 
century, Peter promises to show the reader how “to make almost Six hundred thousand 
different Latine Verses” through what we would now recognize as an algorithm—a rule-based 
procedure for selecting and copying letters from a set of nine “Versifying Tables” (2).  Peter’s 
“operation” involves picking single-digit numbers as starting points and then counting by nines 





promises, will be “true Latine and good Sense” (16).  What is more, 
the procedure can even be carried out “by he that cannot Write or 
Read” (6).  The system does indeed work.  If one generates a 
pentameter line with the starting digits 54321, the result is a 
warning: “sordida prædicunt vina pudenda nova” (“wines foretell 
sordid new shames”). 
To a contemporary reader, Peter’s versifying system might 
call to mind the algorithmic poetry of the Oulipo group, a French 
collective that formed in the late twentieth century to explore the 
relation of literature and mathematics.  A particularly strong 
parallel is Raymond Queneau’s 1961 book Cent mille milliards de 
poèmes (A Hundred Thousand Billion Poems), which enables 
readers to mix and match lines so as to produce more sonnets than one could read in millions 
of lifetimes.  As the American novelist John Barth put it, the algorithmic methods of the Oulipo 
produce “a spooky simulacrum of sense”—texts that are close enough to ordinary language to 
be interpretable, but eerily different from something a human being would write (93).  But 
Peter was living in a different world from the twentieth-century avant garde.  He presents his 
work not as an artistic provocation, but rather as an attempt to turn poetry into a simple 
procedure that may be readily taught to others.  In the preface, he offers his “artificial 
versifying” system as a challenge to mathematicians, artisans, and musicians who “triumph over 
the Latinist and the Poet” because their work can be reduced to a set of mechanical rules that 
do not require intelligent thought (4).  His goal in creating his versifying system, he tells us, is to 
Figure 1. Two of John Peter’s versifying 
tables, 1679 ed. © British Library 
Board, shelfmark 1568/3171, sig. A11v. 
Image published with permission of 
ProQuest. Further reproduction is 





show that the composition of poetry, too, can be made into a fully “artificial” process that even 
“illiterate Artificers” may easily learn (4). 
These arguments draw upon and perhaps, to some extent, parody an excitement about 
algorithms that was widespread in seventeenth-century Europe due in part to recent 
developments in mathematics.  At the beginning of the pamphlet, Peter compares his system to 
a special type of writing that would have seemed like an exciting new idea to many of his 
readers: Hindu–Arabic numerals.  Although we now learn the procedures of decimal arithmetic 
in elementary school, they were far less familiar to Europeans at the time, and the fact that 
people could perform these operations correctly without having to understand the principles 
on which they were based—that even the illiterate could learn to work a sum—seemed a 
marvel.  Peter extols the benefits of such methods in his preface: 
Commodious Advantages have arrived to Persons of divers Faculties, who though 
they have been altogether ignorant of Arithmetick, and of all Literature, yet by 
the benefit of Instrumental Operation, they have been capacitated to perform 
such Conclusions, as their respective Faculties required, though thereof they 
have not been able to give a better Reason, than that it is so, because it is so.  (4) 
Peter was only one of a number of seventeenth-century writers, including Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz and, in a more equivocal way, René Descartes, who considered the possibility of 
extending the power of numerals to other domains beside the quantitative.  If the mechanical 
procedures of arithmetic could produce genuine knowledge about the world without requiring 
thought—so the reasoning went—then why could one not come up with similar procedures for 





ratiocinatur: a universal ratiocinative algorithm that would extend the perfectly mechanical 
nature of arithmetic to all domains of knowledge. 
 By some accounts, this early-modern dream was finally fulfilled, three centuries later, 
with the advent of the general-purpose computer.  Starting in the 1980s, the word algorithm 
went from an obscure technical term to a media buzzword as newspapers reported the 
development of automated methods for solving a wide range of problems—finding the roots of 
mathematical equations, “reading” people’s handwriting, recognizing objects in photographs—
that had previously been the exclusive province of human intelligence.  By 2017, it was 
commonplace both in the academy and the popular press to proclaim the present time “the 
age of the algorithm.”  For technologists of an optimistic stripe, the rise of the algorithm 
supports a utopian vision of automation as a way of relieving human beings of labor and 
opening new, seemingly limitless possibilities for science and technology.  As Ed Finn puts it, 
one of the dominant ideologies of the present day imagines computation as a “universal 
solvent that can untangle any complex system, from human consciousness to the universe 
itself” (8).  The mechanical methods that were once, in Peter’s view, the exclusive boast of 
mathematicians and musicians are coming to pervade more and more areas of human life. 
But one aspect of the seventeenth-century dream is missing from the present discourse 
about algorithms: extending absolute certainty to all fields of knowledge.  Algorithms have fit 
smoothly into engineering and scientific disciplines, where they provide a way to automate the 
analysis of large amounts of quantitative data, but in disciplines that deal with interpretation, 
and most notably, in literary studies, they have faced a significant degree of resistance.  In a 





“meaning problem” due to the absence of a solid epistemological framework in which one can 
“take a signal discovered by machine and develop an interpretation leading to a humanly 
understandable concept” (414).  Liu points out that even advocates of algorithmic methods of 
literary study, such as the digital humanists Ryan Heuser and Long Le-Khac, display a self-
consciousness about the ability of such methods to analyze data “in meaningfully interpretable 
ways” (quoted in Liu 411; emphasis Liu’s).  Liu discerns a common perception that algorithmic 
methods exist in a different sphere from disciplines that involve meaning, such as literary 
hermeneutics.  While digital humanists certainly do not all see the meaning problem as 
intractable, the anxiety Liu diagnoses is widespread.  A programmer can easily create 
algorithms to transform and process textual data in all manner of ways, either for scholarly or 
artistic purposes, but making those results mean something is another question. 
Just as algorithms have faced heightened scrutiny in the humanities, interpretive 
methods have run into problems when applied to the study of computer systems.  In computer 
science, it is standard to draw a distinction between the user interface of a system, which 
conveys information in terms of culturally determined conventions, and the implementation, 
meaning the logic beneath.  The interface does not necessarily give the user a clear picture of 
what is going on inside the machine and can indeed, as the human–computer interaction 
theorist P. B. Andersen points out, be designed intentionally to mislead (26).  A number of 
media scholars, including Friedrich Kittler and Lori Emerson, have responded to the potentially 
deceptive nature of computer interfaces with what might be called computational brutalism, an 
imperative to lay bare the inner workings of computer systems rather than covering them up 





adequacy of interpretive methods for the study of technology.  The graphical interfaces of 
modern computers, he argues, “hide a whole machine from its users” (“There is No Software,” 
n.p.); in his view, the only way to authentically understand a computer is to set aside questions 
of meaning and delve instead into the microscopic details of the hardware, an endeavor that 
typically involves the bracketing of aesthetics, affect, and interpretive play—in short, just those 
aspects of language that are most valued in literary studies. 
Underlying both Liu’s meaning problem and Kittler’s anti-hermeneutic stance is an 
apparent disconnect between algorithms and what are typically thought of as “cultural” 
concerns.  This division falls out roughly along the lines of the “two cultures” of the sciences 
and the humanities that C. P. Snow described in a well-known 1959 essay, and which is 
manifest in a broad range of modern discourses (The Two Cultures).  Critical discussions of 
algorithms in the media often presume that the “cold” logic of computation is indifferent to 
cultural differences and social nuances.  While engineers certainly do recognize the importance 
of cultural factors in the design of computer systems, their lingo carefully distinguishes such 
“soft” considerations from “hard” technical ones, and some programmers have reported the 
experience of disappearing into a realm of abstraction, the world of human life dropping from 
view in favor of absolute focus on technical problems.  The division is also manifest in artistic 
uses of algorithms like those of the Oulipo, which often employ algorithms’ autonomy from 
semiotic conventions as a way of disrupting the semantic order of language.  While various 
attempts have been made to blur the lines between scientific and humanistic fields, the division 
between technical and cultural concerns is obdurate.  Yet this division has not always been in 





the modern division between culture and science, and, in some ways, people in earlier times 
were more comfortable with their mechanical nature than we are at present. 
This dissertation seeks to explain what happened in the centuries that intervene 
between Peter’s time and the present that created this gap between technical and cultural 
perspectives.  To do so, I examine the attitudes toward algorithms that existed in the three 
centuries prior to the development of the modern computer.  While the topic of algorithms 
now falls under the disciplinary purview of mathematics and computer science, understanding 
how they came to exist in opposition to culture requires an approach that does not impose 
modern disciplinary categories on the past.  I thus bring together three histories that are not 
often discussed in combination, although they overlap more than one might expect: the 
histories of semiotics, poetics, and mathematics.2  Many of the most important developments 
in the history of algorithms took place in Great Britain, but my account crosses national 
boundaries, as it must to make sense of a network of discourses in which international 
exchange was common.  In studying these discourses, I have sought to consider epistemology, 
as Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison put it, “in shirtsleeves”—describing not just the theories 
people developed, but also the ways in which those theories translated into practice 
(Objectivity 52).  Far from being matters of merely scholastic interest, the different ways people 
have theorized algorithms supported distinct modes of social organization, education, and 
political praxis, to understand which it is necessary to read epistemological texts within their 
broader social context. 
This study of the intellectual history of the algorithm sheds light on some of the tacit 





rests on a variant of Max Weber’s thesis that modernity divided society into distinct value 
spheres, such as those of science, ethics, and art, that operate autonomously from one 
another.3  While C. P. Snow’s analysis of the divide between the sciences and the humanities 
has been rightly criticized for its emphasis on superficial differences, I argue that a dualism 
between science and culture does exist at a deeper level that cuts across disciplines.4  A wide 
range of disciplinary practices, from engineering to poetics, distinguish the “technical” aspects 
of their work from “cultural factors,” which are seen as developing in an organic fashion that 
cannot be subject to intentional control.  Although I see the disconnect between these two 
perspectives as a problem, not least because it occludes the social consequences of the 
computational processes that increasingly pervade modern life, my purpose in historicizing the 
distinction between technical and cultural considerations is not to undermine it or to question 
its legitimacy.  Quite to the contrary, I contend that this distinction is deeply embedded in the 
way modern technology works, and I am skeptical of the possibility of doing away with it.  This 
skepticism differentiates my position from Bruno Latour’s argument in We Have Never Been 
Modern that the modern division of science from culture never took place (1-12), as well as 
from Jürgen Habermas’s program of attempting to complete the “unfinished project” of the 
Enlightenment by reuniting the value spheres with the praxis of everyday life.5  My goal in this 
study is not to demolish the boundary between technical and cultural perspectives, but rather 
to articulate this boundary’s function more clearly and to discern, perhaps, some ways in which 
people might be able to bring these two perspectives together more productively. 
My account organizes the early-modern discourse on algorithms into three distinct 





toward the relation of mechanical processes to meaning.  This tripartite scheme takes some 
inspiration from Michel Foucault’s The Order of Things, although my account differs from his in 
a number of important ways.6  The earliest tradition I discuss—the one that enabled John Peter 
to imagine extending the methodology of arithmetic to the composition of Latin verse—
attributed the power of mathematical symbols primarily to the fact that they did not involve 
the spoken vernacular.  For adherents of this tradition, which I call the real character tradition, 
algorithms provided a way to circumvent the uncertainty of ordinary language, establishing 
meaning in a way that was not dependent on the collective practices of people and hence 
absolutely certain.  For this group of thinkers, which includes Leibniz, John Wilkins, and William 
Oughtred, there is no meaning problem at all; algorithmic processes bear meaning simply by 
virtue of the fact that they are purely mechanical processes, their intimate relation to the 
structure of the universe being guaranteed by divine providence. 
If this view of algorithms now seems implausible, it is largely on account of the success 
of the second intellectual movement I discuss, a loosely affiliated cluster of projects I capture 
under the rubric of Enlightenment theories of the sign.  This tradition has some roots in the 
work of René Descartes, but it began in earnest with the work of John Locke starting around 
1690.  Locke’s empiricist philosophy led to a greater recognition that meaning is constructed by 
people and that even mathematical symbols can only refer to reality by virtue of the arbitrary 
definitions existing in people’s heads.7  Yet the relation between algorithm and meaning was 
not, for the Lockean tradition, one of autonomy.  For Enlightenment mathematicians such as 
Isaac Newton, Jean le Rond d’Alembert, and Nicolas de Condorcet, algorithms were founded on 





to clear and distinct ideas that had to be established ahead of time.  Whereas the real character 
tradition had presumed that a correspondence between algorithm and meaning was 
guaranteed by the divine order, the Enlightenment tradition sought to create this 
correspondence by altering the ways people think.  The development of algorithms could not, 
for this tradition, be separated from the Enlightenment project of remaking culture anew on 
rational grounds. 
The faith in such programs faltered in the nineteenth century, giving rise to a third set of 
attitudes that are, for my purposes, modern.  After the Romantic turn, meaning was widely 
seen as emanating from, as Wilhelm von Humboldt put it in the 1830s, the “mental life of a 
people”; the idea of replacing existing cultures with something more rational lost its appeal as it 
became apparent that such a reform would constitute a violent shock to people’s ways of life.  
As Raymond Williams has shown, it was in this period that the domain of culture came to be 
seen as existing autonomously from other spheres of value (Culture and Society xvi).  At almost 
exactly the same time, mathematicians such as Martin Ohm, George Peacock, and George 
Boole began to adopt algebraic methods that worked entirely through the algorithmic 
manipulation of symbols without pre-determined meanings.  My contention is that these 
simultaneous developments were part of a single readjustment of the relation between 
scientific standards of validity to the actualities of human thought.  After Romanticism, the 
longstanding goal of establishing a perfect correspondence between algorithm and meaning 
gave way to a separation of the spheres, in which algorithmic systems can be altered at will to 
suit the needs of the creator, whereas the construction of meaning must work with the 





This nineteenth-century intellectual turn, I maintain, set the terms in which people 
continue to engage with algorithms in the present day.  The dualism between process and 
culture that emerged from Romanticism resonates not just in the practice of mathematics, but 
also in social organization more broadly.  Its effects are manifest, for instance, in the language 
managerial workers use to discuss institutional change—the “culture” of the institution has an 
“inertia,” leaving behind a “residue” of habits from former times that must be broken up to 
enable the realization of new organizational structures.  The assumption is that the algorithmic 
aspects of institutional structures (databases, assessment criteria, methods of processing 
paperwork) may be constructed arbitrarily to fit the institution’s aims, but that the human 
aspects are less easily controlled and, in some cases at least, must be handled with delicacy.  
The designers of computer interfaces operate within the same division between the 
autonomous realms of the technical and the cultural when, for instance, they have to select a 
name for a menu item that adequately describes the operation in terms that the users will be 
able to understand.  From a technical perspective, the names of software elements are 
“arbitrary,” meaning that the developer can change them at will without affecting the logic of 
the software, but from a usability perspective, they must be chosen with care.  A user-interface 
designer must consider these two perspectives together, balancing the affordances and 
constraints of the software with the need to connect with the expectations and conceptual 
resources of the people who will use it. 
Such handwringing about “human factors” could not be further removed from the 
concerns of John Peter in the 1670s.  At the beginning of the pamphlet, Peter suggests that the 





grounds as the use of arithmetic.  He explains the power of the numeral system in grandiose 
terms: 
As the Reason of Numbers (if we dare credit Solomon, Wisd. 11.20) was One of 
the chiefest Rules, according to which God fram’d the World; so is it also none of 
the meanest Instruments, by which he still upholds Its Fabrick: So that to set light 
by the power of Numbers, is to undervalue the Wisdom of the Almighty, who 
thereby first modulated the whole Creation; and still makes use of an Harmonical 
Concent, and Physical Proportion to keep All in Tune.  By which means also is the 
Reciprocal Harmony maintained betwixt the Macrocosm, and the Microcosm (1) 
This passage makes a variation of Galileo’s famous statement that God wrote the book of the 
world in the language of mathematics; but Peter goes on to extend “the power of Numbers” 
into what is now the realm of cultural production—to suggest that poetic composition can be 
reduced to a rule-based procedure.  This extension was plausible because Peter inhabited a 
world that made no distinction between what we now think of as art and craft; both types of 
practice were seen as subject to rules of correctness that were not arbitrary in the sense of 
being subject to the mercurial will of the individual.  If versification is based on eternal truths 
just as much as mathematics is, then even the work of the poet can potentially be mechanized. 
These different attitudes toward arbitrariness point to an important but often 
overlooked thread in the intellectual history of algorithms.  The major theoretical contribution 
of this work is to show that the notion of arbitrariness in present-day discourse about 
computation is based on a complex and often unacknowledged set of assumptions about the 





reason algorithms present humanists with a meaning problem, I argue, is that algorithmic and 
semantic considerations now stand in different relations to history: meaning must be 
developed in negotiation with the established practices of a community, whereas algorithms 
can function—in a way that places them in a strange alliance with experimental poetry—as an 
avant garde, capable of being constructed in novel ways that disrupt continuity.  By making the 
underpinnings of this arrangement explicit, I hope to reveal the political stakes of the present 
divide between humanistic and technical practices.  Specifically, I argue that, because the 
production of meaning is required to answer to past practices in a way that algorithmic logic is 
not, any claim to give meaning to an algorithm must rest on a judgment about the relation of 
the past to the future.  This need for a historiographic judgment is, I would like to suggest, one 
reason why the narrative of progress recurs so persistently in discussions of technology.  This 
narrative is potentially reaching a crisis in the present moment, and a part of my purpose is to 
suggest the possibility of a different way of relating meaning and algorithm that could bring 
technical and humanistic perspectives together more fruitfully.  But before I can elaborate on 
this claim, it is necessary to consider in more detail how the present way of thinking about 
algorithms and culture came to be. 
 
The Power of “Instrumental Operation” 
 
Beginning with definitions is not always the best approach for intellectual history, but in this 
case a clear definition of algorithm is called for.  Given the pervasive and often imprecise use of 





potential definition of algorithm involves the use of recursion, which is a key element of 
computer programming.  The historian of mathematics Ivor Grattan-Guinness, for instance, 
defines algorithmic thinking as the contemplation of “successive repetitions of a process or 
maneuver, its reversal, its compounding with other processes, and/or its substitution into 
itself” (“Charles Babbage as an Algorithmic Thinker” 34).  My concern here is less with the 
details of how algorithms work than with how they relate to culture, for which purpose the 
existence of recursion is only of secondary importance.  I therefore use the word algorithm in 
the much simpler sense in which the OED defines it: “A procedure or set of rules used in 
calculation and problem-solving” (“algorithm, n. 2”).  The computer scientist Donald E. Knuth, 
whose multi-volume work The Art of Computer Programming is a standard reference source on 
algorithms, defines the term in a similar, albeit somewhat broader, way.8  In addition to this 
intellectual pedigree, the OED definition has the advantage of extending readily to practices 
that are not usually thought of as mathematical.  It covers John Peter’s poetry-generating 
system; it covers some of the operations one might perform using a subject index or another 
sort of lookup or filing system; and it covers much of what a modern computer can be 
programmed to do without human intervention.9 
It should be noted, however, that the definition I am using is not exactly the same as the 
one that existed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  The word algorithm originated 
as algorism, a word derived from the name of the Persian mathematician Muḥammad ibn Mūsā 
al-Khwārizmī; the change from algorism to algorithm appears to have resulted from people 
confusing the word with the etymologically unrelated logarithm.  Al-Khwārizmī’s c. 820 book Al-





Completion and Balancing) introduced algebra to Europe upon being translated into Latin in the 
twelfth century; the word algebra is derived from al-ğabr in the book’s title.10  Until around 
1800, the words algorism and algorithm referred specifically to the procedures of arithmetical 
computation, such as long division.  When Renaissance writers refer to “the art of algorism,” 
they mean arithmetic.  Nonetheless, I do contend that an idea much like the broader sense that 
we now attach to the word algorithm was available in seventeenth-century Europe.  In early-
modern texts, precisely defined logical procedures were sometimes referred to as “operations” 
or “instrumental operations.”  This is the phrase John Peter applies to his versifying method; 
one of the nineteenth century’s most sophisticated thinkers about algorithms, Ada Lovelace, 
used a similar vocabulary, referring to the study of algorithms as a “science of operations” (H. P. 
Babbage 22).  I have chosen to use the word algorithm instead of operation in spite of this slight 
anachronism because the latter is used in too many other senses.  
Many, although not all, of 
the most important algorithms in 
the lineage of the modern 
computer share an additional 
characteristic: they involve the 
manipulation of written, printed, 
or electronically or mechanically 
represented characters.11  By 
characters I mean any physical 
marks that are organized into 
Figure 2. Multiplication by pen. From the anonymous 1539 book An 
introduction for to lerne to recken with the pen or with the counters 
accordynge to the trewe cast of algorysme […]. Image courtesy of Bodleian 
Library, shelfmark Tanner 55, sig. c7r. Image published with permission of 






recognizable types that may be manifested in multiple locations, such as 1, 0, and α.  By 
manipulation I mean a process that involves only recognizing and producing patterns in the 
arrangements of these marks, not assigning meanings to them.  A prominent example is the 
procedure for multiplying two integers on paper (Figure 2).  As John Peter points out, it is 
possible to perform such a procedure without being literate—that is, without being able to 
“read” the characters in the sense of understanding what they mean.  The procedure only 
involves examining the present arrangement of the digits and writing new ones down according 
to rules that are strict enough as to leave only one possible way in which the procedure may 
correctly play out, at least factoring out variations in penmanship.  This lack of any room for 
judgment makes algorithmic processes amenable to mechanization, as people have recognized 
for many centuries.  Yet it also raises epistemological questions that do not arise in literacy as it 
is ordinarily conceived.  Under what conditions (if any) can such a procedure produce 
meaningful knowledge?  What is the proper way to interpret the results of an algorithm?  Can a 
meaningless algorithm ever have a legitimate use?  Advocates and critics of algorithmic 
methods addressed these questions in very different ways over the past few centuries, 
coinciding with broader changes in attitudes toward language, knowledge, and the nature of 
intelligence. 
Although it is not to my purpose to give a full account of the early history of algorithms, 
it is worth beginning with a brief overview of how the original (that is, arithmetical) “art of 
algorism” came to be known in Europe.  Although it was introduced to Europe in the twelfth 
century, Al-Khwārizmī’s art spread very slowly in the medieval and Renaissance periods.  The 





promoting the new numeral system with his 1202 Liber Abaci (Book of Calculation).  The 
development of arithmetic and algebra accelerated in the sixteenth century with the 
publication of such books as the anonymous An introduction for to lerne to recken with the pen 
or with the counters accordynge to the trewe cast of algorysme […] (1539) and Gerolamo 
Cardano’s The Great Art, or the Rules of Algebra (1545).  At this point, it was largely merchants 
and artisans who promoted these techniques; tainted by their association with commerce and 
lacking a precedent in classical Greek thought, decimal arithmetic and algebra were not taught 
in universities until the seventeenth century.  In spite of 
this low academic prestige, there was also considerable 
excitement over “the art of algorism,” which provided a 
seemingly miraculous way of answering questions about 
the real world using nothing but a pen and paper or 
slate and chalk.  Using trigonometry, for instance, one 
could determine the height of a steeple without 
climbing it—an example of wizardry in the eyes of some 
Renaissance observers.  The power of mathematical 
algorithms expanded in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries with the introduction of algebraic signs such 
as +, −, ×, and =, which made it possible to turn not just 
computation, but also the solving of equations into a 
mechanical process of moving symbols around on paper 
or slate. 
Figure 3. A page from a 1618 edition of Napier’s 
book of logarithm tables. Image courtesy of 
Bodleian Library, shelfmark 8° S 71 Med., sig. F1v. 
Image published with permission of ProQuest. 







The excitement over algorithms mounted further with John Napier’s introduction of the 
logarithm table in his 1614 book Mirifici Logarithmorum Canonis Descriptio.  While the 
logarithm—the inverse of exponentiation—now stands as one mathematical operation among 
many, it had a special purpose in the years before the invention of the calculator.  Once they 
are compiled into a table, as Napier did in his book, logarithms provide an easy shortcut for the 
multiplication of large numbers (Figure 3).  One simply had to look up the logarithms 
corresponding to the two numbers, add them, and then reverse the lookup process.  A strange 
thing about this procedure, exciting or troubling depending on one’s epistemological 
perspective, is that one did not need to understand why it worked in order to use it.  Napier’s 
system functioned by means of a purely mechanical process that was, apparently, able to 
produce correct results regardless of the intelligence of the person undertaking it.  Napier’s 
invention was a possible inspiration for John Peter’s Artificial Versifying, which similarly 
involved looking characters up in tables.  Although the connection is not certain, it is worth 
mentioning that Napier initially called logarithms “artificial numbers” (M. R. Williams, “Early 
Calculation” 24).  In both cases, artificial means something like “According to the principles of 
an art or science; scientific, systematic” (OED, “artificial, n. 6”)—that is, governed by rules that 
fully determine the proper way of proceeding.  With the accelerating development of new 
methods of computation and algebraic problem-solving, the domain of such artificiality seemed 
to be expanding. 
The mechanical nature of logarithms and other new methods of computation raised the 
question of how these “artificial” methods gained their power—how, exactly, one could 





understanding what those characters mean.  One such explanation that was popular in the 
seventeenth century, which I detail in Chapter 1, rested on the idea of a real character.  In his 
book The Advancement of Learning (1605-23), Francis Bacon defined a real character as a 
writing system that signifies things directly, rather than (as alphabetical writing systems were 
believed to do) signifying the pronunciations of words.  This notion, which Bacon derived from 
Scholastic philosophy, covered mathematical and musical notation systems, alchemical 
symbols, and the Chinese writing system: all forms of written representation that functioned 
non-phonetically and thus were not, in Bacon’s term, “parasitic” upon spoken languages.  Real 
characters, as Bacon points out, were comprehensible to people who spoke radically different 
vernaculars; he thus suggests, albeit ambiguously, that these characters possessed the ability to 
circumvent the uncertainty of verbal communication.  To Bacon’s early readers, the success of 
calculating methods like Napier’s logarithms seemed to prove that the superiority of real 
characters to spoken language was no chimera.  Followers of this line of thought attributed the 
power of mathematical notations primarily to their apparent independence from the languages 
people spoke from day to day and granted them a special relation to the natures of things. 
Since this rationale for the use of algorithms had nothing specifically to do with 
mathematics, it raised the possibility of extending the power of numerals to other domains.  In 
a 1629 letter to Marin Mersenne, René Descartes asserts the possibility of a numeral-like 
character that could represent anything whatsoever: “In a single day, one can learn to name 
every one of the infinite series of numbers, and thus to write infinitely many words in an 





other things which fall within 
the purview of the human 
mind” (quoted by Slaughter 
127).  While Descartes was 
skeptical that this goal could 
actually be achieved, others 
were more optimistic, and a number of prominent thinkers actually attempted to create real 
characters that could represent everything as unambiguously as numerals represented 
quantities.  The most fully developed attempt to create such a character was undertaken by 
John Wilkins, an English clergyman whose 1668 book An Essay towards a Real Character and a 
Philosophical Language presents a provisional attempt at a written notation that could 
unambiguously represent anything one might conceivably have occasion to write about, a 
project that was supposed to mend sectarian rifts and alleviate the political discord of 
seventeenth-century England (Figure 4). 
While Wilkins and his collaborators deserve credit for creating the most fully realized 
real character scheme of the seventeenth century, the project with the most enduring influence 
was that of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz.  In a wide array of texts written between 1666 and his 
death in 1716, Leibniz considered the possibility of a universal notation system that would 
enable any dispute to be resolved by means of an algorithmic process as certain as solving an 
equation.  One description of this calculus ratiocinatur is particularly famous: “The only way to 
rectify our reasonings is to make them as tangible as those of the Mathematicians, so that we 
can find our error at a glance, and when there are disputes among persons, we can simply say: 
Figure 4. The Apostles’ Creed written in John Wilkins's real character—a mode of 
communication that was supposed to avoid the uncertainty of language because it 





Let us calculate, without further ado, in order to see who is right” (Selections 51).  While 
Leibniz’s attempts to create such a system are often held up as a precursor to computer 
science, I show in Chapter 1 that his work placed algorithm and meaning in a very different 
relation from the one that now obtains.12  Rather than separating the algorithmic aspects of his 
system from those that involved meaning, Leibniz’s work was founded on a faith that the 
harmony between the two realms, algorithm and meaning, would ultimately enable the 
creation of a symbolic system that represented all things in a non-arbitrary way.  This notion of 
universal harmony could provide a rationale for the use of mechanical processes of symbol 
manipulation in any area of knowledge, even, as the example of Peter’s pamphlet shows, 
writing poetry.  For this tradition, reducing processes to algorithms—making them, in Peter’s 
term, “artificial”—was an end in itself. 
 
The Enlightenment Reasoning Machine 
 
In its most extreme forms, the real character tradition inspired a degree of trust in algorithms 
that was amenable to parody.  If there is some undercurrent of satire in John Peter’s Artificial 
Versifying, it comes to the surface in The Spectator for November 12, 1711, which includes a 
description of the pamphlet written by the English poet John Hughes.  Like “a kind of Poetical 
Logarithms,” Hughes reports, Peter’s system reduces the composition of poems to a rule-based 
procedure, enabling people to generate grammatically correct verses even if they do not 
understand Latin (2.56).  Hughes goes on to suggest that this process can channel meaning 





A Friend of mine, who is a Student in Astrology, meeting with this Book, 
performed the Operation, by the Rules there set down; he shewed his Verses to 
the next of his Acquaintance, who happened to understand Latin; and being 
informed they described a Tempest of Wind, very luckily prefixed them, together 
with a Translation, to an Almanack he was just then printing, and was supposed 
to have foretold the last great Storm.  (2.56) 
Whether or not it was intentional, the reference to almanacs is apropos: in 1678, John Peter 
himself had published an almanac titled The Astral Gazette.  Just as in Artificial Versifying, Peter 
presents his almanac as a means of making knowledge accessible to those who do not 
understand the principles behind it; in the same way that “every one that is capable of being 
relieved by Physick [i.e. medicine], is not therefore fit to be a Practitioner in that Art,” he writes, 
the beneficiaries of astrology cannot all be expected to understand how it works (n.p.).  At the 
end of the introduction, he presents procedures for finding the North Star and the Meridian 
that even “the most unskilful” can undertake (n.p.).  While these procedures are presumably 
more likely to work correctly than his verifying system is to predict the weather, there is little to 
distinguish the two from a user’s perspective—in both cases, one must trust that a rule-based 
process founded on unknown principles will produce the desired result.  For Hughes, the fact 
that one could use these methods without needing to understand them renders the whole 
endeavor questionable.  Taking the idea to its logical conclusion, he ends by suggesting the 
construction of “a Mill to make Verses,” which would enable all people to become “Wits” 
(2.56).  Since a person using such a machine would not genuinely know what he or she is doing, 





 By 1711, when Hughes wrote his letter to The Spectator, such skepticism was winning 
out.  In his letter to The Spectator, Hughes frames Peter’s versifying system as an example of 
what Joseph Addison had, in an earlier issue of The Spectator, called “false Wit” (Spectator 
2.55; 1.232-38).  Addison’s essay attacks a cluster of practices that masquerade, in his view, as 
wit without requiring genuine thought.  A common trait among most of these examples is that 
they deal with characteristics of signifiers rather than with the meanings of signs.  True wit, 
Addison writes, deals with the “Resemblance and Congruity of Ideas” (1.233); false wit deals 
with “Resemblance and Congruity sometimes of single Letters, as in Anagrams, Chronograms, 
Lipograms, and Acrosticks: Sometimes of Syllables, as in Ecchoes and Doggerel Rhymes: 
Sometimes of Words, as in Punns and Quibbles; and sometimes of whole Sentences or Poems, 
cast into the figures of Eggs, Axes, or Altars” (1.233).  With the arguable exception of puns and 
quibbles, this condemnation of wordplay and shape poetry (which had been popularized a 
century before by George Herbert) targets precisely those linguistic practices that are easiest to 
reduce to algorithms—practices that only involve the ability to recognize patterns in the 
characters on a page, not the ability to interpret them.  From Addison’s perspective, these 
patterns fall short of the poetic; true poetry must stem from human thought, and, since it does 
not involve thought, an “artificial” system like Peter’s can only ever hope to produce doggerel. 
Addison’s attack on wordplay signals a shift in epistemological standards that redirected 
the emphasis from signifiers, be they real characters or words, to ideas existing in the human 
mind.  Addison sums up his argument with the epigram, which he attributes to the French 
essayist Dominique Bonhours, that “no Thought can be valuable, of which good Sense is not the 





Locke (see Spectator 1.232).  In his 1689 book Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke 
had famously asserted that all knowledge derives from sensory observations rather than from 
innate principles.  A major part of Locke’s empiricist philosophy is an emphasis on the 
importance of language for thought.  Words, Locke argued, do not refer directly to things, but 
rather to what he called nominal essences—arbitrarily constructed bundles of qualities like 
smooth red sphere.  As Hans Aarsleff has shown, Locke’s argument about nominal essences was 
directed against seventeenth-century theories of language that sought to establish a natural 
correspondence between signifier and signified (From Locke to Saussure 26).  This argument 
inaugurated the cluster of intellectual traditions that I call Enlightenment theories of the sign.  
In these new epistemologies, the claim that real characters could represent the world non-
arbitrarily, as Wilkins and Leibniz had maintained, is inadmissible; the only way to combat the 
uncertainty of words is simply to define them more clearly. 
Enlightenment thought’s emphasis on conceptual clarity placed algorithmic methods 
under a greater degree of skepticism than they had faced in the seventeenth century.  This 
decreased trust in algorithms was not specific to the followers of Locke, but rather spread 
widely in the early eighteenth century.  Jonathan Swift satirized real character schemes in 
Gulliver’s Travels (1726), which depicts the scientifically-minded Laputans attempting to glean 
meaning from a screen that generates random strings of characters (154-56).  The Cartesian 
tradition, which predominated in France, cast suspicion on Leibniz’s use of symbolic methods in 
mathematics by emphasizing the importance of “clear and distinct” perceptions to rationality.  
Some forms of idealist philosophy also precluded the instrumental use of algorithms.  The 





Berkeley’s 1734 screed against the Newtonian calculus, The Analyst.  The fact that Newton’s 
procedure for integration produced verifiably correct results was not, for Berkeley, enough to 
make it scientific.  Berkeley asks, in the series of questions with which he ends the pamphlet, 
“Whether there be not a way of arriving at Truth, although the Principles are not scientific, nor 
the Reasoning just?  And whether such a way ought to be called a Knack or a Science?” (85).  In 
Berkeley’s judgment, the calculus was a “knack” rather than a science because it only provided 
procedures for solving problems, without (in Berkeley’s view) founding those procedures on 
clear principles.  While Berkeley’s arguments about the calculus were controversial, they rested 
on an assumption that was widespread in the eighteenth century: that only knowledge derived 
from some combination of sensory data and self-evident principles could count as scientific.  
Algorithms were widely seen as falling short of this standard.  
In spite of these attacks from both empiricist and idealist quarters, algorithms 
themselves certainly did not die out in the eighteenth century.  The period’s most enthusiastic 
advocate of algorithmic methods was also one of its greatest mathematicians, the Swiss-born 
Leonhard Euler, whose most productive period stretched from the 1730s to the 1780s.  Euler 
was more comfortable with algorithms than many others in his time, and he used them to 
produce important results that could not be attained otherwise.  No admirer of Leibniz’s 
rationalist metaphysics, Euler attempted (similarly to Isaac Newton) to derive his algorithmic 
methods from the natures of physical things (see Calinger 67-68; 249-52).  However, he was not 
always able to ground his methods in principles upon which all could agree.  One of his 
innovations was to develop a method for determining the sums of infinite series that never 





propose solutions to some longstanding problems, but only at the cost of abandoning the usual 
definition of the word sum (see Varadarajan 526-28).  Since he was working in a context that 
required mathematics to be founded on clear concepts, he had to convince others that his new 
definition was worth adopting—a problem that was political as much as it was mathematical.  
Similar issues faced attempts to resolve questions surrounding the natures of negative and 
imaginary numbers, which spawned endless debates in the eighteenth century about how such 
problematic mathematical entities ought to be defined.  A major point of disagreement in these 
debates was to what extent mathematical thought had to remain continuous with the concepts 
embedded in everyday language—whether mathematicians could define sum however they 
wanted, or whether they had to work in some way with the word’s existing usage.  The status 
of algorithms hinged, in other words, on how much respect one thought it was necessary to 
have for the linguistic practices that were already established in one’s community. 
By the later decades of Euler’s career, the Lockean tradition had splintered into multiple 
factions that took very different views on this matter.  This splintering set the stage for the 
emergence of the modern divide between algorithm and culture, but it also, as I show in 
Chapters 2 and 3, produced a number of projects that point in very different directions from 
the one actually taken by modern computation.  Two of the most important factions may be 
exemplified by the French philosopher and educator Étienne Bonnot de Condillac and the 
German philosopher and poet Johann Gottfried Herder.  Condillac’s faction, which was the 
most strongly established in France and England, evinced a view of language that Tristram 
Wolff has usefully called voluntarism—the belief that, since the meanings of words are 





voluntarism usually coincided with the goal of replacing the putatively unclear languages that 
people presently spoke with something better.  Between 1746 and his death in 1780, Condillac 
argued for the dependence of scientific progress on what he called a “well-formed language”—
a language in which each word refers to a clearly defined concept that can be traced back to 
simple sensory impressions.  The exemplary well-formed language, at least in Condillac’s later 
work, was algebra, since, in his view, it could represent the world in a way that left no room for 
disagreement or confusion.  Condillac and his sympathizers advocated remaking language from 
the ground up, eliminating old “prejudices” and “errors” by throwing out the received 
meanings of words in favor of new ones developed in a clear, methodical fashion. 
While Condillac himself was no political radical, the ultimate conclusion of this thinking 
was that society ought to be reshaped into a more rational form.  Condillac’s empiricist theory 
of language led, as the philosopher Joseph Marie de Gérando put it in 1799, to the “seductive 
hope” (l’espérance séduisante) that reforming language would eliminate political discord (1.xxi).  
It is no coincidence that this intellectual strain reached its crescendo in the years following the 
1789 French Revolution.  At their most radical, Enlightenment theories of the sign inspired 
dreams of replacing natural languages altogether with something more like algebraic notation, 
a dream that Nicolas de Condorcet articulated in his book Sketch for a Historical Picture of the 
Progress of the Human Mind (written 1794, published 1795) and actually attempted in a 
manuscript that was published in the twentieth century.  While Condorcet’s universal language 
scheme has some resemblance to Leibniz’s idea of a calculus ratiocinatur, I demonstrate in 
Chapter 2 that Condorcet was working within a radically different epistemology from that of 





Leibniz evinced the sort of optimism that Voltaire had satirized in Candide—the belief that the 
world was already and would always be the best that it could be.  Enlightenment theories of the 
sign, by contrast, suggested that one had to work to make the world better, in particular by 
training people to think in terms of more clearly defined concepts. 
I find a particularly strong illustration of the implications of this thinking for computation 
in Condorcet’s more obscure ally, the English inventor Lord Stanhope, whom I discuss in 
Chapter 3.  Some time around 1801, Stanhope began working on a series of devices that he 
called the Demonstrators, and that were characterized by a contemporary commentator as 
steps toward a “reasoning-machine” (Phillips 106).  The Demonstrators are devices that can 
perform syllogistic inferences mechanically through the interaction of overlapping plates.  In yet 
another iteration of the dream of doing away with words, the Demonstrator enables people to 
perform logical inferences using a “symbol purely mechanical,” which will supposedly prevent 
interpretive confusion (quoted by Wess 385).  Unlike a modern computer, these devices are not 
just meant to produce the answers to questions, but also to display the whole chains of 
reasoning that lead to those answers and thus, in true Enlightenment fashion, to “strengthen 
the human mind” (quoted by Wess 381).  The projects of Condorcet and Lord Stanhope 
demonstrate that Enlightenment theories of the sign did not position algorithms as a way 
around the uncertainty of language, but rather treated them as dependent on the clarity of 
definitions.  Reducing all forms of reasoning to a mechanical process required, for Condorcet 
and Stanhope alike, a revolutionary educational program of implanting the same perfectly 





These revolutionary projects exemplify the best and worst aspects of what Jonathan 
Israel has called the “Radical Enlightenment” (xi).  Both Condorcet and Stanhope were 
committed to producing a democratic and equitable public sphere, but their approaches to 
creating this equity depended on universalist notions of rationality, without which their 
projects were simply imposing arbitrary ways of thought onto people—in effect, turning people 
into machines.  Starting in the 1760s, Herder put forth a sophisticated critique of such linguistic 
reform projects.  For Herder, as I show in Chapter 3, recreating language from scratch was both 
an impossible goal (“You cannot determine them all, philological philosopher!”) and a foolish 
one (Philosophical Writings 36); for Herder, languages are not just repositories of old errors, but 
also treasuries of knowledge that define the lifeworlds of communities.  Languages, Herder 
suggests, have the ability to resist intentional efforts to alter them; a community may accept a 
proposed reform, but it may also reject it for reasons that are difficult to fathom.  Herder’s 
involuntarist philosophy gave an important role to poetry as a means of improving a language, 
since a poet could speak to the involuntary urges of a people and sway them to the use of new 
words and expressions.  In the Herderian view, one had no choice but to work with the 
language and culture that are already established in one’s community; to suppose that one 
could entirely expunge the influence of existing words from one’s way of thinking, as some of 
Condillac’s followers had attempted to do, was to overlook the critical role that membership in 
a group plays in the development of human consciousness. 
Herder’s critique reveals a major weakness in the way Enlightenment theories of the 
sign dealt with algorithms: since clear mental representations were the gold standard to which 





dependent on the reliability of the concepts on which they were based.  If the ways people 
think are (as Herder argued) inevitably conditioned by culture, then mechanical methods of 
computation would have no universal validity; without a grounding in an intersubjective field of 
experience upon which everyone could agree, a “reasoning machine” like Stanhope’s could do 
nothing but report back the logical consequences of the ideas already embedded in the user’s 
language.  Because of this dependence on intersubjectivity, algorithmic methods were largely 
limited, in the later eighteenth century, to working upon notions such as quantity, space, and 
time that could plausibly be posited as self-evident.  Projects that aimed to extend the use of 
algorithms beyond this narrow scope, such as Stanhope’s logic machine, could only do so on 
the basis of strong—and, as Herder would point out, questionable—assumptions about the 
universality of reason.  Where agreement could not be established, algorithms could not 
venture. 
 
From a “Knack” to a Science 
 
What changed to free algorithms from their dependence on ideas?  The critical turning point 
was, I contend, a shift, starting around 1800, away from the universalizing reform projects of 
the Enlightenment toward the establishment of culture and science as autonomous value 
spheres.  For Enlightenment thinkers such as d’Alembert and Condorcet, the goal of philosophy 
was, in essence, to replace culture, to remake the way people understand the world from the 
ground up and altogether expunge the old, “vulgar” ways of thinking that people had inherited 





culture and science as two separate realms, each of which was valuable in its own way and both 
of which were needed to form a healthy society.  The unravelling of Enlightenment 
epistemologies led, in the first half of the nineteenth century, to the development of new 
standards of scientific rigor that attempted to make culture and science work together 
productively, the former providing intuitions and meaning, the latter providing rigor.  This 
epistemological shift—which was, I argue, a product of the Romantic turn in European 
culture—created a new space in which algorithms could operate autonomously from the 
meanings of the symbols upon which they worked.  Now, for the first time, mathematicians 
could put algorithm before meaning, experimenting with new ways of manipulating characters 
and working out what they meant afterwards. 
In Chapter 4, I offer an account of how the modern dualism between science and 
culture came to be.  While I contend that this dualism did not congeal until the nineteenth 
century, it did have some precedents in the eighteenth.  An important reference point for 
modern notions of disciplinarity is Adam Smith’s exposition of the division of labor in The 
Wealth of Nations (1776), which encouraged learned disciplines such as logic and philology to 
delineate their boundaries more rigorously.  Another eighteenth-century tributary is the critical 
philosophy of Immanuel Kant.  In Critique of Pure Reason (1781), Kant attempts to describe the 
limits of what thought alone may accomplish by means of a series of binary oppositions: 
subjective and objective, understanding and reason, concept and idea.  While Kant himself was 
very much an Enlightenment thinker, his influence was greatest among Romantics, who 
transformed (and arguably distorted) Kantian idealism into a rationale for dualistic visions of 





subjective and objective perspectives.13  These dualisms were especially appealing in the wake 
of the Terror and the rise of Napoleon, since they seemed to provide a middle ground between 
the potential for the advancement of knowledge to change the world and the desire to 
maintain some degree of continuity in people’s ways of life. 
In regard to the use of algorithms, a key advantage of this new culture–science dualism 
was that it provided a way of separating those aspects of knowledge-making activities that 
could be subject to intentional design from those that could not.  In Culture and Society, 
Raymond Williams points out that, even though some nineteenth-century writers defined 
culture as “a whole way of life,” the notion did not cover all aspects of British life, excluding 
areas such as industry, finance, and sometimes science (234; 256).  One point of distinction 
between culture and these other domains is a rejection of standardization.  Modernity treats 
culture, as Williams puts it, as “unplannable” (335); as James Abbott McNeill Whistler 
complains in an 1878 pamphlet, “Art is joyously received as a matter of opinion; and that it 
should be based upon laws as rigid and defined as those of the known sciences, is a supposition 
no longer to be tolerated by modern cultivation” (Whistler vs. Ruskin 14).  While Williams’s 
history of the idea of culture focuses narrowly on a tradition of social criticism that presented 
itself as an opposition party to industrialism, I argue that the emergence of culture as an 
“unplannable” domain had an effect on scientific practices as well.  Specifically, the distinction 
between technical and cultural perspectives enabled scientists to subject specialized sign 
systems such as chemical nomenclature and symbolic algebra to strict, intentionally designed 
rules while allowing other aspects of their practice—those that involve the messy actualities of 





An important early articulation of this dualism appears in the work of William 
Wordsworth.  In the 1802 version of his preface to the collection Lyrical Ballads, Wordsworth 
positions poetry as a mediating agent in the process by which scientific knowledge becomes a 
part of the familiar lifeworld of people.  “If,” Wordsworth writes, “the time should ever come 
when what is now called science […] shall be ready to put on, as it were, a form of flesh and 
blood, the Poet will lend his divine spirit to aid the transfiguration, and will welcome the Being 
thus produced, as a dear and genuine inmate of the household of man” (168n).  Poetry, 
Wordsworth argued, could do something the technical terminologies of science could not 
readily do—appeal to feelings—and accordingly was a potentially much more effective 
instrument than a well-formed technical language for introducing scientific knowledge into the 
everyday lifeworld of a people.  While some scholars have taken Wordsworth’s preface as an 
attempt to establish poetry as an intellectual discipline on the level of physics and philosophy 
(Siskin 170; Valenza 146), this framing underrates the extent to which Wordsworth viewed the 
poetic as a general aspect of language, rather than a specific genre of writing.  I show in 
Chapter 4 that Wordsworth was advancing the view that all forms of knowledge, including the 
mathematical, must necessarily have a poetic element, a view that would later find an echo in 
Ada Lovelace’s famous call for a “poetical science” (Ada 10). 
Although it was not exactly Wordsworth’s intention, this fixation on balance eventually 
resulted in the establishment of culture and science as autonomous realms.  In England, this 
autonomy was codified in the second quarter of the nineteenth century by epistemologists 
such as Richard Whately, William Whewell, and John Stuart Mill, who all treated the specialized 





social critics, from Edmund Burke to Thomas Carlyle to Matthew Arnold, further reinforced the 
belief that mechanical models of rationality were anathema to the development of what would, 
by Arnold’s time, be referred to as culture.  Later in the century, the dualism between science 
and culture was manifest in the way language standardization set its limits: the meanings of 
technical terms could be rigorously standardized by organizations like the International Bureau 
of Weights and Measures (founded 1875), but standardization only extended to those aspects 
of artistic and poetic practice that could be considered technical, such as meter.14  In 
universities, the new dualism between science and culture also informed the model of 
academic disciplinarity that Wilhelm von Humboldt put into practice with the founding of the 
University of Berlin in 1810, and which was adopted internationally in the last decades of the 
nineteenth century.  All of these disciplinary shifts carried a single message: cultural concerns—
what later would be referred to as “human factors”—required a connection to the existing 
practices of a community, whereas technical ones were subject only to the judgments of 
experts. 
In Chapters 5 and 6, I explore some of the ways in which this historical frame can 
illuminate two of the early nineteenth century’s most important figures in the history of 
computation: George Boole and Charles Babbage.  I begin with Boole, who, in the late 1840s, 
developed the binary logic system that would eventually be used, in slightly modified form, in 
all digital electronics, including computers.  Like Leibniz and Condorcet before him, Boole was 
attempting to compensate for the uncertainties of ordinary language by extending the scope of 
algebra beyond the quantitative.  But Boole differed from these predecessors in rigidly 





had both intended for their universal algebras to include encyclopedic catalogues of things, 
making them complete, self-sufficient replacements for natural languages.  Boole’s system, by 
contrast, dealt only with formal relations of symbols, excluding questions of meaning from the 
scope of logic.  Unlike Condorcet’s revolutionary project, Boole’s system was not meant to 
replace culture altogether with a new way of thinking about and discussing the world; instead, 
Boole envisioned a system that could work together with existing bodies of knowledge, formal 
logic providing algorithms for reasoning rigorously, culture providing the meaning.   
In addition to demonstrating the importance of the culture–science divide for the 
emergence of modern computation, Boole’s work offers a strong illustration of the connection 
between algorithms and poetry.  Around the same time that he was developing his logic 
system, Boole wrote hundreds of poems in a style influenced by Dante, Milton, and 
Wordsworth, and he reportedly claimed that a poetic sensibility was essential to a 
mathematician’s success.  In his most important work on logic, An Investigation of the Laws of 
Thought (1854), he draws on examples from Milton to show how a text can maintain a logical 
structure even as it violates the grammatical rules of a language.  Boole’s system places logical 
notations in an analogous position to experimental poetry in that both practices operate 
autonomously from the rules that govern ordinary language.  This “lawful freedom” provided 
Boole with a means of developing strict standards of rigor without having to ground logic, as 
Condillac attempted to do, in a notion of universal grammar (30). 
Although the disciplinary divide between logic and ordinary language enabled Boole to 
avoid some of the problems that had hindered the schemes of Leibniz and Condorcet, it also 





is that its algorithms can produce “uninterpretable” expressions—strings of characters that 
have no conceptual meaning within the domain of knowledge to which the logical system is 
being applied.  Since the rules for interpreting logical symbols work differently from the rules 
for manipulating them—the one based on propositional logic, the other based on the 
algorithmic symbol manipulations of algebra—the possibility arises of a disconnect between 
the way the logic system works and what the user thinks the symbols mean.  This “failure of 
correspondency between process and interpretation,” as Boole calls it (Laws of Thought 67), 
might be viewed as an early instance of Liu’s meaning problem.  Boole was among the first to 
discover the possibility that algorithms, once given their autonomy from human thought, could 
produce results that people could not understand. 
Boole himself was too optimistic a thinker to find the existence of “uninterpretable” 
expressions particularly troubling, but a more anxious reaction to the gap between algorithm 
and meaning appears in the writings of Charles Babbage.  Babbage became internationally 
famous in the 1820s and 30s for designing sophisticated computing machines known as 
difference engines and was celebrated, after his rediscovery in the twentieth century, for 
exploring the possibilities of general-purpose computation in his correspondence with Ada 
Lovelace.  In some ways, Babbage and Lovelace granted less power to algorithms than Boole 
did; Lovelace denied that logic could be mechanized, whereas Boole showed decisively that it 
could.  But unlike Boole, Babbage built computing machines, which gave him a direct sense of 
the possibility that an algorithmic process could escape its creator’s control.  While undertaking 
some of his earliest experiments with difference engines, I show in Chapter 6, Babbage 





“beyond the utmost reach of mathematical analysis” (Bridgewater 42).  Babbage’s evident 
discomfort with this possibility, I argue, stems from a tension between the realities of 
mechanization and the Enlightenment epistemology to which he adhered.  The employment of 
algorithms that were not backed up by clear ideas threatened to introduce an inscrutable 
element into the production of knowledge, a possibility that would, if realized, deal a fatal blow 
to the Enlightenment dream of grounding scientific knowledge in the human understanding. 
The early nineteenth century’s most unflinching treatment of these implications 
appears, I argue, in the works of one of Babbage’s most complex interlocutors: Edgar Allan Poe.  
In a series of newspaper texts in which he both debunked and perpetrated hoaxes, Poe 
grappled with the fact that, given the broadening gap between science and the common-sense 
view of the world, empirical methods—that is, ones that work solely through the analysis of 
sensory data—were inadequate to tell real from fake.  In his detective fiction, Poe presents an 
alternative model of rationality that combines mathematical knowledge with a poetic 
sensibility.  The idea of the poetic that Poe was advocating, I argue, involved an embrace of the 
algorithmic aspects of language—a devaluation of meaning in favor of patterns in the 
arrangement of characters on the page and sound waves in the air, which Poe used to convey 
the existence of “ethereal” realms detached from the mundane reality of life.  One place where 
Poe articulates this view is the 1845 dialogue “The Power of Words.”  As I demonstrate in 
Chapter 6, this text is likely based on ideas drawn from Babbage’s writings, but it takes these 
ideas in precisely the direction that Babbage seemed unwilling to go.  The power of words, Poe 
suggests, has nothing to do with what people think they mean—instead, it is based solely on 





made one a dupe, since semantic conventions could never fully account for the effects that 
signs can have on the world.  To avoid being deceived, one must take signifiers for what they 
are, material things moving around according to physical laws. 
Poe’s poetic emphasis on signifier over signified indicates that attitudes toward signs 
had, to some extent, come full circle between the time of John Peter and the nineteenth 
century.15  Whereas Addison had attacked wordplay as “false Wit” in his 1711 essay, requiring 
genuine poetry to be founded on clear ideas and “good Sense,” Poe suggests that the essence 
of poetry is its very lack of sense—poetry is language that draws attention to itself rather than 
referring to the world.  This signifier-oriented poetics, which has roots in Wordsworth and Percy 
Shelley, and which would be further developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries by Stéphane Mallarmé, Guillaume Apollinaire, and others, marked something of a 
return to the seventeenth-century attitudes that Locke had criticized—a return to the elevation 
of form over clear mental representations, a return to the belief that signs could do things in 
the world independently of the semantic conventions of people.  An analogous shift from ideas 
to signifiers occurred around the same time in mathematics and logic, where the symbolic 
methods developed by Boole and others seemed to prove that characters really could have a 
power that had nothing to do with meaning.  The philosophy of Leibniz, too, experienced 
something of a revival in the nineteenth century, cresting with the publication of a two-volume 
collection of his writings on logic in 1840.  By the 1890s, when symbolic logic took off as a 
discipline, the early-modern dream of a calculus ratiocinatur, a mechanical method that could 






But such methods had taken on an uncanny, otherworldly quality that they did not have 
in the seventeenth century.  While formal rules could provide mathematics with rigor, there 
could be no guarantee, from a nineteenth-century perspective, that the structures they 
produced would harmonize with the ways people ordinarily understood the world.  The 
alienation of formal structures from historically transmitted modes of representation is, I argue, 
a distinctive characteristic of modernity in both mathematics and poetry.  Modernity in the 
artistic sense, which is typically considered to begin around the middle of the nineteenth 
century, is especially relevant here.  It was one of Poe’s most ardent admirers, Charles 
Baudelaire, who coined the word modernity (modernité) in his 1863 essay “The Painter of 
Modern Life.”  Baudelaire’s notion of modernity is drawn in contrast to artists who paint figures 
in the costumes of previous periods, taking their inspiration from artistic traditions rather than 
from the observation of the world.  Modernity, he writes, is “the ephemeral, the fugitive, the 
contingent, the half of art whose other half is the eternal and the immutable” (13).  As Foucault 
has pointed out, Baudelaire’s notion of modernity, like Kant’s notion of Enlightenment, involved 
a break from the past (Foucault Reader 39).  But unlike Kant’s all-encompassing vision of 
liberation from the dogmas of old, Baudelaire’s discontinuity is specific to the autonomous 
realm of art, where it is set off in subtle chiaroscuro from a continuous background of human 
history.  Although technical fields differ from art in being more thoroughly subject to 
standardization, the two realms are analogous in regard to this negative relation to the past.16  
In both engineering and the artistic avant garde, one has license to break with the conventions 
established in the culture at large and experiment with new forms; but this license to invent 





been understood, since the mid-nineteenth century, to be characterized by organic and 
continuous development.  In contrast to the Enlightenment dream of an absolute break from 
the superstitious past, modernity as it has existed since the nineteenth century takes the form 
of a compromise between continuity, which is respectfully maintained in the language and 
culture of everyday life, and discontinuity, which is permitted if not altogether encouraged in 
science, technology, and the avant garde. 
One of my purposes in this dissertation is to show that the algorithm could not have 
taken the central position it now holds in the production of knowledge without this 
compromise.  The separation of the technical and cultural perspectives, the following chapters 
argue, arose partly in reaction to the failure of Enlightenment epistemologies to devise a 
philosophically and politically plausible means of uniting scientific rationality with the 
actualities of human thought.  The autonomy of the spheres enabled two of the great factions 
that had clashed in the eighteenth-century debates over language—the followers of Condillac, 
who advocated remaking language and knowledge from the ground up, and those of Herder, 
who emphasized the impossibility of making a total break with the linguistic past—to cease 
squabbling and coexist peacefully in separate compartments.  In the domain of ordinary 
language, Herder’s side definitively won out.  The founders of modern linguistics, from 
Humboldt to Saussure, near-unanimously deny that one can alter a language at will and insist 
that producing meaning requires reckoning in some way with the established practices of a 
community.  But in modern mathematics, logic, and computer science, algorithms are not 
restrained by past practices in the way signification is; they may be made and remade at will, 





compromise between two fundamentally incompatible attitudes toward history, I argue, that 
makes it difficult to reconcile algorithmic and hermeneutic methods at present.  The technical 
and cultural perspectives are alienated from one another by the fact that the first is 
fundamentally about control, while the second is built on a denial of the possibility of total 
control. 
The coexistence of the discontinuity of science with the continuity of everyday culture, I 
maintain, is one reason why the idea of technology has become so inextricable from narratives 
of progress.  The idea of progress originated in the work of Enlightenment thinkers like Turgot 
and Condorcet, but the modern narrative of technological progress functions in a way that runs 
directly counter to Condorcet’s egalitarian politics.  A watershed moment for this modern 
narrative, which forms the end of my historical account, was the commencement of the great 
International Exhibitions—later known as World’s Fairs—in 1851.  The exhibitions were 
founded to promote international trade and intellectual exchange; early on, they focused 
largely on exhibits of unfamiliar goods and new technologies, which were increasingly, as the 
nineteenth century gave way to the twentieth, presented as previewing in some way the world 
of the future.  The exhibitions presented a vision of historical change led not by universal 
reason, as Condorcet had hoped, but rather by science and industry, with capital providing the 
motive force.  An unusually blunt statement of this scheme’s oligarchical implications appears 
in the unofficial motto of the 1933 Century of Progress International Exposition in Chicago: 
“SCIENCE FINDS—INDUSTRY APPLIES—MAN CONFORMS” (Tozer 81).17  This scheme provides 
an explanation of how the discontinuities that punctuate time in the technological sphere can 





vanguard leads the way, introducing new practices, words, and ideas into a culture that will 
respond to them at its own pace, without having to make a total break with tradition. 
I contend that this narrative of progress remains a key element of the way algorithm 
and culture relate in the twenty-first century.  It is manifest, for instance, in the endless push to 
upgrade one’s software and adapt to the latest HTML standards and Web-design practices.  But 
the narrative of technological progress is not the only available way of mediating between 
technology and culture.  As I discuss in the Coda at the end of this dissertation, recent 
developments, including widespread disillusionment with the technology industry and the 
development of powerful new forms of artificial intelligence, might present a new opening for 
alternatives to the Whiggish historiography that continues to undergird attitudes toward 
technology.  Experimental poetics that employ algorithms for their disturbing or uncanny 
effects could provide one such alternative.  New media artists such as the interactive-fiction 
writer Porpentine employ algorithms not to lead the way forward, but rather to unsettle the 
assumptions that undergird the lifeworld of the present.  Such artistic practices involve an 
embrace of the alienness of algorithms, of the fact that they do not always fit smoothly with 
the meaning-making practices of human beings.  Another possibility, I wish to suggest, is a 
philological engagement with algorithms—a form of scholarship that places them in dialogue 
with the past.  Algorithms meant something entirely different 400 years ago, when Napier’s 
logarithm tables were new, and a simple recognition of this fact can provide a valuable 
perspective on the present debates about the meaning problem and the cultural effects of 





language, history, politics, and knowledge that have become so familiar as to be virtually 
invisible. 
My approach in this dissertation is historical.  While the compartmentalization I am 
describing did not fully congeal until around the end of the nineteenth century, I am primarily 
focused on what happened before this period.  In The Laws of Cool (2004), Alan Liu calls for a 
“dark historicism,” a mode of scholarship that seeks to describe what was lost amidst the 
disruptive changes of modernity (9).  Extending this thinking to the study of intellectual history, 
my work attempts to recover past modes of thinking that have been erased and written over by 
epistemological categories that we now take for granted.  Inspired by philology’s etymological 
reference to a loving attitude toward the word, I have sought to keep myself open to the 
strangeness of the past, willing to take seriously ways of thinking that may now seem absurd.  I 
begin in the seventeenth century, when attitudes toward algorithms were sometimes very 
strange indeed.  While my concern is primarily with the turn that took place between the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, considering the seventeenth century is necessary in part 
because Leibniz has played a major role in discussions of computation from his own time all the 
way up to the present day.  In the following chapter, I place Leibniz’s work in the context of 
early-modern discussions about language, in the light of which his attitudes appear far more 





Chapter 1: The Dream of a Real Character 
 
Wherefore, as men owe all their True Ratiocination to the right understanding of Speech; So 
also they owe their Errors to the misunderstanding of the same; and as all the Ornaments of 
Philosophy proceed onely from Man, so from Man also is derived the ugly absurdity of False 
opinions. 
—Thomas Hobbes, Elements of Philosophy 
 
Idols and Hieroglyphs 
 
In the scientific circles of seventeenth-century Europe, words were in disrepute.  In the 1623 
Latin expansion of The Advancement of Learning (1605), Francis Bacon warned of what he 
termed the “idols of the market:” the “vulgar” notions that, in everyday speech, tend to 
“insinuate themselves into the understanding” by means of ill-defined words (242).  As a way of 
guarding against “the seducing incantation of names,” Bacon tentatively suggests the use of 
clear definitions and “terms of art,” but he concludes this is still not enough to protect thought 
from the temptations of words (242).  Definitions “themselves are in many respects 
irremediable, as consisting of words: for words generate words, however men may imagine 
they have a command over words, and can easily say they will speak with the vulgar, and think 
with the wise” (242).  The idea that words can confuse and mislead was widespread in the 
seventeenth century, influencing groups as diverse as the scientists of the Royal Society of 





of Renaissance rhetoric.  For the seventeenth-century Moderns, spending too much time 
studying words was seen as a vice of Scholasticism, a sign of slavish devotion to the ancients 
rather than a commitment to the production of new knowledge.  Even more damningly, words 
were seen as insufficiently stable in their meanings for the purposes of science.  People from 
across the Western world responded to Bacon’s call, spending countless years in lamp-lit 
studies attempting either to improve the clarity of existing languages or, in surprisingly many 
cases, to create new modes of communication that would enable us to rid ourselves of words 
altogether. 
Early in the century, one of the most promising alternatives to words was the use of 
visual symbols.  In The Advancement of Learning, Bacon gives a description of the Chinese 
writing system based on the often fabricated reports of travelers.  According to Bacon, the 
Chinese system of ideographs can operate independently of spoken language, enabling people 
from “numerous nations, though of quite different languages,” to read the same written texts 
(249).  This makes them, in a term that Bacon borrowed from the Scholastics, real characters—
written symbols that directly express things or ideas, rather than representing the 
pronunciations of spoken words (Bacon 249).  Later writers identified Arabic numerals, musical 
notation, and the occult symbols of astrology and alchemy as symbolic systems that are 
comprehensible across spoken languages, which suggested, as the Encyclopédie of Diderot and 
d’Alembert would later state, that “it is not necessary to imagine that the real character is a 
chimera” (2:646).  Such characters seemed, for some, to provide a way around the problems 
caused by words.  A number of people, most prominently the English polymath John Wilkins 





comprehensive systems of real characters that would, they thought, solve Bacon’s complaint 
about words for good.  While such a system could obviously facilitate international 
communication, some thinkers believed that it could do far more than that.  In the seventeenth 
century, symbols were often represented as having a transparency that spoken language 
lacked, representing ideas in a unambiguous way without being subject to the uncertainties of 
verbal communication. 
To back up their claims, advocates of real 
characters could point to the astonishing 
success of one of the seventeenth century’s 
newest symbolic systems: mathematical 
notation.  Not long before Bacon wrote The 
Advancement of Learning, Michael Stifel, Robert 
Recorde, François Viète, and others were 
making major strides in the symbolization of 
algebra, for which no widely accepted standard 
notation existed in the West prior to the seventeenth century.  The introduction of algebraic 
symbols—the now-familiar +, −, =, and ÷—seemed to many to grant a degree of clarity to 
mathematical ideas and inferences that was not possible when they were communicated by 
means of words.  Some thinkers envisioned a future in which an algebra-like notation could be 
extended to all areas of knowledge, mathematical or otherwise.  One of the period’s most 
sophisticated takes on mathematical symbolism survives in the work of Leibniz.  In one of his 
first published works, the Ars Combinatoria of 1666, Leibniz explains how the laws of 
 Figure 5. Frontispiece from Leibniz’s Ars Combinatoria, 1690 
edition. Public-domain image by Deutsche Fotothek via 





combination can be applied not just to numbers, but to alchemical symbols that, he suggests, 
can reveal the natural structure of matter (Figure 5).  Throughout his life, Leibniz experimented 
with the idea of extending this sort of symbolism into what he called a calculus ratiocinatur—a 
general logical calculus that could be used to draw conclusions about anything whatsoever—
while also developing mechanical devices that were meant to free the minds of the elites who 
were lucky to have access to them from the labor of calculation (Figure 6).  As the new algebraic 
notations enabled people to reason about quantities by reasoning about symbols without the 
need to interpret them, this scheme was meant to turn all forms of reasoning into mechanical 
processes that left no room for disagreement, and as such, provide a way around the 
uncertainties that Bacon had attributed to words. 
The products of this early-modern flight from language occupy a paradoxical position in 
the historiography of Western thought.  
On the one hand, Leibniz’s calculus 
ratiocinatur is almost universally 
regarded as one of the earliest major 
advances towards the modern computer.  
In 1961, the computer-science theorist 
Norbert Wiener ensured Leibniz’s place in 
the computer-history canon by 
suggesting that he could be “a patron saint for cybernetics,” the field that deals with systems of 
control and communication involving both humans and machines (12).  Leibniz has since 
attained cultural-hero status within computer science (see Golumbia 8), and he has become a 
Figure 6. A depiction of one of Leibniz’s calculating machines, known as 
the stepped reckoner. The design has some similarities to an earlier 
adding machine designed by Blaise Pascal, although Leibniz claimed not 
to have known about Pascal’s work when he began the project. While 
Pascal’s machine could only add and subtract, the stepped reckoner could 
also multiply and divide. Image from Meyers grosses Konversations-






fixture in histories of computation; David Berlinski (2000), Martin Davis (2001 and 2011), 
Edward K. Blum (2011), Agarwal and Sen (2014), and Subrata Dasgupta (2014) all center Leibniz 
in their discussions of early developments before skipping ahead more than a century to 
George Boole, Charles Babbage, or Giuseppe Peano in the 1800s.  At the same time, however, 
Leibniz’s project is part of a broader seventeenth-century trend of attempting to overcome the 
conventional nature of communication that contemporary scholars have generally 
characterized as misguided.  Leibniz, along with Wilkins and a sizable number of other 
seventeenth-century scholars, was attempting to create not just a new means of international 
communication, but a system of symbols that could express anything unambiguously, and that 
could thus circumvent the “idols” that Bacon identified in natural languages.  The result has 
been a schism in scholarship on the period between accounts that emphasize the 
computational insights of Leibniz, Wilkins, and other near-contemporaries such as Blaise Pascal, 
often with a mind to extracting something of value from their work, and readings that 
emphasize the semiotic aspects of real-character schemes, which are generally presented as 
expressions of early-modern ideas about taxonomy and representation. 
In this chapter, I give an alternative account of the seventeenth century’s position in the 
history of computation that takes the semiotic theories of the time seriously.  In particular, I 
argue that one of the elements of Leibniz’s work that seems most questionable from a modern 
perspective—the confidence in the ability of symbols to bear a stable meaning—provided him 
and his contemporaries with a radically different way of understanding the mechanical aspects 
of symbolic reasoning from the one that was employed from the nineteenth century onward.  





of real characters generally did not view them as languages, but rather drew a sharp distinction 
between characters, which were written or printed, and languages, which were spoken.18  For 
many scientifically inclined thinkers of the time, printed or written characters had an important 
advantage over spoken words because they facilitated algorithmic procedures of computation, 
such as the ones used in arithmetic.  Yet unlike in later periods, seventeenth-century thinkers 
drew no sharp line between algorithmic and semiotic uses of symbols.  For their advocates, I 
argue, real characters provided a way of fixing the meanings of signifiers more firmly than the 
social conventions governing spoken languages could, suppressing the urge to vocalize written 
texts as a way to prevent readers from straying into thickets of verbal disputes against which 
Bacon warned.  In this context, the question of what mediates between algorithmic processes 
and the world of human life—a question that would lead to paranoia and skepticism in later 
centuries—could only be answered by an appeal to the divine will. 
Taking the seventeenth-century discourse on real characters seriously reveals very 
different networks of affect and trust from the ones that came to undergird the mechanization 
of thought in the industrial period, when Leibniz’s idea of universal computation was 
supposedly revived.  Separating Leibniz from the computer are two major shifts in Western 
attitudes towards symbolic systems.  In the eighteenth century, the empiricist tradition 
inaugurated by Locke and Newton called into question the ability of real characters to 
transparently convey ideas.  Rather than taking the correspondence between symbols and 
ideas for granted, Enlightenment thinkers from the eighteenth century attempted to establish it 
through programs of education, while relegating algorithmic processes to a mnemonic role in 





alike began to treat the formal aspects of symbolic systems as entirely separate from 
signification, resurrecting the potential for mechanization by placing algorithm ahead of 
meaning.  Before these shifts, however, it was possible for thinkers from a variety of traditions 
to treat visual signs as a way of getting around language, of establishing meaning without the 
need for social agreement, and thus to represent them as a definitive solution to the pernicious 
dependence of human thought on words.  This view of symbolic systems enabled Leibniz to 
imagine a very different relation between human and machine from the one that emerged in 
the nineteenth century—one founded on a confidence in the power of symbolic representation 
that the linguistic turn of the eighteenth century destroyed, and that has never returned to the 
mainstream of Western thought. 
This chapter begins with a general account of how the idea of a real character 
functioned in the seventeenth century, especially in the conversation ensuing after Bacon’s 
warning about the idols inherent in natural languages.  I then triangulate Leibniz’s symbolic 
project in terms of two other developments that illustrate the attitudes of seventeenth-century 
thinkers towards symbolic systems.  The first, the real character of John Wilkins, is 
characteristic of Britain’s pre-Newtonian scientific establishment, and provides a useful 
example of how the idea of a real character could function in a non-mathematical context.  
Wilkins attempted to create a collection of symbols that constituted miniature definitions of 
the things they represented, a goal that he achieved using a hierarchical taxonomy based on an 
essentialist reading of the Aristotelian system of categories.  Second, I examine the 
symbolization of algebra, which, for many of its early adopters, provided mathematical 





work of Leibniz.  While Leibniz generally dismissed Wilkins’s approach to semiotics, he 
sympathized with his dream of creating a real character that could transparently represent 
things, and shared with him, I argue, a belief in the ability of algorithmic procedures to establish 
the transparent signification of visual symbols.19  Emerging just as the trust in real characters 
was beginning to break down, Leibniz’s work on the calculus ratiocinatur stands at one of the 
last moments when it was possible, in the mainstream of Western thought, to avoid raising the 
issue of what grounds one has for trusting a mechanical system of calculation.  As such, unlike 
many people in later periods, he had little reason to worry about the non-human nature of 
mechanical systems like his calculating machine, but rather saw the mechanical as fitting 
seamlessly with the meaning-making practices of human beings. 
 
The Wound of Babel 
 
A common reference point for early-modern 
attitudes towards language is the story of the 
confusion of tongues from Genesis 11.  At the 
beginning of the chapter, the King James 
Version states that “the whole earth was of one 
language, and of one speech” (Genesis 11:1).  
In the land of Shimar, people constructed a 
tower “whose top may reach unto heaven” (11:4), on account of which—presumably as a 
punishment—God decides to “confound their language, that they may not understand one 
Figure 7. Der Turmbau zu Babel, Vienna Version (c. 
1563) by Pieter Bruegel the Elder. Oil on panel. Public-





another's speech” (11:7).  In the traditional reading of this passage, this resulted in the 
proliferation of mutually unintelligible languages on Earth.  This interpretation is, as Umberto 
Eco has pointed out, complicated by Genesis 10, which states that the Gentiles were divided 
“every one after his tongue” when Noah’s grandsons disperse (Genesis 10:5; see Eco 9-10).  In 
spite of these ambiguities in the scripture, the idea that the multiplicity of languages was a 
divine punishment captured the early-modern imagination.  In the late fifteenth and early 
sixteenth century, European artists produced dozens of visual depictions of the Tower of Babel, 
including the iconic oil painting by Pieter Bruegel the Elder.  Like many other depictions from 
the period, Bruegel’s painting emphasizes the vanity of the builders by showing the instability 
of the tower, which is built at a slight slant and is crumbling in some sections (Figure 7).  In 
addition to its moral overtones, this interpretation of the story contains the value judgment 
that linguistic diversity is to be regretted, a wound that God inflicted upon humankind as a way 
of deflating our hubris. 
In spite of the story’s warning about vanity, many believed that it was possible to repair 
the wound that God inflicted on humanity at Babel, thus restoring a clarity to our 
representations of the world that was lost with the fall of the Tower.  Such schemes tend to 
share a historical assumption that is not apparent from the text of Genesis: that the “one 
language” from before the confusion was better than those that arose later.  Hans Aarsleff calls 
this assumption the Adamic view of language.  In Aarsleff’s definition, the Adamic view holds 
that, “[e]ven after the Fall, Adam was the greatest philosopher, etymologist, and naturalist who 
ever lived on earth” because his language was “divine and natural, not human and 





Saussure 25).  By implication, the Adamic view holds that all changes that language has 
undergone since the time of Adam are to be regretted and—if possible—reversed.  Some 
people in the seventeenth century thought that one could literally recover some of Adam’s 
original language.  Jacob Böhme, the German Lutheran mystic, attempted to do so by means of 
divine inspiration.  In the Mysterium Magnum of 1623, Böhme gives a commentary on Genesis 
that emphasizes the naturalness of the Adamic language, which, he writes, is still 
understandable to “the Birds in the aire, and the beast [sic] in the fields” (230).  Through a 
mystical discourse that combines philology with glossolalia, Böhme tries to recapture some of 
what we “shall againe obtaine in the New-birth” (230)—that is, the sensual language of nature. 
 Böhmean attempts to recover the one original language continued sporadically into the 
early twentieth century (see Eco 111-13).  Most attempts to repair the wound of Babel after 
Böhme relied less on divine inspiration, although Böhme’s mystical theories may nonetheless 
have been an inspiration for some of them (see Knowlson 86-88).  In the early decades of the 
seventeenth century, another tradition emerged whose goal was not to recover a perfect 
language that once existed, but rather to replace language altogether with a new and better 
mode of representation, thus reversing the confusion of tongues by a feat of “art.”  As Cram 
and Maat note, scholars have found references to a number of constructed language and real 
character schemes developed in France, Ireland, and England in the 1620s and 30s that either 
do not survive or only survive in fragments (1032).  The earliest one that is known to survive in 
full is Jean Douet’s Proposition présentée au roy, d'une escriture universelle (Proposition 
Presented to the King, of a Universal Writing), a short book published in 1627 that proposes the 





(Asbach-Schnitker, xxxiii).  While some of the early schemes were concerned only with universal 
communication, more scientifically-oriented schemes began to appear towards the middle of 
the century.  Jan Amos Comenius (1641), Cyprian Kinner (c. 1640s), Francis Lodwick (1647), Seth 
Ward (c. 1654), Isaac Newton (c. 1661), George Dalgarno (1661), and Dalgarno’s erstwhile 
collaborator John Wilkins (1668) all attempted to create universal characters reflecting a 
systematic organization of ideas based on natural philosophy.  These writers wanted to create a 
mode of representation that was not just understandable to everyone, but superior to natural 
languages because it was truer to the natures of things. 
Such a carefully engineered symbolism was thought to have advantages for the new 
forms of scientific inquiry that were gaining momentum in the seventeenth century.  The idea 
that ambiguity was an impediment to science was in the air throughout the century, especially 
in England.  In a statement that would be echoed for hundreds of years, Bacon’s The 
Advancement of Learning warns of a “distemper of learning” that takes place “when men study 
words and not matter” (56).  Bacon is calling for a turn away from the Scholastic focus on 
literary style and interpretation towards observational science.  While Bacon himself wrote 
some of his work in Latin, his rhetoric was used to justify a shift towards the vernacular, which 
would relieve students of the need to spend time studying ancient languages.20  As Robert 
Markley and Denise Tillery have argued, there is a strong gendered component to such 
elevations of the study of “things” over the study of “words.”  Bacon and his followers in the 
British scientific establishment viewed plain language as an imposition of masculine order on a 
feminized nature, while representing flowery language as a surrender to temptation (Tillery 62-





meant to prevent words from occluding the natures of things, which could only be “unveiled” 
through the use of an adequately rigorous means of representation. 
Bacon’s statement that people should stop paying so much attention to words could be 
taken to warrant a shift towards quantification.  Some scientists, such as Christiaan Huygens, 
did go in this direction, but others took Bacon’s statement as a call for the rectification of the 
errors inherent in natural languages (see Dascal 5).  Britain’s Royal Society of sciences, founded 
in 1660, represented itself as opposed to linguistic ornateness and ambiguity.  Thomas Sprat’s 
History of the Royal-Society of London (1667) has often been held up as exemplary of the 
Society’s attitude towards language (see Aarsleff, From Locke to Saussure 226-27).  Although 
this text cannot be taken as representative of all of the members’ views, it does indicate one of 
the prime linguistic ideologies that was in the air in the mid-seventeenth century (see, for 
instance, Robert Hooke’s similar remarks, 63).  In a section about the Society’s “manner of 
Discourse,” Sprat claims that, in order to avoid the errors resulting from “specious Tropes and 
Figures,” the Society strives “to return back to the primitive purity, and shortness, when men 
deliver’d so many things, almost in an equal number of words” (111-13).  Achieving this elusive 
correspondence between things and words, he writes, requires that the members use “a close, 
naked, natural way of speaking; positive expressions; clear senses; a native easiness; bringing all 
things as near the Mathematical plainness, as they can: and preferring the language of Artizans, 
Countrymen, and Merchants, before that, of Wits, or Scholars” (113).  In some cases, this 
stylistic disrobing meant clearly defining terms and foregoing rhetorical flourishes, but for 
others it meant working towards a better medium of writing that imposes a sturdier order upon 





In associating “primitive purity” with “Mathematical plainness,” Sprat’s History indicates 
one of the central tensions in seventeenth-century attitudes towards language: a desire to 
balance the natural with the artificial.  The desire to represent the world in a precise, scientific, 
mathematical way—perhaps by substituting equations for sentences—coexisted uneasily with a 
fixation on modes of communication that were seen as simple or primitive.  Starting with the 
Renaissance and the beginnings of colonialism, Europeans faced an influx of new information, 
some accurate, some not, about both ancient civilizations and cultures from other parts of the 
world, which inspired new reflections on the nature of communication (see Slaughter 10).  In 
colonial expeditions to the Americas, Europeans were encountering languages that were 
entirely unfamiliar, leading to a greater recognition of the arbitrariness of European languages.  
Accounts of colonial encounters also led some writers to speculate about the existence of 
modes of communication that worked in entirely different ways from alphabetical writing and 
that, perhaps, could provide a way around the curse of Babel.  Yet at the same time that non-
Western languages were thought of as potentially more natural than European vernaculars, 
they were also generally denigrated as being uncivilized.  The goal of real character schemes 
was to create a language that was just as natural as the non-verbal modes of communication 
that supposedly existed in the Americas, Asia, and the ancient world, but also reflective of 
modern science and civilized manners. 
Many of the non-Western or non-modern modes of communication that were seen as 
more natural than European languages had something in common—they did not use words.  
One such medium of communication was the hieroglyph.  In his discussion of language in The 





that is “significative without the help or interposition of words” (249).  While the hieroglyphs 
were not correctly deciphered until the discovery of the Rosetta stone in 1799, they sparked a 
great deal of interest in the seventeenth century, culminating in the extensive analyses of the 
German scholar Athanasius Kircher starting in the 1630s.  Some writers speculated that the 
hieroglyphs could bypass linguistic convention because the symbols bore a representational 
relation to things that arose, in Francis Lodwick’s words, “not at Random” (quoted by Singer 
57).  In addition to hieroglyphs, gesture and facial expression were also widely seen as modes of 
communication that were non-arbitrary and therefore understandable to all.  In his 1644 book 
Chirologia, the English physician John Bulwer argues that the “naturall Language of the Hand 
[…] had the happinesse to escape the curse at the confusion of Babel”—an idea that was widely 
shared by seventeenth-century writers on language (7).  Eco traces this interest in gesture as a 
universal language to early accounts of contact between Europeans and Native Americans such 
as the one given by Álvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca, who describes how the explorers learned to 
communicate with the people they encountered non-verbally (159; 210).  Accounts of both 
hieroglyphs and the language of gesture encouraged the designers of real characters by 
suggesting that the divisions created at Babel were not absolute—rather, it seemed that there 
remained a universal common ground, a natural mode of communication that could convey 
meaning transparently because it worked independently of spoken words. 
 While Bacon distinguishes real characters from hieroglyphs, insisting that real characters 
are non-representational, he attributes this independence from speech to both of them.  In 
early-modern Europe, it was generally assumed that letters referred to sounds rather than 





Maat 1032).  But a number of travel narratives were circulating in Europe claiming that the 
ideographic writing systems of the Chinese and the indigenous peoples of Central and South 
America could bear meaning independently of spoken languages (Eco 158; see Gu 192).  Bacon 
puts it this way in The Advancement of Learning: 
And it is now well known, that in China and the more eastern provinces, they use 
at this day certain real, not nominal, characters, to express, not their letters or 
words, but things and notions; insomuch, that numerous nations, though of 
quite different languages, yet, agreeing in the use of these characters, hold 
correspondence by writing.  And thus a book written in such characters may be 
read and interpreted by each nation in its own respective language. (248-49) 
If, as was widely known in early-modern Europe, kanji could be read in either Chinese or 
Japanese (see Bacon 248; Wilkins, Mercury 107; “Character” in Chambers’s Cyclopædia I.196; 
“Caractère” in the Encyclopédie II.646), then perhaps a writing system could be created that 
could work for any language.  In addition to kanji, Hindu–Arabic numerals, musical notation, 
alchemical and astronomical symbols, and algebraic signs were often held up as examples of 
symbols that could be “read off” in multiple languages.  The philosophical character schemes of 
the seventeenth century almost all attempted to produce a comprehensive set of symbols that 
were universal in this way, and that would thus be untainted by the idols of any particular 
language. 
 Exactly how these real characters were supposed to work has been a subject of debate 
among twentieth- and twenty-first century scholars.  Most accounts emphasize some 





language, and second, the idea that they establish, in some way, a natural correspondence 
between symbols and the natures of things.  Jaap Maat emphasizes the first of these aspects in 
his book on philosophical character schemes.  Bacon’s innovation, Maat writes, was to 
generalize the Aristotelian theory of signification by “pointing out that the third place in the 
sequence ‘things – notions – words – letters’ may also be occupied by other types of symbols 
than words” (17).  What distinguishes real from nominal characters, then, is that they “refer to 
things and notions directly, without spoken words being intermediate between written symbols 
and extra-linguistic reality” (18).  While Maat contends that the term real character meant no 
more than this, many scholars have noted that the most successful real character schemes of 
the seventeenth century attempted to establish a relation between signifier and signified that 
was not entirely arbitrary.  In The Search for the Perfect Language, Eco argues that the 
designers of philosophical real characters attempted to create a “conformal” relationship 
between the form and content of the expression (23).  In his later essay “The Language of the 
Austral Land,” Eco explains this correspondence in terms of modern chemical notation: while 
the individual characters in the formula for sulfuric acid, H2SO4, are arbitrary, they are 
composed together in a way that is “motivated by the nature of the designated object” (426).  
In Eco’s view, it was primarily this conformal quality that distinguished philosophical character 
schemes from natural languages. 
But the idea of a conformity between expression and content does not, in itself, explain 
why written or printed characters were given such a privileged role over spoken language in the 
seventeenth century.  It was possible to imagine the sort of conformity that Eco describes 





Logopandecteision (1653), imagines just this, a universal spoken language in which there is “a 
proportion betwixt the sign and thing signified” (1).  But, with some exceptions, those who 
advocated real characters tended to assume that visual symbols had a special ability to resist 
the sort of natural shifts to which spoken language is liable.21  As Maat points out, Bacon 
suggests that “in the Far East, the order of spoken and written language has been reversed” 
(18).  In the West, Bacon thinks, alphabetical symbols refer to words to which people have, to 
the detriment of science, attached a proliferation of differing ideas.  In Bacon’s mythical version 
of Asia, however, people have attached a proliferation of different words to symbols, but the 
ideas remain fixed.  The presumption that written characters could convey ideas with a greater 
stability than spoken language persisted in later accounts of the Chinese language, such as a 
John Webb’s 1669 book An Historical Essay Endeavoring the Probability that the Language of 
the Empire of China is the Primitive Language, which claims that, despite the proliferation of 
corrupt spoken dialects, the written version of Chinese has existed unchanged since the Flood 
of Noah (189).  Advocates of philosophical characters suggested that they would have a similar 
resistance to change on account of their independence from speech. 
This trust in the stability of characters is especially apparent in the work of Wilkins, who 
produced the most detailed of all the real character schemes in the seventeenth century.  
Wilkins made one of the last prominent attempts to create a universal character without using 
mathematics as a model, instead basing his work in the qualitative science of natural history.  
Nevertheless, his system has striking a resemblance to computation, presenting the reader with 
a precise procedure for looking up the meanings of symbols that, as Eco notes, works in a very 





the deterministic and, from our perspective, computational nature of this procedure that could 
protect the symbols from the sort of corruption to which spoken language was subject.  Seen in 
this light, Wilkins’s work illustrates one of the aspects of seventeenth-century thought that is 
most strongly at odds with modern assumptions: the idea that symbolic notation made it 
possible to bypass the hermeneutic circle by replacing reading with a more thoroughly rule-
based and more definitively mute process.  For Wilkins, it was not the recovery of the Adamic 
language that was to heal the wound of Babel; it was the algorithm.  
 
John Wilkins: Characters Answerable to the Nature of Things 
 
Wilkins was born to a prominent Puritan family in 1614, and he maintained close connections 
to those in power throughout his life, marrying Oliver Cromwell’s sister in 1656 and gaining the 
favor of King Charles II after the Restoration.  In the late 1650s, he inaugurated the meetings 
that led to the formation of the Royal Society of London, and he served as the Society’s first 
Secretary (Aarsleff, From Locke to Saussure 254-55).  His writings about semiotics constitute 
only one part of a diverse collection of published works that also includes The Discovery of a 
World in the Moone, a 1638 treatise arguing that the moon is an inhabitable world, and a 
popular book on simple machines and automata entitled Mathematical Magick (1648).  Wilkins 
was, above all, an administrator; he was active in both church and university, and he 
energetically defended the academic institutions of England from attacks by John Webster and 
Thomas Hobbes (Wilding 155).  His universal character project betrays an administrative logic 





refer in determining the meanings of symbols.  How Wilkins meant this standard to function, 
however, was quite different from more familiar instruments of language-planning like the 
dictionary, not least because of how it handled the relationship of symbols to spoken language. 
 Wilkins first discusses the idea of 
a universal character in his 1641 book 
Mercury, or the Secret and Swift 
Messenger, which covers a variety of 
topics in cryptography, steganography, 
and unusual modes of communication.  
Almost thirty years later, in 1668, he published An Essay towards a Real Character and a 
Philosophical Language, which, at over 450 folio pages, is one of the most detailed universal 
character schemes ever produced.  In this book, Wilkins introduces two distinct, though closely 
related, systems of communication that were meant to revolutionize scientific practice.  The 
first, the real character, consists of peculiar symbols of Wilkins’s devising (Figure 8).  Since this 
character is supposed to be “real” in the sense Bacon discusses, the symbols should be “legible 
by any Nation in their own Tongue” just as all of the inhabitants of China use the same 
character, each “reading it in his own Language” (13).  The second system, the philosophical 
language (Figure 9), is meant to provide a substitute for existing languages, including both the 
written and spoken components, and is printed in a phonetic alphabet loosely based on Latin 
and Greek characters.  Although the philosophical language could work independently, Wilkins 
emphasizes the primacy of the real character, which, he suggests, should be easier to learn than 
the language because it can work with the pronunciations one already knows (385).  
Figure 8. The Lord’s Prayer in Wilkins’s real character (395). 











The heart of Wilkins’s system is a detailed, hierarchical classification scheme (Figure 10).  
This hierarchy, Wilkins writes, provides “a just Enumeration and description of such things as 
are to have Marks or Names assigned to them,” arranged in a fashion inspired by the 
Aristotelian system of categories (20; see Slaughter).  This system is complex, but the basic idea 
is to organize concepts in a three- 
level hierarchy: 40 genuses, each 
containing 9 differences, each of 
which, in turn, can contain up to 15 
species.  From this hierarchy, Wilkins 
attempts to derive a system of 
signifiers that are “answerable to the 
nature of the things which they 
signif[y],” so that “we should, by 
learning the Character and the 
Names of things, be instructed likewise in their Natures” (21).  That is, the form of each symbol 
serves as a miniature description of the thing it represents.  In practice, this means that the 
symbols each indicate a particular set of coordinates within the hierarchy.  In the real character, 
a shape at the middle of a line indicates the genus, while marks at the left and right indicate the 
difference and the species (Figure 11).  Loops and hooks can also be added on to characters to 
indicate part of speech, conjugation, and to further modify the meaning.  Wilkins also provides 
smaller characters for pronouns and grammatical words.  The words of the philosophical 
language express the same information, mapped onto syllables rather than shapes. 





In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, this scheme is often characterized along two 
diverging lines: it is either mocked as hopelessly naïve or praised as ahead of its time.  The 
received account of Wilkins’s Essay treats it as an exemplar of a discredited approach to 
classification that was supplanted either, in Foucault’s view, with the emergence of modern 
biology in the nineteenth century or, in Slaughter’s view, with the rise of Newtonian science in 
the 1680s.  Robert Markley has given a detailed analysis of the conservative political values 
encoded in Wilkins’s hierarchy, which are, in his account, laughably far from the sort of 
disinterested representation of the world that would be needed to make the system truly 
universal (80-84).  Yet in spite of the apparent impossibility of his goal, Wilkins has also gotten 
some positive press recently from scholars who have noted hints of computational thinking in 
his work.  John Guillory notes, albeit guardedly, that Wilkins’s project was ahead of its time in 
treating communication as a technological matter (“Enlightening Mediation” 46-47).  Michael 
Hancher argues that Wilkins was able to solve a problem in information retrieval that later 
troubled Charles Babbage by uniting a hierarchical taxonomy with an alphabetic dictionary 
(Hancher 129-30).  Eco, too, compares Wilkins’s handling of repetitions within the hierarchy to 
the way hypertext establishes non-linear connections between pages (258-9).  Wilkins’s work 
has also been cast as a precursor of the print thesaurus, and it could even be likened to 
computationally oriented thesaurus projects like WordNet or the Historical Thesaurus of the 
Oxford English Dictionary.  This is not a wholly gratuitous connection.  The categorization 
scheme in Wilkins’s Essay provided a model for the development of Roget’s Thesaurus, which is 
perhaps the greatest practical result of Wilkins’s project (Hüllen 95).  This recent turn has cast 





certain as it is meant to be, at least provides a usable set of procedures for navigating a very 
complex repository of information. 
As with Leibniz, however, Wilkins’s treatment of semiotics has proven a stumbling block 
for scholars who have set out to redeem his ideas.  One of the ongoing debates in Wilkins 
scholarship has centered on whether the Essay is dependent on the idea of a natural relation 
between the signifier and signified, or whether it treats signifiers as arbitrary.  Wilkins himself 
claims that the real character signifies “by Institution” rather than “Naturally” (385), suggesting 
the latter; but Hans Aarsleff and Michael Isermann have taken Wilkins’s desire to make 
signifiers “answerable” to things as evidence that he maintained an attachment to the 
mysticism of earlier thinkers like Böhme, who held to the Renaissance doctrine of divinely 
instituted resemblance between signifier and signified (Aarsleff, From Locke to Saussure 262; 
Isermann, “Substantial” 108).  Maat has argued against this position, distinguishing Wilkins’s 
semiotic theory from “mystical” ones on the grounds that Wilkins’s “view of language was 
strictly utilitarian” (250).  Nonetheless, even Maat has found some aspects of Wilkins’s attitudes 
towards symbols difficult to rationalize.  Wilkins’s idea of a universal character, Maat writes, 
depends on “the clearly unreasonable assumption that linking the word ‘elephant’ to the 
symbol  is easy since it is a matter of pronunciation only, while linking the word ‘elephant’ 
to the word ‘zibi’ [the word for elephant in the philosophical language] is a matter of translation 
from one language to another” (160).  On account of the practical difficulties of using such a 
scheme, Maat finds it “remarkable that composing the Essay did not arouse any doubts about 





While Maat is certainly right to conclude that Wilkins’s scheme for a universal character 
is untenable, he leaves open the question of what made it possible for him and his supporters 
to be so confident in the idea of a universal character in spite of the obvious (from a modern 
perspective) problems it faces.  As Maat points out, the real character appears to add nothing 
to the scheme, since the phonetic alphabet for the philosophical language can encode exactly 
the same information (158).  Yet Wilkins clearly put a great deal of effort into developing it, as 
did Joseph Moxon, Samuel Gellibrand, and the workers in his print shop into carving and 
typesetting the special symbols that Wilkins devised.  Wilkins’s confidence in the transparency 
of characters was not an eccentricity.  In seventeenth-century scientific circles, the idea that 
visual signs could bear meaning more reliably and transparently than spoken language and thus 
provide a fair recompense for the Confusion of Tongues was a widespread, if not universally 
accepted, belief.22  For Wilkins, I propose, what was supposed to set the symbols apart from 
words was the hierarchy, which enabled their meanings to be fixed through a set procedure 
rather than through the process of reading as it was understood at the time.  Like the 
celebrated Hindu-Arabic numeral system, Wilkins’s real character reduces a wide semantic field 
to a small set of components put together through simple rules.23  To determine the meaning of 
one of the real character, one has only to decompose it into its parts and look up or recall the 
genus, difference, species, and modifications that they indicate.  The character , for 
instance, refers to position T. 1. 4. in the hierarchy.  If one wishes to read it, one can turn to the 
appropriate page of the book and select an English synonym from the list—in this case, name, 
style, title, etc. (26)—but the scheme makes this verbalization posterior to the establishment of 





It is clear from Wilkins’s remarks in the Essay’s Epistle to the Reader that he sees the 
hierarchical classification system as functioning differently from verbal definitions.  Previous 
authors of real character schemes, he writes, “did generally mistake in their first foundations” 
because they attempted “the framing of such a Character from a Dictionary of Words, 
according to some particular language, without reference to the nature of things” (n.p.).  It is 
less the words in the hierarchy that are meant to provide the fixity of meaning than the 
structure of the hierarchy itself.  Wilkins clearly distinguishes the sort of deterministic process 
that his lookup system enables from reading.  In the hierarchy, Wilkins classifies “READING” as 
one of the “particular kinds of speaking,” defining it as a variety of articulate speech that refers 
to “such words as we see before us” (235).  This view of reading was not peculiar to Wilkins; 
John Wallis’s comments on deaf education betray a similar assumption that the ability to speak 
ordinarily plays a role in reading, although Wallis believed that it could be circumvented 
(“Letter” 1091).  The real character alters the situation, separating the process of establishing 
the meaning of a symbol from that of verbalization.  So long as one follows the rules correctly, 
then, meaning precedes the act of reading, in which all the divisions imposed on us at Babel are 
quarantined. 
The lookup process could, of course, work just as well with the written version of the 
philosophical language as it could with the real character.  But in Wilkins’s time, verbal language 
was seen as too much of a temptation to make an entirely alphabetical scheme appealing.  In 
introducing the real character, Wilkins makes a rather cryptic comment that suggests he saw 
the phonetic alphabet of the philosophical language as inextricable from orality.  Introducing 





end of Facility” in learning the system, whereas “To proceed from the Language to the 
Character, would require the learning of both; which being of greater difficulty, than to learn 
one alone, is not therefore so sutable to that intention of ingaging men by the Facility of it” 
(385).  The thinking here seems to be that, since the written version of the philosophical 
language is constructed from letters, it cannot be learned without learning its pronunciation at 
the same time, thus making it more difficult to learn than the character.  Like other linguistic 
thinkers of his time, Wilkins used the term letter to refer to both alphabetical glyphs and 
speech sounds, apparently conflating the two (see Isermann, “Letters, Sounds, and Things”); he 
thus appears to view alphabetical writing systems as inherently bound up with orality.  In light 
of the rhetoric of Bacon, Sprat, and Hooke about the idols and temptations that exist in 
language, then, it makes sense that Wilkins would take extraordinary pains to extricate his real 
character from phonetics.  Differentiating the character and the language provided a way of 
enforcing the muteness of the signifiers, guarding against the Curse of Babel by ensuring the 
authority of the standardized procedures by which those symbols are defined over the 
unpredictable temptress that is, in the Baconian imaginary, speech. 
All of this is not to suggest that Wilkins’s scheme could have actually worked.  The 
assumption that there is a universal set of notions shared by everyone was as false in the 
seventeenth century as it is now.  Setting aside the issue of universality, there are serious 
problems with both the real character and the philosophical language as media of 
communication that could not be overcome without compromising Wilkins’s goals.  Wilkins’s 
scheme is rendered more-or-less useless by a failure to recognize that the aspects of 





and Hooke deplore—are not noise, but rather a form of protection against noise.  All natural 
languages have some degree of redundancy, which is essential because it enables them to 
function even in a noisy channel; this way, one can skip over or miss a phoneme or two—or a 
word or two—and still get the gist.  This phenomenon has been studied in detail.24  But in 
Wilkins’s philosophical language, every letter is significant, and consequently every loss of 
information is potentially catastrophic.  As Eco points out, there is at least one misprint in the 
printed version of Wilkins’s book; the word Gαpe (tulip) is misprinted as Gαde (barley) (Eco 
249).  Where, for instance, in an English text, one might easily recognize tulid as a misprint of 
tulip, it is only possible to determine that Gαde is an error based on context.  Worse, since the 
language is designed such that similar spellings represent similar things, misprints are likely to 
be off in meaning only by a little—one species of plant substituted for another, for instance.  
This increases the chance of an unintended meaning insinuating itself into a text that is 
plausible enough to slip by unnoticed. 
This excessive information density is certainly not the only strike against Wilkins’s 
project from a practical point of view.  Bringing the real character into use would also require 
both an educational infrastructure and some degree of momentum.  Needless to say, it did not 
catch on, although the initial reception was generally positive.  The Royal Society formed a 
committee for the improvement of Wilkins’s scheme, although there is no evidence that this 
committee did anything (Asbach-Schnitker xxviii; Lewis 195).  In 1669, the Anglican clergyman 
Andrew Paschall reported that he was using the real character in correspondence with some of 
his friends (Slaughter 177).  Another Royal Society member, Sir Robert Moray, claimed that King 





263), and John Collins wrote that the King was so pleased with it that he resolved to make 
Wilkins a bishop, which indeed he did (Slaughter 161).  In 1676, Robert Hooke, an enthusiastic 
supporter of Wilkins’s linguistic work, used the real character in a patent application for a 
pocket-watch, partly as an attempt to promote Wilkins’s scheme (Johns 525; Slaughter 174).  
But after the initial period of excitement, serious theoretical and practical concerns with 
Wilkins’s Essay came to light, and by the mid-1680s, not twenty years after it was first 
published, interest had died out (Slaughter 183).  Some later writers, including Charles 
Babbage, attempted to construct languages on similar plans to Wilkins’s, but none had more 
success.  Most later attempts at replacing language were either humbler than Wilkins’s project, 
merely aiming to create a new mode of expression rather than to capture the true natures of 
things definitively, or more strongly rooted in mathematics.  The latter is the route taken by 
Leibniz, whose scheme would eventually rival Wilkins’s in fame, even though he accomplished 
far less than Wilkins did.  Before proceeding to Leibniz’s attempt at a universal character, it is 
useful to consider, briefly, the origins of the mathematical symbolism on which he drew.  While 
algebraic symbols like + and – are now so familiar as to escape notice altogether, in the 
seventeenth century they were new, and people had a wide range of reactions to them, some 
of which are manifestly at odds with the commonplace assumptions of the twenty-first century. 
 
The New Algebra, or, (𝒂 + 𝒙)(𝒂 − 𝒙)(𝟐𝒂 − 𝒙) = 𝒂𝒙𝒚 
 
While Hindu–Arabic numerals had been well-established in Europe since the late middle ages, 





cliché that mathematics is a universal language, comprehensible to speakers of all national 
tongues, but mathematical knowledge was communicated with words through most of its 
history, and European algebraists did not have a fully developed symbolic system of their own 
until around 1700.  While Egyptian, Greek, and Indian mathematicians had developed some 
symbolic notations thousands of years ago, no such system was established in Europe until the 
sixteenth century (see Mazur, x).  It was in 1557 that Robert Recorde introduced the = sign as a 
way, he writes, “to avoid the tediouse repetition of these woordes: is equalle to” (quoted by 
Boyer and Merzbach 290), and this symbol, which Heeffer takes as the final step towards the 
symbolization of algebra, was not universally adopted until the mid-seventeenth century 
(Heeffer 22). 
Prior to symbolization, algebra was a 
verbal art.  In early textbooks, the written 
traces of algebra looked more like oddly 
fragmented prose interspersed with digits 
(Figure 12).  In modern notation, the 







+ 9 = 𝑥, and could be easily 
solved by the application of formal rules.  
But early-modern algebraists expressed such 
reasonings in prose paragraphs that were 
often, as Travis D. Williams has pointed out, 
shot through with sensory details such as, in 
Figure 12. Algebraic reasoning in prose. From the anonymous 
1539 book An introduction for to lerne to recken with the pen or 
with the counters accordynge to the trewe cast of algorysme […] 
(n.p.). Image courtesy of Bodleian Library, shelfmark Tanner 55, 
sig. k3v. Image published with permission of ProQuest. Further 





this example, a “spere” sticking out of the water.  These passages resemble the story problems 
of modern textbooks, but it is not only the problem that is stated like a story: the solutions are 
also worked out in prose.  As Williams puts it, “their mathematics is in many ways not our 
mathematics” (47).  There was no question, at this time, that algebra involved the 
“manipulation of symbols.”  For sixteenth-century practitioners, it was a way of reasoning 
about sensible things. 
 The symbolization of mathematics was not a sudden breakthrough.  In his landmark 
study A History of Mathematical Notations, Florian Cajori traces the history of how each major 
mathematical idea has been represented from ancient times to the present.  The general 
picture he gives is of a gradual shift from prose to symbols and from varying personal 
preferences to uniformity, with algebra reaching something like its modern state around 1700.  
The traditional account of the shift from prose to symbols, deriving from an 1842 study by 
G.H.F. Nesselmann, divides it into three stages.  First is the rhetorical phase, in which authors 
use prose (and often quite vivid prose) to communicate their reasonings to others.  The second 
is the syncopated phase, in which symbols serve as shorthands or ligatures that stand for 
words, in the same way that & stands for and.  Finally, in the symbolic phase, algebraic symbols 
become tools for thought as well as abbreviations, enabling people to solve equations using 
formal rules.  Some recent historians have contested this three-stage model, which rests on a 
relatively small number of documents whose purposes are often difficult to interpret (Heeffer 
1-2).  But the fact remains that, in post-Classical Europe, the division between the language of 
mathematics and prose was not at all sharp until around the middle of the sixteenth century.  





formal elements of how people wrote about equations were isolated from the rest of natural 
language and given an embodiment of their own.  Algebra came before the symbols, and it can 
be done without them, but they change the sort of thinking that the practice involves. 
 Credit for the development of modern algebraic notation often goes to René Descartes 
(see Boyer and Merzbach 319).  While many of the elements were already in place prior to 
Descartes’s time, he did play an important role in demonstrating the range of utility that 
symbolic notation could have.  Prior to the work of Descartes and his contemporary Pierre de 
Fermat, geometry and algebra had been two distinct fields with different methods; geometry 
primarily worked through visual demonstrations in the form of diagrams, while only algebra 
worked with symbols (Boyer 74).  Descartes’s 1637 treatise Geometry, which was published as 
an appendix to Discourse on Method, brings algebra and geometry together, showing how 
problems in each field can be translated into the other (Boyer and Merzbach 337).  Descartes’s 
book introduced something similar to, although not exactly identical to, the modern x-y 
coordinate system as a way of converting geometric problems into numerical ones, thus making 
algebraic and visual reasoning interchangeable.  (Fermat developed a similar system to 
Descartes’s independently around the same time, although he did not immediately publish his 
work.)  For example, Descartes applied his symbolic notation to an old geometric problem 
raised by the Alexandrian mathematician Pappus, which involves a curve described with the 
equation (𝑎 + 𝑥)(𝑎 − 𝑥)(2𝑎 − 𝑥) = 𝑎𝑥𝑦 (Boyer and Merzbach 340).  Contrary to traditional 
practice, Descartes does not represent this shape visually at all; instead, he presents the 





Compared to earlier texts like Recorde’s book, Descartes’s mathematical work looks 
mostly modern in its use of notation.  But there is another, subtler gap between the use of 
symbols in the early-modern period and the formalist mathematics of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries that is important to emphasize.  Descartes’s algebraic geometry is 
supposed to be an example of reasoning with the method that he develops in the Discourse, in 
which he resolves “to comprise nothing more in my judgment than what was presented to my 
mind so clearly and distinctly as to exclude all ground of doubt” (15).  Algebraic notation, in 
Descartes’s view, provides a way to divide a long chain of reasoning into small enough steps 
that each deduction proceeds with this absolute clarity of apprehension.  The reasoning is still, 
however, supposed to have reference to geometrical ideas.  The purpose of Descartes’s treatise 
on geometry is, as Boyer and Merzbach put it, first, “through algebraic procedure to free 
geometry from the use of diagrams,” and second, “to give meaning to the operations of algebra 
through geometric interpretation” (339).  Until the nineteenth century, it was not accepted that 
symbolic notation could be used to produce new concepts; it was still supposed to have 
reference to ideas that were founded in spatial and temporal intuitions.  What was new about 
algebraic notation was that, in the minds of the early-modern mathematicians who adopted it, 
it bore a more direct and transparent relationship to ideas than the verbal statements that had 
formerly constituted algebraic texts.  Shorn of all that was extraneous, it was supposed, the 
symbolic notation presented bare thoughts in their simplest possible form, with the result that, 
as Descartes claims, there could be no doubt about their truth or falsity. 
One reason for this confidence in the self-evidence of symbols was that they made it 





often linked the power of algebraic symbols specifically to their visual nature, and especially to 
the way in which notation allowed people to view a complex equation at a glance.25  John 
Wallis, who is remembered for introducing the infinity sign (∞), explains in the preface to his 
1685 Treatise of Algebra that the advantage of symbolic notation is to provide a condensed 
representation in which “the whole process of many Operations is at once exposed to the Eye 
in a short Synopsis” (n.p.).26  Similarly, in discussing the practice of “Registering” the results of 
experiments in natural history, Robert Hooke recommends using “some very good Short-hand 
or Abbreviation,” and states that “’twere to be wisht, that we could express the whole History 
in a few Letters or Characters” in the manner of “Geometrical Algebra” (63-64).  Hooke 
emphasizes the cognitive advantages of such a concise notation: contracting the account “into 
as little Space as possible,” he writes, “is of huge Use in the Prosecution of Ratiocination and 
Inquiry, and is of vast Help to the Understanding and Memory” (64).  By breaking its ties to 
verbal language, such condensed notations could serve as visual mnemonics as well as means 
of communication, facilitating forms of “Ratiocination” that would otherwise be difficult and 
unreliable. 
But many seventeenth-century scientists viewed algebraic symbols as more than just an 
aide memoire; they also saw them as a way around the uncertainties of verbal argument.  As 
Helena M. Pycior argues, British mathematicians in the Baconian tradition saw mathematical 
symbols as a way of keeping their attention on “things” rather than “words” (46).  Some 
seventeenth-century algebraists described their notation as presenting ideas directly on the 
page rather than representing or signifying them.  For instance, in the 1630s, William Oughtred, 





symbols as a way of reaching the naked truth beneath the veil of language: “Wherefore that I 
might more cleerly behold the things themselves, I uncasing the Propositions and 
Demonstrations out of their covert of words, designed them in notes and species appearing to 
the very eye” (The Key, “To the Reader,” n.p.).  For many thinkers of the seventeenth century, 
mathematical symbols were exempt from the need for interpretation; the initial choice of 
symbols may be arbitrary, but once the decision was made, the symbols and the corresponding 
ideas would be as one. 
As with the numeral system, people had varying views on whether it was the 
mathematics or the symbols themselves that produced this transparency.  For some, it was the 
use of numbers that made the difference, and the solution to Bacon’s challenge was thus to 
extend quantification as far as it could go.  This was the route taken by, to pick a prominent 
example, Christiaan Huygens, whose 1659 book on pendulums replaced the verbal elements of 
Descartes’s and Galileo’s theories of motion with an entirely mathematical theory as a way of 
increasing their precision (Yoder 42).  Others, however, suspected that the symbols were the 
key, and that, as a result, it would be possible to extend the transparency of algebra to non-
mathematical areas of study.  Such a project would enable the “uncasing” not just of equations, 
but of all sorts of ideas from the potentially misleading garb of words and, by doing so, enable 
conclusions to be drawn with absolute certainty.  This idea reached its fullest development in 
the work of Huygens’s one-time student Leibniz. 
 






Unlike Wilkins and Dalgarno, Leibniz never published a detailed plan for a real character.  
Scattered throughout his writings, however, are numerous references to a project called the 
universal characteristic (caractéristique universelle or characteristica universalis) or universal 
symbolism (spécieuse générale), which he apparently revisited sporadically through much of his 
life.  As mathematical, astronomical, and musical symbols provide real characters within their 
specific domains of knowledge, the characteristic was meant to provide a universal “alphabet of 
human thoughts” that could be applied to anything (Philosophical Papers and Letters 222).  In a 
letter to Walter Von Tschirnhaus dated May, 1678, Leibniz declared that, with the aid of this 
characteristic, “a spoken and written language can also be developed […] which can be learned 
in a few days and will be adequate to express everything that occurs in everyday practice, and 
of astonishing value in criticism and discovery, after the model of the numeral characters” 
(Philosophical Papers and Letters 193).  Elsewhere, he declared that it “will be an instrument 
even more useful to the mind than telescopes and microscopes are to the eyes” (261).  The 
language and character he proposed was meant to be able to express everything that German, 
French, or Latin could, and do it in a way that makes ideas clearer and easier to reason with. 
While it is difficult to determine exactly how Leibniz envisioned it, the characteristic 
appears to be more akin to algebraic notation than to Wilkins’s taxonomic scheme.27  As Donald 
Rutherford points out, Leibniz differentiated his project from those of Dalgarno and Wilkins by 
its greater emphasis on the role of signs as instruments of thought (230-1; see also Pombo 81).  
Wilkins’s real character is, as Eco has argued, a closed system; it represents an existing body of 
knowledge without providing a means of developing new concepts (250-51).  Leibniz, however, 





meant to work together with a calculus ratiocinatur—a rational calculus—that would make 
reasoning on philosophical matters as easy and certain as solving an equation.  In his 1685 
essay “The Art of Discovery,” he states the dream wistfully: “The only way to rectify our 
reasonings is to make them as tangible as those of the Mathematicians, so that we can find our 
error at a glance, and when there are disputes among persons, we can simply say: Let us 
calculate, without further ado, in order to see who is right” (Selections 51).  As this widely 
quoted statement indicates, Leibniz had much broader ambitions than those of later logical 
formalists; symbolic reasoning, for him, was not restricted to the abstract disciplines of logic 
and mathematics, but capable of making truth claims about any subject matter. 
A key idea in Leibniz’s project is blind thought.  There has been a great deal of debate 
over exactly what Leibniz means by this, but the central idea seems to be that a properly 
constructed character makes it possible to produce new knowledge about things entirely by 
performing algorithmic operations on symbols, without the need to interpret them.  In his early 
work Dissertation on the Art of Combinations (1666), Leibniz argues that Hindu–Arabic digits 
themselves are an example of this shortcut, since “we often grasp a number, however large, all 
at once in a kind of blind thought, namely, when we read figures on paper which not even the 
age of Methuselah would suffice to count explicitly” (Philosophical Papers and Letters 76).  The 
point is that one does not need to have a clear image of a million in one’s head in order to 
reason correctly with the word million—one only needs to know the proper rules for the word’s 
use.  This manner of thinking derives in part from the standardization of algebraic notation and 
Descartes’s introduction of the coordinate system (Davis 9).  By enabling mathematicians to 





figure, the Cartesian coordinate system enables mathematicians to reason “blindly” about 
shapes that they have not seen.  The characteristic was meant to extend this sort of symbolic 
thought to fields beyond mathematics, enabling the creation of an encyclopedic character that 
opens the totality of human knowledge to the rigors of symbolic reasoning. 
In spite of the likelihood that Leibniz took some of the inspiration for blind thought from 
Descartes’s geometrical work, the way he imagined such a system working was in direct 
opposition to Cartesian philosophy.  One of Descartes’s few extended discussions of semiotics 
appears in a 1629 letter to Marin Mersenne, which was published in 1657.  In response to 
Mersenne’s description of an early philosophical language project (which project appears to 
have been lost), Descartes argues that a truly philosophical language could not be created 
without “la vraie philosophie” (the true philosophy), which would be needed to determine the 
correct way of dividing up concepts (915).  Against Descartes’s view, Leibniz held that the signs 
could be developed alongside the theory, aiding in the process of analysis rather than 
depending on it (Pombo 95-100).  Leibniz was confident in the utility of blind thought in 
developing theories not just about mathematics, but also about the essences of substances.  In 
the letter quoted above, he assures Tschirnhaus that the characteristic will not lead thinkers 
into tangles of abstraction: “No one should fear that the contemplation of characters will lead 
us away from the things themselves; on the contrary, it leads us into the interior of things” 
(Philosophical Papers and Letters 193).  The rational calculus would be blind, but given the 
correct character it would be infallible. 
Despite—or perhaps because of—the lack of a detailed description of how it was to 





character.  A century before Leibniz became an icon of the computer age, there was a rush to 
claim him for the newly successful tradition of formal logic.  Bertrand Russell’s 1900 book A 
Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz describes the characteristica universalis as a 
“Universal Mathematics” and claims that it “was evidently akin to the modern science of 
Symbolic Logic, which is definitely a branch of Mathematics, and was developed by Boole under 
the impression that he was dealing with the ‘Laws of Thought’” (169-70).  Russell’s nemesis, 
Kurt Gödel, likened the universal characteristic to his own work in theoretical mathematics in a 
1944 essay, even suggesting to a friend that there was a conspiracy to suppress the elusive 
details of Leibniz’s scheme (Dawson 137; 166).  The most influential attempt to make a logical 
formalist of Leibniz, though, is Ernst Cassirer’s chapter on the history of linguistic thought in 
Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (1923-29), which crowns Leibniz’s characteristic as the 
culmination of an early-modern form of Platonism that “demanded a return from words to 
‘things’” and “accorded primacy to mathematics and the mathematical study of nature” (127).  
While Cassirer himself does not connect Leibniz to later developments in logic, his account led a 
generation of scholars to presume that the characteristic was meant to be something entirely 
different from signification systems as they are usually conceived, and, for the most part, to 
treat it as a forerunner of Boolean, Fregean, or Russellean formalism (see Aarsleff, “The 
Eighteenth Century” 386; 399). 
While there is some merit to this connection, simply equating the characteristic with 
formal logic only captures one aspect of Leibniz’s program.  For Russell, the problem with the 
characteristic was that it attempted to apply to philosophy what was an essentially 





calculus ratiocinatur cannot help in “the discovery of those simple notions, and those primitive 
axioms, upon which any calculus or science must be based” (170).  If we construe Leibniz’s 
project as Russell does, it would seem to involve composing the symbols for complex ideas out 
of components representing simple ideas.  Leibniz comes close to this way of thinking in a text 
from the early 1690s called “A Study in the Logical Calculus,” in which he introduces the 
concatenation of letters as a way of representing the combination of properties—thus, if R is 
rational and A is animal, human is equivalent to RA (Philosophical Papers and Letters 371-82).  
Such a character would, as Russell suggests, only be able to produce conclusions that follow 
from the definitions of terms, which would limit its usefulness.  But as a way of defining the 
entire “alphabet of human thoughts,” this bottom-up approach would seem to conflict with 
Leibniz’s anti-Cartesian stance.  If the character is to be developed in parallel with the analysis 
of knowledge, rather than founded upon it, how could it express complex ideas entirely 
through the composition of simple ones? 
One possible answer to this question, suggested by Donald Rutherford, is that Leibniz 
had in mind something similar to what Hilary Putnam calls a “division of linguistic labor” 
(Rutherford 247-8; Putnam 13).  Arguing against the positivist definition of meaning as a 
criterion for recognizing a thing, Putnam observes that people concern themselves with 
different aspects of a word’s usage based on their social roles.  Thus, for example, people can 
genuinely care whether a wedding ring is made out of gold without, themselves, knowing how 
to tell real gold from fake; the latter “job” is left to chemists and jewelers (13).  The notation 
that Leibniz invented for the infinitesimal calculus would seem to be tailor-made for just this 





the area of arbitrary shapes by dividing them into infinitesimal portions.  In Leibniz’s notation, 





0 and 1 indicate the left and right bounds of the area; 𝑥 is the expression that defines its upper 
bound; and 𝑑𝑥 indicates the infinitesimal steps by which the area is to be measured.  The 𝑑𝑥—
which is typically held up as a reason why Leibniz’s notation is superior to Newton’s—provides 
a clue as to how the calculation works.  But this formula does not tell us what simple ideas 
make up the complex idea of the integral in the way that “rational animal” decomposes the 
idea of the human.  The symbol  is a stand-in for a longer definition that one does not need to 
keep in mind—or even know—in order to perform the calculation.  Leibniz’s notation provides 
just enough information to make the idea of integration useful, while enabling most people to 
leave the details to the experts. 
 There is, however, major difference between the labor politics of Leibniz’s work and the 
division of labor as Rutherford and Putnam represent it.  While Rutherford imagines blind 
thought supporting the delegation of responsibilities between disciplines of knowledge—one 
can defer questions like what gold is to “experts with the latest knowledge and techniques 
available” (Rutherford 274)—Leibniz was generally antagonistic toward the division of 
disciplines, which was not, in his time, taken as a given.28  In particular, his remarks about his 
calculating machine suggest not the sort of disciplinary autonomy that characterizes Weberian 
modernity, but rather a hierarchy between the philosophers who create the definitions and 





purpose of the machine is to enable scientists to delegate the task of calculation to inferiors: “it 
is unworthy of excellent men [such as astronomers] to lose hours like slaves in the labor of 
calculation, which could be safely relegated to anyone else if the machine were used” (“Leibniz 
on his Calculating Machine” 181).  The point of mechanization is to make calculation into an 
easier, less intellectual task, thus enabling philosophers to entrust it to those of lesser mind.  
Addition is reduced to turning a crank.  While the procedure for dividing numbers requires a 
somewhat more complex process that involves estimation, Leibniz emphasizes that it is “but 
very easy for anyone of mediocre ability to estimate the correct quotient at first sight” (178).  In 
characteristically seventeenth-century fashion, Leibniz supposes that science takes place under 
the direction of an individual genius, whose range of ability is not limited to any particular 
science, and who would gladly delegate the tedious parts of scientific inquiry to others were 
there not the troubling possibility of error.  The prime concern that arises in dividing up labor, 
for Leibniz, is not whether an ordinary person can trust the experts—a concern that would 
reach a crisis in the nineteenth century—but whether “excellent men” can trust people at 
lower positions on the social hierarchy. 
For Leibniz, I argue, what enables a machine to ground this trust is a belief in the ability 
of real characters to retain a stable relation to ideas as they go through mechanical processes.  
Whereas the industrialists who revived the idea of mechanizing thought in the ninenteenth 
century would come to treat symbols instrumentally, separating the question of interpretation 
from the mechanical aspects of calculation, Leibniz never gave up on meaning.  He states one 
version of his rationale for the use of algorithmic process in the 1684 essay “Meditations on 





argument that truth is arbitrary because it depends on the arbitrary signs of language (see Maat 
338; 353).  Leibniz begins this essay by defining clear and distinct ideas in terms broadly similar 
to Descartes’s, but he then notes that some forms of reasoning can proceed without perfectly 
clear ideas.  In complex chains of reasoning, he writes, “we do not intuit the entire nature of a 
subject matter at once but make use of signs instead of things, though we usually omit the 
explanation of these signs in any actually present thought for the sake of brevity, knowing or 
believing that we have the power to do it” (292).  Later in the essay, he gives a partial 
explanation of how this sort of blind thought might apply to the material world by drawing a 
distinction between “nominal definitions, which contain only marks for discerning one thing 
from others, and real definitions, through which the possibility of the thing is ascertained” 
(293).  Real definitions in this sense would enable blind thought to produce knowledge about 
things, rather than just about the meanings of words.  The calculus ratiocinatur and, in 
principle, the mechanization and delegation of reasoning, could thus be applied to any subject 
matter, provided only that we keep in mind “the difference between a true and a false idea,” 
backing our symbols up with definitions that are not arbitrary, but that, to the contrary, encode 
truths about the possibilities and causes of things (293).  Given a symbolic calculus that is 
constructed upon such true definitions, it should be possible to offload the operations of 
reasoning to a subaltern without having to worry about whether they truly understand the 
ideas or not—so long as they are made to follow the procedures correctly, they can do no 
wrong. 
 How exactly Leibniz thought these definitions would work is a difficult question to 





Leibniz’s universal characteristic to a fundamental ambiguity in his writings about symbols.  Two 
such accounts are those of Dascal and Pombo.  Through a reading of Leibniz’s use of the 
traditional metaphor of words as money, Dascal argues that Leibniz wavered in his 
characterizations of the calculus ratiocinatur, sometimes suggesting a “formalist” position in 
which deduction proceeds from an analysis of complex ideas into simple, but at other times 
treating symbols more like promissory notes that must eventually be “cashed in” in exchange 
for ideas (21).  In her monograph on Leibniz’s linguistic projects, Pombo explains this wavering 
as the result of a desire to have it both ways, gaining the advantages of formalism without the 
trade-off.  The essence of Leibniz’s project, she argues, is “to reconcile the rigour of a formal 
language with the meaning that only natural languages possess, and thus to avoid both the 
meaninglessness of formal systems and the ambiguities of ordinary language” (25).  Pombo 
argues that the ambiguity in Leibniz’s remarks on the characteristic ultimately results from the 
theological underpinnings of his project, which presents simple ideas (of which the idea of God 
is, for Leibniz, the sine qua non) as both forming the foundation of and existing outside the 
bounds of human reason (119).  Leibniz did make some strides towards what now appears as 
symbolic logic, Pombo concludes, but he held back from creating systems that were “totally 
formalized, and as such, separated from the world by an impassible barrier” (189).  
To treat this attempt to reconcile meaning with formalism as an ambiguity, however, is 
to impose modern categories and a modern sensibility on the aspects of Leibniz’s work that 
most conflict with them.  From Leibniz’s perspective, there was no problem in reconciling 
formalism with meaning; if a “real definition” can load a symbol with knowledge about the 





be separated from more worldly considerations by an “impassible barrier.”  Based on his 
scattered comments about the characteristic, Leibniz seemed to have anticipated no difficulty 
in connecting symbolic systems to practical concerns across all areas of life.  As Leroy E. 
Loemker notes, one of Leibniz’s longstanding preoccupations was with legal reform, and he saw 
his universal character as a necessary element of a rationalized legal system (6).  In addition to 
law, Leibniz suggested that the characteristic could be applied to matters as diverse as 
cryptography, music, morality, and religion (Philosophical Papers and Letters 192; 224; 261).  
The idea that a symbolic calculus can extend to all these areas depends, of course, on some 
very strong assumptions about how symbols relate to the world.30  Leibniz does not seem to 
have denied the arbitrariness of signifiers in all cases; in the New Essays, he suggests that the 
“artificial languages” of “George Dalgarno and the late Bishop Wilkins of Chester” are “wholly 
chosen and arbitrary” (278).  But even if the symbols themselves are arbitrary, the mechanical 
processes to which they are applied could, from his perspective, be used to establish their 
meanings with certainty, and thus to put them in a non-arbitrary relation to the world.  As long 
as this metaphysics remains unquestioned, there is no barrier between algebraic symbols and 
the world of people and things.  
Committed as Leibniz seemed to be to it, this metaphysics of the algorithm had a 
powerful adversary in the Cartesians, and it fell out of favor in the eighteenth century.  As I 
show in the next chapter, many from the 1680s onward were highly skeptical about the efficacy 
of character systems like Leibniz’s universal characteristic, and some even questioned the 
ability of symbolic algebra itself to connect to the world of sensible things.  While Leibniz held 





encountered intractable problems only a few decades after its author’s death in 1716.  In the 
mid-eighteenth century, one of the most prominent followers of Leibniz (after the tireless 
Christian Wolff) was the Swiss logician Joseph Heinrich Lambert, who attempted to develop 
Leibniz’s idea of blind thought further in the direction of a logical calculus.  Lambert began his 
investigations into logic in the 1750s with an attempt to discover, through a series of essays 
that were published after his death, what “was concealed in the Leibnizian characteristic and in 
the ars combinatoria” (quoted by Capozzi and Roncaglia 137).  To this end, Lambert developed 
a logical system based on a representation similar to Venn diagrams, which was meant, as he 
presented it, to do for qualities what the algebraic notation had done for quantities.  But 
Lambert soon had difficulty moving from theoretical descriptions to a practical system that 
could maintain a clear relation to the material world. 
While Lambert’s work contains several important advances in symbolic logic, his 
symbolism is sharply distinguished from the formalism of later periods by its attempt to make 
logical symbols into non-arbitrary signifiers.  In the New Organon (1764), an important pre-
Kantian work of critical philosophy, Lambert coined the word semiotics to describe a cognitive 
theory of signification whose scope extended, in Winfried Nöth’s words, “from musical notes, 
gestures, and hieroglypics to chemical, astrological, heraldic, social, and natural signs” (Nöth 
28).  The highest variety of sign, Lambert declares in this book, is the scientific sign, which 
represents the world with such a veracity that, he writes, “the theory of things and the theory 
of signs become interchangeable” (quoted by Nöth 28).  Lambert presents his attempt at such a 
scientific symbolism in his book Disquisitio, published in 1767 (Capozzi and Roncaglia 139).  





of the Disquisitio were disappointed to find that his logical calculus used arbitrary letters to 
represent qualities rather than, as he had promised, symbols that naturally corresponded to the 
essences of things (Capozzi and Roncaglia 141).  In spite of Lambert’s efforts, Leibniz’s universal 
symbolism remained unrealized. 
Lambert’s failure was due in part to a change in the intellectual climate between the 
time of Leibniz and the 1760s.  The 1755 Lisbon earthquake, which Voltaire depicted in Candide 
and in his “Poème sur le désastre de Lisbonne,” was only one of a number of factors that placed 
Leibniz’s optimistic metaphysics under question.  By the latter half of the eighteenth century, 
the possibility of a connection between symbols and things could no longer be taken on faith, 
as it could for Leibniz himself; instead, connecting symbolic systems to the world had become a 
practical problem and, as Lambert recognized, a psychological one.  In the next chapter, I 
examine how one of the major intellectual traditions of the eighteenth century—the strain of 
empiricism running from John Locke through Étienne Bonnot de Condillac to the French 
idéologues—grappled with the question of how the symbolic systems of science relate to 
people’s mental representations of the world.  For the thinkers in this tradition, unclear words 
were just as much a problem for scientific thought as they were for Bacon, but it was no longer 
seen as possible to bypass the uncertainties of verbal language, even through the use of 
mathematical symbols.  Instead of seeing algorithmic systems as an alternative to language, 
these thinkers viewed them as better languages that one had to learn to “speak” in order to 
genuinely connect the symbols to objects of the senses.  For this eighteenth-century tradition, 





rules of a symbolic system—one had to absorb that system as deeply into one’s being as one 






Chapter 2: Science and/as Language in the French Enlightenment 
 
The alphabet is really now superfluous 
for in this sign all men can find salvation. 
—Faust, Part II (trans. Atkins) 
 
Condorcet: An Exorcism 
 
In the winter of 1794, Nicolas de Condorcet knew that he would not live long.  During the early 
years of the French Revolution, he was an enthusiastic participant, helping to draft the 1789 
Declaration of the rights of Man and of the Citizen and representing Paris in the Legislative 
Assembly of 1791-2.  Just a year and two weeks after that assembly was dissolved, however, his 
support for the moderate Girondin faction made him into an outlaw.  On October 3, 1793, the 
Jacobins released a warrant for his arrest, and he was forced to flee from his home (D. Williams 
42).  During his eight months in hiding, he passed the time by writing political texts whose 
forward-looking nature belied the direness of his situation.  In these manuscripts, which include 
some of his best-known work, he sketched out a utopian plan for the future that stood in sharp 
contrast to the realities of revolutionary France. 
In one of the fragments he wrote while a fugitive, later published as Esquisse d'un 
tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain (Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress 
of the Human Mind), Condorcet suggests two means by which the improvement of the human 





uniting a great number of objects in an arranged and systematic order;” and second, a 
“universal language” that “expresses by signs, either the direct objects, or those well-defined 
collections constituted of simple and general ideas, which are to be found or may be introduced 
equally in the understandings of all mankind” (285-6).  Such a language, he writes, would not 
have “the inconvenience of a scientific idiom, different from the vernacular tongue” (287); it 
could be learned by all, as schoolchildren learn the language of algebra, providing universal 
access to the best scientific knowledge available and ensuring that there could be no 
disagreement about either the meaning of terms of the validity of arguments.  Uncertainty 
about the meanings of words would be solved once and for all, and reasoning would be 
reduced to a purely mechanical process. 
Condorcet’s work has long stood as a metonym for the longstanding desire to extend 
mathematical reasoning to all domains of knowledge.  Foucault, in The Order of Things, cites 
Condorcet as one of the Classical thinkers who attempted “to mathematize empirical 
knowledge” in domains outside of physics and astronomy (56).  Similarly, Umberto Eco, in The 
Search for the Perfect Language, takes Condorcet’s approach to creating a universal language as 
proof that “the search for perfect languages was definitively turning in the direction of a logico-
mathematical calculus” (283), and Roger Chartier holds Condorcet’s project up as an example of 
a desire for “formalizing cognitive operations and logical reasoning” (137).  More boldly, Keith 
Michael Baker argues that Condorcet’s remarks about the possibility of mechanizing algebraic 
operations are prophetic of twentieth-century developments in computation (124).  There has, 
however, been surprisingly little in-depth scholarship on the way Condorcet’s views on 





Condorcet’s universal language scheme alongside two other linguistic projects from late-
eighteenth-century France: the pedagogical program of Étienne Bonnot de Condillac and the 
reform of chemical terminology undertaken by Antoine Lavoisier.  My reading of these three 
projects shows that algorithms had a very different relation to semiotics in French 
Enlightenment thought than it did for Leibniz.  While Leibniz could take it on faith that symbols 
bore a stable relation to things, by the late eighteenth century it was no longer possible to 
avoid the question of how the algorithmic processes of calculation related to the world of 
human life; instead, in order to make a logical calculus useful, one had to take pains to establish 
a connection between the symbols and the ideas by which people understand the world.  
Condorcet’s project thus exemplifies a distinctly eighteenth-century approach to relating 
algorithm and meaning, one that keeps the human understanding in the center even as 
reasoning becomes bound to a fixed set of rules. 
 Condorcet did not live to see his remarks about the universal language published.  On 
March 27, 1794, he was arrested while attempting to flee the house where he was hiding, and 
two days later he died in his cell of unknown causes.  His papers, however, survived, and the 
Sketch was published the following year (Manuel 59).  Along with the manuscript for the Sketch, 
he left behind an unfinished plan for the 
universal language he describes.  Over the 
course of about 90 handwritten pages, 
Condorcet shows how the symbolic 
language of algebra can be made to 
subsist on its own, without the need for 
 Figure 13. Condorcet shows how a mathematical proof can be 





sentences linking the pieces together (Figure 13).  He thus eliminates the need for the 
fragments of natural language that, in a typical mathematical paper, link propositions together 
into proofs; in this system, a complete argument can be made without the need for a single 
word of French, English, or German.  While Condorcet begins with algebra, his goal is to extend 
this sort of symbolization beyond mathematics to “all kinds” of knowledge (Granger 204).  
What he seems to have in mind is a classification system that enables all ideas to be 
represented as numbers.  To use his example, one could have the number 145702342 
designate a particular plant, with 145 representing the class, 70 the genus, 23 the species, and 
42 the individual (217).  Just before the manuscript cuts off, Condorcet promises to explain how 
such a symbolic system can be extended to the realms of metaphysics, linguistics, morals, and 
politics (219). 
 Even before Condorcet begins to move beyond mathematics, however, he begins to 
show some anxiety about the possibility of natural language finding its way back in.  Before the 
universal algebra can be put to use in a particular case, it is necessary to establish the meanings 
of the symbols, and it was not apparent that this could be done without some recourse to 
words.  Condorcet considers this a flaw in his scheme, although not a fatal one: 
We observe first that if, in a rare circumstance, it were impossible to make 
understood an absolutely new theory, to designate an object which had not yet 
been considered, to develop an operation of which one has not yet formed any 
idea, without having recourse to some verbal explications, the language would 
not merit less the name of universal, would not be less useful.  It would happen 





sometimes one is obliged to show the object itself or its representation, because 
of a lack of having the expressions to describe it.  One would need one language 
to supplement [suppléer] the other.  One might believe that this defect will not 
be encountered but very rarely in the language of universal algebra[.]  (213; my 
translation) 
To make theories understood, to designate objects, to form ideas of operations—these are all 
matters of mediating between the symbols and a person’s mental conceptions of the world. 
When an adjustment has to be made to the alignment between symbols and ideas, “verbal 
explications” must intervene.  This is an objection that the philosopher Joseph Marie de 
Gérando would judge, a few years later, to be fatal to the idea of a philosophical language: one 
would have to explain the meanings of the newly minted words in an existing, presumably 
imperfect language, thus tainting the new one (Knowlson 200).  Yet Condorcet is confident that 
it will not be a problem in the majority of cases.  One can mostly avoid the taint of language, he 
thinks, by taking care always to proceed “from known to unknown” and by expressing new 
ideas as “generalizations” or “restrictions” of existing ones (213).  In this way, the algebraic 
system can be made as self-contained as possible, and words can, for the most part, be held at 
bay outside the walls. 
 The urgency with which Condorcet wanted to get rid of natural language manifests 
much the same distrust of words that had motivated Wilkins, albeit in a very different context.  
But his apparent anxiety about the possibility that, despite his best efforts, natural language 
would seep back in—the fact that he sees the occasional need for French definitions as a 





establishing the meanings of symbols had not been a major problem.  The two of them could 
argue over what sort of taxonomy a real character scheme should use, but there was never 
much doubt at the time that a hierarchical thesaurus would suffice to fix the meanings of the 
characters with certainty, independently of any verbal language (see Maat 155).  By the 1750s, 
however, it had become clear that the idols of the market existed not just in words, but in the 
minds of people who spoke them.  A new attention to the histories of European vernaculars in 
the mid-century had led to the widespread belief that languages were deeply bound up with 
thought, a proposition that implied, for some Enlightenment thinkers, that it would be much 
harder than previously believed to overcome the influence of words.  If one’s native tongue is 
an essential element of one’s way of thinking, it is not such a simple matter to learn a new 
symbolic system without some of the old prejudices polluting it.  In order to truly dispense with 
the idols that lurk in one’s mind, one would have to rebuild the language and the ideas alike. 
In spite of the very evident difficulty that such a project faced, Condorcet was far from 
alone in attempting it.  The French Enlightenment context produced some of the eighteenth 
century’s most radical claims for the ability of new symbolic systems to reshape society, and 
Condillac and Lavoisier, two widely respected thinkers, both expressed their own versions of 
the desire to create a new scientific language from scratch.  Condillac, one of the period’s most 
influential philosophers on the subject of language, argued that words play a constitutive role in 
human thought and that, as a result, a clear language was essential to the pursuit of science.  
Citing Condillac’s maxims, Lavoisier worked to renovate the terminology of chemistry, 
promoting new definitions for the elements based on experimental evidence.  While 





to create a more rational society, they faced a difficult task in bringing this rationality into 
being.  As empiricists of an eighteenth-century stripe, they could appeal neither to the 
essentialism of Wilkins nor to the pre-established harmony of Leibniz as a way of linking their 
scientific languages to the world.  As a result, they had to navigate between twin threats to the 
coherence of their languages: on the one side, the possibility that the new language will be 
tainted by the role that the vernacular plays in its construction, and on the other, the possibility 
that the reasonings it enables are merely arbitrary algorithms, not grounded in any analysis of 
physical reality. 
Placing these three thinkers together illustrates the epistemological rifts that separate 
this moment from what came before and what followed.  With the benefit of hindsight, one can 
perceive Condorcet’s universal algebra, like Leibniz’s characteristic, as a prefiguration of the 
later development of formal logic by George Boole, Gottlob Frege, C.S. Peirce, and their 
followers.  But viewed in its intellectual context, Condorcet’s desire to expunge words from 
algebra suggests that he was responding to quite the opposite concern from the one that drove 
the formalisms of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  Like Lavoisier, Condorcet was trying 
to create a language for analyzing physical things as they are perceived—a language in which 
one can think about the world.  From this perspective, mechanization was no solution to the 
uncertainty of language, as it would become in the time of Babbage and Boole; instead of 
formal rules, what a properly scientific language needed in the context of eighteenth-century 
empiricism was a well-constructed system of mental representations that connect it to the 
senses.  From this perspective, the continued influence of received ways of understanding the 





Condillac: Linguistic Purity as an Epistemic Virtue 
 
To see how Condorcet’s linguistic project differs from that of Leibniz, it is necessary to gain a 
sense of the difference between the natural science of the seventeenth century and the 
empiricist philosophy of the eighteenth.  An important figure in the new empiricism is Condillac.  
In the last chapter of his second book, A Treatise on Systems (1749), Condillac sums up his 
argument with the gnomic, often-quoted statement that “a well-conducted science is merely a 
well-formed language” (151).  The heart of any scientific endeavor, in Condillac’s view, is the 
analysis of sensory data, and language provides a “method of analysis,” its words dividing up 
the world into comprehensible chunks and indicating their relations.  As a result of the 
fundamentally linguistic nature of science, he argues, “any science should be within the reach 
of an intelligent mind, since every well-formed language is comprehensible” (151).  Condillac 
disarmingly turns the rubric of the well-formed language upon himself.  “If you do not 
understand me,” he writes, “it is because I do not know how to write; and if you happen 
sometimes not to understand me, that is because I sometimes write badly” (151).  Condillac’s 
insistence on the importance of language to science participates in the push for clarity that 
goes back to Bacon.  But Condillac is not just saying that science requires a clear language; he is 
saying that science is a language.  This statement heralds a new alternative to the Baconian 
mandate to study things rather than words. 
Between the time of Wilkins and Leibniz and that of Condillac stand a number of 
changes in the relations of science, language, and education.  Earlier in the eighteenth century, 





while the Newtonian revolution had cemented the place of quantitative methods at the center 
of the physical sciences.  Together, these changes made the idea of a language that naturally 
corresponds to the essences of things, after Wilkins’s model, an anachronism.  At the same 
time, however, the rise of Newtonian science had created new communicational issues.  
Newton’s Principia (1687) was almost universally hailed as a work of genius in the eighteenth 
century, especially in his native England, but it was of daunting complexity even for skilled 
mathematicians.  This problem led, in the first half of the eighteenth century, to an outpouring 
of textbooks and popular accounts that attempted to explain Newton’s physics more clearly, 
including books by John Harris and Charles Hayes in English and Voltaire in French (Guicciardini, 
Development of Newtonian Calculus 13-18; Hine 38).  Condillac attacked the challenge of 
communicating complex systems like Newton’s at a theoretical level, attempting to explain, 
through the psychological theories of his time, why people sometimes have trouble absorbing 
scientific ideas. 
Condillac’s approach to this project is heavily indebted to British empiricism and natural 
philosophy, including Newton’s Principia.  As Ellen McNiven Hine has noted, Condillac often 
wrote of the “Newtonian Method” as the best route to knowledge (43).  This method, as 
Condillac construes it, is to derive the laws of nature “from an examination of sense 
experience,” not “geometrically from indubitable first principles” (Hine 42).  In A Treatise on 
Systems, Condillac presents this Newtonian method as a superior alternative to the “abstract 
systems” of rationalists like Leibniz, Spinoza, and Malebranche.  According to Condillac, such 
thinkers fall prey to an “excessive blindness” due to their rigid adherence to principles that are 





blindness—which is one of many in the Treatise—as a jab against Leibniz’s idea of blind 
thought, but Condillac leaves no doubt about what he thinks of the doctrine of pre-established 
harmony.  Unlike Leibniz, Condillac is not willing to take it on faith that a system of symbols, 
even the one used in algebra, has anything to do with the world. 
While Newton was a key model of scientific achievement for Condillac, the most 
important reference point for his philosophy is John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding (1689, dated 1690).  As Aarsleff has argued, one of Locke’s overall thrusts in the 
Essay is against the idea that words can naturally express the true essences of things (From 
Locke to Saussure 27-28).  In Locke’s view, there are no innate ideas in the mind; all of our 
knowledge ultimately derives from the senses and the faculty of reflection, and as a result, it is 
not possible for us to know the “real essences” of substances (401).  Instead, all we have access 
to are simple ideas that derive directly from the senses, such as the idea of yellow.  In Locke’s 
view, ideas of substances, such as gold, only refer to what he calls nominal essences—
collections of qualities that we have arbitrarily chosen to bundle together in the definitions of 
particular words.  To continue with his example, we might define gold as something that is 
yellow, malleable, and fusible, but our choice to include these particular qualities in the 
definition is ultimately arbitrary (393).  As a result, contrary to the views of Bacon, Wilkins, and 
Leibniz, we can never test our language against the natural order of the world.  There is no 
question, for Locke, of characters being answerable to the nature of things (Wilkins) or ideas 
being true (Leibniz); the only standard to which words and ideas can be held is whether or not 





Locke concludes his discussion of language with a long section on “the abuse of words,” 
which presents yet another call for clear language as a way of avoiding philosophical confusion.  
Compared to the expansive real-character projects of the earlier seventeenth century, 
however, Locke’s solution to the problem of linguistic imprecision is relatively modest.  Locke 
disavows the idea of a philosophical language, stating in the Essay, with apparent reference to 
Wilkins, “I am not so vain to think, that anyone can pretend to attempt the perfect reforming 
the languages of the world, no not [sic] so much as that of his own country, without rendering 
himself ridiculous” (453; on the connection to Wilkins, see Slaughter 206).  Instead, Locke 
merely suggests that one use clear and consistent definitions for all of one’s terms; echoing 
Sprat, he also exhorts his reader to avoid figurative language (437; 455-65).31  More 
speculatively, he envisions that people might someday create a dictionary “containing, as it 
were, a natural history,” which would rectify the problem for good (463-64).  In response to 
what he called, in a letter to William Molyneux, “the cheat of words,” Locke primarily 
emphasizes definitions rather than the construction of a completely new language (Works, 
9.301).  As long as one clearly states the simple ideas that make up one’s complex ideas, words 
should not get in the way. 
While Condillac accepts most of Locke’s epistemology without question, he takes a 
much more radical position than Locke in regard to language.  For Locke, words are primarily 
communicational in function, and at only a few points does Locke suggest that they also play a 
role in thought (e.g. 346).  Condillac, on the other hand, asserts emphatically that complex 
ideas cannot exist without signs of some sort.  As a result, coming up with a system of signs—a 





Clearing up language thus takes much more than definitions; instead, Condillac argues, clear 
ideas can only be derived from a careful analysis of the world that begins with the senses.  
Condillac’s notion of analysis, which had a great deal of influence in the later eighteenth 
century, is a two-stage process: first, one divides up sensory data into component parts, and 
then one reassembles the ideas of the parts into an idea of the whole.  The result is a sign that 
refers to a complex idea that, if one has been careful enough, relates in a clear way to sensory 
data.  The role of language in this process is unavoidable for Condillac.  A language, for 
Condillac, is an “analytical method,” meaning that it consists of nothing but signifiers referring 
to ideas, either clear or confused, by which one can divide up the world of the senses (Logic 
392).  As a result, if we want to build a scientific theory of the world based, in Newtonian 
fashion, on the analysis of observations, we will have to recreate language anew. 
Condillac first attempts this refashioning of language in Essay on the Origin of Human 
Knowledge (1746).  In this book, he attempts to give an account of “the springs of human 
understanding” on the model of Locke’s Essay, but in a way that accounts for the role of 
language from the start rather than, as Locke did, considering ideas first and words second (7).  
This book includes Condillac’s theory of the origin of language, which spawned a great deal of 
debate in the second half of the eighteenth century (see Aarsleff, From Locke to Saussure 146-
99).  Imagine, he suggests, two children alone in the “desert,” lacking any language (113).  The 
idea of signification might first arise when one of them tries to reach a fruit on a branch that is 
too high.  The other, recognizing the desire of his companion, would help her get the fruit (114-
15).  Noticing this response, the first child would realize that a reaching motion can be used to 





vocal language would emerge as a supplement to the “language of gestures,” and, at length, 
words would form (116).  But in early times, according to Condillac, abstract ideas could only be 
developed by imperfect analogies, as the French word esprit (mind) arose “from the idea of 
very rarified matter, of vapor” (165).  Languages became confused when “people forgot the 
origin of these signs,” mistaking the imperfect metaphors for true reflections of the essences of 
things (166).  Thus, as Knowlson writes, Condillac concludes that “[a]s languages have become 
more elaborate and richer in terms, they have also tended to become less effective as methods 
of analysis” (168).  Condillac assigns the new language, just emerged from simple sensations, a 
kind of empirical purity that has since been lost. 
Condillac thinks that his “imaginative reconstruction” of the origin of language can 
provide us with a method for making a better language.  In order to overcome the errors in 
existing languages, he suggests, we must imagine ourselves in the situation of a man “created 
fully grown by God” without the knowledge of any words or ideas, and thus, through the 
analysis of our sensory input, “make an entirely new language for ourselves” (209).  In practice, 
this reconstruction of language amounts to a didactic method that emphasizes learning 
concepts in the proper order.  As the newly created man would develop simple ideas first and 
gradually build complexity, so the student should begin by learning about simple sensations, 
and learn other subjects in the order in which they derive from these primal ideas.  The 
progression from simple to complex, which Slaughter traces to Comenius’s pedagogical theory 
and to Locke’s Some Thoughts Concerning Education (Slaughter 206), is meant to ensure that all 
of the words the student learns have definite, “fixed and secure” ideas attached to them, 





When Condillac writes that a science is a “well-formed language,” he means a language 
with clear ideas attached to every word.  His project is thus very different from the 
philosophical languages of Wilkins and Leibniz, which included (or were meant to include) 
lexicons of symbols for simple ideas.  For Condillac, there is no particular reason to create new 
symbols or words.  In the section on learning science at the end of A Treatise on Systems, he 
suggests that a scientific language can be built on the foundation of French.  When setting out 
to study the sciences, Condillac admonishes his reader, “you have a language to learn,” and in 
order to learn it well, it is not enough to glance over its words; instead, you must “speak it and 
make it familiar” (152).  “Nevertheless,” he continues: 
one difficulty remains and it is a big one.  It comes from the fact that before 
studying the sciences, you already speak their language, and you speak it badly.  
For with the exception of a few words, their language is your own.  Now you 
agree that you often speak your language without really understanding what you 
are saying or that at most you understand yourself only approximately.  This is 
nevertheless sufficient for you and for others, because they pay you in coin.  It 
seems that to maintain our conversations we tacitly agreed that words can take 
the place of ideas, as in games chips take the place of money.  And although 
there is only one cry of protest against those imprudent enough to play without 
having learned the value of chips, everyone can with impunity speak without 
having learned the value of words. 
 Do you wish to learn the sciences easily?  Begin by learning your 





So concludes the book.  Condillac is suggesting that sciences can be difficult to learn because, 
however clearly an author might explain them, they involve words which most people already 
know, but to which they have not attached clear ideas.  Blind thought—treating words as 
“game chips”—is a vice for Condillac, even if it is a necessary one.  To truly understand a 
science, one must attach precise ideas to every signifier that the science uses, be they words, 
numbers, or even—as Condillac suggests in his later work—symbols like + (on numbers, see the 
Essay 204; on algebraic symbols, see Logic 408-09). 
While Condillac paid little attention to algebra in his early work, he later came to see it 
as an exemplary instance of a well-formed language (Albury 23).  In Logic, published a few 
weeks after Condillac’s death in 1780 (Albury 15), he argues that exact proofs are possible in 
algebraic notation because it is tainted by neither “vulgar words that have no determinate 
sense” nor “foreign or barbarous words that are poorly understood,” and thus capable of a 
greater degree of certainty than other languages (410).  From the success of algebra he draws 
one of his most extreme conclusions about the relationship of science and language: that 
“scientific progress depends solely on the progress of languages” (410).  Since the language of 
algebra has a superior clarity to the “jargon” of “inexact sciences,” it spreads certainty and 
enlightenment everywhere it extends (410).  This clarity, however, is not on account of the 
symbolic notation itself.  Condillac demonstrates how an equation can be solved in just the 
same way using either sentences like “Two plus three equals two lefts minus a left” or symbolic 
notations like “2 + 3 = 2𝑦 − 𝑦” (408-09), which he takes as equivalent in rigor, if not in 
convenience.  “We should not,” he writes, “suppose that the sciences are exact—or that we 





notation is that it is simple and pure, free from the confusions caused in other languages by the 
mixing of idioms and the naturalization of metaphors; if this purity could be extended to the 
languages of other sciences, they would all be subject to exact proof in the way that 
mathematics is. 
 By asserting this, Condillac is emphatically not suggesting a logical calculus of the sort 
proposed earlier by Leibniz and later by Boole.  Condillac sees algebra, like other languages, as a 
method for analyzing sensory data, and accordingly, for him, one cannot ignore the meanings 
of symbols even temporarily; the symbols must, rather, become enmeshed in the way we 
understand the world.  For this reason, Condillac rejects the idea that reasoning can take place 
through the application of formal rules.  As he states in one of the last paragraphs of Logic, it is 
a mistake to think that “for each line of reasoning, the first thing we ought to do is to think 
about the rules for pursuing it” (419).  “It is not,” he writes, “up to us to think of rules, it is up to 
them to guide us without our thinking about them.  We would not speak if, before beginning 
each sentence, we had to concern ourselves with grammar.  Now, like all languages, the art of 
reasoning, can be spoken well only insofar as it is spoken naturally” (419).  In other words, the 
rules should become habits, worn into the grain of one’s being, just like the grammar of one’s 
native language.  As a way of ensuring this deep absorption of his ideas, he prefers students 
whose habits are not yet deeply ingrained: “I write only for the uninstructed.  Since they do not 
speak any scientific language they will find it easier to learn mine.  It lies closer to hand than 
any other because I have learned it from nature, which will speak to them as it does to me” 
(419).  In Condillac’s logic—as for many logic textbooks of the eighteenth century—the point is 





memorization, but to become someone who understands and reasons about the world more 
clearly.  This means, in Condillac’s view, learning a better-formed language than the ones most 
people speak. 
 From a twenty-first-century perspective, of course, Condillac might seem to be trying 
and failing at objectivity, imposing his own linguistic preferences on others and calling it the 
voice of nature.  That Condillac was effectively colonizing the minds of his students is a fair 
criticism; that he certainly was doing.  However, to hold him to the standard of objectivity 
would be to misunderstand the epistemology in which he was working.  The procedures of 
formal logic, as it developed in the late nineteenth century, are objective in that they prevent 
one’s individual judgment from influencing the results of a deduction, but objectivity in this 
modern sense is not an important consideration for Condillac.  What is at stake is the concern 
that what Condillac calls “abstract systems” might, if one is not careful with them, become 
unconnected to the material world.  Near the end of Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge, 
Condillac argues that even the seemingly formal task of comparing ideas can be facilitated by 
the contemplation of physical objects, which “offer aid to reflection” (212).  Because well-
formed ideas are rooted in the material world, “it is not necessary for us to take the precaution, 
as some philosophers do, of withdrawing into solitude or entering a cave in order to meditate 
there by the light of a lamp.  Neither light, nor darkness, nor noise—nothing can stand in the 
way of the mind of a man who knows how to think” (212).  Even the apparently formal aspects 
of reasoning that only involve the relationships of signs are ultimately meant to gain their truth, 
in Newtonian fashion, from observations of physical things.  For its own part, the well-formed 





existing only on sheets of paper in lamp-lit rooms.  Like most other thinkers of the French 
Enlightenment, Condillac wanted to extend rationality as much to the marketplace as to the 
laboratory.  For this purpose, algorithms for manipulating symbols are not enough; logic must 
be enacted through a comprehensive program of character formation. 
 Condillac sparked, as Hans Aarsleff has discussed in “The Tradition of Condillac,” a great 
deal of debate about the origins of language in the late eighteenth century, drawing interest in 
France, Germany, and the English-speaking world (From Locke to Saussure 148).  Even among 
those who rejected his specific claims, Condillac’s version of the Newtonian method was widely 
admired (Hine 3).  His work was a major reference point for the idéologues, although, as 
Knowlson discusses in detail, they had varying appraisals of it; some, such as Maine de Biran, 
rejected Condillac’s proposition that language plays a fundamental role in reasoning, while 
others, such as Pierre Jean George Cabanis, pushed it even further, claiming (as Condillac did 
not) that signs are necessary not just for thought, but for sensation itself (Knowlson 177).  As a 
result of the work of Condillac and Locke, Knowlson writes, “the degree of influence that 
language exercised on the understanding” became a key question for philosophers in the late 
eighteenth century, leading to a renewed interest in the idea of a philosophical language in the 
1790s (165).  The problem in this late-eighteenth-century moment, however, is very different 
from the one faced by the seventeenth-century language designers.  For Bacon, as well as for 
the Royal Society of Sprat and Wilkins, signs were primarily seen as a means of communicating 
discoveries, and the goal was to make them as unobtrusive as possible.  For Condillac and his 
followers, in contrast, language is an instrument for analyzing sensory data, and, as such, the 





defining new symbols using pre-existing words is not enough; it must be possible to construct 
the language in one’s mind, along with the structure of ideas to which it is attached, from the 
ground up. 
One way of doing this, implied if not explicitly stated in Condillac’s later work, would be 
to extend the language of algebra to all areas of science.  This is the road that Condorcet took in 
his unfinished manuscript.  The extent of Condillac’s direct influence on Condorcet’s universal 
algebra is uncertain.  Granger states that Condorcet’s “philosophy of knowledge is very 
evidently of Condillacian inspiration” but notes that there is nothing in Condillac’s corpus that 
directly suggests Condorcet’s plan for a universal language (199; my translation).  Condorcet 
was lukewarm in his comments about Condillac, claiming, in a 1780 letter, that the Abbé’s work 
stated only “things that everyone had known for a long time” (quoted in Baker 116).  He did, 
however, read Condillac’s Logic (Granger 199; Baker 117), which holds up algebra as an 
example of a particularly clear language and declares that “every science would have the same 
precision if we spoke them all with well-formed languages” (410).  While he disagreed with 
Condillac on a variety of points, Condorcet shared his belief that mathematics was a language 
and that its certainty should serve as a model for all the sciences.  More importantly, the two 
thinkers shared the belief that this mathematical language ought to be built from the ground 
up—that one could and should throw out existing ways of thinking altogether and replace them 
with mathematical rationality.  Yet doing so proved easier said than done.  A well-formed 
language as Condillac describes it must connect to the concepts of the understanding and thus 





connection that Condorcet found it necessary to resort to French, despite the taint of “vulgar” 
thinking that it might introduce into his system. 
 
Three Views of Mathematical Notation 
 
In his attempt to extend the language of mathematics to all areas of life, Condorcet was riding a 
wave.  John Heilbron writes that “the later 18th century saw a rapid increase in the range and 
intensity of application of mathematical methods,” which he and his colleagues call “the 
quantifying spirit” (2).  In the later decades of the century, Heilbron argues, this turn to 
quantification responded to the increasing importance of “imponderables” like phlogiston, the 
ether, and the electrical fluid that were important to scientific theories, but that do not refer to 
anything that can be perceived directly (5).  Measuring instruments provided a way of getting at 
these (supposed) phenomena, but their results could only be analyzed quantitatively.  The 
quantifying spirit had a political bent in the time of the American and French revolutions, in that 
mathematical methods were thought to reach the naked truth irrespective of the interests of 
aristocrats and the wealthy.  In post-Revolutionary America, surveyors, under the direction of 
Thomas Jefferson, applied quantitative methods to the division of land in an effort to distribute 
it more equitably (Heilbron 15-17).  In France, Condorcet was at the forefront of a movement to 
quantify political decision-making itself through the mathematization of voting (Urken 3).  The 
assumption underlying both projects is that mathematics is immune to the biases that can 





could overcome people’s prejudices, breaking down the structures of monarchical and 
aristocratic authority with the force of undeniable truth. 
 For its most ardent supporters, the quantifying spirit provided a definitive solution to 
Bacon’s call for the study of things rather than words.  The philosophical language that Wilkins 
and Leibniz had sought a century before had been there all along, so the thinking goes, in the 
language of calculation; once everything has been measured and counted, algebra would 
provide an incontrovertible means of resolving all manner of disputes.  Condorcet’s mentor, 
Turgot, viewed mathematical language as, in Frank E. Manuel’s words, “the loftiest expression 
of human thought, at the summit of intellectuality” (43).  In Turgot’s version of Enlightenment, 
Manuel writes, “the armor of numbers and equations” was a safeguard against “antiprogressive 
forces” like the recurrence of “barbarism” (Manuel 43).  Mathematical rigor was not, however, 
by itself enough to accomplish this political program.  It was also necessary to make the results 
understandable to the public.  Even if mathematics is a perfectly precise language, that does 
not necessarily make it a universal one, and in practice, the mathematizers recognized that 
their demonstrations would be comprehensible only to a select few.  This need to make one’s 
reasoning known to the general populace raised questions about the status of mathematical 
language that Condorcet, in his attempt to accelerate the spread of quantitative rationality, had 
to contend with.  If algebra is the true language of reason, can its results be translated, as it 
were, into French or English, without losing their undeniable force?  Or, to put it more 






The French philosophes had debated these questions a few decades earlier.  In Elements 
of Philosophy (1759), Jean le Rond d’Alembert poses the question of why algebra, in spite of the 
certainty of its principles and inferences, “is not yet entirely exempt from obscurity in certain 
regards” (261; my translation).  As a specific example, d’Alembert offers negative numbers, for 
which, he writes, he does not know a single work to provide a clear theory (261n).  D’Alembert 
is referring to one of the most notorious conceptual readjustments caused by the widespread 
adoption of symbolic notation in the seventeenth century.  Antoine Arnauld, one of the authors 
of the well-known Port-Royal Logic, argued in a 1667 geometry text that, intuitively, the 
proportion of a larger number to a smaller one should be larger than the reverse (Heeffer 13).  
Yet, he points out, this is not the case with negative numbers, at least in modern symbolic 
algebra: 1/−1 =  −1/1.  The continuing debate about this seeming paradox illustrated, 
Albrecht Heeffer argues, “the clash between symbolic reasoning and classical proportion 
theory” (Heeffer 14).   The transition to symbolic mathematics fundamentally altered the 
definition of division, leading, for d’Alembert, to an epistemological gap between those who 
knew symbolic algebra and those who did algebra with words.  As an explanation of this gap, 
d’Alembert concludes that algebra is “a kind of language which has, like the others, its 
metaphysics” (262).  A person who blindly follows the rules of algebra without understanding 
this metaphysics, d’Alembert writes, “only celebrates the result” but cannot “see the germ that 
produced it” (262).  In order to genuinely understand what the results of algebra mean, one 
must learn to think within its conceptual scheme; otherwise, it will only lead to confusion. 
Condillac took an emphatic stand against this line of thinking.  In his Logic, he states: “I 





language and cannot be anything else” (410).  As W. R. Albury points out (23), two of the 
mathematicians he is referring to are d’Alembert and Alexis-Claude Clairaut, who, in his 1746 
book Elements of Algebra, calls algebra a “particular kind of language” that uses “simple signs” 
so as to make it easier to see one’s operations at a glance (3; my translation).  The distinction 
between algebra being “a kind of language” and being “a language” might seem pedantic, but 
something serious is at stake.  Condillac is attempting to argue that the way of thinking involved 
in algebra is fundamentally the same as the way people always think.  Against the objection 
that his description of “reasoning” only captures “the way we reason in mathematics, where 
reasoning is carried out with equations,” he asserts that “equations, propositions, and 
judgments are at bottom the same thing, and that consequently we reason the same way in all 
the sciences” (413).  As Albury argues, Condillac is equating two different types of analysis that 
d’Alembert, in the Encyclopédie entry for “Analytic,” distinguishes: the analysis of ideas into 
components, and algebraic analysis (17-18).  This means that, contrary to d’Alembert’s claim, all 
languages are based on the metaphysics of algebra.  While Condillac admits that algebra 
“develops lines of argument that cannot be translated into any other language” (410), this is 
not, for him, because of a fundamental difference between algebraic and natural language; 
rather, it is because algebra is better-formed than other languages.  If some algebraic results 
cannot be expressed in French, this is just because one’s French terms are not clearly defined, a 
fault that can be rectified by developing ideas in a careful, methodical way. 
Whether or not there was any direct influence, the quantifiers of late eighteenth 
century mostly shared Condillac’s optimism about the universal comprehensibility of 





calls an “equation of reason with 
mathematics” (28).  The leveling pretensions 
of Turgot and Condorcet rested on the 
assumption that the results of algebra, if not 
the proofs themselves, could be restated in 
the vernacular with their persuasive force 
intact.  Condorcet employs the rhetorical 
equation of mathematics with reason in one of 
his most influential works of “social 
mathematics,” Essay on the Application of 
Analysis to the Probability of Majority 
Decisions (1785).  In this book, he develops a 
theory of voting through densely packed formal notation, albeit not yet entirely exorcised of 
French words (Figure 14).  Recognizing the difficulty that these thickets of mathematical 
symbols will present for many of his readers, Condorcet also explains his argument non-
technically in a “Preliminary Discourse” almost as long as the main text of the book.  This way, 
he writes, “readers who are not Geometers, will only need, in order to judge the work, to admit 
as true that which is given to be proven by calculation” (ii; my translation).  Even though the 
innumerate reader will have to take Condorcet’s word that the proofs are correct, Condorcet 
does not expect much surprise as to the results: “almost everywhere one will find results 
consistent with what the simplest reason would have dictated” (ii).  The assumption is that, 
 Figure 14. Mathematical notation comingles with prose 
in Condorcet’s 1785 Essay (5). Source gallica.bnf.fr / 






even if one cannot follow the intricacies of the algebra itself, the conclusions it produces 
remain intuitively true, so closely does mathematics limn the grammar of reason. 
 But for all the confident rhetoric of the 1785 Essay, Condorcet did not accept Condillac’s 
argument that all types of analysis were equivalent, and he saw more value than Condillac did 
in imposing rules upon thought as a way of preventing error.  As Baker points out, Condorcet’s 
goal in his universal language project was to extend the certainty of mathematical analysis to 
areas of inquiry that were ordinarily the domain of other, less reliable forms of analysis (Baker 
117).  Doing so led him to the possibility of turning reasoning into a mechanical process, which 
Baker takes as evidence of proto-computational thinking (114).  Yet there is an important 
difference between Condorcet’s universal language project and the instrumental approach to 
computation that took hold in the nineteenth century.  Mechanical implements for reasoning, 
Condorcet writes in a late fragment, “would appear ridiculous” until the “tables” of 
classification on which they are based are proven worthy by experience (quoted by Baker 124).  
Mechanizing thought, for Condorcet, is only possible after one has established a clearly defined 
system of signs.  For eighteenth-century empiricists, the establishment of signification was a 
problem not just for utopian language schemes, but also for the mechanical methods employed 
in mathematics itself.  The positions of Condillac and d’Alembert betray a common desire to 
avoid a third possibility that was troubling from the point of view of empiricism: that 
mathematical notation is not a language at all, that its symbols have no referential relation to 
any conceptual scheme, vulgar or not.  A third view that was present in the eighteenth 
century—to a teleological reading of history, a seed waiting to grow into the computer—was 





 As much as eighteenth-century mathematicians insisted that their work rested on clear 
concepts and self-evident principles, their practice consisted to a large extent of rearranging 
patterns of symbols on paper or slate.  Notation was especially important in the calculus, 




 and ∫ 𝑦𝑑𝑥, reigned supreme.  The Leibnizian version of the calculus provided a set 
of algorithmic or partially algorithmic procedures for the two basic operations of calculus—
differentiation and integration—that enabled people to produce correct results even in cases so 
complex as to be virtually impossible to reason about conceptually.32  Euler’s work of the 1740s 
and 50s was an especially strong illustration of the power of symbolic methods.  But the 
rationale for these methods was missing.  Leibniz could explain the power of his symbols in 
terms of his idea of blind thought; the symbols, he could argue, constituted a non-arbitrary 
mode of representation whose workings existed in intimate relation to the natures of things.  
Yet by the 1760s, little faith remained in the power of real characters.  The combination of 
Leibnizian methods with Lockean and Cartesian epistemologies produced a gap between theory 
and practice that was largely unresolved in the late eighteenth century.  In effect, people were 
still using Leibniz’s algorithms even though the rationalist metaphysics by which Leibniz himself 
had justified them had collapsed.  The methods worked, apparently, but no one had a fully 
convincing explanation of why they worked. 
The problems were not simply theoretical.  Useful as they are, Leibniz’s symbols can 









point), appears to be a quotient of two numbers, and in some ways it works similarly to one; 
yet what it represents is not quite the same as division in the usual sense.  In the Leibnizian 
calculus, the 𝑑𝑦 and 𝑑𝑥 are supposed to represent infinitely small quantities, which, as Berkeley 
had pointed out, cannot be reasoned about in the same way that ordinary numbers can be.33  
Treating these symbols as if they behave like normal quantities can lead to contradictory 
results.  If one supposes, for instance, that 
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑥 = 𝑑𝑦—something that would be true for 
ordinary, non-zero numbers—then one can easily use the calculus to prove that 1 = 2.34  A fully 
rigorous theory of what one can and cannot legitimately do with Leibniz’s symbols was not in 
place until the work of nineteenth-century mathematicians such as Bernard Bolzano, Augustin-
Louis Cauchy, and Karl Weierstrass, who developed the version of the calculus that is now 
standard in mathematics textbooks.35 
In Condorcet’s time, there were several competing explanations of why the calculus 
worked that all had unresolved difficulties.  One of the preëminent theories was d’Alembert’s.  
In the Encyclopédie, D’Alembert attempted to explain “the metaphysics of the differential 
calculus”; since, he argues, the calculus provides simple methods that work with certainty, “the 
principles on which it depends must also be simple and certain” (4.985; my translation).  
D’Alembert’s theory is based on the notion of the limit, which he explains, in the article for 
“Limite,” in terms of the idea of one quantity “approaching” another—so that an infinitesimal is 
a quantity that “approaches” zero (9.542).  D’Alembert’s theory anticipates the famous epsilon–
delta definition, which Bolzano formalized in 1817 and which forms the basis of modern 
calculus.36  Yet there is an important epistemological difference between d’Alembert and 





“metaphysics”—a system of ideas that would ground the algorithms of the calculus in a clear 
conceptual basis.  Whether the idea of one quantity “approaching” another really met this 
standard of clarity was open to dispute.  Around the end of the eighteenth century, Joseph-
Louis Lagrange developed an alternate theory that aimed to root calculus in algebra, a view of 
which Charles Babbage was a late holdout (Robinson 267; Grattan-Guinness, “Babbage” 36).  
Since one’s choice between the two theories rested on which ideas one thought were clearer, 
the disputes were endless.37 
One reason for the ongoing difficulties in the foundation of the calculus was that, for 
both the Condillac and the d’Alembert factions, algorithmic procedures had to derive their 
validity in some way from the natures of physical things.38  Enlightenment mathematicians 
responded to the empiricist challenge by depicting mathematical ideas as abstractions from 
experience, applicable with a great deal of generality but still ultimately rooted in sensory data.  
As d’Alembert writes in the Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopédie, geometry arises when 
“by a few successive operations and abstractions of our minds we divest matter of almost all its 
sensible properties, in order to envisage in a sense only its phantom” (19).  Algebra, he 
continues, is “the farthest outpost to which the contemplation of the properties of matter can 
lead us” (20); yet, as Amir Alexander has pointed out, he ultimately suggests that it retains a 
connection to the physical world (see Alexander, “From Voyagers to Martys” 21).  A similar 
statement appears in Diderot’s dialogue D’Alembert’s Dream: “Every abstraction is merely a 
symbol devoid of particularized meaning.  Every abstract science is simply juggling with 
symbols.  The exact picture was dropped when the symbol was separated from the physical 





the science once again becomes a matter of real things” (221-22).  It was a difficult question, 
however, how to ensure the possibility of this return to the world of “real things” in a field that 
increasingly involved the shuffling-around of symbols on sheets of paper. 
For some, the answer was simply to avoid depending on symbols.  In the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, there was a reaction against symbolic algebra, 
especially in Britain.  Leading the anti-symbolic charge was Isaac Newton.  While he did use 
algebraic notation, Newton was skeptical of methods that depend heavily on it, a skepticism 
that was exarcerbated by his priority dispute with Leibniz.  In a 1715 Philosophical Transactions 
article discussing this dispute, Newton declared in the third person that “Mr. Newton doth not 
place his Method in Forms of Symbols, nor confine himself to any particular Sort of Symbols for 
Fluents and Fluxions” (quoted by Cajori II.200).  Rather than employing symbolic forms as a 
method of demonstration, Newton preferred to make his arguments through geometrical 
diagrams when possible.  This preference for the visual, as Douglas M. Jesseph argues, reflects 
an empiricist desire to root mathematics in physical forms and motions rather than in abstract 
notions of quantity (279-80).  The influential Scottish mathematician Colin MacLaurin promoted 
Newton’s geometric approach into the 1740s, presenting the computations of the calculus, as 
Guicciardini writes, not “as blind manipulations of symbols, but rather as a meaningful language 
that could always be translated into the terminology of the kinematic-geometric model” 
(Guicciardini, “Dot-Age” 239-40).  In Newton’s immediate followers we already see the idea, 
later repeated in Condillac, that mathematical notation is a language like any other, more a 
means of representation than of computation.  For Newton and MacLaurin, equations are 





Newton’s skepticism toward symbolic methods had a precedent in an earlier critique 
made by his countryman Thomas Hobbes.  In a 1656 pamphlet titled Six Lessons to 
the Professors of the Mathematiques, Hobbes made perhaps the early-modern period’s most 
vicious statement against algebraic notation.  Hobbes’s pamphlet is primarily an attack on a 
geometrical treatise by John Wallis, who, as I mentioned in Chapter 1, was an enthusiastic user 
of symbolic methods.  Hobbes deplores the way in which Wallis’s book “is so covered over with 
the scab of Symbols” and states that algebraic notations “ought no more to appear in publique, 
then the most deformed necessary business which you do in your Chambers” (Six Lessons 49, 
23; see Alexander, Infinitesimal 280 and Pycior 146).  Hobbes’s view seems to be that algebraic 
notation is acceptable as an aid in the performance of mathematical reasoning, but not as a 
means of public argumentation.  In Elements of Philosophy, he divides symbols into two 
categories—“Markes,” which one creates for one’s own use, and “Signes,” through which one 
may share information with others (11).39  His criticism of Wallis suggest that he views 
mathematical symbols primarily as marks and, accordingly, not as an appropriate means of 
communication.  Further, Hobbes suggests in his pamphlet that the meaningfulness of 
mathematical symbols is ultimately dependent on natural language: 
Symboles though they shorten the writing, yet they do not make the Reader 
understand it sooner than if it were written in words.  For the conception of the 
Lines and Figures (without which a man learneth nothing) must proceed from 
words, either spoken or thought upon.  So that there is a double labour of the 
mind, one to reduce your Symboles to words (which are also Symboles) another 





This statement turns Bacon’s idea of a real character inside out.  Rather than circumventing the 
need for words, Hobbes argues, mathematical symbols add an extra, unnecessary step into the 
signification process.  Algebraic notation could have some use in one’s “private” reckonings, but 
it is of no epistemic significance—when it comes to demonstrating a mathematical truth, the 
important action takes place in the mind, where, according to Hobbes, natural language is the 
name of the game. 
Hobbes’s attack on Wallis illustrates an aspect of early-modern attitudes toward 
algorithms that may seem paradoxical from a modern perspective: that some of the strongest 
opposition to algorithmic methods came from philosophers who were deeply committed to 
mechanical views of the world.  After 1800 or so, algorithmic methods came to be seen as a key 
part of “mechanical” philosophies like utilitarianism, an association that was encouraged by 
industrialists like Charles Babbage.  But in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, this 
association did not always hold.  In Elements of Philosophy, which was published the same year 
as his attack on Wallis, Hobbes begins his discussion of logic with the more-or-less 
unprecedented statement that all human thought consists of mathematical operations: “By 
RATIOCINATION, I mean Computation.  Now to compute, is either to collect the sum of many 
things that are added together, or to know what remains when one thing is taken out of 
another.  Ratiocination therefore is the same with Addition and Substraction” (2-3; see also 
Leviathan 22-23).  Such views echoed in the French Enlightenment; in La Langue des calculs, 
Condillac asserts that “to calculate is to reason, and to reason is to calculate” (150; my 
translation).  But unlike contemporary computationalism—that is, the philosophical school that 





not necessarily lend themselves to developing algorithms.  If human thought is already a 
computational process, then creating additional mechanical systems of computation is 
redundant.   
This lack of interest in algorithms, which stemmed in part from a generalized opposition 
to imposing rules on thought, had a significant degree of influence in the eighteenth century.  
As I discuss in more detail in Chapter 3, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century logicians 
launched a sustained attack on the system of formal rules that constituted Scholastic logic.  One 
participant in this attack, Locke, advocates teaching by example rather than by rule, since habits 
become more deeply ingrained than statements committed to memory: “Children are not to be 
taught by Rules which will be always slipping out of their Memories.  What you think necessary 
for them to do, settle in them by an indispensible Practice, as often as the Occasion returns; 
and if it be possible, make Occasions.  This will beget Habits in them, which being once 
establish’d, operate of themselves easily and naturally, without the Assistance of the Memory” 
(Some Thoughts 39).  Immanuel Kant states a similar view in his 1784 essay “What is 
Enlightenment?”: “Dogmas [Satzungen] and formulas [Formeln], those mechanical aids to 
rational use (or rather misuse) of [individual man’s] natural endowments, are the ball and chain 
of his permanent immaturity” (54-55).  The Enlightenment elevated natural reason above the 
logical formalism of the Scholastics, and the idea that the human mind needed artificial aids like 
algorithms to discover the truth was anathema. 
By the 1780s, however, Leibniz’s algorithms for calculus had attained a secure place in 
the mathematical canon.  Symbolic notation was simply too useful to abjure, and Euler had 





inaccessible (Guicciardini, “Dot-Age” 244).  A key sign of the change was that, by 1780 or so, 
mathematics textbooks had stopped explaining the value of algebraic symbols; by the later 
decades of the eighteenth century, the need for notation was a given.  This raised again the 
problem of establishing trust in the method, which from an empiricist perspective meant linking 
it to the senses.  An important consequence of this theoretical need to assign meanings to 
symbols is that, in eighteenth-century empiricism, mathematical reasoning is fundamentally 
dependent on the concepts by which one thinks about the physical world.  There is thus more 
at stake in the dispute between Condillac and d’Alembert than the question of translatability—
it also bears on the reliability of symbolic mathematics itself.  If Condillac is right, then symbolic 
methods are admissible so long as one explains them clearly using terms that are rooted in 
sensory experience, and it is not particularly important which language one uses to do this so 
long as one’s approach is methodical.  If d’Alembert is right, however, mathematics constitutes 
an entirely separate theory of the world from the ones embedded in natural languages, and so 
the excessive reliance on words in explaining mathematical symbols is suspect.  If, as we trace 
our mathematical ideas back to the senses, we find that it is not mathematics all the way down, 
that our notions are based in “vulgar” thinking rather than the true metaphysics of algebra, this 
is a sign, in d’Alembert’s view, that our understanding is confused. 
Condorcet’s last writings suggest a mounting anxiety about this potential for the errors 
embedded in ordinary language to infect mathematical reasoning.  In his 1785 Essay, he is 
confident that mathematical results can be clearly communicated in plain French; circa 1793, 
he takes extreme measures to exorcise French from mathematics altogether.  It makes 





he came to see rationality as something more rarified than he had earlier in his life, something 
that requires a greater amount of discipline to attain.40  As Sophia Rosenfeld argues, after the 
French Revolution began to fragment, many began to blame the mounting factionalism on the 
fundamental slipperiness of terms like liberté and égalité (2).  Bacon’s idols of the market had 
become not just a problem for science, but a political issue with life or death consequences.  In 
this context, it is not surprising that Condorcet’s Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of 
the Human Mind, written while the Revolution was at its deadliest, repeatedly celebrates 
moments in history where linguistic confusions were removed, even congratulating the 
Scholastics—so often condemned for their endless verbal disputes—for clarifying “the different 
senses that may be affixed to the word liberty” (140).  Condorcet’s universal algebra was 
supposed to solve the problem of language once and for all by introducing one of the most 
extreme forms of equality imaginable—equality of ideas.  The universal language would, to 
recall the definition quoted above, firmly attach signs either to “direct objects” or “those well-
defined collections constituted of simple and general ideas, which are to be found or may be 
introduced equally in the understandings of all mankind” (286).  Instituting this scheme would 
require not only teaching everyone the same words or symbols, but inserting the same 
mathematically rigorous concepts into every individual’s mind. 
Condorcet’s philosophical language scheme is an extreme response to the anxiety about 
the role words play in the formation of mathematical ideas.  Most empiricist thinkers of the 
time advocated more moderate linguistic reforms.  But the view that mathematical reasoning 
was fundamentally dependent on language was widespread in the late eighteenth century.  





requires words—and preferably, it requires clearly defined ones.  The desire to create words 
that are adequate for the purposes of science produced a genre of its own. 
 
Lavoisier: From Real Characters to Well-Formed Words 
 
If Condorcet’s attempt to turn algebra into a full-fledged language proved to be, like Pound’s 
Mauberley, wrong from the start, the development of modern chemical terminology shows 
eighteenth-century theories of semiotics at their most effective.  The chemical formulas that 
are now a familiar part of high-school science and popular culture—H2O and C8H10N4O2—were 
introduced by Jöns Jacob Berzelius in 1813, but much of the conceptual apparatus underlying 
them was constructed around the 1780s.  Prior to the late eighteenth century, the concepts of 
hydrogen and oxygen simply did not exist; people thought of air as an indivisible element, not 
as a mixture of multiple gasses.  The fact that oxygen, hydrogen, and nitrogen gas could not be 
directly perceived in the course of ordinary experience meant that these concepts could not be 
built up through simple ostension (that is, by pointing and saying “that stuff”); a more complex 
conceptual and instrumental armature was needed.  But defining the elements in terms of 
distinguishing qualities was not a simple matter.  Bringing the new system of elements into 
being would require reconstructing the conceptual structure with which people think about 
substances.  For some, this provided an opportunity to put Condillac’s theories of language and 
education to the test.  The example of Lavoisier shows that Enlightenment theories of the sign 





The so-called chemical revolution 
was, by some accounts, the only major 
scientific revolution of the eighteenth 
century (see Donovan 1).  It was in the late 
eighteenth century that the classical theory 
of the four elements—fire, water, earth, and 
air—gave way to modern chemical terms.  
One of the most venerable real characters 
was a casualty of this revolution.  The occult 
symbols of alchemy, which can be found in 
Isaac Newton’s manuscripts and numerous 
early-modern books of “secrets” (Figure 15), 
provided an international language of 
chemical substances and operations, albeit 
one that was known only to a select few.  
Although they were fairly standardized in the early-modern period, these symbols were, from 
the perspective of the new chemistry, based on unclear concepts and faulty thinking about the 
natures of substances.  By the 1780s, a number of experiments had rendered the old system of 
elements untenable.  In the early 1770s, Joseph Priestley and Antoine Lavoisier discovered 
methods of isolating various gasses from air; in 1783, Lavoisier and his colleague Pierre-Simon 
Laplace demonstrated that water, which was previously held to be one of the four fundamental 
elements, is a compound of what are now called hydrogen and oxygen (Donovan 154).  These 
 Figure 15. Table of alchemical symbols from the 1670 book 
Basilius Valentinus […] His Last Will and Testament (n.p.). 






discoveries, for many young chemists, provided definitive proof that the system of alchemical 
symbols was misguided.  Lavoisier stood at the forefront of a movement to replace the real 
characters of alchemy with—in characteristically eighteenth-century fashion—a well-formed 
language. 
Lavoisier’s project is as good an illustration as any of the difference between the 
attitudes toward signs that prevailed in Bacon’s time and those of Condillac’s followers.  Real 
characters, which seemed, for many in the seventeenth century, a more reliable alternative to 
words, had lost much of their magic in the late eighteenth century.  The idea of a character that 
referred directly to ideas rather than to words was, to be sure, still around; in 1797, Joseph de 
Maimieux introduced a new sort of a priori language called pasigraphy, which offered a set of 
ideographic symbols that were supposed to be comprehensible to speakers of any language.  
But these latter-day universal languages had much narrower ambitions than the real characters 
of Wilkins and Leibniz.  Pasigraphies were mainly meant to facilitate international 
communication, and they were not, as Wilkins’s Real Character was, intended to limn the true 
structure of the world.  In the late eighteenth century, symbols were no longer regarded as a 
way to bypass language altogether, but rather were seen as another sort of signifier, subject to 
the same uncertainties as natural language.  For Condorcet, this meant that an effort had to be 
made to ensure that algebraic symbols have clear meanings.  For Lavoisier, it meant that words 
could serve the purposes of science just as well as special symbols like , , and , so long as 
they are attached to a well-formed system of ideas. 
Lavoisier set out for himself, from the very beginning of his scientific career, the 





empirical observation than the old alchemical methods.  Lavoisier came from a well-off family 
of Parisian lawyers and bureaucrats, and from a young age he balanced aspirations to public 
office with lofty intellectual goals.  As he recalled in the early 1790s, after completing four years 
of courses with eminent chemists of the time, the young Antoine concluded that the science 
“was founded on only a few facts” and “was composed of absolutely incoherent ideas and 
unproven suppositions” (quoted by Donovan 47).  Lavoisier represented his work as a new 
approach to chemistry founded on the methods of experimental physics, especially the 
Newtonian method of drawing generalizations from empirical observations.  In a 1773 
manuscript that was published in the nineteenth century, Lavoisier claimed that his work would 
produce “a revolution in physics and chemistry” (quoted by Donovan 104).  An important part 
of this “revolution” would be a new system of nomenclature to replace the old symbols.  
Lavoisier first announced his linguistic project in 1782, but he did not begin campaigning 
seriously until a few years later.  He publicized his plan in an April 1787 address before the 
French Academy of Sciences entitled “The Need to Reform and Improve Chemical 
Nomenclature.”  In this address, Lavoisier calls for improvements to both the language and the 
method of chemistry.  Citing Condillac’s Logic, he declares that languages are “veritable analytic 
methods, with the aid of which we proceed from the known to the unknown,” as a result of 
which “it is important that these instruments be the best that is possible” (V.356-57; my 
translation).  Lavoisier’s purpose was to institute a new, clearer set of terms for chemistry, and, 
in doing so, render the old, “incoherent” ideas of alchemy obsolete. 
In characteristic fashion for one of the bureaucrat-scientists of pre-Revolutionary 





been collaborating intensively with three other chemists, Guyton de Morveau, Berthollet, and 
Fourcroy, to design a new array of words to describe chemical elements and compounds.  
While Guyton, as well as Pierre Macquer and Torbern Bergman, had already made forays into 
the revision of chemical terms (Knowlson 173), none were as authoritative as the effort of this 
group.  Their work was published in 1787 as Method of Chemical Nomenclature, and it bore the 
approval of a committee formed by the French Academy of Sciences.  As Jonathan Simon 
argues, the 1787 Method had a greater degree of authority than these previous reforms due to 
the official backing of the Academy (Simon 206).  While Lavoisier was careful not to offend 
those members of the Academy who rejected the new chemistry, the new terminology that the 
Method presented was theoretically loaded.  As Arthur Donovan writes, it was also “an 
ambitious effort to convince, and to a degree compel, all chemists to adopt Lavoisier’s new 
theories and the methods on which they were based” (157).  The project’s consonance with the 
absolutist logic of the Bourbon monarchy is clear: by promoting the new terminology, they 
promoted their new theory, and by securing for it an institutional sanction, they installed their 
theory as the official doctrine of the French chemistry community. 
Lavoisier gives a more detailed philosophical justification of this project in his later 
publications.  In the winter of 1789, just a few months before the storming of the Bastille, he 
published an expanded version of his 1787 address under the title Traité élémentaire de chimie, 
translated into English the next year as Elements of Chemistry.  In the preface to this text, 
Lavoisier enthusiastically yokes the terminological reform with Condillac’s philosophy, including 
the controversial remarks about algebra in Logic.  On the first page, Lavoisier cites four “maxims 





We think only through the medium of words. — Languages are true analytical 
methods. — Algebra, which is adapted to its purpose in every species of 
expression, in the most simple, most exact, and best manner possible, is at the 
same time a language and an analytical method. — The art of reasoning is 
nothing more than a language well arranged.  (xiii-xiv) 
From these maxims, Lavoisier deduces “[t]he impossibility of separating the nomenclature of a 
science from the science itself” (xiv).  Since, he writes, “ideas are preserved and communicated 
by means of words, it necessarily follows that we cannot improve the language of any science 
without at the same time improving the science itself; neither can we, on the other hand, 
improve a science, without improving the language or nomenclature which belongs to it” (xiv-
xv).  Since science is, in Condillacian terms, a well-formed language, the idea of pursuing 
research in the new chemistry without using the new terminology is incoherent, as is the 
reverse.  The science and its terminology, Lavoisier suggests, are one. 
To an extent, Lavoisier’s appropriation of Condillac’s philosophy was a rhetorical ploy.  
Donovan suggests that Condillac merely provided a familiar reference point by which Lavoisier 
could get his ideas across to the members of the Academy, among whom Condillac was a 
generally admired figure (162-63).  But Lavoisier’s approach to nomenclature was, if not directly 
inspired by Condillac’s thought, very much in step with it.  The words would be, as they must in 
a Condillacian program, backed up with well-formed ideas, and they would thus encapsulate 
both the theories and the methods of the new chemistry.  Lavoisier and his group attempted to 
create terms whose derivations would give clues as to their meaning, which they did through 





makes acid.  The word itself is a capsule summary of one of Lavoisier’s theories (in this case, 
one that was eventually proven false).  The new terminology thus constitutes a sort of 
epistemic Trojan horse that would introduce the ideas of the new chemistry into any text that 
used it.  Lavoisier backed up the reform of the language of chemistry with a program of 
education that was meant to ensure that the thinking of young chemists would not be tainted 
by the old alchemical terms.  As Lavoisier declares in the preface to Elements of Chemistry: 
“When we begin the study of any science, we are in a situation, respecting that science, similar 
to that of children; and the course by which we have to advance is precisely the same which 
Nature follows in the formation of their ideas” (xvi).  By developing the principles of the science 
in the student’s mind from this child-like beginning, the text would remake chemistry from the 
ground up on a sturdier foundation. 
Regardless of its “revolutionary” implications for chemistry, Lavoisier’s program did not 
suit the climate of opinion in France after the political revolution began in 1789.  Lavoisier’s 
approach to administering linguistic reform, with its dependence on the authority of a royally 
sanctioned institution, was a product of the pre-Revolutionary context in which he came of age.  
Although Lavoisier tentatively supported the creation of a new constitutional monarchy in the 
early days of the Revolution, he also had ties to the old regime through his bourgeois 
upbringing and his membership in the Order of Barristers (Donovan 19-24).  His conception of 
science combined an ideal of knowledge for its own sake with a notion of civic utility, a 
combination that perfectly suited the social structures of Bourbon France, with its tensions 
between the top-down administrative projects of the monarchy and the decentralized power of 





scrutiny, Lavoisier attempted to position himself as the architect of the educational system of 
the new order.  In 1793, he authored a report to the National Convention titled Reflections on 
Public Instruction, in which he extended the Condillacian theories of his chemistry texts into a 
general program of national education (Poirier 342).  But in spite of his attempts to establish his 
standing in the new regime, Lavoisier was never in favor with the Jacobins.  In part because of 
his connection to the Order of Barristers, and in part because he owned a share of the 
Company of General Farmers—a tax-collecting organization of the old regime—the deck was 
stacked against him.  In November 1793, he was arrested for violating the public trust, and on 
May 8, 1794, he faced the guillotine, becoming one of the Revolution’s most notorious 
casualties. 
 In spite of the destruction of their institutional support structure during the Reign of 
Terror, Lavoisier’s reforms had a lasting effect on the field of chemistry.  They did, however, 
face some opposition among those interested in the science.  Lavoisier’s program raises a 
similar question to the one that Descartes had raised in his letter to Mersenne: does it make 
sense to create new terms before the theory is perfected?  Thomas Jefferson, during his time in 
Paris, made such an argument about the new chemical nomenclature (see Donovan 72).  In a 
1788 letter to James Madison, Jefferson calls the reform “premature”: 
It is probably an age too soon to propose the establishment of system [sic].  The 
attempt therefore of Lavoisier to reform the Chemical nomenclature is 
premature.  One single experiment may destroy the whole filiation of his terms, 
and his string of Sulfates, Sulfites, and Sulfures may have served no other end 





of which time will be requisite to extricate us.  (Jefferson to Madison, 19 July 
1788) 
A few months later, Jefferson reiterated his argument in a letter to James Currie, calling the 
terminology “premature, insufficient, and false,” and noting that the publications written using 
Lavoisier’s terms “must be translated into the ordinary chemical language before they will be 
useful” (Jefferson to Currie, 20 December 1788).  Jefferson’s point is that, loaded with new 
theories that had not yet stood the test of time, the new terms could make matters worse; if 
Lavoisier’s theory of chemistry did not turn out to be “la vraie philosophie,” as Descartes had 
put it, the reform would only lead to more confusion. 
Jefferson’s rejection of the new system of chemical terms could easily be dismissed as a 
misjudgment.  Contrary to Jefferson’s prediction, Lavoisier’s nomenclature has by and large 
proven durable, even in some cases where the theories underlying it did not.  But there is a 
political, as well as a scientific, import to Jefferson’s disagreement with Lavoisier that is 
deserving of consideration.  While Jefferson admired and was on friendly terms with Lavoisier 
(see Adams 43), the two had very different linguistic ideologies.  Lavoisier—as well as 
Condorcet, with different aims—supported d’Alembert’s view that the learned had the 
responsibility to “legislate for the rest of the nation in matters of philosophy and taste” (quoted 
in Donovan 161).  Jefferson’s well-known writings on language present a very different view of 
how language change happens.  In an 1820 letter to John Adams, Jefferson declared himself “a 
friend to neology”—that is, to the coining of new words—yet Jefferson was also fixated on the 
purity of Anglo-Saxon roots, and he granted languages a kind of immunological ability to reject 





speaks a language, not a central organization like the French Academy, should be the tribunal 
that will ultimately judge which new words are acceptable and which are not. 
Jefferson’s disagreement with Lavoisier rests on the division between the voluntarist 
and involuntarist theories of language that coexisted in the eighteenth century.  Condillac, 
Condorcet, and Lavoisier all treat language primarily as something that exists inside an 
individual’s head and assume that is capable of revision whenever one desires; but a language 
can also be viewed as a historical phenomenon, shared by a community and subject to forces 
that are, at least in most cases, beyond the control of any individual.  Empasizing one or the 
other of these aspects of language leads to very different attitudes toward linguistic reform 
projects.  Referring specifically to the French tradition, Jessica Riskin identifies these two 
different tendencies in eighteenth-century linguistic as the “social” and the “cultural.”  The 
social approach, which was, Riskin argues, the one taken by Lavoisier and his collaborators, 
involved “deliberately orchestrated, rather than organically arising, human activity” and treated 
signs as “deliberately chosen” (210; 217).  By contrast, in the cultural approach, “one did not 
deliberately invent customs, manners of thought, or sciences according to first principles, but 
only fostered their natural growth” (208).  These differing views of language’s artificiality have 
epistemological and political consequences in equal measure.  Social, voluntarist approaches to 
language like Lavoisier’s were conducive to centralized administrations, such as the ones 
supported by the Bourbons in France, Frederick II’s supporters in Germany, and the Federalists 
like John Adams in the United States; they could also fit in with radical Enlightenment projects 
like Condorcet’s universal algebra, which he could justify imposing on people by contending 





fit better with popular sovereignty and the anti-Federalism of Jefferson, treating language as 
the collective property of a people. 
Since eighteenth-century linguistic thought made no sharp distinction between ordinary 
language and special-purpose notations, these competing linguistic ideologies could apply to 
what Condillac called “the language of calculation” as much as they could to the languages 
people speak; the choice between voluntarism and involuntarism thus had important 
implications for the status of algorithms.  The next chapter examines these implications by 
contrasting two very different thinkers who took opposite sides in the debate—Lord Stanhope 
and Johann Gottfried Herder.  Although Stanhope is a far more obscure figure than Herder, his 
work is, to my knowledge, the only example of an actual attempt to mechanize reasoning on 
the basis of Enlightenment epistemology.  In line with his radical politics, Stanhope’s “reasoning 
machine” is not just meant to produce results, but rather to enlighten—to provide people with 
a new, rational set of concepts that will replace the unclear concepts that exist in present 
political discourse.  Herder’s cultural view of language, which emphasized the inextricability of 
individual modes of thought from collectivity and from history, undermines the universalist 
basis of Stanhope’s program.  In linguistics, it was ultimately Herder’s side that won out.  But 
prior to the triumph of linguistic involuntarism, possibilities were imaginable that have now 
moved to the margins.  Right as Herder may have been that language is a collective 
phenomenon, incapable of being rebuilt from the ground up, this recognition came at the cost 
of foreclosing the possibility that new symbolic systems could serve the end of mending 





Chapter 3: Logic Machines in the Age of Reason 
 
What is their deduction of metaphysical attributes but a shuffling and matching of pedantic 
dictionary-adjectives, aloof from morals, aloof from human needs, something that might be 
worked out from the mere word ‘God’ by one of those logical machines of wood and brass 
which recent ingenuity has contrived as well as by a man of flesh and blood.  They have the trail 
of the serpent over them. 
—William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience 
 
The Gold Standard 
 
If Condorcet’s universal algebra shows that Enlightenment thinkers were far more skeptical 
about algorithms than Leibniz was, the work of Charles Mahon, Third Earl of Stanhope shows 
how credulous they could be about the possibility of discarding the past.  Stanhope created 
several calculating machines starting around 1770 and experimented, around the turn of the 
century, with doing something much more ambitious.41  An anonymous 1818 obituary in Annals 
of Philosophy explained it this way: “It has been asserted, upon grave authority, that his 
Lordship conceived the possibility of forming a reasoning machine, by which the results of 
certain combinations of ideas, or of elementary propositions, might be ascertained with as 
much ease and accuracy as those of figures” (“Biographical Account of Lord Stanhope” 85; the 
“grave authority” is perhaps Richard Phillips, who discusses Stanhope’s device in the book 





as we might understand the term today.  He did, however, conceive of what Martin Gardner 
calls a logic machine—“a device, electrical or mechanical, designed specifically for solving 
problems in formal logic” (xiii).  Between around 1801 and 1811, he constructed a series of 
devices that he called Demonstrators based on a logical theory that he had been working on 
since the 1770s.  These devices were supposed to cut through the pedantry and complexity of 
Aristotelian logic, making the truth or falsity of chains of reasoning plain to all; and further, 
Stanhope claimed that they would do this “by means of a symbol purely mechanical, and 
without using any of those symbols which are called words” (quoted by Wess 385).  Like 
Condorcet, Stanhope was attempting to make a radical break from the past modes of thought 
in the name of social revolution—a goal that tethered his system to a voluntarist view of 
language that was rapidly losing its foothold in the early 1800s.  Stanhope’s project stands as a 
rare attempt to mechanize thought on the basis of Enlightenment universalism, an 
epistemology that places algorithmic processes in a radically different relation to culture from 
the one that now obtains. 
Stanhope’s reasons for building “reasoning machines” can only be understood in the 
context of the British political radicalism of the early Romantic period.  Stanhope was one of the 
few members of the British House of Lords to support the French Revolution, and he kept up 
his support for it long after most English radicals had jumped the ship.  The “Jacobin Earl,” as his 
contemporaries called him, had personal ties to Condorcet, la Rochefoucauld, and other French 
figures involved in the Revolution (G. Stanhope and Gooch 110-12), and immediately after the 
storming of the Bastille, he became the London Revolution Society’s envoy to the French 





replacing existing modes of social organization with more rational ones, the Demonstrator is 
meant as a way of dispelling the “prejudices” and “superstitions” of the past.  Underlying this 
political program was a belief that the machine was founded on the universal teachings of 
reason, on the basis of which Stanhope envisioned the possibility of establishing a perfect 
correspondence between its workings and the ideas that exist in people’s heads—a process 
that would, if carried out successfully, be primarily a matter of changing how people think. 
 While Stanhope’s work occasionally shows up in discussions of early computing 
machines, the moment in which he lived has largely been overlooked in accounts of the 
philosophical roots of computation.  Standard histories of the computer tend to focus primarily 
on thinkers with hierarchical, anti-democratic views of society, notably Leibniz and Babbage, 
mostly overlooking the radical thought in which Stanhope was immersed.  David Golumbia, in 
The Cultural Logic of Computation, traces the ideology of computationalism to the philosophies 
of Leibniz and Hobbes, thinkers that, in his view, exemplify the political tendency that “we 
typically think of as the right, or conservatism, or Tory politics, or in our day […] neoliberalism” 
(9); against this conservative strain he constructs an anti-mechanistic liberal tradition including 
Locke, Hume, and Kant.  Stanhope does not clearly fit into either of the traditions Golumbia 
describes.  Epistemologically, he was broadly in line with Locke, and politically, he was as far left 
as the British parliamentary politics of the time allowed; yet he was committed to the idea that 
human thought was equivalent to a process that could literally be mechanized.  The example of 
Stanhope shows that radical thought was not incompatible with mechanical computation—it 
just required a very different approach from the one that modern computers have taken.  





labor, but are rather designed to lay their workings bare; the machine was not supposed to 
serve as a “black box” that spits out answers to questions, but rather to rationally persuade 
people by means of mechanical processes that were, in Stanhope’s view, embodiments of 
universal reason. 
In this chapter, I explore the implications of radical Enlightenment thought for the 
possibility of creating a “reasoning machine” by considering Stanhope’s work alongside that of 
another thinker—Johann Gottfried Herder—who reached the opposite conclusion about 
whether mechanical processes could serve the end of Enlightenment.  While Stanhope and 
Herder were very different thinkers emerging from different national contexts, they were both 
strongly influenced by Condillac, and yet they took his ideas in opposite directions.  The critical 
difference that made the mechanization of thought plausible for Stanhope but not for Herder, I 
argue, was Stanhope’s acceptance of linguistic voluntarism.  For Stanhope, as for Condillac, 
language was an artificial phenomenon, and it was accordingly possible to create a new 
language by a feat of mental discipline; one could thus establish agreement about what the 
symbols meant by developing their meanings methodically from first principles.  Herder, on the 
other hand, argued that language and thought were fundamentally historical and that one’s 
cultural background exerted an influence on one’s way of thinking that could not be overcome 
by such an analytical method.  From Stanhope’s perspective, this argument would pose a fatal 
threat.  If, as Herder suggested, the ways people think cannot easily be reduced to a set of 
mechanical laws, then a “reasoning machine” is less a means of social leveling, as Stanhope 
certainly intended his Demonstrator to be, than an expression of “arbitrary power”—an 





scientific knowledge, but to enlighten, the Demonstrator sank or swum based on whether its 
workings reflected the undeniable teachings of universal reason. 
 From a practical perspective, it sank.  Like most of Stanhope’s projects, the 
Demonstrator logic met with a mixed reaction (see Wess 375-76).  The 1818 obituary was not 
very sanguine about the idea that a logic demonstrator could avoid the taint of words: 
[I]t is scarcely necessary to observe that, independent of other difficulties, no 
mechanical process for reasoning can ever be employed until mankind have 
agreed upon certain general principles as decidedly as upon the value of certain 
numbers, and until all doubt has been removed respecting the import of words, 
or the combinations of them.  A machine for resolving political queries would 
give very different answers, according as it was constructed under the 
superintendance of an advocate for reform, or an admirer of the infallible 
wisdom of our ancestors.  (85) 
The Cartesian “la vraie philosophie” argument strikes again—but by the nineteenth century, 
few in the mainstream of Western thought would be convinced by the Leibnizian response that 
real characters have a special revelatory power that transcends Babel.  The ability of a 
“reasoning machine,” in the sense the author describes, to produce true conclusions depends 
on people’s agreement about “the import of words”; the human, and particularly the linguistic, 
remains squarely at the center.  While Stanhope would certainly disagree with the obituary-
writer’s dismissive conclusion, he would not dissent from this general construal of the project.  
The Logic Demonstrator was not meant to automate thought, in the sense of performing 





depended on the possibility of connecting its elements to a well-formed system of ideas, 
without which its results would mean nothing. 
The failure of the Demonstrator perhaps proves Herder right about the inevitable 
influence of culture upon thought.  But this failure resulted less from the faultiness of 
Stanhope’s logical principles than from the excessive scope of his ambitions.  While Herder’s 
side won out definitively in how people view language and culture, voluntarist views of 
language somewhat like Stanhope’s did survive in the modern disciplines of logic, mathematics, 
and computer science.  Placed together, the opposing perspectives of Stanhope and Herder 
provide a clear illustration of why the division of such scientific fields from the domain of 
culture was needed to free algorithms from their dependence on human thought.  The 
establishment of culture as an autonomous sphere enabled advocates of mechanical methods 
to circumvent critiques like Herder’s, employing those methods in limited disciplinary contexts 
in which the messy actualities of language and thought could be prevented from undermining 
their validity, as they did undermine that of Stanhope’s Demonstrator.  This disciplinary 
compartmentalization came at the cost of foreclosing the possibility that computing machines 
could serve the sort of leveling function that Stanhope had envisioned for his machines.  While 
it happened very gradually, the separation of the voluntary and involuntary aspects of language 
into separate spheres inflicted a new wound upon language that, unlike the wound of Babel in 
the early-modern imagination, could not be healed by any feat of artifice: the severing of 
natural languages, which were recognized as subject to the mercurial collective wills of the 





which were freed to be constructed arbitrarily without concern for what happened in the realm 
of culture and, thereby, defanged as potential instruments of enlightened reform. 
This chapter begins with an analysis of Stanhope’s theory of logic along with some of his 
political activities and experiments with calculating machines.  I then discuss Herder’s 
philosophy in the context of some other cultural views of language that existed in the second 
half of the eighteenth century.  Advocates of such views, such as Herder and Johann David 
Michaëlis, mustered a strong case that meaning was inextricably bound to the experiences that 
people share with their communities; as a result, the rigid operations of a “reasoning machine” 
can serve as no guarantee that people will reach the same interpretation of a result.  While 
these arguments anticipate in many ways the direction taken by nineteenth-century philology, 
they are also critically engaged with the Enlightenment theories of language that this new 
discipline ultimately displaced, making them a particularly useful ground for understanding the 
tensions that existed before science and culture were cordoned off into separate spheres.  
Considered together with Stanhope’s project, they illustrate one of the key Enlightenment goals 
that Western science had to abandon in order to reconcile itself to the algorithm: the goal of 
ensuring that all symbolic systems, even the specialized ones of science, meshed well with the 




Like Condorcet, the Earl of Stanhope immersed himself in a realm of logical certainty in the face 





personal fortunes were waning.  But whereas Condorcet fell from a seat in the Legislative 
Assembly to a prison cell in less than two years, Stanhope’s disappointment was more 
protracted and, in a sense, more personal.  Stanhope’s support of the French Revolution, as 
might be expected, did not win him many allies in the House of Lords.  He withdrew from 
Parliament in 1795, upon which, according to his 1914 biography, “a medal was struck in his 
honour, with the motto, ‘The Minority of One, 1795’” (G. Stanhope and Gooch 139).  Stanhope 
would eventually return to politics with some success, but his children bristled against his 
democratic views and, one by one, deserted him in favor of more decadent company.  In 1801, 
the Earl’s eldest son, then twenty, left to travel abroad without informing his father of his 
whereabouts, a decision that a family acquaintance described as a fortunate escape from “the 
infernal principles of Jacobinism” (quoted in G. Stanhope and Gooch 240).  In 1803, his 
daughter, Lady Hester Stanhope, drove in another nail by moving into the household of his 
political rival, Pitt the Younger (Cleveland 47).  Hester detested her father’s politics, declaring 
herself “an aristocrat” and denouncing the “dirty Jacobins” with which he associated (G. 
Stanhope and Gooch 241).  Hester would eventually exceed her father in fame, becoming a 
well-known adventurer and archaeologist; her Byronic exploits in the Levant would eventually 
form the subject of several popular books, including Charles Meryon’s Memoirs of the Lady 
Hester Stanhope (1846), which depicts the Earl as a moralistic, imperious, and distant parent 
(Meryon 2). 
Throughout this whole series of frustrations—from the ignominious, though temporary, 
departure from Parliament in 1795 through the public quarrels with family that continued until 





Stanhope was a prolific inventor, and his work on logic was not his principal claim to fame.  
Among other inventions, he made early advances towards the steam-ship, conceived an 
effective means of fireproofing buildings, and developed a new method of printing that was 
widely adopted in the early nineteenth century (W. Walker 171-73).  According to the 1914 
biography, however, “[n]o branch of his many-sided activity interested him more than the 
attempt to create a new science of logic” (261).  He often discussed philosophical problems in 
logic with Hester, who referred to him by the nickname “The Logician” when she was young 
(241).  The capstone of Stanhope’s logical theory, which he never completed, was to be the 
Demonstrator, a device that was meant to lay sophistry bare and that would, if successful, 
render the sort of political disagreement that had alienated him from so many people 
impossible. 
Stanhope’s approach to logic fits in well with both his political views and his personal 
predispositions.  Like Thomas Paine, whose work he often championed, Stanhope advocated 
scientific reason as a way of challenging the authority of the aristocracy (G. Stanhope and 
Gooch 21; 113; 238).  Stanhope also had a well-documented puritanical streak; as a young man 
living in Geneva he offered extra prizes in a shooting competition as a “reward” for those who 
had not been to the theater (G. Stanhope and Gooch 17).  The Demonstrator suits this 
moralistic tendency as well as it does Stanhope’s championing of science: in addition to 
ostensibly embodying rationality, it is a fundamentally didactic instrument, a means of 
informing people of their logical errors through a “mechanical symbol” that was supposed to 





machines of later periods, which were meant to operate independently of the human mind; 
instead of replacing human reason, the Demonstrator is designed as a way of training it. 
Philosophically, Stanhope’s logic appears to have been aligned with Condillac’s late 
philosophy (Wess 381).42  Stanhope recorded his views on logic in an unfinished treatise 
entitled The Science of Reasoning Clearly Explained Upon New Principles, which he had privately 
printed and distributed to his friends in 1800.  While this book never circulated outside a small 
circle of Stanhope’s acquaintances, Robert Harley published excerpts from it in an 1879 article 
in the journal Mind, which provides an outline of Stanhope’s distinctive approach to logic.  In 
his manuscript for the book, Stanhope claims that his work accomplishes something that Locke 
suggests in the Essay but was unable to complete: correcting a “manifest mistake in the rules of 
syllogism” that restricts syllogistic reasoning to working with general propositions (Locke, Essay 
601; see Harley 195).  As a result of this and other “mistakes,” Stanhope writes, the whole 
syllogistic apparatus as it had existed since Aristotle was to be “totally reformed” (quoted by 
Harley 195).  His primary purpose in “reforming” the syllogism was, it seems, to develop a form 
of logic that better corresponds to the way human reasoning works in the real world, enabling 
deductions from observations as well as from universal principles.  In addition to renovating the 
rules of syllogism, Stanhope introduces a new nomenclature, replacing middle term with 
totality, distributed with whole, and quantity with extent (Harley 200).  His intention in this 
terminological reform, he writes, is “to exclude entirely that long catalogue of pedantic words” 
that rendered logic “both unintelligible to youth and unfit for men of any age, so far at least as 





the old Scholastic terminology, Stanhope is out to make logic easier to learn and, presumably, 
more useful for practical applications. 
In rejecting the “pedantry” of Aristotelian logic, Stanhope was doing nothing that would 
have been unexpected for the author of a logical treatise circa 1800.  As James Franklin has 
pointed out, the Aristotelian system was under sustained attack throughout the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, with Bacon, Descartes, Locke, and their many followers all criticizing 
it for being excessively complicated, confining, and impractical (838).  Stanhope’s adult life, 
stretching from the 1770s to the 1810s, roughly corresponds to the period in which what 
Wilbur Samuel Howell has called “the new logic” was at its peak popularity (259).  Responding 
to a general shift away from the belief in eternal truths towards scientific discovery, eighteenth-
century authors from countries across the Western world attempted to construct new sorts of 
logic that were better suited to empirical inquiry than the old system of syllogisms.  As Capozzi 
and Roncaglia point out, one of the principal goals of logic from humanism to the end of the 
eighteenth century was “to make logic inventive”—to develop logical procedures that could not 
only determine the validity of inferences but also teach us something new about the world 
(146).  While Lambert, along with Gottfried Ploucquet and other logicians influenced by Leibniz, 
continued to experiment with mathematical approaches to logic, some of the most influential 
British logicians of the later eighteenth century, notably Thomas Reid and George Campbell, 
turned away from formal methods altogether in favor of practical education.  Perhaps the 
strongest statement against formalism appears in Campbell’s The Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776), 
which declares, after an extended discussion of the limitations of syllogisms, that no one “will 





system, the “new logic” provided a pedagogical program that was meant to train people to 
think methodically and without prejudice—something that had more to do with developing 
good habits of mind than with memorizing formal criteria for validity.43  For a brief period, logic 
was an eminently practical concern. 
Stanhope’s project thus stands in 
an odd position in intellectual history—a 
“reasoning machine” created within an 
intellectual climate that was actively 
hostile toward “mechanical” forms of 
logic.  The Demonstrator is, as one might 
expect, very different from the logic 
machines of later periods that were 
more friendly to the mechanical (Figure 
16).  The device represents a whole 
category using a square aperture, which 
Stanhope referred to as the holos or 
holon; two sliders are inserted through slots so as to represent other categories that make up 
either all or some of this whole (see Wess).  If the sliders are forced to overlap, a conclusion can 
be deduced about their relation.  To take an example from Harley, suppose we have the 
premises “No boaster deserves respect” and “Some heroes are boasters” (202).  We use the 
holon to represents boasters, since this is the term that is common to the two premises.  One 
slider represents people who do not deserve respect; since this includes all boasters, the slider 
Figure 16. Text pasted to the front of the square version of Stanhope’s 





must cover the whole aperture.  The other slider represents heroes; since there may be other 
boasters who are not heroes, this slider only covers some of the aperture.  Because the sliders 
must overlap, we can conclude that “Some heroes do not deserve respect.”  
If, as Shilov and Silantiev observe, this process seems to require about as much mental 
exertion as it would take to think through the inference oneself (4), it is likely by design.  As 
Jane Wess points out, Stanhope viewed the mechanization of logic primarily as a way to 
“strengthen the human mind” (quoted by Wess 381).  Stanhope calls this device the 
Demonstrator, he explains, because it is supposed to convey the reasoning that leads to a 
conclusion as well as the conclusion itself: “It exhibits the consequences symbolically, and 
renders them evident to the mind.  By the aid of this instrument the accuracy or inaccuracy of a 
conclusion is always shown, and the reason why such consequence must of necessity exist is 
rendered apparent” (quoted by Harley 195).  Although it is not reliable as a document of 
Stanhope’s own thinking, the account in Public Characters is indicative of what the phrase 
reasoning machine suggested circa 1800: the Demonstrator was meant “not only to detect false 
reasoning, however sophistically combined, but to shew the various links of the chain by which 
these false conclusions have been deduced” (Phillips 106).  Both of these statements rest on an 
assumption that was widespread among adherents of the Enlightenment: that to know the 
truth of a proposition is to know the entire chain of reasoning that produced it.  To pick 
someone from Stanhope’s immediate political circle, William Godwin states this precept 
explicitly in the Enquiry Concerning Political Justice: “Wherever truth stands in the mind 
unaccompanied by the evidence on which it depends, it cannot properly be said to be 





which “government assumes to deliver us from the trouble of thinking for ourselves” (596), his 
argument could just as well apply to the use of machines in reasoning.  Enlightenment 
epistemology excludes the possibility of trusting a machine to produce knowledge when one 
does not understand the deductions oneself.  In accordance with this distrust of conclusions 
that are not backed with the gold bullion of reasoning, the Demonstrator functions in a radically 
different way from the “black-box” logic machines of later periods.  Instead of separating the 
user interface from the internal logic of the machine, it makes the entire process transparent to 
the user.  Such a machine, if we accept the thinking that surrounds it, can help to train or to 
direct the understanding, but it does not attempt to replace it. 
A consequence of this centering of the human understanding is that the Demonstrator 
does not, in itself, provide a guarantee against the uncertainties of language.  It is still 
incumbent on the user to attach well-formed sensory ideas to the aperture and the sliders, 
without which the inferences that the Demonstrator produces would be, at best, mere 
tautologies; accordingly, uncertain words still have a chance to infect the results.  Stanhope’s 
views on this issue seem to have been broadly similar to Condillac’s.  His principal advance in 
the theory of logic (which anticipates later developments by George Bentham and William 
Hamilton) is to reduce all logical propositions to what he called identic propositions—
statements of the form A is B (see Gardner 80; Wess 385).  In an exchange with the Rev. John 
North starting in November 1811, Stanhope responds to the objection that such a logic can only 
work with tautologies and is thus as sterile as the Aristotelian syllogism.  “L’âme est un être 
pensant,” North writes, “is a proposition which may be of use in argumentation, but its 





consequently if such an identic proposition were inserted in any argumentation, it would be so 
far from forming a step to facilitate our progress that it would present a most insurmountable 
barrier to our passage: such identities would inevitably bar up every avenue to knowledge” 
(quoted by Harley 197).  Harley quotes Stanhope’s response at length: 
When I talk of identity, I do not say, as you make me say, que “L’ame [sic] est 
l’âme,” car cela ne dit rien, but I say thus: Example.  Suppose I had heard that 
there was such a thing as a comet.  I now perceive in the heavens at night a star 
with a luminous tail; that is all I know, and it is by means of that mental 
description that I distinguish that star from all other stars.  I afterwards find my 
star, so distinguished, described and defined, amongst the stars of some new 
constellation, and I predicate that that star has moved fast, which is a quality of 
my comet, but which quality of my comet was before to me unknown; that is to 
say, I aver that “the star with a luminous tail” and a star which “moves fast,” that 
is, which belongs to the class of stars that move fast, are IDENTIC.  Have I not 
made an advance in knowledge by my having so perceived, though in point of 
fact, it is the same comet, the identical comet, originally described by me 
incompletely, before I perceived, or could predicate, such identity?  Voilà tout.  
(quoted by Harley 197) 
Given the reasoning he describes, one might suspect that the sentence was meant to read, 
“Suppose I had not heard that there was such a thing as a comet.”  Apart from that one 
sentence, this passage describes someone constructing the idea of a comet from the ground 





Stanhope’s response to North.  The “principle of identity” can only avoid falling into tautology if 
it is used to posit the identity of something across two different observations, or at least across 
two different analyses of one observation.  Without this link to the senses, Stanhope’s 
“reformed” theory of logic is limited, like the Scholastic syllogism, to producing nothing but 
words about words about words. 
Stanhope’s argument might as well have been taken straight out of Condillac.  Jacques 
Derrida’s reading of Condillac is particularly relevant to the question North raises, provided that 
we remain aware of its limitations.  As Derrida points out in The Archaeology of the Frivolous, 
Condillac exhibits an anxiety about the tautological nature of philosophical language 
throughout his work, and especially in Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge.  In the Essay, 
borrowing an example from Locke, Condillac argues that any statement we can make about the 
properties of gold must be a tautology, since it can only be verified against the definition of the 
word gold (415; see Locke, Essay 516-18).  If one could know the real essence of gold, one could 
deduce its properties from this essence.  “But that is not how I know it,” Condillac writes.  “In 
truth, every proposition that I make about this metal if it is true is identical.  Such a one is the 
following, gold is malleable; for it means A body that I have observed to be malleable and that I 
call gold, is malleable—a proposition in which an idea is affirmed of itself” (415).  In Condillac’s 
terms, this sort of self-identical proposition is frivolous—it is true, but it tells us nothing of use.  
Since metaphysical statements are all, in Derrida’s view, self-referential in this way, there must 
be some defect that these statements are meant to relieve; otherwise we would have no 
reason to write.  In such cases, Derrida writes, “the sign remains for nothing, an overabundance 





merchandise nor money” (118).  Derrida argues that the supplement that motivates philosophy 
is desire, the need for which, he intimates, undermines the “legitimacy” of Condillac’s 
metaphysics (135).  But this reading of Condillac, while insightful in many ways, is distorted by 
Derrida’s well-documented aversion to empiricist philosophy (A. Dick 15-21; see also Garver).  
For Condillac, as well as apparently for Stanhope, the supplement that protects us from frivolity 
is the use of the senses, which, Condillac writes in Logic, provide “a storehouse of knowledge” 
from which we may draw propositions that truly expand our conceptions of the world, rather 
than merely restating what we already know (375). 
A more sympathetic critique than Derrida’s would be to go after the universalism of 
Condillacian thought.  What differentiates the empiricism of Locke and Condillac from more 
skeptical philosophies like that of Hume is the assumption that, so long as they carefully 
suppress all presuppositions and prejudices, all human beings will naturally tend to perceive the 
same things to be true.  By means of this universalist assumption, the new logic is able to do 
without formal criteria for truth.  As Locke puts it in The Conduct of the Understanding: “Every 
man carries about him a touchstone, if he will make use of it, to distinguish substantial gold 
from superficial glitterings, truth from appearances.  And indeed the use and benefit of this 
touchstone, which is natural reason, is spoiled and lost only by assumed prejudices, 
overweening presumption, and narrowing our minds” (10).  The existence and reliability of this 
“touchstone” is essential to the workings of empiricist logic, since without it, there is no reason 
to think that logic is anything but arbitrary, and, worse, no reason to think that one can 
effectively communicate one’s reasonings to another person.44  Seen in this light, the comet is a 





was almost certainly influenced by the excitement over the Great Comet of 1811, which had 
been visible throughout much of the world for several months at the time of his writing (Figure 
17).  This comet stands for something that looks the same to everyone, a sensory object that 
cannot (with nineteenth-century instruments) even be viewed from different angles, but that 
rather presents the same image to anyone who can look up at the sky.45  It is, if anything is, 
eminently public.  Without this shared field of sensory data and a shared faculty of reason by 
which to analyze it, the Demonstrator would be able to produce no knowledge that can be 
communicated to another person, and would thus be, in Condillac’s term, frivolous.  
In the context of the British politics of the late eighteenth century, this universalist 
position was political as much as it was epistemological.  Like the other members of the 
Figure 17. H. R. Cook’s engraving of the Great Comet of 1811, after a drawing by A. Pether. This exceptionally large comet 
reached its peak brightness in October, just a few weeks before Stanhope’s exchange with the Rev. North. A major topic of 
conversation worldwide, this comet was almost certainly the one Stanhope had in mind when he composed the letter.  






Revolution Society, Stanhope founded his politics on the belief that every “citizen,” as he 
defiantly referred to commoners and nobles alike, is capable of political participation on an 
equal basis; and in accordance with the quantifying spirit of the time, he put his trust in 
mathematical reason as a way of appealing to what is common to the minds of nobility and 
peasants.  Like Paine and Godwin, Stanhope defended this belief in the rationality of 
commoners on the grounds that, given proper education, everyone can perceive the truth or 
falsity of logical argumentation.  In a pamphlet attacking Burke, he explains away the irrational 
behavior of the French peasants who participated in the October March as a result of their 
debased circumstances (“A Letter” 10).  In his work as a Parliamentarian, his style of 
argumentation could verge on the geometric.  His 1786 pamphlet “Observations on Mr. Pitt’s 
Plan for the Reduction of the National Debt” sketches out an alternative to Pitt the Younger’s 
plan in a style that mimics the structure of a mathematical proof, beginning with “AXIOM I” and 
ending with the pronouncement, “And this is the proposition, which I had proposed to prove” 
(14; 27).  Stanhope backs up his argument with a series of statistical tables presented as 
appendices.  The effectiveness of this “axiomatic” approach as a political tactic depends on the 
assumption that mathematical reasoning bears persuasive power simply because it is 
mathematical.  In this case, it did not happen to succeed (G. Stanhope and Gooch 70); 
Stanhope’s “proof” convinced some people, but not Pitt. 
This pamphlet is, to my knowledge, the only documented case in which Stanhope 
actually used a machine to make a political argument—although it was not the Demonstrator.  
A contemporary biographical account reports that Stanhope used a mechanical calculator to 





machine invented by himself” (Phillips 83).  If this is true, Stanhope did not seem to be 
confident that the machine itself would impress his audience; the pamphlet does not mention 
it, and states, instead, that two people independently verified the calculations (23).  This 
rhetorical choice makes sense given the context.  Used as a way of appealing to universal 
reason, as Stanhope had to do given his political commitments, computing machines can only 
fill a modest role: saving time (at least if one trusts them enough not to check the results) and 
preventing errors.  To go beyond this and use a machine for rhetorical purposes, however, 
would also require convincing one’s audience that the machine works properly, and in the 
1780s, this would not have been so easy. 
The evidence is foggy as to how many different calculating machines Stanhope made 
and when.  According to a letter by Lady Mary Coke, he had already built his first “mathematical 
instrument” by the age of seventeen, which would place it in 1771 at the latest (G. Stanhope 
and Gooch 11).  Two of the machines, bearing the dates 1775 and 77, eventually wound up in 
the collection of Charles Babbage (G. Stanhope and Gooch 33-34).  Richard Phillips describes 
them in his book Public Characters of 1800-1801: 
The first and smallest machine is about the size of an octavo volume, which, by 
means of dial-plates and small indices, moveable with a steel pin, is calculated to 
perform with undeviating accuracy the operations of simple and compound 
addition and subtraction.  The second, and by far the most curious machine, is 
not more than half the size of a writing desk.  By this problems in multiplication 
and division, of almost any extent, are solved without the possibility of a mistake 





surprising to every spectator of the machine, is, that in working division, if the 
operator be inattentive to his business, and thereby attempts to turn the handle 
a single revolution more than he ought, he is instantly admonished of this error 
by the sudden springing up of a small ivory ball.  (84) 
Stanhope’s division machines improved on the Leibniz design primarily in automating the 
process to a greater extent.  The user no longer has to carry ones manually, and, for division, 
the machine can help the user determine whether his or her estimate is correct.  By 
mechanizing more of the procedure than previous machines, Stanhope’s devices reduce the 
number of points at which an oversight or misjudgment could lead a calculation astray, 
ensuring that at every step the algorithm for long division is followed to the letter. 
This approach to mechanical computation is sound when it comes to arithmetic, but it 
would quickly encounter difficulties if extended to politics, as Stanhope appears to have 
intended.  The spectators’ amusement at the ivory ball indicates one of the points at which 
Stanhope’s calculating machine most clearly deviated from the expectations of the time: its 
mechanism is meant to enforce a rule upon the user.46  The device is an example of what Ursula 
M. Franklin calls prescriptive technology—it not only moves in response to human action, but 
also provides feedback that is meant to alter the behavior of the human being turning the crank 
(18).  While this mode of human–machine interaction is familiar to anyone who has used a 
computer, it is a shock to an eighteenth-century sensibility that is suspicious of rigid logical 
rules.  From this perspective, Stanhope’s machine is just as despotic as his parenting allegedly 
was; the ivory ball substitutes for a wagging finger.  What one is to make of this depends 





mechanical calculator, it is a benevolent tyranny because more-or-less everyone did agree on 
the rules for division (for positive numbers, at least).  When a gap opens between the rules 
embodied in the machine and those internalized by people, however, it is not a given that the 
machine will win the argument, especially when ancient and cherished beliefs are involved.  In 
response to such an impasse, empiricism can only offer the assurance that the result makes 
sense if you think about it.  The right of the machine to tell the user what to do is founded on 
the assumption that its workings correspond to laws of reason that are accessible to anyone 
who is willing to let go of prejudice and keep an open mind. 
This enforcement of rules is much harder to justify when it comes to logic, which is 
supposed to be binding on all forms of reasoning, not just the numerical.  I have found no 
examples of the Demonstrator in action, but it would be hard to imagine it faring better than 
Stanhope’s axiomatic theory of debt if it were let loose in the political sphere.  The complexity 
of British political discourse was too great for people to reach anything like an agreement on 
what the basic terms meant, especially in the tense atmosphere of the 1790s and early 1800s.  
A sonnet that Samuel Taylor Coleridge wrote to Stanhope in early 1795 provides as good an 
example as any of the slipperiness of the political vocabulary of the period (see Zall).  While 
Coleridge originally intended to dedicate his volume of poetry to Stanhope, he soon reversed 
his opinion of the Earl, and he later insisted that the poem “was written in ridicule of Jacobinical 
⟨Bombast⟩” (quoted in Works 16.I.1.191).  The published version follows: 
Not, STANHOPE! with the Patriot’s doubtful name 
I mock thy worth—FRIEND OF THE HUMAN RACE! 





Aloof thou wendest in thy stately pace, 
Thyself redeeming from that leprous stain, 
NOBILITY: and aye unterrify’d 
Pourest thine Abdiel warnings on the train 
That sit complotting with rebellious pride 
Gainst her, who from the Almighty’s bosom leapt 
With whirlwind arm, fierce Minister of Love! 
Wherefore, ere Virtue o’er thy tomb hath wept, 
Angels shall lead thee to the Throne above: 
And thou from forth it’s [sic] clouds shalt hear the voice, 
Champion of FREEDOM and her God! rejoice!  (Works 16.I.1.191-92) 
The fact that this poem is convincing both as a Jacobin eulogy and as a Tory parody thereof 
illustrates the extent to which the two political factions could produce radically different effects 
with a common vocabulary.  By refiguring conservatives as the rebels of Lucifer’s army, the 
speaker sets divine authority against that of the aristocracy.  The paradoxical reference to 
“NOBILITY” as a “leprous stain” from which one must be “redeemed” requires a moral judgment 
to sort out.  On the one hand, it could be a sarcastic description of Stanhope’s stubborn 
rejection of the trappings of aristocracy, as in his persistent refusal to powder his hair (G. 
Stanhope and Gooch 20).  But the inversion of values was also common in radical writing from 
the period; the paradox closely resembles, for instance, Thomas Paine’s remark in The Rights of 
Man that the use of hereditary titles “degrades” the human character (50), and one might also 





remark about the “swinish multitude” (O. Smith 79-82).  Either way we read it, the tone is, in 
this instance, virtually the only factor by which we might distinguish an anti-Jacobin poem from 
a “Jacobinical” one. 
Enlightenment empiricism could provide no way to extricate computing machines from 
this sort of interpretive difficulty.  If machine-made knowledge is inadmissible into arguments 
except insofar as people can understand the whole set of operations that produced it, then 
mechanical processes are dependent on the clarity of ideas just as much as written texts.  How 
serious a problem this is depends on the extent to which we believe that language can be 
reconstructed from first principles.  Stanhope’s position appears to have been that, starting in 
Newtonian fashion from sensory data, one can develop clear “mental descriptions” of things 
from the ground up, so that, through a careful enough conversation, one could build a common 
set of terms with one’s interlocutor without the interference of any old, bad words.  But this 
approach cannot work in cases where reason does not clearly dictate a single correct analysis 
that everyone can agree upon, regardless of political leaning.  This appears to have been the 
case with regard to the political language of the time.  Even if the older Coleridge sets off an 
ivory ball to indicate that we are reading his poem wrong, we are under no obligation to believe 
him; the meaning of the poem differs radically depending on which side one thinks it is on.  To 
be sure, the logical inferences the Demonstrator produces, if it is used properly, are hard to 
dispute.  But convincing someone that they are relevant to the matter at hand requires the use 
of words, and the idols of the market thus remain a potential threat.  The Demonstrator can 





method can override preexisting disagreements about the meanings of the words in question.  
A failure to agree upon terms reduces it to a chunk of wood. 
One idea that is noticeably absent from the public corpus of remarks about the 
Demonstrator is that the ability of the machine to operate autonomously of the human mind 
could itself serve as a guarantee against bias—that the machineness of the machine could itself 
be a solution to linguistic uncertainty.  This would be the approach taken by advocates of what 
Daston and Galison call “mechanical objectivity” in the later nineteenth century.  As they 
explain it, mechanical objectivity involves “the insistent drive to repress the willful intervention 
of the artist-author, and to put in its stead a set of procedures that would, as it were, move 
nature to the page through a strict protocol, if not automatically” (121).  Within this later 
epistemological arrangement, any disagreements people have about the significance of words 
could be quarantined in the realm of the subjective, leaving mechanical processes of data-
recording and -processing to proceed unhindered.  But this use of the terms subjective and 
objective would have made no sense to Stanhope.  The form of Enlightenment empiricism in 
which he was immersed does not permit the result of a mechanical process to have any 
meaning unless every step that led to it can be comprehended.  This assumption precludes the 
possibility of a machine that can extend the human mind beyond its natural capacities; human 
reason remains the outer bound of what one can accomplish, however many artificial aids one 
might devise.  An Enlightenment computing machine can only legitimately perform a regulatory 
function, enforcing rules upon our thinking better than we can do ourselves, but still remaining 





Stanhope’s adherence to the empiricist project of grounding knowledge in the senses is 
why, as the 1818 obituary points out, his goal of creating a “reasoning machine” is ultimately 
dependent on a utopian vision.  Ensuring that everyone genuinely understands words in the 
same way would require the sort of top-down educational program that Condorcet proposed, a 
means of placing the same ideas in each individual’s head.  By the end of Stanhope’s life, this 
empiricist view of language had largely given way to a new school of linguistics that placed the 
possibility of such a project under serious doubt.  Around the same time that Stanhope was 
designing his first computing machines, Johann Gottfried Herder and the philologist Johann 
David Michaëlis were arguing against the idea that the artificial notations of logic and 
mathematics could function as languages in the true sense, suggesting, instead, that meaning 
can only be established through the medium of culture.  These critiques, for those who 
accepted them, put an end to the idea that the empiricist method of analysis could suffice to 
establish the meanings of symbols independently of any existing language.  While they were 
not universally accepted in the eighteenth century, the triumph of such involuntarist views of 
language ultimately, over the course of the nineteenth, supplanted Enlightenment theories of 
the well-formed sign, leaving behind, on the one hand, language in all its messiness and beauty, 
and on the other, finally detached from any concerns so fuzzy as meaning, the algorithm. 
 
Herder: The Sins of the Father 
 
For the version of Enlightenment upheld by Turgot, Condorcet, and Stanhope, “the people” 





extermination of all forms of prejudice and superstition across the world; in its most extreme 
form, it means teaching everyone the same well-formed algebraic language so that political 
disagreements can be resolved through computation.  Starting in the 1750s, Michaëlis, Herder, 
and other thinkers, centered primarily in a German context, undertook one of the eighteenth 
century’s most sophisticated attempts to redeem what this tradition wanted to throw out: the 
language of common life.  Developing a well-formed language from the ground up, in the view 
of these thinkers, is a futile endeavor, because people cannot truly expunge the influence of 
their native languages from their ways of thinking; instead of chasing the impossible dream of a 
philosophical language, one must make productive use of the tension between the rigidity of 
philosophical abstractions and the liveliness of everyday speech.  The works of Michaëlis and 
Herder suggest a conclusion that, while perhaps mere common sense today, was disturbing 
from the perspective of Condillacian empiricism: that the sort of linguistic uncertainty that 
enabled Coleridge to retroactively change the political message of his poem, and that 
threatened, from an empiricist perspective, the validity of Stanhope’s Demonstrators, will be 
with us forever.  These writings stand as early expressions of a view of language that would 
ultimately, in the nineteenth century, displace the Enlightenment theories of the sign on which 
the projects of Condorcet and Stanhope alike depended and establish, in their place, a newly 
sharp divide between the concerns of philology and those of logic and mathematics. 
Modern scholars have had varying views of how Herder’s thought relates to that of the 
Enlightenment.  Isaiah Berlin classifies Herder as one of the “critics of the Enlightenment,” 
attributing to him a form of relativism that undermines the liberal universalism of 





living or dead.  There is no ‘deep’ logical structure presupposed by all forms of rational thought; 
in his Sprachphilosophie, logic is an approximation to what is common in isomorphic languages, 
which themselves point to a high degree of similarity in the experiences of their users” (193-
94).  While Berlin insists that Herder viewed cultures as entirely incommensurable and thus 
denied the existence of any possibility of progress, this interpretation is hard to uphold (see 
Morton 19).  Other scholars, such as H. B. Nisbet and Robert Edward Norton, have noted 
affinities between Herder’s work and Enlightenment thought, and Jonathan Israel classes 
Herder as a radical Enlightenment philosopher (H. B. Nisbet 1; Norton 6; Israel 15).  A nuanced 
reading would be that Herder’s project insists on maintaining, rather than resolving, the tension 
between universalism and relativism—attempting to unite these two poles, as Michael Morton 
puts it, “in a synthesis […] that does not go back on the initial formulation of the problem but 
rather preserves the element of opposition between them” (20).  This perspective troubles one 
of the central assumptions of Stanhope’s project: that the workings of a “reasoning machine” 
can be made to fit smoothly with the way everyone thinks, rather than (at best) embodying the 
practices of a small community of academic logicians.  Herder’s work contains an early 
expression of a view that would become widespread by the beginning of the nineteenth 
century: that the development of such methods could never form a substitute for natural 
language, as Condillac and Condorcet asserted, but would rather inevitably exist in tension with 
the culture of a people. 
Herder’s work was situated within a broader eighteenth-century cultural formation that 
existed in opposition to the Enlightenment project of recreating language.  In a commonplace 





academic discourse to the language of common life were depicted as effeminate and bloodless.  
A famous example appears in the English poet Edward Young’s long poem Night Thoughts, first 
published in parts between 1742 and 1745, which contains a passage that is often cited as an 
example of an eighteenth-century statement of the relationship of language to thought: 
Speech, Thought’s Canal! Speech, Thought’s Criterion too! 
Thought, in the Mine, may come forth Gold or Dross; 
When coin’d in Word, we know its real worth. 
If Sterling, store it for thy future Use; 
’Twill buy thee Benefit; perhaps, Renown. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
What Numbers, sheathed in Erudition lie, 
Plung’d to the Hilts in venerable Tomes, 
And rusted in; who might have borne an Edge, 
And play’d a sprightly beam, if born to Speech; 
If born bless’d Heirs of half their Mother’s tongue!  (63) 
This passage exemplifies a widespread tendency in eighteenth-century linguistic thought that, 
in contrast to the seventeenth-century valorization of real characters, elevated the liveliness of 
the vernacular over the abstractions of bookish discourse.  Once again, words are coins, but the 
valence of the metaphor here is quite the opposite of Condillac's comparison of words with 
“game chips” in A Treatise on Systems.  Instead of fiat currency, Young's words—at least the 
good ones—are coins minted from gold or silver, and their stamps certify their value based on 





the pages of a book.  Without speech, Young suggests, the printed word is lifeless, impotent; its 
true value is unknown until it is wielded in conversation.  The speaker of these lines shares with 
Condillac a concern about the possibility of abstractions becoming detached from the world.  
For Young, however, it is not the world of the senses to which thoughts must connect in order 
to be meaningful, but the world of society.  To avoid rusting away in the dark recesses of 
“erudition,” thoughts must inherit some of the vitality of the “mother’s tongue.” 
While views like Young’s were common internationally, it was the German context that 
produced the most sophisticated attempts to theorize these cultural aspects of language.  
Under the reign of the famously Francophilic Frederick II (from 1740 to 1786), the Prussian 
government attempted to establish a centralized administrative structure on the model of 
Bourbon France.  These measures inspired a controversy that produced some of the period’s 
best writing on education and language.  A center of this activity was the Royal Prussian 
Academy of Sciences, which began in 1700 as one of Leibniz’s administrative projects.48  
Thinkers involved with the Academy, including Herder, Michaëlis, and Johann Georg Hamann, 
produced a powerful critique of the French Enlightenment’s fixation on linguistic purity that 
arguably undermined the idea of a well-formed language, and with it one of the eighteenth 
century’s most important rationales for the use of algorithmic methods.  This critique attacked 
the universalism of French Enlightenment views of mathesis at a deeper level than d’Alembert 
did with his argument that algebra is “a kind of language,” suggesting that all forms of thought, 
however formalized, are inextricably bound to culture. 
This discourse was conditioned in part by an influx of French thought into the Academy 





invited to Germany in the early 1740s and named, in 1746, the president of the Academy, 
produced a series of writings on language that are indicative of the general direction the 
German debates on language took.  In a 1748 pamphlet, he gives an account of the origin of 
language that is broadly similar to Condillac’s, but that makes much more of the differences 
between languages.49  English and French are, he writes, merely “translations of one another,” 
their signs “cut in the same manner” (4; my translation); but there are, he believes, other 
languages built on “plans of ideas so different from ours” that they are almost impossible to 
translate into European languages (5).  Many of the German writers on language in the later 
eighteenth century shared this tendency towards linguistic relativism, which resulted in a very 
different attitude toward language planning in Germany from the one that prevailed in France.  
While Maupertuis and a number of others still clung to the Condillacian program of remaking 
language anew in the student’s mind, Germany also produced a number of proposals for 
linguistic reforms that attempted to work with the linguistic knowledge that was specific to 
German culture, a movement that was spurred on both by mounting linguistic nationalism and 
by a desire to keep the sciences grounded in the ordinary lifeworld of the people. 
 While some thinkers associated with the Academy, such as Johann Georg Sulzer, 
attempted to find a middle ground between an appreciation for the resources of natural 
languages and a desire for something better, there was also a significant amount of pushback in 
Germany against the idea that science should use a different language from the one used in 
daily life (see Sulzer, Kurzer Begriff).  The philologist Johann David Michaëlis made a detailed, 
well-argued case against constructed language schemes in the published version of his 





which is primarily an examination of the ways in which language can introduce errors into 
people’s thinking, won the Prussian Academy prize in 1759, and it was well-received 
internationally, winning high praise from d’Alembert in France (Lifschitz 38), and circulating in 
England and the United States in an unauthorized 1769 English translation.50  The French and 
English versions of the essay include an extensive section arguing against the idea of creating a 
“learned language,” with apparent reference to Leibniz’s universal characteristic, advocating 
instead a science presented “in the language of common life” (English 91/French 175).  In an 
argument that would go on to have significant influence in the German context and elsewhere, 
his section concludes that, in spite of all the problems that language causes, we are to a large 
extent stuck with it—the costs of doing away with words, as Condorcet, Stanhope, and so many 
others would attempt to do in the name of Enlightenment, outweigh the benefit. 
Appropriate to the time of Frederick II, Michaëlis’s essay places the “learned language” 
in a very different political light from the utopian vision of Condorcet’s Sketch.  One of 
Michaëlis’s arguments concerns the possibility that it would create a deeper divide between 
those who understand science and those who cannot.  “The body of the people,” he writes, 
“and all who are not learned by profession, will be daily sinking deeper into ignorance: the 
characteristic throws up a partition between them and the sciences” (86/164).  In addition to 
reinforcing stratification, he suggests, the characteristic could be used to delude the masses by 
concealing the way new inventions work and thus casting them as “false miracles” (87/166).  
Michaëlis’s concerns can apply to the specialized terminology of philosophical writing as well as 
to constructed languages, since, he writes, “an author treats as sovereign master the technical 





give of it: we then are all obliged to understand him, as he has declared he will be understood, 
and as little can we contest that right with him, as prescribe to the Algebraist what lines he shall 
call a and what b” (88/168).  In contrast to the “sacred tyranny” of the technical, Michaëlis 
argues, with the living languages of nations “all is Democratic: words cannot be deprived of 
their received meaning but by the consent of the people, and by a contrary usage, that is 
introduced bit by bit” (88/168).  Being foreign, as it were, to all nations, a learned language 
could never be absorbed as deeply as we absorb the languages we hear from the cradle. 
Michaëlis’s essay points in the direction of a different response to the flaws of language 
that would gain a great deal of influence by the end of the century: that imaginative literature, 
in appealing to the feelings as well as to reason, was better suited to influence the linguistic 
practices of a people than explicitly prescriptive projects like Leibniz’s characteristic or 
Condorcet’s universal algebra.  Similarly to Jefferson, Michaëlis denies that scholars have a right 
to propound changes: “it is not for him [the scholar] to give laws, nor proscribe established 
expressions: if he hazards it, he is ridiculed, and deservedly; it is no more than a just 
chastisement for his ambition and for the infraction he commits against the rights of the 
people” (78/148).  Instead, in a section entitled “Improvement of the Vocabulary” 
(“Amélioration du langage”), he suggests that poets and authors of belles lettres are best 
situated to correct flaws in a language (77/147).  This line of thought would gain cultural 
dominance in Germany around the end of the century with the emergence of German 
Classicism, which was one of a number of cultural formations to emerge at the time that 
consider language as a product of culture rather than as a set of mental representations that 





view, it is poets, not philosophers, who have a legitimate right to attempt to improve upon 
existing languages. 
Herder was a key figure in defining the linguistic program of German Classicism, and his 
body of writings on language constituted a powerful case against the Enlightenment project of 
replacing language with a new system of abstractions.  Herder’s unfinished early work “How 
Philosophy Can Become More Universal and Useful for the Benefit of the People” (1765) sets 
the terms of his philosophical program.  Taking a cue from Jean-Jacques Rousseau, this essay 
attacks the idea that “the people” would benefit from learning philosophy, suggesting, instead, 
that the “natural understanding” is better suited to the needs of common life.  Throughout the 
essay, Herder maintains an opposition between “healthy reason” and metaphysics, the latter of 
which, he suggests, chokes students with “school-dust” rather than enlightening them 
(Philosophical Writings 7; 9).  In expounding on the dangers of philosophical education, Herder 
emphasizes the deadening effects of memorizing abstractions: “O you his machine-like teacher, 
well do you need to suppress his healthy understanding with your school Logic; otherwise he 
would take your measure, repeat the gobbledygook you took an hour to trot out afterwards 
naturally but without school-cleverness in three words.  He would despise you!” (9).  All the 
greatest deeds in war and statecraft, for Herder, are results “of the Logic which our nurses 
implanted in us, not of the Logic which our schoolteachers wanted to stamp us with” (10).  
Herder’s opposition to rote memorization is broadly similar to Locke’s argument that parents 
should teach their children through positive examples rather than forcing them to remember 
“Rules” (Some Thoughts 39); it is in step with the eighteenth-century trend away from rote 





than were Locke’s British and French followers.  His later work developed into a program of 
improvement directed not towards individual students but towards “the people” as a whole—a 
goal that raises very different questions about what it would take to bring an improved 
language into being. 
Herder’s most direct response to the Condillacian theory of signs appears in his Treatise 
on the Origin of Language, which won the Academy’s essay prize in 1772.  In the first part of 
this essay, Herder gives an explanation of the origin of language that is rather different from 
Condillac’s story of the two children picking fruit.  For Herder, language does not wait to 
emerge until a person needs to communicate with another; instead, he writes, “it is 
unintelligible to me how a human soul was able to be what it is without precisely thereby, 
already even in the absence of a mouth and society, inevitably inventing language for itself” 
(90).  In Herder’s view, we create signs instantly as soon as we begin to develop ideas of things.  
Herder’s account of how this process might begin is as follows.  A sheep passes before the eyes 
of a man.  Since human beings are not driven entirely by instinct, the significance of the sheep 
for the man is not pre-ordained, as it would be for a “blood-licking lion” or a ram (88).  Once the 
man “develops a need to become acquainted with the sheep,” he searches for a “characteristic 
mark” by which he can “recognize” it (88).  Just in time, “the sheep bleats!—his soul has found a 
characteristic mark.  The inner sense takes effect” (88).  Later, the sheep returns, “it bleats, and 
now the soul recognizes it again!  ‘Aha!  You are the bleating one!’ the soul feels inwardly” (88).  
The sign enables the man to recognize the sheep “in a human way,” rather than in terms of 
mere animal instinct (88).  The development of language is, Herder argues, an inevitable result 





So far, Herder primarily focuses on language as an individual medium of recognition 
rather than as a medium of communication.  But while sociality does not yet enter at the point 
of origin, Herder shifts his focus to the social aspects of language in the second part of the 
Treatise, in which he attempts to argue that human language develops “progressively” over the 
course of human history (127).  Herder’s case for the progressive nature of language rests on 
the procreative chain linking us back to the beginning of the human species: “If I came into the 
world in order to need to enter immediately into my family’s instruction, then likewise my 
father, likewise, the first son of the first father of the tribe […].  The chain goes on and only stops 
with ‘the one, the first’; in this way, we are all his sons, from him begin species, instruction, 
language” (156).  Since no one can survive infancy without the aid of elders, the language of 
each generation is inevitably influenced by “the inheritance of their ancestors’ whole treasure 
of experiences” (157); and since no human being can live without language, the chain cannot be 
broken.  Apart from constituting a position within a rather esoteric eighteenth-century 
academic dispute (whether language improves or declines over time), Herder’s argument 
suggests a very different pedagogy from the one that Condillac and Lavoisier were enacting a 
few hundred miles away.  Building a new language from scratch is neither possible nor 
desirable for Herder.  Instead, one must work with and improve the language that one inherits 
from one’s ancestors. 
There has been some disagreement among scholars about how these arguments should 
fit into the historiography of the eighteenth century.51  Friedrich Kittler associates Herder 
primarily with later developments; in Kittler’s view, Herder’s “lamb” (which is actually, Kittler 





Treatise stands as an early volley of the Classical–Romantic discourse network that existed in 
Germany circa 1800 (39).  But one might also read Herder’s text in its entanglement with the 
empiricism of earlier thinkers like Locke and Maupertuis (see Forster 132).  The importance that 
Herder grants to the parental voice makes perfect sense in terms of the Enlightenment 
sensationalism of the mid-eighteenth century.  A similar statement, for instance, appears in 
Maupertuis’s 1748 pamphlet: “Hardly are we born, but we hear repeating an infinity of words 
that express rather the prejudices of those who surround us than the first ideas that are born in 
the spirit” (6; my translation).52  What differentiates this account from Herder’s is primarily that 
Herder places more value in knowledge obtained from other people.  For Maupertuis, the 
presence of the mother’s (or nurse’s) voice is a bad thing, because the old prejudices (préjugés) 
that we imbibe in the cradle keep us from perceiving the genuine origins of ideas.  Herder 
would respond that those natal experiences are, in fact, essential to the development of the 
spirit, and what we gain from our caregivers is not prejudice but culture—an initiation into a 
lifeworld in which we will need to learn to dwell in order to work together with the other 
members of our community. 
This argument suggests a very different pedagogy from the one that Condillac 
developed.  For Condillac, one can start from scratch with an individual student, in whose mind 
ontogeny will recapitulate phylogeny, fixing a few things up as it does so.  This educational 
method presumes not only that the mind begins as a blank piece of paper, as Locke claimed, 
but also that whatever stray markings it may have accumulated before the student started 
school can be rubbed or scraped off.  Herder denies the genuineness of this new beginning.  For 





who made them; accordingly, the sort of thought experiment that Condillac and Maupertuis 
used to reconstruct language from first principles must give way to philological research.  
Herder states this view exultantly in Fragments Concerning Recent German Literature: “Not 
how language should have arisen or could have arisen, but how it arose—that is the question!” 
(Philosophical Writings 55).  While a consensus generally exists that Herder failed to fulfill his 
stated purpose of explaining the origin of language without hypothesis or imaginative 
reconstruction, his historicist response to Condillac still deserves consideration as a 
philosophical argument.  For Herder, languages are a part of history, and there is no starting 
history anew.  From this perspective, attempts to expunge words from algebra, as Condorcet 
tried to do, are not only futile but counterproductive, because they sever the connection to a 
historically situated human community that would be needed to give meaning and vitality to 
the symbols. 
One of Herder’s most direct statements against well-formed languages appears in a 
passage in one of the manuscripts of the Treatise.  Herder begins by stating a version of the 
familiar complaint about the errors caused by Bacon’s “idols,” which “are made eternal by 
nothing as much as by language,” and which command people “to think in accordance with the 
analogy of their fathers and not in accordance with the analogy of nature, to read the images of 
the universe in the distorting mirror of tradition and not in nature” (144n).  But against the long 
tradition of attempting to heal the wound of Babel, Herder asserts that fallen languages are the 
best we can hope for: 
Whoever can, let him think his way beyond [the idols], or rather right through 





as prejudices (praeiudicia) and empty idols, then indeed one has the easy work 
of the Goths in Italy or the Persians in Egypt, but one also leaves oneself with 
nothing more than a desert.  Precisely thereby one has stripped oneself of the 
aid of all the centuries of one’s fathers, and stands there naked […].  So, unless 
we want to follow the warning example of all those who make systems out of 
their own heads, there is nothing for us to do in such a case but to throw 
ourselves into the great ocean of truths and errors, and, with the help of all 
those who have lived before us, to see how far we can get, then, in beholding 
and observing nature and in naming it through distinct linguistic ideas!  (144n) 
Whatever the reason this passage did not end up in the published version of the essay, Herder 
did not abandon the line of thinking it expresses.  Herder was, along with Michaëlis and 
Giambattista Vico, one of the early practitioners of a form of philosophical discourse that came 
to be known as Sprachkritik, a practice that aims to create a greater attentiveness to the 
language we speak in daily life and, through the poetic development of new linguistic 
resources, to improve and enrich it without creating a sudden break with the past.53  His work 
points not towards yet another attempt to replace language with something better, but 
towards a critical appreciation of words as what they are: an inheritance from the past. 
In response to the Lockean epistemology, then, Herder offers the warning that, given 
the fundamentally collective nature of language, there might be a limit to our ability to alter the 
system of signs by which we understand the world.  As Tristram Wolff has pointed out, in 
eighteenth-century linguistic thought, the idea that language is arbitrary could mean that it is 





Michaëlis with his remark against the “sacred Tyranny” of technical terms) pushes against this 
assumption by emphasizing the “involuntary” aspects of language, as Wolff calls them (259), 
the fact that even the most creative individual must root her language in social practices that, 
far from being subject to the arbitrary pronouncements of any individual, seem to have a life of 
their own.  This turn against linguistic voluntarism, if accepted, causes serious problems for the 
way eighteenth-century empiricists made sense of artificial symbolic systems like algebra.  The 
sort of constructed-language project that Condorcet undertook is not just impractical, but 
altogether impossible in the Herderian view; algebra could not be made into a living language 
by a mere feat of bureaucracy.  One possible response to this critique—and the one that would 
eventually prevail with the emergence of nineteenth-century formalism—would be to abandon 
the connection between symbols and ideas altogether, reducing the scheme to an algorithmic 
system rather than a Condillacian method of sensory analysis.  But Herder’s work points in a 
rather different direction from this one.  Instead of turning to formalization as a way of finally 
defeating the influence of words on thought, Herder embraces this influence, trying to develop 
a form of philosophy that can work together with the linguistic resources of “the people.”  As 
he concludes in the second section of “How Philosophy Can Become More Universal and Useful 
for the Benefit of the People”: “You the philosopher and you the plebian, make a common 
alliance in order to become useful” (20). 
Herder’s philosophy would seem to have dire consequences for projects like Stanhope’s 
Demonstrator.  f Herder when he writes that James W. Marchand echoes a common view o
“Herder hated systems, algorithms, discrete entities, rules, and the kind of thinking that went 





-nment; Herder did, after all, sketch out a set of pseudoEnlighte-received image of the Counter
H. algebraic “laws” for history and ethics based on the mathematical research of Lambert (see 
93).  But Herder’s work does present a challenge to projects attempting to -Nisbet 92B. 
For Herder, in a way that does not take account of their position in history.   establish meaning
it is not possible to return to the innocent state of the primitive human who, staring naked at 
later times,  the night sky, saw a comet for the first time in human history; for us living in
whatever judgments we make will inevitably be inflected by those who came before us.  In this 
view, the storehouse of knowledge is not the senses, but language itself, and we are thus, to an 
r tongues.  If Herder is right, then a logic important extent, stuck with the flaws of our mothe
machine like Stanhope’s Demonstrator can do little to establish concord among people who do 
in short, it —not already share a great deal in common culturally, politically, and intellectually
way of thinking of a particular community at a particular point in history can only reflect the 
rather than letting through the light of universal truth.  As such, it could still be useful; but it 
its users already  would be limited in its utility by the extent to which it corresponds to the way
think.  It would have no right tyrannically to enforce its logic upon us, as Stanhope’s machines 
did and modern computers (with their error messages and warning beeps) arguably do. 
Whether or not Herder had any direct influence on the new cohort of philologists who 
rose to prominence in the early nineteenth century, they largely followed his lead in viewing 
language as an inherently historical phenomenon.  The idea that we can and should “make an 
entirely new language for ourselves,” as Condillac had put it, lost its credibility as language 
became an object of scientific study.  The research of Grimm, Bopp, and Humboldt provided 





language were right: languages could not be created and replaced at will, but were rather 
subject to historical laws that could be imperfectly discerned with careful study but not easily 
overcome.54  A few latecoming universal language projects notwithstanding, this new form of 
linguistics gave lie to the notion that symbolic systems modeled on mathematics or logic could 
ever attain the status of true languages like English and German.  As Humboldt put it in his book 
On the Diversity of Human Language Construction and its Influence on the Mental Development 
of the Human Species (first published in 1836), language “possesses an autonomy that visibly 
declares itself to us, though inexplicable in its nature”; rather than something intentionally 
created, it is “an involuntary emanation of the mind” that people use “without knowing how 
they have fashioned it” (24).  Involuntarism had become an unquestioned doctrine in linguistics 
by the twentieth century, with Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics arguing at length that 
“the individual has no power to alter a sign in any respect once it has been established in a 
linguistic community” (68; see also 71-74).  With the collapse of the Enlightenment optimism 
about the universality of reason, it became clear in Humboldt’s time that the linguistic practices 
of groups of people could not be changed at will in the same way that algebraic and logical 
symbols apparently could.  The languages people speak in daily life and the symbols that 
circulate through algorithmic systems were doomed to be at odds. 
But the result of the abandonment of Enlightenment voluntarism was perhaps not what 
Herder would have wished.  Although it took nearly a century, the form of algorithmic 
reasoning that Leibniz had called blind thought finally returned to the mainstream of Western 
science in the nineteenth century.  In a turn that culminated with the work of Boole, 





that their algorithms must map transparently onto clear and distinct concepts; they thus, at 
length, relieved computational processes of the dependence on words that inspired such 
skepticism in the writer of Stanhope’s 1818 obituary.  This shift away from signification enabled 
not just ambitious computational projects like that of Babbage and Lovelace, but also the 
development of seemingly counterintuitive mathematical constructs like the non-Euclidean 
geometries of János Bolyai and Nikolai Lobachevsky, which were both published in the early 
1830s.  Unlike Enlightenment mathematicians, for whom mathematics had to constitute a 
comprehensible analysis of the world to be valid, the young mathematicians of the nineteenth 
century made no effort to back their symbols up with ideas; instead, they used formal rules to 
construct imaginary mathematical worlds whose structures, in some cases, seemed to flatly 
contradict what human reason dictated (Alexander, “From Voyagers to Martys” 39-40).  
Differentiating the formal symbolic systems of mathematics from languages in the strict sense 
freed people once again to experiment with blind thought, but it left them in a very different 
position from Leibniz, with his faith in the divinely instituted meaningfulness of algorithms.  The 
fact that algorithms could be constructed arbitrarily was no longer a threat to their credibility, 
but rather—for the first time in the modern history of the West—an asset. 
One reason why cultural views of language were eventually able to coexist with 
algorithms was that, unlike Enlightenment theories of the sign, modern linguistics restricted its 
scope to dealing only with what we now think of as ordinary language.  For Humboldt, the 
involuntarist argument that language existed in an intimate relation to the practices of human 
communities applied only to natural languages like Sanskrit and Kawi; mathematical languages 





to history.  The next chapter examines how this new form of disciplinarity came into being.  A 
key element in this shift, I contend, was the Romantic thought of Germany and England.  While 
Romanticism is widely regarded as a reaction against the mechanical philosophy of the 
Enlightenment, I show that at least some Romantic thinkers were less concerned with opposing 
the mechanical than with creating a space in which culture could develop autonomously from 
mechanical rationality.  This compartmentalization enabled mathematicians to develop new 
symbolic methods based not on the gold standard of reason, but rather on arbitrary rules that 
were decided, as it were, by fiat; yet it had the side-effect of alienating scientific knowledge 
from the sort of common-sense reason on which Stanhope’s Enlightenment project depended.  
As science departed further and further from culture, empirical methods of the sort advocated 
by the Lockean tradition became increasingly inadequate as means of telling real from fake.  
Locke’s touchstone might work to distinguish gold from dross, but a mere touchstone is not 





Chapter 4: Romanticism and the Objectivity of Culture 
 
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I 
choose it to mean—neither more nor less.” 




If the reputation of language reached a lowpoint in revolutionary France, Romanticism restored 
it.  In the 1830s and 40s, writers from a variety of disciplines praised the vitality of vernacular 
tongues, suggesting that, rather than enemies of science, they were its wellsprings.  The most 
famous scientist of the early nineteenth century, the naturalist Alexander von Humboldt, 
includes a brief discussion of the power of words in his popular-science book Kosmos, first 
published in 1845.  Humboldt begins by claiming that signs play a fundamental role in thought, 
a statement that echoes the Enlightenment philosophy of Condillac.  But whereas Condillac had 
emphasized the danger words posed to the certainty of reasoning, Humboldt’s tone is 
celebratory: 
THOUGHT and LANGUAGE […] stand in most intimate and old relationship to one 
another.  When speech adds grace and clearness to ideas, when its 
picturesqueness of derivation and organic structure favour our efforts sharply to 
define natural phenomena as a whole, it scarcely fails at the same time, and 





thought itself.  The WORD is, therefore, more than the mere sign and form, and its 
mysterious influence still reveals itself most strikingly where it springs among 
free-minded communities, and attains its growth upon native soils.  (1.42) 
Here Humboldt breaks entirely from the venerable suspicion of words, extolling, in somewhat 
nationalistic terms, the resources of the German language for communicating scientific 
discoveries.  What saved language from the Baconian critique was that, for Humboldt, the 
“mysterious influence” of words did not stand like a distorting lens between the observer and 
reality, as it had for the Enlightenment empiricists, but rather existed in a dialectic with the 
material world.  Humboldt’s goal, as he states it in the preface, is to develop a writing style that 
combines a rigorous scientific “completeness” with a “liveliness” of presentation (1.x; see 
Tresch, “Even the Tools Will Be Free” 255).  Humboldt’s discussion of language exemplifies a 
dualism between science and culture that radically altered the way mechanical processes 
related to ordinary language in the early nineteenth century. 
This chapter examines how this dualism came to supplant Enlightenment theories of 
language.  The terms Humboldt uses to explain the relation between language and thought, as 
this chapter shows, stem from the Romantic turn of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries.  Although some recent accounts of Romantic thought have emphasized the 
continuities between the Enlightenment and Romanticism, I show that the notion of culture on 
which Humboldt draws constituted a departure from Enlightenment views.55  A number of 
Romantic thinkers, including William Wordsworth, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, and the Humboldt 
brothers, rejected Enlightenment theories of the sign in favor of a division between science and 





and the connection to the organically developing mental life of a people that only long-
established words could provide.  Although it was not exactly the intention of either 
Wordsworth or Coleridge, this division produced an epistemological atmosphere that was far 
more conducive to the development of mechanical methods of computation than the 
Enlightenment had been.  No more was it necessary for the specialized symbolic systems of 
mathematics and logic to determine how people think all the way down; now, mathematical 
notations could work together with existing languages, the former providing rigor, the latter 
providing the “animating power,” as Humboldt puts it, of culture.  Before Leibniz’s dream of a 
calculus ratiocinatur could return, the vernacular needed to be redeemed. 
 Outside of its well-known importance for Ada Lovelace, Romanticism has not often 
played a prominent role in histories of computation.  The received view is that the Romantic 
movement was a reaction against the “mechanical” philosophies of the eighteenth century, 
making it antagonistic to the development of anything like an algorithm.  In Discourse Networks 
1800/1900, Friedrich Kittler frames the emergence of the digital as a break with Romantic 
attitudes toward communication (177-84).  But Romantic thought was not as unilaterally 
antagonistic to the mechanical as scholars have assumed.  This chapter shows that at least one 
strain of Romanticism was more concerned with delineating the limits of mechanical methods 
than with condemning them altogether.  Two of the central poets of the British Romantic 
canon—Wordsworth and Coleridge—made explicit statements to the effect that scientific 
reason must work together with an enlivening supplement of feeling (Wordsworth) or moral 
purpose (Coleridge).  These statements were part of a broader, international trend toward 





Humboldt’s brother, the linguist and educational theorist Wilhelm von Humboldt.56  Insofar as 
it pushed toward the separation of the technical aspects of science from the organic 
development of human thought, Romanticism was not effaced with the advent of technical 
media, but rather contributed to the modern notion of culture that continues to inform the 
ways people interact with information technologies in the twenty-first century. 
This chapter makes a variant of Max Weber’s argument that modernity took the form of 
the division of society into a number of distinct spheres.  This notion of modernity has become 
somewhat disreputable among scholars in the past few decades, especially in the field of 
Science and Technology Studies.  In We Have Never Been Modern, Bruno Latour argues that the 
division between nature and culture never truly existed and that modernity as a historiographic 
rubric gives a distorted view of the events of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (1-12).  I 
agree with Latour that disciplinary compartmentalization leads to a difficulty in understanding 
the entanglements, as he calls them, of ecology with human culture, yet I do maintain that a 
form of the science–culture divide took place in the nineteenth century.  The division I am 
positing is discernable in a quite concrete set of practices.  Since the word literature took on its 
modern sense, no one, to my knowledge, has seriously suggested that the meaning-making 
aspects of literary language could or should be standardized in the way that chemical 
nomenclature has been standardized.57  It is hard to imagine, for instance, an international 
consortium publishing a list of standard metaphors for describing a sunset.58  If any literary 
work did appear to be following a standard—an allegation that was made, for instance, against 
the formulaic sensation tales churned out by Blackwood’s Magazine in the early nineteenth 





suspect when it shows up in technical contexts, since it interferes with the requisite conceptual 
clarity. 
As common-sensical as it may now seem, this differential treatment of literary and 
scientific language did not exist before around 1800.59  In the eighteenth century, the word 
literature referred to any sort of learned writing, including many of what we would now 
recognize as works of science.60  While specific literary genres, such as poetry and drama, were 
clearly delineated, they did not exist in the same contradistinction to informational or 
argumentative forms of writing that they now occupy.  In the early eighteenth century, writing 
poetry would have been seen as an art in the same sense that shoemaking was an art: a rule-
based craft involving skills that one may learn from others.  Augustan poetics, the dominant 
aesthetic school in early-eighteenth-century Britain, emphasized regularity in meter and rhyme, 
and rhetoric manuals and florilegia—compilations of quotations from famous authors that 
were used to simulate erudition—arguably provided standards for the use of figures of speech 
and allusions.61  By the time that national and international standards organizations began to 
form in the later nineteenth century, though, there was no question that poetry would fall 
under their purview.  Post-Romantic notions of culture placed literature and other forms of 
serious art in opposition to such intentional planning; what made a text literary in the modern 
sense was precisely that it was not using language in a standard way, but rather in some way 
exploring novel expressive possibilities.  As technical language became more standardized, 
literary language became less so.  
The emergence of this differential treatment of culture and science, I contend, was a 





to expunge all traces of natural language from logical reasoning, as Condorcet and Stanhope 
had done, gave way to a desire to make rigorous scientific languages work together with the 
organically developing culture of the people who use them.  In the introduction to Kosmos, 
Humboldt calls for a balance between experience and intellect, utility and beauty, 
“manufacturing industry” and “the liberal arts” (1.38); true science, in his view, occupies a 
middle ground between mechanical, fact-gathering “empiricism” and an excess of imaginitive 
“fancy” (1.9).  Similar calls for balance appear in Wordsworth, who claimed that feeling plays a 
role in all knowledge, making it necessary to balance a scientific perspective with a poetic one; 
and Coleridge, who argued that the abstractions of science must be “enlivened” with a sense of 
purpose.  This dualism led thinkers across Europe to see the specialized nomenclatures, 
terminologies, and notations of science not as replacements for natural languages, but rather 
as artificial constructs that had to work together with the organically developing culture of a 
people to produce meaningful knowledge.  For a moment, the watchword was, as Ada Lovelace 
put it, “poetical science”—an approach to knowledge production that combines the advantages 
of mechanical methods with the intuition and imagination of a poet.  Science and culture, 
algebra and poetry, innovation and tradition arrived at a truce. 
Although it had significant advantages over Enlightenment empiricism for developers of 
mechanical methods of computation, this dualism also created new anxieties regarding such 
methods.  In the simultaneous adoption of organic views of culture and mechanical views of 
algebra I locate the origin of Alan Liu’s “meaning problem,” a difficulty in reconciling the results 
of algorithmic methods with interpretive discourses (“Meaning” 411).  The difficulty, I argue, 





to history: while the algorithmic aspects of symbolic algebra could be altered at will, attempts 
to give them meaning had to answer in some way to the signification practices already 
established in a community.  This disconnect between algorithm and meaning differentiates 
modern attitudes toward computation from those of Leibniz and his early-modern 
contemporaries, for whom the mechanical nature of algorithmic methods was itself a 
guarantee of their meaningfulness.  Now, the case was quite the opposite: the mechanical 
nature of such methods was reason to doubt that they meant anything at all.   
This chapter begins with a discussion of William Wordsworth’s role in the development 
of the modern notion of literature.  As an alternative to Enlightenment programs of social 
reform, Wordsworth offers a dualistic vision of society, in which science deals specifically with 
matters of fact, whereas poets handle the emotional aspects of human life.  In his long poem 
The Prelude, Wordsworth explicitly links this break with Enlightenment precepts to his 
experiences during the French Revolution, which demonstrated, in his view, the danger of 
supposing that moral questions could be addressed through the same sort of philosophical 
abstraction employed in science.  In the next section, I discuss another major ingredient in the 
dualism between culture and science: Kantian thought.  Kant articulated a number of binary 
oppositions, including the distinction between reason and understanding and the modern 
definitions of the subjective and objective perspectives, that became part of the common 
parlance in the nineteenth century.  An especially powerful statement of the division between 
subjective and objective appears in the work of Wilhelm von Humboldt, whose philosophy, I 
argue, remains useful in understanding the relation of computational systems to language.  





Taylor Coleridge, approached the philosophical questions raised by the employment of 
mechanical methods in the production of knowledge.  Coleridge’s prose writings of the 1810s, I 
argue, reveal a problem latent in the dualism between science and culture that is our 
inheritance from Romanticism: in order to mediate between the ahistorical realm of science 
and the historical realm of culture, one must make some claim about how the past ought to 
relate to the future.  The need for such a claim opens a gap into which, in the absence of a 
legitimate moral basis for believing that the results of algorithmic methods should be 
meaningful to people, pure ideology may flow. 
 
William Wordsworth: A Wholesome Separation 
 
In the 1805 version of The Prelude, William Wordsworth describes an early encounter with a 
type of writing that we would now recognize as literature: 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Thirteen years, 
Or haply less, I might have seen when first 
My ears began to open to the charm 
Of words in tuneful order, found them sweet 
For their own sakes—a passion and a power— 
And phrases pleased me, chosen for delight, 
For pomp, or love.  (1805 5.575-81; emphasis in original)62 
For Wordsworth, the idea of a kind of writing done purely for the sake of pleasure is no frivolity, 





Rousseau and William Godwin, abstract knowledge cannot be translated into human action 
without the aid of feelings, and in particular, the feeling of enjoyment one gets from learning.  
In both poetry and prose, Wordsworth argued against universalizing Enlightenment projects of 
linguistic reform, suggesting that poetry, rather than the well-formed languages of the 
empiricists, was best suited to produce social change.  Wordsworth’s poetic project formed a 
key element of the nineteenth-century notion of culture that replaced Enlightenment theories 
of the sign, and that ultimately led to a differential treatment of literary language and the 
specialized languages and notations of science. 
Wordsworth’s writings are valuable in understanding the origin of this modern division 
not just because of his influence—although that certainly was large—but also because, at least 
in the early phases of his career, he had one foot in modernity and one in the eighteenth 
century.  As Stephen Gill has remarked, Wordsworth can be difficult to appreciate as a 
philosophical poet because many of his ideas have since become common sense (151).  But 
going back to Geoffrey Durrant’s Wordsworth and the Great System and Alan Bewell’s 
Wordsworth and the Enlightenment, scholars have recognized that, as much as Wordsworth 
rejected some of the philosophical claims of Enlightenment thinkers, his work owed a 
significant debt to Enlightenment writings on history, language, and science.  Moreover, some 
scholars have noted the continuity of Wordsworth’s writings on the nature of poetry with 
Enlightenment models of disciplinarity.  In Clifford Siskin’s view, Wordsworth’s poetic project 
embraced a “divide and conquer strategy” of disciplinary specialization that he inherited from 
the Enlightenment (170); similarly, Robin Valenza argues that Wordsworth was attempting to 





representing poets as “specialists, with their own peculiar technical usage” (144).  Reading the 
Lyrical Ballads project in this frame, Valenza finds “strong and not incidental parallels between 
how Wordsworth and Coleridge aimed to transform poetic language in the Lyrical Ballads and 
how, a decade earlier, experimental chemists had reformed their nomenclature” (146). 
Yet this continuity is stronger in Wordsworth’s rhetoric than in his actual claims about 
poetic language.  At a philosophical level, there is a major difference between the positions of 
the chemical reformers and Wordsworth.  Lavoisier had framed his reform effort in terms of 
Condillac’s philosophy, which posited language as something that can be taken apart and 
rebuilt at will.  Wordsworth, on the other hand, quite plainly denies that a genuinely poetic 
language could be built from scratch in this way.  Wordsworth addresses this point most 
directly in the preface to the 1800 edition of Lyrical Ballads, where he makes a much-debated 
argument for a poetry based on “a selection of the real language of men in a state of vivid 
sensation” (153).  One of his arguments in favor of this rustic language is that it has, he claims, a 
deep connection to the “durable” experiences of the natural world (156); it thus provides “a 
more permanent and a far more philosophical language” than that of Dryden and Pope, whose 
work is hobbled by “false refinement or arbitrary innovation” (157).  Wordsworth’s use of the 
word arbitrary should be read as a signal that he is positioning himself against the eighteenth-
century tradition of linguistic voluntarism.  Wordsworthian poetic diction is supposed to be less 
“arbitrary” than that of the Augustans because it stems from human experiences—especially 
rural experiences that put one in touch with the natural world—that have been repeated over 





individual writers.63  Whereas Lavoisier’s nomenclature was literally designed by committee, 
Wordsworth’s ideal poetic diction emanates organically from the common people. 
One reason for the importance of rooting poetic language in human life is that, in 
Wordsworth’s view, poetry is specifically concerned with expressing feelings.  In the note to 
“The Thorn,” which first appeared as an appendix in the 1800 edition of Lyrical Ballads, he 
makes one of several statements that might be taken as his definition of poetry: “Poetry is 
passion: it is the history or science of feelings: now every man must know that an attempt is 
rarely made to communicate impassioned feelings without something of an accompanying 
consciousness of the inadequateness of our own powers, or the deficiencies of language” 
(140).64  This definition of poetry aligns Wordsworth with a cluster of eighteenth-century 
thinkers, including Rousseau and Edmund Burke, who had centered their arguments on 
affective and aesthetic aspects of language that the Lockean tradition had largely ignored.  As 
Burke had pointed out in his 1757 book on the sublime and the beautiful, the emotional effects 
of words do not depend solely on their definitions; one can feel the emotional impact of a word 
like angel, heaven, or death even if one can attach no clear idea to it (334-42).  Poetry, 
Wordsworth’s note suggests, must work with these emotional associations, as well as 
employing techniques such as repetition and tautology to convey emotions that cannot be 
communicated through explicit statements.  Wordsworth’s definition of poetry precludes the 
possibility of intentionally designing a poetic language, as Lavoisier’s group had designed their 
chemical nomenclature; instead, Wordsworth argues, true poetry must be written in, as he puts 





In its elevation of naturally arising linguistic forms over “arbitrary innovation,” 
Wordsworth’s poetic project is less akin to Lavoisier’s reform effort than it is to the 
involuntarist arguments of Michaëlis and Herder.  But Wordsworth differs from the eighteenth-
century involuntarists in restricting his argument to poetry, while leaving open the possibility 
that scientific languages could work differently.  Wordsworth is not calling for, in the words of 
the English translation of Michaëlis’s essay, “[a] science laid down to us in the language of 
common life” (91)—instead, Wordsworth suggests that poetry places fundamentally different 
demands upon language than science does.  In a footnote, he rejects the “contradistinction of 
Poetry and Prose” in favor of “the more philosophical one of Poetry and Science” (164n), 
meaning, as he clarifies in the revised version of the preface, a distinction between language 
that deals with feeling and language that deals with facts.  If this distinction seems to contradict 
his statement elsewhere in the book that poetry is a “science of feeling,” this is a mere 
symptom of the lack, circa 1800, of a clear vocabulary in which to articulate the distinction that 
is now captured by the terms literature and science.  Both the preface and the note to “The 
Thorn” push toward the establishment of this division, suggesting that the sort of language 
needed to communicate facts (in the preface’s terms, science) is very different from the sort 
needed to create pleasure (poetry). 
The extent of this argument’s implications depends on how broadly one interprets the 
term poetry.  Wordsworth’s immediate target in the preface is the highly formal poetic 
language of the Augustan poets, against which he offers a collection of poems written (he tells 
us) in a diction more rooted in the language of the middle and lower classes.  Interpreting it 





a space for poets among the emerging disciplinary system (144).  But poetry could also carry a 
broader sense in the Romantic period.  Poets, Percy Shelley would write in 1821, “are not only 
the authors of language and of music, of the dance and architecture, and statuary, and painting: 
they are the institutors of laws, and the founders of civil society, and the inventors of the arts of 
life, and the teachers” (7.112); William Hazlitt puts forth a similarly broad definition of poetry in 
his 1818 essay “On Poetry in General” (2).  While Wordsworth is more guarded in his claims for 
the pervasive importance of poetry than Shelley, his footnote about poetry and science leaves 
open the possibility that the poetic is not a specific type of writing, but rather an aspect of 
language that is potentially relevant to all forms of knowledge.  Throughout the preface, he 
makes it clear that “Poetry” refers not specifically to metrical compositions, but rather to any 
uses of language whose primary purpose is to impart pleasure.  If so, then it is possible that, for 
Wordsworth, poetry and science are not distinct disciplines, but rather distinct aspects of 
language that may come together in a wide range of disciplines, including mathematics and 
chemistry as much as the composition of verse. 
The long section that Wordsworth added to the preface in the 1802 edition of Lyrical 
Ballads upholds this interpretation.  Poetry’s object, he writes, “is truth: not individual and 
local, but general, and operative; not standing upon external testimony, but carried alive into 
the heart by passion” (166n).  Wordsworth makes it clear that this “passion” is an element of all 
forms of knowledge, including scientific ones: “We have no knowledge, that is, no general 
principles drawn from the contemplation of particular facts, but what has been built up by 
pleasure, and exists in us by pleasure alone.  The Man of Science, the Chemist and 





this and feel this” (167n).  Given what Wordsworth has already said about the importance of “a 
language arising out of repeated experience and regular feelings” for producing pleasure, the 
implications of this claim are large: no matter how thorougly one scrubs the understanding 
clean of any traces of words, natural language is still at work in the feelings that motivate 
action.  In granting this important but not all-encompassing role to poetic language, 
Wordsworth departs from the Enlightenment fixation on eliminating “prejudices” toward 
something more like the modern notion of culture.  For scientific purposes, it may remain 
desirable to create a well-formed language from scratch or even to forgo words in favor of 
symbols; but as far as the “human” aspects of science go—as far as one must develop the 
affections that make scientific knowledge mean something to people—one will have to work 
with an organically developing natural language and take on the role, to however diminished a 
degree, of a poet.  Far from slotting in poetry alongside other disciplines as one among many, 
Wordsworth’s system of poetic language opens the way for Lovelace’s “poetical science.” 
Wordsworth gives an explicit rationale for this balancing of fact with feeling in the 1805 
version of his long, autobiographical poem The Prelude.  Although The Prelude was not 
published in time to have any major influence in the early nineteenth century, it serves as a 
clear statement of the historical and personal circumstances that led Wordsworth to develop 
his mature views of poetry and science.  The 1805 version, in particular, balances a sympathy 
with the aims of the French Revolution with a recognition of its disastrous consequences, which 
he blames in part on a failure of radical Enlightenment thought to account adequately for the 
role of feeling in human life.  Over the course of his autobiographical account, Wordsworth is 





them, arriving finally at a commitment “to keep / In wholesome separation the two natures— / 
The one that feels, the other that observes” (1805 13.330-31).  The imperative to divide culture 
from science, to cordon off the cultivation of human activity from the construction of abstract 
bodies of knowledge, flows for Wordsworth directly from a perception of the violence that 
resulted from an actual attempt to unify scientific knowledge with human life.  This awareness 
of the potentially catastrophic consequences of Enlightenment criteria of knowledge leads to a 
reconfiguration of the relation of language to human action, with implications for literature and 
science alike. 
 Wordsworth’s explication of this division in The Prelude rests, as in the 1802 preface to 
Lyrical Ballads, on the idea that pleasure plays an important role in the formation of knowledge.  
In the sections of the poem dealing with his education, Wordsworth assigns less importance to 
formal schooling than to the playful experiences through which nature works “her tender 
scheme / Of teaching comprehension with delight” (Prelude 1805 3.587-88).  In the “Books” 
section, he describes a young boy corrupted by the utilitarian educational system of England 
circa 1800, a child who is “no child, / But a dwarf man,” a “monster birth” whose mind is 
distorted by premature erudition (5.294-95; 292).  The child’s discourse, Wordsworth writes, is 
“Tremendously embossed with terms of art. / Rank growth of propositions overruns / The 
stripling’s brain; the path in which he treads / Is choked with grammars” (5.322-25).  As an 
alternative to this stifling imposition of technical language upon the too-young, Wordsworth 
describes (in a section that he published separately as “There Was a Boy”) another child who 
would call out to wild owls with “mimic hootings,” joining them in a “concourse wild / Of mirth 





dichotomy between the artificial and the natural, the point is not exactly that the second boy is 
in touch with nature in the modern sense—with the wilderness.  The point is more that, instead 
of attempting to plan out his vocabulary intentionally, the second boy’s guardians have let him 
discover the pleasures of language on his own.  The analytical languages of the schools, for all 
their precision, cannot provide a child with a sense of joy in the voice itself, and so, 
Wordsworth suggests, they stifle rather than enlighten.65 
In this section of The Prelude, Wordsworth was responding to a proliferation of 
educational theories that did, quite overtly, treat childhood as something to be engineered for 
optimal results.  As the editors of the Norton Critical Edition of The Prelude point out, a likely 
target for Wordsworth’s polemic is Maria Edgeworth’s 1798 book Practical Education, which 
includes a few chapters written by her father Richard Lovell Edgeworth (162n); Coleridge read 
this book while staying with the Wordsworths in Germany.  One of its principle arguments, 
inspired by such Enlightenment thinkers as Condillac and Dugald Stewart, is that scientific 
knowledge “may be insensibly acquired from the usual incidents of life” (vi).  Rather than 
separating instruction from play, the Edgeworths advocate using the “technical terms” of 
chemistry and other scientific fields in ordinary situations, thus enabling children to absorb 
their meanings deeply (vi).  Although Maria Edgeworth criticizes some of Condillac’s 
pedagogical choices, she endorses his approach of building a well-formed language by defining 
words before using them: “There is no occasion to make any sudden or violent alteration in 
language, but a man who attempts to teach will find it necessary to select his terms with care, 
to define them with accuracy, and to abide by them with steadiness; thus he will make a 





argument that language plays a fundamental role in thought: “Words, as M. Condillac well 
observes, […] are in all mental processes the algebraic signs which assist us in solving the most 
difficult problems” (61-62).  While the Edgeworths reject “sudden or violent” approaches to 
linguistic reform, their educational program is ultimately directed toward remaking language on 
more rational grounds, starting with the earliest phases of a child’s encounters with the world. 
Maria Edgeworth’s project shares one of the major weaknesses of Lockean nominalism 
in that it rests on the possibility of tracing each idea back to its absolute origin.  The 
“philosophical vocabulary” is supposed to arise from carefully defining each new word in terms 
of other words one has already defined, thus creating an unbroken chain back to first principles 
in which every step is clear.  Wordsworth’s Prelude as a whole can be taken as a demonstration 
of the inadequacy of this theory to capture the complexities of actual human experience.  In a 
passage that is sometimes read as his statement of intent in the poem, Wordsworth notes the 
impossibility of ever reaching a definitive analysis of one’s own mind: 
Hard task to analyse a soul, in which 
Not only general habits and desires, 
But each most obvious and particular thought— 
Not in a mystical and idle sense, 
But in the words of reason deeply weighed— 
Hath no beginning.  (1805 2.232-36) 
The lack of beginning has important consequences if considered in the context of 
Enlightenment linguistic thought.  Lockean psychology allows for no subconscious influences 





the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, “to imprint anything on the mind, without the 
mind’s perceiving it, seems hardly intelligible” (60).  By denying that one can ever determine 
the origins of one’s “habits and desires,” Wordsworth also denies the transparency of the mind 
to itself that had underwritten the Enlightenment project of remaking language anew.  It is 
telling that he anticipates being seen as mystical for asserting that thoughts have no beginning 
and, through an oddly positioned parenthetical, attributes his position to “reason.”  
Wordsworth was breaking with one of the major epistemologies of his time, positing the 
existence of a vast domain of subjectivity that it cannot encompass. 
In the later sections of The Prelude, Wordsworth quite explicitly links this repudiation of 
Enlightenment theories of language to his disillusionment with Enlightenment reform.  In Books 
Nine through Eleven, Wordsworth narrates his flirtation with and and subsequent turn away 
from the radical politics of, first, the French Revolutionaries and, second, the followers of the 
English radical William Godwin.  During his first residency in France, in royalist company, 
Wordsworth shares in the faith of the Jacobins that the revolution is merely the inevitable 
result “of nature’s certain course” (9.253).  He believes, at this point, that the progress of 
nature will inevitably put paid to the reactionary arguments of his companions: “Every word / 
They uttered was a dart by counter-winds / Blown back upon themselves; their reason seemed 
/ Confusion-stricken by a higher power / Than human understanding, their discourse / Maimed, 
spiritless” (9.261-66).  His experience during the Terror shakes this early confidence that the 
understanding and the spirit will inevitably fall into harmony.  While he certainly does not reject 
reason in the Kantian sense—he reminds us at various points that he sees writing poetry as a 





feeling has just as much of a role to play in social change as abstract argumentation.  In order to 
prevent the disaster that results when reason is allowed to substitute for affect, he concludes in 
the final book of the poem, the two must carefully be separated.  He thus turns away from the 
Enlightenment project of remaking society on the basis of scientific reason in favor of a dualistic 
arrangement in which science is autonomous within its sphere, but not permitted to encroach  
on areas of life that must rightly be governed by feeling. 
This “wholesome separation” of empirical knowledge from feeling gives science a much 
more tenuous authority over moral questions than it had had for Enlightenment reformers.  
Wordsworth makes this distinction most explicitly in reference to the science of mathematics.  
In stark contrast to the eighteenth-century empiricist view of mathematics as a means of 
representing reality, Wordsworth characterizes geometry as “an independent world / Created 
out of pure intelligence” (6.186-87).66  He places mathematics in opposition to politics in Book 
Ten, which deals with the core of Wordsworth’s spiritual crisis.  Having become disillusioned 
with Godwinian thought, he “Yielded up moral questions in despair, / And for my future 
studies, as the sole / Employment of the enquiring faculty, / Turned toward mathematics, and 
their clear / And solid evidence” (10.900-04).  There is arguably a parallel for Wordsworth’s 
frustrated retreat into mathematical abstraction in Condorcet, who devoted himself to his 
universal algebra scheme while in hiding from the Jacobins.  But Condorcet certainly had not 
“Yielded up moral questions”—mathematics for him was a way to pin morality down.  As 
d’Alembert had viewed mathematics as a potential instrument for spreading enlightenment, a 
fundamentally political and ultimately revolutionary project, Condorcet believed that his 





mathematics comforting precisely because, in his view, it has nothing to do with the political 
turmoil surrounding him.  The social conflicts of the 1790s, the poet has come to recognize, 
were governed by affections and sentiments more than by reason; mathematics, even 
considered as a generalized “method of analysis,” could have no direct bearing on these 
motives. 
Wordsworth’s contention is that poetry is better suited than mathematics to fill this 
moral function.  He contrasts the powers of mathematics and poetry explicitly in one of the 
best-known passages in The Prelude, the allegorical dream at the beginning of Book Five.  In the 
1805 version of The Prelude, Wordsworth attributes the dream to “a friend” (5.49); as Jane 
Worthington Smyser has shown, the story is likely inspired by a passage from Descartes (270-
72).  Alone in an Arabian desert, the dreamer encounters a stranger carrying a stone under one 
arm and a shell under the other.  The stone, the stranger says, is Euclid’s Elements, while the 
shell “[i]s something of more worth” (5.90).  The dreamer places the shell up to his ear and 
hears “[a]n ode in passion uttered, which foretold / Destruction to the children of the earth / By 
deluge now at hand” (5.97-99).  The stranger then delineates the difference between the stone 
and the shell, 
The one that held acquaintance with the stars, 
And wedded man to man by purest bond 
Of nature, undisturbed by space or time; 
Th’ other that was a god, yea many gods, 
Had voices more than all the winds, and was 





The first three lines, those dealing with geometry, do not make a fundamental break from 
Enlightenment views of mathematics.  That Wordsworth’s lines contain traces of the 
revolutionary dreams of the early 1790s is confirmed by the changes he made in later versions 
of the poem: he replaces “wedded man to man by purest bond / Of nature” with “wedded soul 
to soul in purest bond / Of reason” (1850 5.104-05), eliminating the Rousseauian connotation 
that geometry can create social bonds rooted in “nature.”  But depicting Euclid’s Elements as a 
stone suggests that its diagrams and propositions are ultimately inert, lacking the active power 
of the shell of poetry.  It is significant that the ode comes in the form of a voice.  Like the 
hooting of the owls in “There Was a Boy,” the “ode in passion uttered” conveys feeling through 
pure sound, in this case channeled from a divine source.  Echoing Young’s passage about lifeless 
knowledge “sheathed in Erudition,” Wordsworth suggests that both the diagrams of Euclid and 
the bookish “terms of art” with which utilitarian educators tried to overload childrens’ minds 
lack an essential connection to the feelings.  Only poetic language, Wordsworth tells us, can 
convey the truth with the vitality of passionate speech.  Poetry thus steps in to do what 
scientific reason could not, without repeating the mistakes of the French Revolution, take it 
upon itself to do: regulate the emotional attachments that motivate people to behave morally 
in their actual lives.  
Wordsworth’s claims for the importance of poetry were controversial in his own time, 
and later critics have taken varying views on how seriously they should be taken.  The early 
reception of his work was decidedly mixed, and the utilitarian theories of education that he 
criticized in The Prelude remained a powerful force well into the nineteenth century.  But by the 





win out, and at least some of Wordsworth’s poetological gambits remain part of the received 
notion of literature to this day.  While not all modern conceptions of literature specifically 
concern pleasure or other feelings, the idea that literary writing is distinct from scientific 
writing is so deeply ingrained that it hardly seems necessary to mention it.  Literary texts are, to 
be sure, permitted to incorporate scientific or technical language; Walt Whitman employed 
terms drawn from a variety of mechanical trades and sciences in the 1855 edition of Leaves of 
Grass and, over a century later, Thomas Pynchon interpolated large amounts of engineering 
discourse into his novel Gravity’s Rainbow.  But such literary uses of technical terms would by 
no means count as technical writing for the purposes of modern science.  Scientists and 
engineers are trained to avoid, at least in technical contexts, employing language in an 
excessively “literary” or “poetic” fashion; permitting linguistic play or overt emotionality into 
scientific texts would compromise the clarity to which scientific language aspires.  The 
distinction between culture and science created a space in which this sort of linguistic discipline 
could exist without requiring any revolutionary change in people’s ways of life.  No longer 
would it be necessary to impose technical terms on a student from the earliest days of 
childhood, as the Edgeworths had suggested, so that those terms are absorbed down to the 
bone; scientific language could achieve the discipline it required without such an effort because 
it operated only in technical contexts that required no deep connection to human feelings. 
This schism between the technical and literary aspects of language marks a turn away 
from the empiricist tradition of linguistic thought that extended from Locke at the end of the 
seventeenth century to Maria Edgeworth at the end of the eighteenth.  Empiricism remained 





John Stuart Mill, but nineteenth-century empiricism largely rejected the linguistic voluntarism 
that had characterized Lockean nominalism.  Mill, taking direct inspiration from Wordsworth 
and Coleridge, enthusiastically adopted the Romantic dualism between science and feeling, 
emphasizing that a healthy society requires a careful balance between the two.  The separation 
of science from feeling was even more pronounced in mathematics.  Between the 1810s and 
the 1830s, the specialized symbolic systems of algebra came to be viewed as ever more open to 
arbitrary reshaping and ever less dependent on the contents of people’s minds.  Wordsworth’s 
characterization of geometry as “an independent world / Created out of pure intelligence” was 
prophetic: at last freed of the need to maintain a perfect correspondence between 
mathematical reasoning and the way people understand the world in their daily lives—because 
this was now recognized as impossible—mathematicians could create worlds of their own 
based solely on moving symbols around on paper according to rules that are chosen arbitrarily. 
In order to make sense of these simultaneous shifts in attitudes toward mathematical 
and literary languages, it is necessary to consider another great dualism that emerged in the 
Romantic period: the modern division between subjective and objective perspectives.  While 
these words had existed since the middle ages, they did not take on their modern senses until 
the early nineteenth century, due in large part to the growing popularity of ideas derived from 
the work of Immanuel Kant.  A particularly useful articulation of the nineteenth-century version 
of this divide appears in the work of Wilhelm von Humboldt.  In addition to being one of the 
founders of modern linguistics, Humboldt was one of the principle architects of modern 
academic disciplinarity, which he put into effect as founder of the University of Berlin.67  Like 





the everyday worldview of a people; but whereas Wordsworth was primarily interested in 
experience on an individual level, Humboldt’s work emphasizes the collective nature of 
language.  In his 1836 book on language, Humboldt employed the Kantian division between the 
subjective and the objective to make sense of the seeming paradox that language is both 
created by people and out of the control of the individual—a fact that seems to sharply 
differentiate natural languages from the symbolic systems used in algorithms. 
 
Kant and Humboldt: The Vindication 
 
Although they did not find widespread use until well after the traditional end of the 
Enlightenment period, the modern definitions of subjective and objective are ultimately due to 
one of the most self-consciously Enlightened thinkers of the eighteenth century: Immanuel 
Kant.  Kant’s critical philosophy was supposed to establish the limits of what reason alone could 
accomplish without the aid of the senses; he thus distinguished reason from the understanding, 
which dealt with concepts based on sensory data.  Pure reason was, he argued in Critique of 
Pure Reason, capable only of drawing conclusions about the conditions that make experience 
possible.  In the hands of later thinkers, however, Kant’s articulation of the subjective–objective 
divide provided a way of distinguishing inner and outer perspectives upon a wide range of 
human phenomena, including, in Wilhelm von Humboldt’s work, language.  Although the 
outcome was not at all in line with Kant’s intentions, the Romantic version of Kantian idealism 
played an important role in the rise of the algorithm.  By articulating a new way of dividing the 





calculus ratiocinatur, a mechanical process of symbolic manipulation that could produce 
knowledge independently of the uncertainties of ordinary language, to return in a diminished 
form among nineteenth-century mathematicians and logicians. 
Kant himself did not coin the terms subjective and objective; what he did was reverse 
them.  Prior to Kant, the terms had been part of the vocabulary of Scholastic logic, in which 
they had rougly the opposite of their current meanings.  As the OED puts it, objective in this 
older sense means “Existing as an object of thought or consciousness as opposed to having a 
real existence,” whereas subjective means “Relating to the subject as that in which properties 
or attributes inhere; inherent; relating to the essence or reality of a thing; real, essential” 
(“objective, adj. 3a”; “subjective, adj. 2”).  But by 1852, Tennemann’s Manual of the History of 
Philosophy could give exactly the opposite definitions: the objective “is the externally caused 
element in our perception and knowledge” while subjective “implies the internal individual 
element, in perception, feeling, and knowledge” (vii; see also Hamilton, “M. Cousin” 196-97n).  
As Daston and Galison point out in Objectivity, it was Kant, along with, in the English-speaking 
world, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who spurred this reversal in the definitions of subjective and 
objective (30).  Once it escaped from Kant’s grasp, the subjective–objective divide ultimately 
underwrote a sharper division between the formal and semiotic aspects of symbolic systems 
than had existed in previous periods, reinforcing the divide between the scientific and common 
ways of understanding the world that many Enlightenment thinkers had attempted to unify. 
The idea of objectivity that reached broad acceptance in the nineteenth century is not, 
however, exactly in line with Kant’s intentions.  To avoid confusion, I employ the term post-





strongly committed to the universalism of the Enlightenment, making him, in some ways, more 
akin to Locke than to Romanticism.  In the “Transcendental Doctrine of Method”—the brief, 
relatively little-discussed second book of Critique of Pure Reason—Kant draws a distinction 
between what he calls “rational” and “historical” knowledge.  Knowledge is “historical,” he 
writes, “if he who possesses it knows only so much of it as has been given to him from outside, 
whether through immediate experience or through narration, or also through instruction (of 
general knowledge)” (655).  Under this heading Kant captures the linguistic “inheritance” that 
Herder celebrates.  Kant’s point is that philosophical knowledge that is memorized through 
reading or verbal instruction (as Christian Wolff intended for students to memorize his system) 
is not truly rational knowledge for the student.  Such knowledge, Kant thinks, is subjectively 
historical even though it is objectively rational, and thus the system-memorizing student “has 
grasped and retained, that is, he has learnt well and has become a plaster cast of a living 
person” (655).  In other words, one cannot legitimately possess philosophical knowledge until 
one thinks the thoughts oneself.  In this regard, Kant’s views on education are just as 
dependent on an individualistic notion of reason as those of Locke, who warns, in The Conduct 
of the Understanding, that a person who memorizes conclusions from books without following 
their arguments “makes his understanding only the warehouse of other men’s lumber” (93).  
Like Locke and Condillac, Kant categorically excludes the possibility of collaborative knowledge-
production in the domain of pure reason, confining collaboration instead to the realm of 
“historical” knowledge. 
In spite of sharing Locke’s skepticism toward collective knowledge-production, Kant did 





philosophical thought and the concepts through which it is expressed.  Condillac, recall, takes 
responsibility for the clarity of his language with a disclaimer: “If you do not understand me it is 
because I do not know how to write” (A Treatise on Systems 151).  Kant takes no such 
responsibility.  In the preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, he admits 
that he “can lay no claim” to “a talent for lucid exposition”; he thus leaves the task of improving 
the “presentation” of his philosophy to others (20).  In the preface to the first edition, he states 
that he has aimed for “discursive (logical) clarity,” meaning clarity of concepts, but not 
“intuitive (aesthetic) clarity,” meaning clarity through concrete examples, which he chose not 
to include in his text (10; emphasis in original).  Kant was certainly not the first to distinguish 
the quality of thought from the quality of its expression; various thinkers going back to Aristotle 
have treated the content of philosophy as more important than the words in which it is 
“clothed.”  But Kant’s critical philosophy provided a powerful new way of expressing this 
distinction.  The need to root abstractions in sensory data no longer applied to the 
transcendental realm of logic; thus, the manner in which the philosopher or teacher explains it 
to the student does not bear on its validity.  Some of Kant’s early critics (including Herder) took 
issue with the first critique’s lack of attention to language, but these responses were of 
relatively little influence compared to Kant’s new definitions of the subjective and the 
objective.  Whereas French and British empiricists were disturbed by the nagging possibility 
that the unclear words of one’s vernacular might taint one’s reasoning—the possibility that 
inspired Condorcet’s attempt to depose language in the 1790s—Kant suggested that this 
concern was only subjective and that writing clearly was, accordingly, nothing for a 





The effents of Kant’s influence on nineteenth-century developments in science are 
complex.  Daston and Galison link Kant’s redefinition of the word objective to the ideal of 
mechanical objectivity in the later nineteenth century, which involved following rigorously 
defined procedures that leave as few traces of the self in one’s conclusions as possible (30).  But 
as John Tresch has pointed out, this definition of objectivity does not adequately account for 
the ways scientists used the term in the earlier decades of the nineteenth century (“Even the 
Tools Will Be Free” 256).  Tresch argues that early-nineteenth-century advocates of scientific 
objectivity, such as Alexander von Humboldt, did not attempt a suppression of the self in favor 
of mechanical procedures, but rather viewed the use of instruments as a way of bringing 
together multiple perspectives both subjective and objective (257).  The post-Kantian 
terminology did, however, provide early-nineteenth-century scientists with a way of 
distinguishing the inner and outer perspectives with a greater degree of clarity than in previous 
periods.  As Capozzi and Roncaglia argue, Kant’s critical philosophy enabled a new approach to 
logic that divided standards of logical validity in a newly absolute way from empirical facts 
about how the human mind works (147).  This distinction between subject and object 
differentiated early-nineteenth-century science from the morally tinged scientific projects of 
the Enlightenment, which pathologized any deviations from universal reason as signals of 
“error” or “prejudice.”  By reclassifying the factors that lead different people to different 
conclusions as subjective, the new terminology enabled the personal and cultural differences 
that prevented agreement to be both destigmatized and diffused of their potential to explode 





The Kantian turn led, in other words, to a notion of culture that celebrated, or at least 
tolerated, differences rather than viewing them as impediments to the progress of reason.  The 
linguistic thought of the time provided a theoretical rationale for the newly positive attitude 
toward language that Alexander von Humboldt so enthusiastically expressed.  One of the 
period’s most sophisticated version of this argument appears in the work of Alexander’s 
brother Wilhelm von Humboldt, who was an assiduous reader of Kant.  In his 1836 book On the 
Diversity of Human Language Construction and its Influence on the Mental Development of the 
Human Species, Humboldt famously declared that language “is no product (Ergon), but an 
activity (Energeia)” (On Language 49).  By this declaration, Humboldt drew a distinction 
between the language itself, which is a “work of the spirit” (49), and the material traces that 
linguistic activity produces (see J. Walker 92).  Only the latter, he thinks, can fall within the 
purview of objective study: from the perspective of linguistics, form is “an abstraction 
fashioned by science” by way of systematically describing the patterns that appear in people’s 
linguistic practices (50).  This scientific view of language can never, for Humboldt, capture the 
true essence of a living tongue.  From the perspective of the people who actually speak a 
language, its form is not an abstraction, but “the quite individual urge whereby a nation gives 
validity to thought and feeling in language” (50).  This urge, which Humboldt calls the “inner 
linguistic sense” (innerer Sprachsinn), exists in a dialectic with the objective sound system of a 
language, which limits but does not entirely constrain the creative activity of language-making 
(see Harris and Taylor 177).  The language that one internalizes in this deep way is not, in 
Humboldt’s view, a repository of old misconceptions, but rather a connection to the “mental 





The scientific linguistics that arose in early-ninenteenth-century Germany followed 
Herder in taking an involuntarist view of natural languages: it denied that anyone, even the 
academic elite, could alter a living language at will.  Comparative grammar rested on the 
assumption that language was a collective creation rather than an intentional invention of “the 
learned or the priesthood,” as Franz Bopp puts it in the 1821 Analytical Comparison of the 
Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, and Teutonic Languages (14).  The processes by which language 
develops, in Humboldt’s terms, are difficult to “calculate” from a scientific perspective because 
they depend on “the mysterious influences whereby one generation is connected with the 
next” (31).  For Humboldt, improving a language is thus the exclusive province of literature in 
the new sense, in which language is raised above “the commonplaces of material life” to “the 
pure evolution of thought, and to free expression” (151).  Poetry, in particular, has an ability to 
transgress and thus expand the boundaries of a language precisely because it derives from the 
subjective urges that create language rather than from the analytical methods of science.  
(Ralph Waldo Emerson makes a similar statement in “Circles”: “Literature is a point outside of 
our hodiernal circle through which a new one may be described” [257].)  In the newly emerging 
field of linguistics, unlike in Condillac’s educational program, it was outside the purview of 
science to help people speak their languages better or—even more heretically—to try to 
improve a language.  Instead, contributing to the linguistic life of a people required a poetic 
engagement with that people’s mentality, their subjectivity, the interior perspective that an 
analysis of the objective facts of sound and spelling can never totally capture. 
In spite of its insistence on the importance of subjectivity, Humboldt’s theory did open 





institutionalized control.  Scientific terminology (wissenschaftliche Terminologie), Humboldt 
suggests in his 1836 book, may be governed in a different way from natural languages.  In 
discussing the ways in which common concepts like soul can acquire distinct “characters” in 
different languages, Humboldt associates technical language with an objective perspective that 
excludes such differences: 
For here we are speaking of the expression emanating from the abundance of 
mental life, not of the shaping of concepts by the school, which confines them to 
their necessary characteristic marks.  From this systematically exact limitation 
and fixing concepts and their signs, there arises scientific terminology […].  The 
dual comparison aforementioned [e.g. between words with similar denotative 
meanings but different “characters”] brings in the specific and delicate 
separation of subjective and objective into the light of consciousness, and shows 
how both always interact with each other, and how the uplifting and ennobling 
of creative power goes hand in hand with the harmonious integration of 
knowledge.  (English 167-68; German 223) 
With Kantian imprimatur, Humboldt exempts the specialized languages of scientific disciplines 
from the need to emanate organically from the “mental life” of a people.  The language of “the 
school” is governed by strict definitions that exclude subjective differences in the “characters” 
of words.  The distinction between technical and common language was nothing new; David 
Hume, among others, made such a distinction in the eighteenth century (Valenza 40).  But 
Humboldt describes it in a distinctly Romantic way.  Unlike Condillac’s well-formed language, 





Scientific terms, he suggests, are objective precisely because their meanings are determined by 
explicit definitions rather than by the organically developing mental life of a people; they could 
be built and rebuilt arbitrarily in a way that the words of natural languages could not because 
these definitions worked, at least to an extent, autonomously from the mindsets of the people 
who use them. 
Humboldt’s deployment of the terms subjective and objective provides a powerful 
explanation for one of the major differences that now exists between natural languages and 
mathematical ones: one can define f(x) however one likes, but making the word albatross mean 
burden, as Coleridge did with “Rime of the Ancient Mariner,” takes more than just will.68  What 
places natural language out of control of the individual is that its social nature grants its 
strictures objectivity from the perspective of the speaker or writer.  Language, Humboldt 
writes, “is objectively active and independent, precisely in so far as it is subjectively passive and 
dependent” (62).  Thus the individual person is bound by the linguistic practices of those who 
came before: “Language belongs to me, because I bring it forth as I do; and since the ground of 
this lies at once in the speaking and having-spoken of every generation of men, so far as 
speech-communication may have prevailed unbroken among them, it is language itself which 
restrains me when I speak” (63).  By contrast, what is objective in the use of the symbol f(x)—
what has the power to restrain how one uses it—is not any collective convention determining 
its meaning, but rather the formal rules governing its role in algebraic operations.  Thus, 
whereas the meaning of a German or English word is objectively determined (in part) by 
cultural factors, the meaning of f(x) is entirely subjective in the sense of personal.  The practices 





certainly play a role in the development of one’s mathematical abilities, as a great theorist of 
Bildung like Humboldt would surely remind us—but they have no bearing on mathematical 
truth.  Culture, along with the messy, “incalculable” complexities of its development, is thus, as 
far as mathematical notations go, quarantined in the realm of subjectivity. 
A direct statement of this application of the post-Kantian subject–object divide to 
mathematics appears in the work of the German mathematician Martin Ohm.  (The ohm, a unit 
of measurement for electrical resistance, is named after Martin’s brother Georg.)  Beginning in 
1816, Ohm attempted to eliminate the paradoxes that continued to plague arithmetic, 
developing the first set of consistent rules for determining the value of ab that account for 
imaginary numbers.  In his 1842 book The Spirit of Mathematical Analysis and its Relation to a 
Logical System (published in an English translation the following year), Ohm explains his 
thinking in terms that borrow from the new post-Kantian terminology (see Martin 41).  His 
solution to the confusions that surrounded imaginary numbers is based, he writes, on the 
realization that mathematical expressions “do not represent magnitudes (quantities), but 
mental acts (in systematic language: ‘symbolized operations’), which stand in certain relations 
to one another” (11); thus “the whole of mathematical analysis is solely employed in the 
transformation of given forms” (13).  By reframing calculation in terms of “operations” (which is 
to say, algorithms) rather than ideas of quantity, Ohm breaks radically with the Enlightenment 
view, shared by Newton, Condillac, d’Alembert, and Descartes, that mathematical expressions 
must refer to ideas derived from our understanding of or intuitions about space and time.  
Addition and subtraction become matters of “mere form,” and calculation consists of “nothing 





of them down” (20).  The correctness of a mathematical inference, in this view, can be 
determined solely through an examination of the physical marks a person makes; “subjective” 
considerations such as what one thinks the symbols mean are secondary.69  Ohm represents 
this formal turn as a rejection of the prevailing wisdom, claiming that, upon the first publication 
of his Versuch eines vollkommen consequenten Systems der Mathematik (Attempt at a Perfectly 
Consequential System of Mathematics) in 1822, several other mathematicians declared his 
ideas “insane” (Spirit 10).  But by the 1840s, symbolic methods were winning out over the 
empiricist view of mathematics that had reigned from the time of Newton to that of 
d’Alembert.  Mathematics was moving from the brain to the page. 
While Humboldt’s book on language came too late to have any influence on Ohm’s 
system, the two developments make sense as a part of the same intellectual turn.  For both 
thinkers, the post-Kantian division between subjective and objective provided a way of 
separating the aspects of a system that can be altered at will from those that may be restrained 
by culture.  Although this division may seem too common-sensical to be worthy of note, it 
represented a departure from the Enlightenment theories of language on which Humboldt cut 
his philosophical teeth.  From Lockean and Cartesian perspectives alike, all symbolic systems 
had to be backed up with clear and distinct ideas in order to bear any epistemic weight; 
accordingly, the Herderian argument that the influence of one’s upbringing could never be 
totally expunged from one’s way of thinking could potentially undermine claims about the 
universal validity of algebra.  The post-Kantian division between the subjective and objective 
perspectives provided a way of circumventing this problem by separating the question of how 





separation in place, there was no need to take precautions, as Condorcet so nervously did, 
against the possibility of “vulgar” ideas finding their way into mathematical reasoning.  Instead, 
natural and artificial languages could work together: one’s culture would provide intuitions and 
mental energy, while formal rules would provide the discipline needed to achieve objectivity.70  
The influence of one’s native tongue on mathematical reasoning was, for comparative linguists 
like Humboldt and mathematical formalists like Ohm, no longer a taint, but rather a source of 
vitality. 
The division of semantic from formal aspects of symbolic systems produced a major 
improvement in the rigor of algebra and calculus in the early nineteenth century, and it remains 
a key element in attitudes toward computation to this day.  One might, in particular, apply 
much the same Kantian terminology that Humboldt and Ohm applied to natural and algebraic 
languages to explain why computer code seems to be autonomous from culture.  Consider, for 
instance, this trivial piece of code in the Python programming language: 
albatross = 45 
print(albatross) 
 
The first line stores the value 45 in memory and gives it the name “albatross.”  The second line 
displays the value named “albatross” on the screen.  One can change the name “albatross” to 
anything else—provided that it remains the same in both places, and provided that the new 
name does not already have some other role in the program—and the program will do exactly 
the same thing.  This aspect of the program, as engineers say, is “arbitrary.”  But it is only 
arbitrary in the sense of voluntary if one considers the code from a technical, as opposed to a 
cultural, perspective.  If the symbols are considered as signs, such choices are not arbitrary, but 





“albatross” among English speakers and expect it not to suggest a bird.  Programming 
languages are typically designed so as to make the aspects of the software that may be, in 
Humboldian terms, restrained by language—namely, the choice of signifiers—as irrelevant to 
the logic of the software as possible.  In this sense, the modern dualism between subjective and 
objective is written into the way programming languages work. 
The roots of this modern view of algorithmic systems can be found in the post-Kantian 
discourse of the early nineteenth century.  It was in this period that mathematicians first 
seriously considered the possibility that mathematical validity could be defined entirely in 
terms of the arrangements of symbols on a page, independently of their meanings.  Not all 
advocates of symbolic algebra picked up on the post-Kantian terminology—Charles Babbage, 
who was as important a figure in the development of British algebra as he was in the early 
history of computers, showed little interest in German idealism—but for those who did, it 
provided a compelling explanation of why the algorithmic manipulation of symbols could 
produce knowledge that was seemingly independent of the varying ways people think.  This 
appropriation of the Kantian subjective–objective divide fit in with the broader trend in the 
Romantic period toward dividing the technical details of science from “human” factors.  Just as 
Wordsworth had called for a “wholesome separation” of science from the affective complexity 
of human life, Kantian transcendentalism seemed to nineteenth-century readers to reveal a 
realm of pure reason in which logical thought could operate autonomously from the details of 
actually existing human experience, which is inevitably colored by culture.  This dualism 
provided a way of turning some aspects of reasoning into a mechanical process without 





had envisioned.  The point is not that the algorithmic and semantic aspects of a symbolic 
system are totally independent—the subjective and objective, as Humboldt writes, “always 
interact with each other”—but rather that neither side may absolutely constrain the other.  
Shuffled away to their respective sides of the dialectic, culture and the algorithm learned to 
coexist in peace. 
While it originates in the work of Kant, the version of the subjective–objective divide 
that came to undergird modern attitudes toward algorithms is not quite in line with Kant’s 
intentions.  As Daniel J. Cohen notes, Victorian mathematicians such as George Boole 
appropriated Kant’s ideas to identify their work with the transcendental realm of pure reason, 
but this position rested on a construal of the transcendental that was, from a strictly Kantian 
perspective, illegitimate (29-30).  This objection was aired in the early nineteenth century, 
albeit in a slightly different context.  In a widely discussed essay first published in an 1829 issue 
of the Edinburgh Review, the Scottish logician William Hamilton levies such a charge against the 
German and French followers of Kant.  Kant himself, as Hamilton points out, rejected the 
Leibnizian doctrine that truths about the world could be arrived at by means of reason alone, 
instead limiting the scope of pure reason to discerning the conditions under which experience is 
possible.  According to Hamilton, later idealists such as Fichte, Schelling, and Victor Cousin 
ignored this limitation, presuming instead that pure reason could provide direct knowledge of 
being; they thus, Hamilton argues, employed superficially Kantian terminology to conceal what 
was actually an even “bolder and more uncompromising Rationalism” than that of Leibniz 
himself (“M. Cousin’s Course of Philosophy” 197).  While Hamilton does not directly address 





and Boole who employed Kantian terms to justify the use of symbolic methods.  To the extent 
that such algebraists claimed to produce objective knowledge about the world by shuffling 
around symbols on pieces of paper, they were arguably Leibnizians in Kantian clothing. 
One should not, however, overstate the extent to which Leibniz’s dream of a calculus 
ratiocinatur returned in the nineteenth century.  Not even the most enthusiastic advocates of 
symbolic algebra had the level of confidence that Leibniz had had about the power of written 
characters; formal rules could provide rigor, but they could not, within nineteenth-century 
terms, serve as a guarantee that the symbols had any reference to the world.  Numerous 
thinkers in the early nineteenth century expressed concerns that the results of symbolic 
methods would ultimately prove to be mere nonsense.  In 1835, for instance, Augustus de 
Morgan—one of the key figures in the development of symbolic logic—described the algebraic 
practice of his time as “something like symbols bewitched, and running about the world in 
search of meaning” (quoted in Fisch, “Peacock’s Treatise” 145).  These complaints might be 
seen as early instances of Alan Liu’s “meaning problem,” which stems from an apparent gap 
between the ways algorithms work and the concepts by which people understand the world.  If 
the division between subjective and objective perspectives created a space where symbolic 
methods could operate autonomously of culture, it did not provide a way to bridge the gap 
between these two realms.  At just the same time that algebra and calculus became truly 
rigorous from a logical perspective, it became far more difficult to explain what their 
abstractions meant. 
The appearance of widespread anxiety over this gap in the early nineteenth century 





optimism of Leibniz and Wilkins.  For all that Locke had gone out of fashion by the 1830s, one 
element of his critique of real-character schemes had stuck—it was still unacceptable to assert 
that non-phonetic symbols could bear meaning independently of the curse of Babel.  Meaning 
was now seen as something that had, inherently, to arise from human thought, regardless of 
whether the signifiers were real characters or words.  In order to give meaning to mathematical 
symbols, then, one somehow had to connect them to the ideas in people’s heads, which meant, 
in modern terms, reckoning with culture.  This was not always easily accomplished, especially as 
mathematics grew increasingly complex and counterintuitive over the course of the nineteenth 
century.  De Morgan’s comment that algebraic symbols seem to be “bewitched” captures a 
sense of uncanniness in the fact that one could apparently employ algorithmic methods to 
produce epistemically valid mathematical knowledge that one does not, oneself, understand.  
The return of Leibniz’s dream came at the cost of creating a rift between algorithms and the 
world of human life. 
One of the period’s most sophisticated commentators on this problem was England’s 
premier emissary of Kantian thought, Samuel Taylor Coleridge.  In his philosophical writings of 
the 1810s, Coleridge made the case that scientific knowledge must be “enlivened” with moral 
purpose in order to avoid producing destructive outcomes.  Coleridge attempted to turn the 
Kantian distinction between understanding and pure reason into a rationale for the necessity of 
supplementing the “mechanical” activities of science and industry with a religious perspective.  
While Coleridge’s overt goal is to defend a Christian mode of social organization in the face of 
utilitarian scientism, his work poses an array of problems that are relevant from a secular 





possibility that an “unenlivened” process may be set in motion—an algorithm cut loose from 
culture, prowling the world like a zombie, pursuing ends that human beings can neither 
understand nor control.  The lack of a stable framework for interpreting the results of such a 
process creates a gap into which, since genuine morality has fallen out of the picture, the raw 
exertion of power may flow.  Coleridge’s work thus reveals a difficulty in discerning the ethical 
consequences of algorithms, a problem that remains unresolved in the twenty-first century. 
 
Coleridge and the Prophetic Machine 
 
Although Coleridge was a Godwinian radical when he wrote his poem to Stanhope in 1795, his 
influence was greatest as a popularizer of German idealism.  Coleridge was a progenitor of the 
class of writers John Holloway dubbed the “Victorian sages”—writers who offered moral 
warnings against the perceived materialism and shallowness of the Industrial age (The Victorian 
Sage).  Coleridge’s sage writings played a major role in the popularization of Kant in England, 
and they contributed an important element to the nineteenth-century dualism between 
science and culture.  Whereas Wordsworth emphasized the need to balance empirical 
observation with feeling, Coleridge’s mature writings on science are primarily concerned with 
its relation to moral philosophy.  In his writings of the 1810s, he makes a variation of the 
standard anti-Jacobin argument that, if mechanical methods are allowed to encroach upon the 
moral domain, the consequences would be disastrous; but rather than decrying these methods 
altogether, he merely stipulates that they must be guided by a “leading idea” (Works 4.II.513).  





drawbacks of utilitarianism, but read more skeptically, his work provides a powerful analysis of 
one of the costs of the division of algorithmic systems from culture that took place in the 
nineteenth century: by separating scientific standards of validity from the ways people give 
meaning to the knowledge science produces, the sundering of algorithm from meaning creates 
an opening for ideology. 
 Although Coleridge’s sage writings were read in the nineteenth century as critiques of 
“mechanical” philosophies broadly conceived, the arguments he makes are less condemnations 
of mechanical methods as warnings about their limitations.  Similarly to Wordsworth in The 
Prelude, one of his primary targets is a system of education.  in his 1813 book Instructions for 
Conducting Schools through the Agency of the Scholars Themselves, Andrew Bell described a 
system for administering schools that he calls the Madras system (3).  This system, which was 
also known as the monitorial system, involved employing upper-level students to tutor the 
lower-level students, thus reducing the number of full-time faculty needed to run a large 
school.  Coleridge’s critique of Bell’s system appears in The Statesman’s Manual (1816), which is 
oriented toward aristocratic readers.  He later addressed a similar argument to the middle 
classes in a second volume, A Lay Sermon (1817), and he planned to complete the series with a 
third volume addressed to the lower classes, although this was never written.  In The 
Statesman’s Manual, Coleridge describes this administrative apparatus as a “vast moral steam-
engine” (Works 6.41); although he praises the efficiency of Bell’s system for teaching reading 
and writing, he asserts that, even if it were set “in free motion throughout the Empire,” the 
monitorial machine would not suffice to fulfill the goal of educating the people (6.41).  





provide a sense of moral direction to the students.  Since the monitorial system provides no 
way “to stem up against the strong currents set in from an oppposite point,” it could potentially 
“be driven backward by them and become confluent with the evils, it was intended to 
preclude” (6.42).  The metaphorics of this passage creates a dichotomy between the 
mechanical and the moral, which Coleridge figures respectively in terms of speed and direction: 
a “steam-engine” like Bell’s system can rapidly move the educational apparatus forward, but a 
moral sense is needed to determine the direction in which it should go. 
The crux of Coleridge’s critique of mechanical methods is that their practitioners 
typically professed an ability to predict what the machines they created would do.  Addressing 
the French Revolution, he argues that advances in the arts and sciences have led “to an 
assumption of prophetic power, and the general conceit that states and governments might be 
and ought to be constructed as machines, every movement of which might be foreseen and 
taken into previous calculation” (6.34).  Throughout The Statesman’s Manual and A Lay 
Sermon, Coleridge ironically casts utilitiarians as the “prophets” and “seers” of the time, 
suggesting that the ability of Jacobins and utilitarians to foresee the consequences of their 
reforms is just as illusory as divination by entrails.  Comparing utilitarian planning to such 
superstition points up not only the excessive faith that reformers had in their methods, but also 
a deeper problem lurking within the idea of the mechanical that prevailed during Coleridge’s 
time.  As Rick Rylance has pointed out, the word machine could bear two different senses in the 
nineteenth century—on the one hand, it referred to something that was intentionally designed, 
and on the other hand, it meant something whose actions were entirely predictable (25).  These 





mean that one can predict with certainty what it will do.  The possibility that people might 
create mechanical processes whose actions they could not predict would reach a crisis in the 
nineteenth century, most notably in the work of Charles Babbage.  For Coleridge, the gap 
between the two conceptions of the mechanical provided a space for moral philosophy to 
enter.  Utilitarian educations might have planned out every aspect of an educational 
institution’s daily operations, but such planning cannot provide a way of knowing for sure that 
the institution will take a morally correct direction.  To claim that one can do so is to take on, 
illegitimately, the mantle of a prophet. 
Coleridge’s alternative to utilitarianism is a general theory of method that is supposed 
to balance the benefits of mechanical activity with a sense of purpose grounded in a moral 
order.  His most direct statement of his views on method appears in his “Essays on the 
Principles of Method,” which were first published in the 1818 edition of The Friend.  In this 
series, Coleridge attempts to develop an idea of method that recovers some of the positive 
aspects of machine-like activities while leaving room for the sense of moral purpose that 
mechanism cannot account for.  In introducing his conception of method, he discusses the 
cliché that a very industrious person is “like clockwork.”  “The resemblance,” Coleridge writes, 
“extends beyond the point of regularity, and yet falls short of the truth.  Both do, indeed, at 
once divide and announce the silent and otherwise indistinguishable lapse of time.  But the 
man of methodical industry and honorable pursuits, does more: he realizes its ideal divisions, 
and gives a character and individuality to its moments” (4.II.449-50).  Coleridge’s concept of 
“methodical industry” combines the virtues of being “like a machine”—organization, industry, 





Coleridge spends most of the later essays in the sequence expounding, in terms clearly 
influenced by the Kantian distinction between reason and understanding, on the distinction 
between genuine science and mere “nomenclature” or “theory.”  Coleridge’s main antagonist 
in his discussion of science is the sort of inquiry that is purely concerned with assigning names 
to things, rather than understanding them in terms of their relations to each other and places 
within a whole—an approach that is exemplified by the dictionary.  In contrast to this approach, 
Coleridge praises Erasmus Darwin’s view of animal and plant life as complementary hierarchies 
and hopes that someone will further develop this idea, “or rather the yet higher idea to which it 
refers us, matured into laws of organic nature; and thence to have one other splendid proof, 
that with the knowledge of Law alone can dwell Power and Prophecy (4.II.470).  Coleridge 
explains the difference between mere “theory” and genuine “law” within what contemporary 
philosophy of science calls the theory-data distinction.  In a footnote, Coleridge quotes an 
“intelligent friend” who responds to a paper calling for data on the Earth’s magnetic field to be 
collected and “brought together into one focus” by asking, “But what and where is the lens?”  
Coleridge, however, defends the idea that data can be prior to theory, at least if “theory” is 
understood in a restricted sense: “All this and much more [e.g. data collection] must have been 
atchieved before ‘a sound and stable Theory’ could be ‘constituted’” (4.II.477).  But, he 
continues, “except as far as it might occasion the discovery of a law,” such a theory “might 
possibly explain (ex plicis plana redere), but never account for, the facts in question” (4.II.477).  
Coleridge contrasts this “theoretical” approach to the work of Kepler and Newton, who, he 





In order to genuinely “account for” phenomena, scientists must draw upon their own intuition 
as well as analyzing observational data. 
In spite of his repeated diatribes against what he calls “mechanic philosophy,” Coleridge 
does not so much condemn mechanical methods as deny that they can suffice by themselves.  
If the gathering and analysis of data cannot, by itself, provide the insight needed to discern the 
genuine laws of nature, it might nonetheless play an important role in the discovery of those 
laws.  Coleridge associates such “mechanical” activities with the Kantian category of 
understanding, which, though Coleridge certainly valued it less than pure reason, was not as 
derogatory a term for Coleridge than some scholars have assumed.  As Timothy Michael has 
argued, the understanding, in Coleridge’s later political thought, plays the central role of 
establishing the sense data that serve as a foundation for political knowledge (446-7).  In his 
writings on science, as well, Coleridge offers not so much a condemnation of empirical methods 
as a warning that something additional is needed.  Coleridge’s objection to the “mechanic 
philosophy” of the eighteenth century, as he puts it in The Statesman’s Manual, is that it 
attempts to make predictions about society by means of “an unenlivened generalizing 
Understanding” (6.28)—a form of thought that works entirely in concepts abstracted from 
empirical data without a clear purpose to drive it.  The echoes of David Hume’s celebrated 
argument about the problem of induction are apparent in the essays on method.  Like Hume, 
Coleridge suggests that such methods can only abstract out the patterns that exist in the data 
that have already been gathered; without an additional assuption about the stable nature of 





 While Hume’s critique of induction tends toward a general skepticism that people could 
ever learn the genuine causes of things, Coleridge pushes in the opposite direction, stressing 
the need to supplement empirical data with an intuitively derived sense of purpose that 
“enlivens” the knowledge.  Throughout his sage writings of the 1810s, Coleridge explains the 
relation between the mechanical and the moral with figures drawn from natural science—the 
machine that channels power, the wire that conducts electricity, the chemical compounds that 
react in the presence of a catalyst—that suggest the need for an external force to drive a 
physical process.  Coleridge provides a paradigm for this pattern of argument in his passage on 
allegory and symbol in The Stateman’s Manual, in which he states that the symbolic passages in 
the Bible are the “conductors” of truth (6.29).  Similarly, in the discussion of agriculture in A Lay 
Sermon, he argues that “the extension of the commercial spirit into our agricultural system” 
tends to alienate agriculture from the purpose of the state (6.214); but “as the specific ends of 
Agriculture are the maintenance, strength, and security of the State, so […] must its ultimate 
ends be the same as those of the State: even as the ultimate end of the spring and wheels of a 
watch must be the same as that of the watch” (6.217).  Coleridge’s reference to Bell’s system of 
education as a “steam-engine” might be seen as another instance of this general type of figure.  
The key implication is that such an engine is dependent on external guidance, since, as a mere 
machine, it can only move in reaction to outside forces.  In all cases, the driving force of the 
mechanical practice is “purpose,” without which it is lifeless, meaningless, amoral.  As 
Wordsworth had turned away from Enlightenment radicalism in favor of a dualism between 





and a sense of moral direction, by means of which alone the potentially destructive effects of 
utilitarian planning can be averted. 
 While Coleridge’s philosophy of method does not specifically deal with computation, it 
has important implications for the relation of mechanical processes of symbol manipulation to 
the construction of meaning.  In piecing out these implications, it is useful to recall the example 
with which this dissertation begins: the seventeenth-century poetry-generating algorithm of 
John Peter.  Peter’s pamphlet provides a procedure for producing Latin poems based solely on 
copying letters out of a table in pre-given patterns.  For Peter, apparently, the fact that the 
“artificial versifying” system did not require the ability to read or write was an advantage: now, 
even “illiterate Artificers” had a fully “artificial” way to make verses (4).  Peter explains the 
method in terms of the idea of the reciprocal harmony between the microcosm and the 
macrocosm, an idea that provided other seventeenth-century thinkers, Leibniz foremost among 
them, with a powerful explanation of why the mechanical processes of arithmetic could 
produce real knowledge about the world.  This thinking had been out of favor in England for 
over a century by the time that Coleridge became a public figure.  John Hughes’s satirical 
description of the versifying system in The Spectator exemplifies the skepticism toward such 
methods that had prevailed for most of the eighteenth century.  By suggesting that an 
algorithmically generated poem is able to predict the weather, Hughes lampoons the absurdity 
of seventeenth-century thinkers’ claims for the power of real characters.  For Peter himself, the 
algorithmic nature of the system made it more trustworthy; for Hughes, it made it less so. 
 When Hughes holds Peter’s versifying system up as an example of “false Wit,” he draws 





linguistic activity should be held.  Peter’s method of composition is “false” because it only 
involves shuffling symbols around based on rules, without a perception of what they mean.  
This Lockean perspective leads, in Addison’s essay on “false wit,” to a devaluation of punning 
and other forms of wordplay, which Addison sees as equally mechanical processes of 
comparing and contrasting signifiers.  This opposition to the algorithmic stems from an aspect 
of the Lockean tradition that is commonly misunderstood by scholars focusing on the Romantic 
period.  While Lockean thought is often cast as one of the “mechanical” philosophies that 
Romantics like Coleridge opposed, Locke himself was decidedly opposed to the proposition that 
human thought could be reduced to set of mechanical rules, as were his early followers.71  
While some of the eighteenth-century thinkers Locke inspired, such as David Hartley and Julien 
Offray de La Mettrie, developed more overtly mechanical theories of the human mind, even 
these philosophies were not especially conducive to the use of algorithms.  The mechanical 
processes La Mettrie and Hartley described were based on ideas, not signifiers, and their 
psychological theories could provide no explanation of how a process of moving symbols 
around on paper based on formal rules could produce something meaningful.  From a Lockean 
perspective, mechanical processes are only admissible if they are based on clear ideas, without 
which they can only produce nonsense. 
Coleridge was no less opposed to the mechanization of reasoning than Locke was—he 
lamented, in a note in his copy of a book on Spinoza, that students turned to logic textbooks in 
hopes of learning “how to think without thought” (13.lxi)—but he attacks “mechanism” from a 
different angle that ultimately creates more room for algorithmic methods than the Lockean 





perspective—what it would need in order to produce genuine predictions about the future—is 
not conceptual clarity, but rather what Coleridge calls the copula.  In order to justify drawing a 
general conclusion from a limited set of observations, and, in particular, to justify making claims 
about the future from a study of the past, we need a premise that cannot be derived 
empirically.  Appendix C of The Statesman’s Manual answers this need with the claim that “the 
act of Being is the great organ of Truth” (6.78).  “That, which we find in ourselves,” Coleridge 
writes, “is (gradu mutate) the substance and the life of all our knowledge.  Without this latent 
presence of the ‘I am,’ all modes of existence in the external world would flit before us as 
colored shadows, with no greater depth, root, or fixture, than the image of a rock hath in a 
gliding stream or the rain-bow on a fast-sailing rain-storm” (6.78).  In other words, without the 
assumption of a correlation between mind and the laws of nature, we have no basis for relating 
what we know of the past and the present to the future—our knowledge would merely be 
insubstantial shadows with no relation to what came before or what will become after.  Applied 
to an algorithmic system like Peter’s “artificial versifying,” this line of thought does not entail, 
as Lockean and Cartesian attitudes toward algorithms do, that a clear idea must be attached to 
every individual symbol; that form of reading and writing would, indeed, be a merely 
mechanical procedure for Coleridge.  Instead, the system as a whole must be given a purpose, 
based not on an analysis of its individual components, but rather on something that we must 
find within. 
 This need for purpose comes into effect most importantly at the level of 
interpretation—that is, at the stage when one must give the results of the algorithm meaning.  





“Essays on the Principles of Method.”  In the final essay, Coleridge imagines an “unlettered 
African, or rude yet musing Indian” looking at a Bible that he cannot read (4.II.512).  Lacking the 
genuine method of reading, this reader would have to attempt to abstract categories from the 
patterns on the page: 
Say that after long and dissatisfying toils, he begins to sort, first the paragraphs 
that appear to resemble each other, then the lines, the words—nay, that he has 
at length discovered that the whole is formed by the recurrence and 
interchanges of a limited number of cyphers, letters, marks, and points, which, 
however, in the very height and utmost perfection of his attainment, he makes 
twentyfold more numerous than they are, by classing every different form of the 
same character, intentional or accidental, as a separate element.  And the whole 
is without soul or substance, a talisman of superstition, a mockery of science […] 
(4.II.512-3) 
Just like the construction of “theory” without “law,” this attempt to understand a text through 
mere abstraction is “without soul or substance.”  This passage shows clear traces of the 
German hermeneutic tradition, which, as Kittler observes, maintained that reading involves the 
perception of the spirit of a text more than a “mechanical” focus on letters (Discourse Networks 
178).  Coleridge goes on to imagine a “friendly missionary” arriving and explaining the meaning 
of the words to the reader, after which point the “words become transparent, and he sees 
them as though he saw them not” (4.II.513); once a person learns a true method of reading, 





The unenlivened form of reading that Coleridge imagines in this passage is what would 
result if algorithmic methods were permitted to trespass in the realm of meaning.  An algorithm 
can enable the illiterate to produce lines of verse with proper grammar and meter, as Peter’s 
system adequately demonstrates, but to find genuine meaning in a text it is necessary to see 
through the words to a truth that is brought to life by the “eternal ‘I am,’” which, according to 
Coleridge, no merely mechanical method can accomplish.  From this perspective, it is not in 
lacking clear concepts, but rather in lacking a clear purpose that the poems produced by Peter’s 
algorithm fall short.  In this Romantic notion of reading lay the origins of Liu’s meaning 
problem.  The abstractions of quantitative analysis—in which we may include twenty-first-
century text-analysis methods as well as the process by which Coleridge’s “unlettered” reader 
attempts to classify characters—can seem “soulless” in comparison to human interpretations 
because, without the supplement of purpose, they cannot fully account for the body of intuitive 
knowledge that is needed to make a text come alive with meaning.  Algorithmic methods of 
reading, in other words, only involve seeing the letters on the page, whereas genuine reading 
means seeing through them. 
Although it was not exactly Coleridge’s intention, these arguments about the need for 
purpose contributed to the emergence of a disciplinary distinction between scientific and 
cultural perspectives in the Victorian period.  In a pair of essays published in 1838 and 1840, 
John Stuart Mill cast Coleridgean thought as one of two opposing intellectual forces in Britain, 
the other being the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham (Mill on Bentham and Coleridge 40).  Mill 
argues that each of these two thinkers sees what the other fails to see.  Bentham’s key blind 





education” in developing moral character nor the differences in “national character” between 
countries (71; 73).  Coleridge, Mill tells us, has a better understanding of these cultural factors 
as well as a better appreciation for the value in older ways of thinking, but he fails to see the 
errors in established institutions.  While Mill expressly sides with the Benthamites’ empiricism 
over the idealism of the Coleridgeans (114), he asserts the value in both perspectives, 
concluding that “these two sorts of men, who seem to be, and believe themselves to be, 
enemies, are in reality allies,” their powers forming “opposite poles of one great force of 
progression” (140).  In the eighteenth century, Mill argues, England combined the worst 
elements of philosophical radicalism and institutional conservatism; in the nineteenth, he 
hoped, it would come to combine the best of each, with Benthamites contributing a reforming 
spirit and Coleridgeans an appreciation for what is valuable in the experiences of the past. 
The meaning problem is immanent in this attempt to make two fundamentally 
incompatible philosophies work together to a common purpose.  Since the time of Mill, the 
technical and cultural perspectives have been alienated from one another by the fact that they 
stand in different relations to the past.  A computer programmer can get away with ignoring 
history when working on the technical details of a program; culture affects the programmer’s 
motivations and ways of thinking—the subjective aspects of programming—but the practices of 
the past cannot objectively restrain the logic of a program in the same way that they can 
restrain the production of meaning.  For technical purposes, therefore, an ahistorical 
Benthamite perspective works well.  But this perspective cannot be reconciled with modern 
notions of culture.  In his essay on the meaning problem, Liu takes issue with what he calls 





on a text untainted by any prior assumptions about what that text means.  The fact that such 
methods seem inevitably to pose a meaning problem—to be, in Coleridgean terms, 
unenlivened—stems from the fact that, within the conception of culture that we have inherited 
from the nineteenth century, the semantic aspects of symbolic systems are objectively 
restrained by the practices of the past in a way that the algorithmic ones are not.  This 
recognition is a product of thinkers from the early nineteenth century, including Wordsworth 
and Humboldt as well as Coleridge.72  After Romanticism, it was no longer credible to claim that 
science would one day produce a complete replacement for culture, as Condorcet had 
contended.  Instead, technical and cultural perspectives appeared, in some cases, as 
complementary forces that must work together to produce progress and, in others, as warring 
disciplinary factions. 
 Useful as it is in making sense of the relation of technical and natural languages, this 
dualism between science and culture/cultivation leaves open an ethical question that has never 
been adequately addressed.  Coleridge’s use of colonial imagery in the passage about the 
illiterate reader exemplifies the pitfalls of his own approach to enlivening knowledge with 
meaning.  His purpose in describing this reader’s ill-informed interpretation as “a talisman of 
superstition” might be partially a matter of rhetorical positioning, an attempt to frame what he 
considers to be legitimate science as more civilized than the alternative, but as the chauvinism 
of Coleridge’s presumption that a Western missionary is needed to provide the reader with the 
“light” of a “leading idea” suggests, the assumption that something eternal is needed to 
“enliven” knowledge creates an opening for conceptions that serve the interests of power.  





is, he never leaves any doubt that it is specifically Christian, and he also presumes that it is the 
possession of Western colonizers.  Coleridge’s critique of the limits of empiricism leaves us with 
a gap that that cannot be filled by merely mechanical methods, but it cannot provide us with a 
guarantee that we have found the truth.  We may instead have fallen under the influence of 
our own internalized prejudices. 
For all that is repugnant in Coleridge’s later political views, his sage writings remain 
valuable as expressions of a negative truth: that any attempt to grant meaning to an algorithm 
must rest on some form of ethical judgment.  The problem that religion addresses for Coleridge 
cannot be evaded so long as algorithms operate autonomously from culture.  As Liu points out, 
the meaning problem does not manifest itself in all instances of algorithmic methodology; the 
creators of the Historical Thesaurus of the Oxford English Dictionary, he observes, employed 
essentially algorithmic methods in the mid-twentieth century, and humanists do not bat an eye 
about integrating its philological claims into their meaning-making discourses (417).  In 
Coleridgean terms, this is because the methods of the HTOED are enlivened for humanists—
they have a history and a purpose that grants them authority within the domain of culture.  
Given the potential role of power in producing this sense of purpose, though, one might 
question its origins.  My point is not to criticize the HTOED in particular, but rather to point out 
an undertheorized problem that affects all algorithmic methods.  Making the leap from 
algorithm to meaning, as Coleridge’s philosophical writings reveal, requires a judgment about 
how the past ought to relate to the future—about how, specifically, the past practices that bear 
on the creation of meaning ought to relate to the new possibilities that the algorithm will 





himself, the ultimate source of this judgment is always religion; for Mill and other utilitarians, it 
stemmed from a more secular notion of progress.  Whatever its source, the judgment that 
bridges algorithm and meaning is difficult to extricate from ideology. 
This problem is not specific to what we now think of as humanistic disciplines.  The 
example of the use of algorithmic methods in the HTOED underscores an aspect of the modern 
divide between science and culture that has often been misunderstood.  Although this division 
did sharpen in the later nineteenth century, the two sides did not form entirely separate 
disciplinary spheres—it was not the case that only the Benthamites could deal with algorithms, 
only Coleridgeans with culture.  Instead, the sciences and the humanities both worked within 
the same fundamental division between the cultural and technical aspects of their respective 
objects of study.  Charles Babbage, for instance, a Benthamite if anyone was, applied cultural 
thinking to the practice of mathematics.  In the introduction to their 1813 book on algebra, 
Babbage and John Herschel present their attempt to introduce French approaches to symbolic 
algebra to England in terms of an organic metaphor much like the ones the philologists of the 
period applied to language: “as if the soil of this country were unfavourable to its cultivation, it 
[British algebra] soon drooped and almost faded into neglect, and we have now to re-import 
the exotic, with nearly a century of foreign improvement, and render it once more indigenous 
among us” (Memoirs of the Analytical Society iv).  But for nineteenth-century mathematicians, 
such cultural considerations were merely practical matters—from a post-Kantian perspective, 
merely subjective ones—and while important, they were carefully excluded from having any 
bearning on questions about the validity of mathematical results.  Such discussions of cultural 





they persist in the twenty-first century in Silicon Valley’s fixation on the importance of 
“company culture” in spurring innovation. 
On the other hand, some of the early nineteenth century’s most enthuastic users of 
algorithmic methods were adherents of the Coleridge school.  The most important such figure is 
George Boole.  In the 1840s, Boole developed the logical system that eventually evolved into 
the one that underlies all digital electronics, including computers.  It is from Boole that we 
inherit the use of 1 and 0 to represent true and false and the logical operators and and or that 
appear in search engines, programming languages, and circuit designs.  Although Boole’s 
system was eventually used for instrumental ends, his intentions were, like Coleridge’s, 
primarily religious—although, to be sure, Boole’s religious views were very different from 
Coleridge’s.  In spite of his immense importance for the development of modern information 
technologies, Boole’s writings have been almost entirely overlooked in both intellectual history 
and media studies.  In the next chapter, I consider how Boole dealt with the problem of 
connecting algorithmic systems to the realm of meaning.  In attempting to justify the use of 
algorithms in disciplines other than the mathematical, he dealt directly with one of the central 
questions that arises from the modern division between science and culture: how one can find 
meaning in algorithmic systems when the workings of those system fail to align with the ways 






Chapter 5: George Boole: Faith in Algorithms 
 
The class of problems capable of solution by the machine can be defined fairly specifically.  
They are those problems which can be solved by human clerical labour, working to fixed rules, 
and without understanding… 
—Alan Turing, memorandum concerning a proposed Automatic Computing Engine (ACE), 1945 
 
A Language Without Things  
 
The period from the 1830s through the 1850s produced two projects that loom large in the 
history of computation: the Analytical Engines of Charles Babbage and Ada Lovelace, and the 
logical algebra of George Boole.  Babbage and Boole had very different styles of thought, and 
their paths did not cross much, but some aspects of their work run in parallel.73  Both of them 
toyed with the idea of creating a philosophical language somewhat like the real character 
schemes of the seventeenth century; both ended up creating something much more like a 
machine than like a language in the usual sense.  Both were deeply religious, albeit in 
unorthodox ways, and both explicitly connected their religious views to their use of algorithms.  
While Babbage and Lovelace captured the popular imagination in the nineteenth century much 
more than Boole did, it was Boole’s work that had the greater influence on the technical 
development of the computer.  Boole’s most important contribution was to show that certain 
types of logical operation can be performed by manipulating symbolic equations that need not 





eighteenth-century empiricists like Condorcet and Stanhope, both of whom held back from 
embracing symbolic systems that were not backed up with comprehensible interpretations.  
From Boole’s time on, logic would be seen as an entirely separate consideration from grammar 
and meaning, and algorithms would have a new degree of epistemic authority within certain 
restricted domains. 
In the twenty-first century, the term Boolean logic refers to a system in which 
statements are joined together using the connectives and, or, and not.  Students and scholars 
encounter Boolean logic in the search strings used in library databases, such as “logic AND 
(mathematics OR algebra).”  Virtually all commonly used programming languages incorporate 
similar and and or operators, and Boolean logic also plays an important role in the physical 
design of computers and other electronic devices.  While its details have changed since Boole’s 
time, the fundamental insight behind Boolean logic is the product of an early-nineteenth-
century shift in conceptions of how symbolic systems relate to the human mind and to the 
world.  Born in 1815, Boole published two books on logic, The Mathematical Analysis of Logic 
(1847) and An Investigation of the Laws of Thought (1854), both of which are largely concerned 
with developing a method for representing propositions in the notation of symbolic algebra.  
Boole mentions that this system could provide “a step toward a philosophical language” 
(Mathematical Analysis 5), echoing the claims of Leibniz, Condorcet, and many others before 
him.  But Boole’s work differs from previous attempts at creating a universal algebra in 
separating the computational aspects of the system entirely from matters of meaning.  Unlike 
Condorcet, Boole was not attempting to replace language with something conceptually clearer, 





By giving up on the assumption that logical deduction must rest on self-evident principles and 
strictly defined concepts, Boole made the great leap that was necessary to turn some types of 
ratiocination into fully mechanical processes that could operate with true autonomy from the 
human mind. 
In spite of his being dubbed “the ‘father’ of symbolic logic” (Peckhaus, “Was George 
Boole” 271) and, more dubiously, “the father of computer science” (Cooksey 81; MacHale 82), 
Boole has received virtually no scholarly attention in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries 
outside of specialist work on logic and mathematics, and there is considerable confusion over 
his philosophical views.74  Bertrand Russell criticized Boole for assuming that logic can be 
grounded in the nature of human thought (Critical Exposition 169-70), and it has since been 
widely assumed that Boole’s philosophical work is hobbled by his “psychologism” (Vassallo 
311).  Others have defended him against this charge on the grounds that he viewed the “laws of 
thought” as normative rather than descriptive (Bornet; Corcoran 282).  But Boole’s views were 
more distinctive than either of these interpretations suggests.  Rather than viewing logic as 
either a description of how human thought works (as in some forms of eighteenth-century 
logic) or a system of rules for defining correctness (as in formal logic from the late nineteenth 
century on), Boole was attempting to turn deduction into a clearly defined algorithm that 
involves only the rule-based rearrangement of symbols without consideration of their 
meanings.  To an extent that few thinkers have before or since, Boole accepted the possibility 
that such algorithmic methods might produce, in his term, “uninterpretable” symbolic 
expressions—expressions that have no meaning within the subject area to which the logical 





grapples, with uncommon explicitness, with one of the key questions raised by the adoption of 
algorithms in the production of knowledge: how one can render a jumble of symbols whose 
significance is defined only by their formal relations into something meaningful to people. 
Boole’s work is typically understood as part of a broad shift in attitudes toward 
mathematical symbols and their relation to language in the first half of the nineteenth century.  
The introduction of The Mathematical Analysis of Logic begins with a statement that sums up 
the new view of algebra upon which Boole built his logical theory: “They who are acquainted 
with the present state of the theory of Symbolical Algebra, are aware, that the validity of the 
process of analysis does not depend upon the interpretation of the symbols which are 
employed, but solely upon the laws of their combination” (3).  This purely symbolic method 
represented a break with the Enlightenment epistemologies of the eighteenth century.  
Enlightenment mathematicians like d’Alembert had viewed algebra as a means of 
representation that must be backed up with clear notions in order to be valid; but starting 
around the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, mathematicians began to accept the use of 
symbolic methods even in cases where their meanings could not yet be established.  In the 
1830s, a new generation of algebraists, including Boole’s sometime mentor Duncan F. Gregory, 
redefined rigor based not on conceptual clarity, but rather on the following of formal rules 
concerning the arrangements of symbols.  While strict mathematical formalism was and is 
controversial as a philosophical position, this formal turn had a pronounced practical effect on 
the way mathematicians used symbols; algorithm began to have a degree of primacy over 
meaning that it had not had since the time of Leibniz, and what relation mathematics had to 





 It has long been recognized by historians of mathematics that this formal turn involved a 
change in attitudes toward algebraic signs.  As the twentieth-century mathematician E. H. 
Nevile puts it, if presented with a modern mathematical text, an eighteenth-century 
mathematician “would feel, not that he did not know what the symbols stood for, but that he 
could not see how they were being used” (146).  Yet there has not been much written on how 
the nineteenth-century rise of symbolic algebra relates to the linguistic thought of the period or 
to the fate of the Enlightenment project more broadly.  Foucault makes a brief mention of the 
disentanglement of mathematics and language in The Order of Things, noting that around 1800, 
“mathesis was regrouped so as to constitute an apophantics and an ontology,” whereas 
“history and semiology […] united to form the interpretive disciplines” (74).  Amir Alexander’s 
study of biographies of mathematicians has revealed some of the cultural resonances of the 
perceived departure of mathematics from common sense in the nineteenth century, which 
people expressed in Romantic images of the mathematician as a mad genius (“From Voyagers 
to Martyrs”).  Focusing more on mathematical practice, Lorraine Daston has shown that, 
starting in France in the years following the Revolution, facility in mental arithmetic went from 
being a sign of mathematical genius to the mark of an idiot savant, a shift that she links to the 
application of the division of labor to computation (“Enlightenment Calculations” 186).  The 
accounts of Alexander and Daston point to contrary movements in nineteenth century 
mathematics, its theoretical aspects moving into ethereal realms at the same time that its 
practicalities were devolving into mechanical drudge-work. 
While some of the developments that Daston and Alexander note can be traced back to 





prevailed in Boole’s time differed sharply from the utopian dreams of the early 1790s.  As I 
show in this chapter, the rise of symbolic algebra and, eventually, symbolic logic between the 
1810s and the 1840s constituted a turn away from the Enlightenment project of remaking 
culture on the basis of mathematical rationality.  The reason Boole was able to succeed where 
Condorcet and Stanhope had failed, I argue, was that he did not view mathematics as a 
complete replacement for natural languages like English and French, but rather rigorously 
separated the standards of mathematical validity from the cultural considerations involved in 
establishing what symbols mean.  The difference between Condorcet and Boole is especially 
apparent in the way the two thinkers intended their systems to relate to the subject matter to 
which those systems would be applied.  Condorcet had intended his universal algebra to 
incorporate an encyclopedic catalogue of things, thus enabling it to constitute, in itself, a 
unified body of knowledge that could be used to settle disputes in any area of science or of life.  
Boole, by contrast, excludes the signifying function of the algebra entirely from the domain of 
logic; his logical system is meant to work together with, rather than replace, the bodies of 
linguistic and conceptual knowledge that already exist in other spheres of the academy and of 
society more broadyl.  I link this newly narrow conception of a universal algebra to the general 
skepticism toward attempts to reconstruct languages that took hold following the arguments of 
Herder, Coleridge, and Wilhelm von Humboldt.  Boole’s approach to logic was thus suited to an 
academy that was increasingly characterized by disciplinary specialization rather than by 
ambitions of universal reform. 
For Boole himself, the purpose of symbolic logic was emphatically not to create divides 





inference into a rigorously defined method that could in theory be applied in any discipline.  
This logical calculus was supposed to create “harmony” among the branches of knowledge 
(Mathematical Analysis 14).  But it was harmony Boole sought, not unity; and the way he 
approached this goal created a schism between algorithm and meaning that would have been 
inadmissible for d’Alembert or Condorcet.  Boole denies, in a sentence that appears verbatim in 
both of his books on logic, that he is setting out “[t]o supersede the employment of common 
reasoning, or to subject it to the rigour of technical forms” (Mathematical Analysis 2; Laws of 
Thought 12); yet his system reduces at least certain parts of the deductive process to an 
algorithm that can be performed just as well by a machine as by the human mind.  My reading 
of Boole’s texts on logic shows that his trust in such algorithmic methods was contingent on a 
division between the technical details of algorithms and the cultural construction of meaning 
that was already in place by the mid-1840s, when he started his project.  With this division in 
place, mathematics and culture existed in separate domains where each could have some 
degree of protection from the other—the first from the uncertainty of ordinary words and 
notions, the second from the possibility that the mechanical nature of mathematical reasoning 
would deprive culture of the breathing room that, as Romanticism had convinced the 
intelligentsia of the mid-nineteenth-century, it needed to thrive. 
This chapter begins with a general account of the transformation in attitudes toward 
mathematical notations that occurred in the early nineteenth century.  I aim, in particular, to 
show that the newfound rigor that nineteenth-century algebraists gave to their science came at 
the cost of creating a divide between the results of advanced mathematics and the resources a 





the Enlightenment project.  I then examine Boole’s distinctive approach to connecting an 
algorithmic system to the world of human life.  While some nineteenth-century writers drew 
disturbing conclusions from the apparent division of mathematics from reality, Boole’s mode of 
addressing this problem errs on the reassuring side.  The most creative phase of his career as a 
logician (1847-1856) coincides with the Irish Potato Famine, which Boole witnessed from his 
chair at Queen’s College, Cork, and the political upheavals of 1848; but his work contains few 
traces of the political issues of his day.75  Boole viewed the mathematical realm in terms of the 
Kantian notion of pure reason, which he adapted to apply to symbolic methods of logic.  
Undergirding his trust in algebra was an unorthodox faith in the power of mathematics to 
channel a divine truth that exceeded the capacity of the human understanding.  On the basis of 
this religious faith, he made a blind leap into the abyss that had opened up between meaning 
and algorithm, accepting, as few others did, that as processes of reasoning become increasingly 
mechanized and externalized from the human mind, the knowledge they produce may 
ultimately prove incomprehensible to human beings. 
 
The Splitting of the Signifier 
 
In order to understand the conditions that enabled the emergence of symbolic logic in the early 
nineteenth century, it is necessary to re-open a question that is seldom asked in the twenty-
first century, but whose answer is by no means straightforward.  How do we know that 
−1 × −1 = 1?  We are all taught this as a fact in school.  Yet early-modern algebraists had 





truth.  These different attitudes toward negative numbers indicate different views of the 
relationship between the rules for a symbol’s use—the algorithmic plane—and that symbol’s 
meaning.  The difficulties surrounding negatives were only resolved with the adoption of a 
modern view of algorithms that gave them a degree of authority over the way people ought to 
reason in the mathematical domain.  With a few exceptions, this apotheosis of the algorithm 
did not happen until the nineteenth century, and it involved a fundamental break with 
Enlightenment views of mathematics, language, and knowledge more broadly. 
 It is useful to begin with some definitions.  In Begriffsschrift (1879), Gottlob Frege points 
out that certain types of logical statement must be considered in terms of the form of the 
signifier as well as of its meaning.  Suppose one writes, using Frege’s notation, 𝐴 ≡  𝐵, which 
means A is equivalent to B.  If one thinks entirely in terms of the concepts to which the symbols 
refer, then this statement would have the same meaning as 𝐴 ≡  𝐴.  But if this were so, the 
symbol for equivalence would be useless.  Somehow, it must be possible to interpret the 
symbols in such a way that the difference in the shape of the letters distinguishes them in spite 
of their equivalent content.  As Frege explains it, “the introduction of the sign for identity of 
content necessarily produces a bifurcation in the meaning of all signs: they stand at times for 
their content, at times for themselves” (20-21).  This distinction is similar to, but not quite the 
same as the one between sense and reference that Frege would famously articulate in a later 
essay (“Sense and Reference” 209).  Frege’s insight in Begriffsschrift is that the operations one 
can perform upon symbolic expressions, such as the ones used in his system of formal logic, do 
not work the same way as mental operations performed upon the ideas to which the symbols 





symbols are the same and which are different.  The employment of signs in logical reasoning, 
Frege argues, thus creates a division that does not otherwise exist between identity of content 
(or, in other words, meaning) and identity of form. 
 The ability to recognize identity and difference at the level of form—not the ability to 
understand meaning—is what one needs to perform an algorithm.  As John Peter recognized in 
the 1670s, when he wrote his pamphlet on “artificial versifying,” rearranging characters 
according to a set procedure is an entirely different thing from reading, and can even be 
performed by the illiterate.  The only things one need do in order to perform Peter’s 
“Instrumental Operation” is recognize whether inscriptions are or are not instances of the same 
character—to know that 𝐴 =  𝐴 but 𝐴 ≠  𝐵—and create new copies of them.  Meaning is 
irrelevant.  Yet the symbols also must bear meanings if one wishes to relate the algorithm and 
its results to one’s conception of the world—that is, to interpret the algorithmically generated 
poem.  Any signifier that is employed in an algorithmic system is therefore split: it can work 
both as an ordinary signifier, its meaning determined by some collection of semiotic and 
linguistic conventions, and as a physical thing to be moved around according to set procedures.  
To give a contemporary example, what one thinks the word “Open” in a “File” menu means, 
whether considered in isolation or in context, bears only an indirect relationship to what the 
“Open” function will do.  One depends on the body of linguistic and practical knowledge in 
one’s head that is partly one’s own, and partly shared with a community; the other depends on 
the way a particular assortment of machines are programmed, connected, and operated by 
human beings one will in most cases never meet.  If the meaning does not line up well with the 





The possibility of discord between the algorithmic and semantic planes has troubled 
mathematicians since the very earliest flowerings of modern European algebra.  The Italian 
algebraist Gerolamo Cardano encountered a version of this problem in the sixteenth century.  
While Cardano did not use symbolic methods, he did employ algorithms, and his concern was 
largely with describing general procedures for solving a variety of equation types.  In his 1545 
book Artis Magnæ, dive de Regulis Algebraicis (The Great Art, or the Rules of Algebra), Cardano 
considers the equation that would be written in modern notation as follows: 𝑦3 = 8𝑦 + 3 
(103).  Following his algorithm for solving this equation produces an expression that includes 
imaginary numbers, making the solution, in his language, “sophistic” (sophistica) (220).76  
Cardano generally treated such solutions as mere curiosities and denied them any 
mathematical validity.  Yet, as Helen M. Pycior observes, the imaginary numbers in this 
particular solution cancel each other out, producing a real solution that is clearly correct: 𝑦 = 3 
(Pycior 23).  As Pycior notes, Cardano glosses over the fact that his method for producing the 
solution involved imaginary numbers, and he elsewhere expresses puzzlement at the fact that 
imaginary solutions can result from the application of seemingly trustworthy algebraic 
algorithms.  In Pycior’s account, Cardano never reconciled himself to the use of imaginary 
numbers and even, late in his life, developed reservations about the legitimacy of negative 
numbers.  In the posthumously published book De Regula Aliza (1570), Cardano considered the 
possibility that −1 × −1 = −1, justified by the fact that negative numbers are “alien” to our 
experience of the world: something alien multiplied by something alien could only, Cardano 
reasoned, produce more alienness (Pycior 25).  The fact that a “sophistic” method involving 





comprehensible solutions did not prove that method’s worth for Cardano, as it might for a 
modern pragmatist, but rather suggested that an unresolved metaphysical problem lurked in 
the foundation of algebra. 
 While few mathematicians accepted (or were aware of) Cardano’s late-career disavowal 
of negative numbers, the reluctance to employ methods that could not be backed up with the 
gold bullion of clear and distinct concepts persisted until around the end of the eighteenth 
century.  For d’Alembert and other thinkers of his generation, one of the key problems of the 
philosophy of mathematics was how one can explain the meanings of such puzzling entities as 
negative and imaginary numbers.  In his entry for “Negative” in the Encyclopédie, d’Alembert 
notes that to define negative numbers as quantities “below nothing,” as Euler and many other 
authors did, was to propose something inconceivable (“Négatif” 11:72; my translation).77  
D’Alembert attempts to show how the “true notion” of a negative number is simply a real 
number oriented in the opposite direction along a line from positive numbers (11:73).  Even this 
geometric interpretation was not clear enough for some eighteenth-century mathematicians.  
The English lawyer and polymath Francis Maseres developed an elaborate theory of negation 
that was supposed to eliminate the need to admit the existence of negative quantities, which 
he called “mere nonsense and unintelligible jargon” (2).  In Maseres’s theory, which he presents 
in the 1758 book A Dissertation on the Use of the Negative Sign in Algebra, -5 represents not a 
number, but rather the operation by which five is subtracted from a number greater than or 
equal to five.  William Frend similarly questioned the comprehensibility of negative numbers in 
1796 (x).  The amount of effort that went into constructing these conceptual armatures 





between meaning and algorithm.  While French and English mathematicians worked within 
different epistemologies at the time (see Richards), they shared the emphasis on rooting 
methods in clearly defined notions and self-evident principles.  The goal of mathematics was 
not just to develop methods of ratiocination, but also to create a system of ideas that would 
work together with the symbols to form a comprehensible representation of the spacial and 
numerical aspects of the world. 
By the middle of the nineteenth century, though, algorithms had gained a new degree 
of autonomy from meaning within certain, limited domains of knowledge.  In the 
Enlightenment imaginary, the mechanization of thought was a utopian end-state that would 
obtain after a perfect system of concepts—la vraie philosophie—is created.  By contrast, the 
new, nineteenth-century approach put the mechanical first: one could start by defining the 
rules by which symbols are to be moved around and work out what it all meant afterward.  The 
roots of mathematical formalism lie in the eighteenth-century work of Leonhard Euler and Karl 
Friedrich Gauss, both of whom embraced symbolic methods to a greater extent than was 
generally accepted at the time.  Between the 1810s and the 1840s, such approaches rose to 
preeminence internationally.  It is not the case that people accepted the use of symbols that 
have no meanings; in some areas of mathematics and symbolic logic, this never happened.  But 
there was a reversal of the manner in which the alignment of algorithm and meaning was to be 
established.  The algorithms were no longer required to follow from the application of self-
evident principles to the meanings of the symbols, but rather could themselves serve as the 
standards to which the meanings had to conform.  The shift from conceptual to formal 





means of operationalizing knowledge that had already been established by means of natural 
reason, but also as a way of cutting new paths into uncharted mathematical territory. 
This shift took place on an international scale.  At around the same time that Martin 
Ohm introduced his “perfectly consequential” system of algebra in Germany, the Cambridge 
Analytical Society, founded in 1811 by the then undergraduates Charles Babbage and Edward 
Ffrench Bromhead, began promoting symbolic methods in Britain.78  The stated purpose of the 
Society was to advocate the use of Leibniz’s symbolic notation, which had (at least in their view) 
been unfairly overlooked in England due to a nationalistic preference for Newton (Babbage, 
Passages 29; see Becher 406).  In 1816, Babbage along with two other members of the society, 
John Herschel and George Peacock, published an English translation of a calculus textbook by 
the French mathematician Sylvestre François Lacroix as a way of promoting the symbolic 
approach of Continental mathematicians.  While the Analytical Society were enamored (in a 
way that was politically dangerous during the Napoleonic Wars) with the late-eighteenth-
century French tradition that viewed algebra as a form of “analysis,” Peacock would later take a 
major step beyond this tradition into fully formalist methods.  In the 1842 edition of his Treatise 
on Algebra, Peacock characterizes algebra as “a science, which regards the combinations of 
signs and symbols only, according to determinate laws, which are altogether independent of 
the specific values of the symbols themselves” (vii).  Peacock’s theory is meant in part to 
resolve the difficulty surrounding negative numbers by showing that their significance is 
determined not by their reference to some notion of quantity, but rather solely by the rules 
that govern their use.  Algebra, Peacock suggests, is not a means of representation, as it was for 





“is governed by laws which must likewise govern, and to a certain extent determine, their 
interpretation, and not conversely” (xiv).79  There cannot be a clearer statement of dissent from 
the Cartesian epistemology advanced by d’Alembert’s Preliminary Discourse, in which rigor’s 
first demand was to ground the method on clear notions that would determine the meanings of 
the symbols.  For Peacock, the symbols would lead the way, and meaning would follow. 
The shift to these new standards of validity gave mathematicians a great deal more 
leeway to produce counterintuitive results than they had under the sign of Enlightenment.  
Bernard Bolzano’s 1810 book Beyträge zu einer begründeteren Darstellung der Mathematik 
(Contributions to a Better-Founded Presentation of Mathematics) presented a theory of calculus 
that was meant to be more rigorous than previous ones because it did not involve intuitive 
notions of space and time—a premise that is itself indicative of the break with Enlightenment 
norms of rigor.  Along with Peacock, Évariste Galois contributed some of the rudiments of 
abstract algebra, which enabled the creation of arbitrarily defined algebraic systems that did 
not necessarily correspond to the way numbers ordinarily worked.  Perhaps most importantly, 
non-Euclidean geometries arrived in earnest in the early 1830s.  For centuries, it was believed 
that Euclid’s fifth postulate—roughly, that two non-parallel lines must intersect at some point—
could be proven either from his other four axioms or (as in Kant’s view) from undeniable truths 
of reason; but in the early nineteenth century it became clear that it was an arbitrary 
assumption and that other geometries could be developed without it.  This event has long been 
viewed as the point at which mathematics began to move away from making truth claims about 
the world since, as Bertrand Russell writes in the 1903 book Principles of Mathematics (which is 





mathematics has no concern with the question of whether the axioms and propositions of 
Euclid hold of actual space or not” (5).  In doing so, it broke the chain of mental representations 
that, for d’Alembert, linked geometry to the sensible world.  For this new generation of 
mathematicians, the validity of results was less a matter of their comprehensibility (as 
Cartesians and Lockeans alike had had it) than of their accordance with formal rules; what went 
on in the researcher’s brain was of less and less epistemological significance. 
While the symbolic turn of the early nineteenth century is generally considered to have 
advanced the rigor of mathematics significantly, this rigor came at the cost of placing a rigid 
barrier between mathematics and the way people thought in daily life.  This barrier was 
reinforced by the emergence of nineteenth-century notions of culture, which viewed natural 
languages as developing in an organic fashion that was seemingly at odds with the 
“mechanical” and intentionally constructed nature of mathematical notations.  As the 
involuntarist views of language put forth by Herder and Humboldy gained in influence 
internationally, it became much more difficult to believe that an algebraic language could serve 
as a full replacement for one’s native tongue, as some of the more radical Enlightenment 
language-reform projects had presumed.  The nineteenth-century notion of culture also gave 
natural languages a much more positive valence than they had for Enlightenment thinkers like 
Condorcet, who were out to exterminate old prejudices and errors from the world.  The parallel 
transformations toward formalism in mathematics and toward involuntarism in linguistics 
resolved one of the epistemological problems that had troubled eighteenth-century 
mathematicians: no longer was it necessary to purify mathematics of all traces of the “vulgar” 





attempted to do.  Now, the concern was much the opposite: that the mechanical nature of 
mathematical reasoning would deprive its results of the meaning that only a connection to the 
“mental life of a people,” as Humboldt calls it, could provide. 
Complaints about the divide between algorithm and meaning were common in critical 
discussions of the new symbolic algebra.  While it is now a cliché that algebra involves the 
“manipulation of symbols,” this phrase was novel in the nineteenth century, and it often served 
as a way of mocking the perceived shallowness of symbolic methods.  In the Proceedings of the 
Royal Society of London for April 15, 1858, for instance, the Rev. James Booth castigates English 
mathematics teachers for focusing on “nimble dexterity in the manipulation of symbols” rather 
than on “the knowledge of principles” (176).  John Venn uses the phrase in a similarly negative 
way in his 1866 book Logic of Chance, questioning whether Pierre Simon Laplace’s theory of 
induction can provide anything more valuable than “formulæ for the manipulation of symbols” 
(164).  These comments suggest a class-based fear of mathematics becoming a physical activity 
rather than an intellectual one—“manipulation” referred primarily to physical acts, especially 
with the hands—as well as an apprehension that mathematical theories were becoming 
disconnected from reality.  Even mathematicians who advocated symbolic methods, such as 
Herschel, expressed the concern that such methods would enable students to pass their 
mathematics exams by “cramming”—that is, learning symbolic proofs by rote without 
understanding them (Becher 413-14).  The mechanical nature of modern algebra was clearly 
useful, but only insofar as one could eventually carry its results back to the realm of meaning 





These criticisms functioned within a cultural matrix that elevated mental above physical 
labor, especially in fields with pretentions to being scholarly.  From Burke’s anti-Jacobin writings 
through Arnold and Ruskin, English social critics defined high culture in opposition to the 
“mechanical,” broadly considered.  A commonly cited reference point for Victorian attitudes 
toward the mechanical is Thomas Carlyle’s 1829 essay “Signs of the Times,” which declares the 
nineteenth century the “Age of Machinery,” “in every outward and inward sense of that word” 
(100).  Carlyle’s primary target in the essay is a mode of social organization based on rational 
planning rather than tradition and moral conviction, which for him constitutes the imposition of 
mechanical rules upon the populace.  Matthew Arnold references the idea of the mechanical in 
a similarly negative way in his famous definition of culture in Culture and Anarchy (1869).  
Culture, he writes, is “a pursuit of our total perfection by means of getting to know, on all the 
matters which most concern us, the best which has been thought and said in the world, and, 
through this knowledge, turning a stream of fresh and free thought upon our stock notions and 
habits, which we now follow staunchly but mechanically, vainly imagining that there is a virtue 
in following them staunchly which makes up for the mischief of following them mechanically” 
(viii).  As Raymond Williams has pointed out, the nineteenth-century notion of culture was used 
to distinguish human development from the material advances of civilization, which were seen 
as imposing a mechanical form of rationalism upon people (Keywords 52).  By adopting 
algorithmic methods, mathematicians risked aligning their work with the merely material and 
instrumental.  While some (like Babbage in his industrialist mode) were fine with this 
alignment, others demurred.  If the adoption of symbolic methods caused trouble for the 





a language as well as providing a means of computation, this new notion of culture made the 
prognosis even worse.  By extending the rigor of mathematics to other areas of life that fell 
within the domain of culture, such a project would, under the definitions of mathematics and 
culture that prevailed in the mid-nineteenth century, risk turning people into machines. 
In stark contrast to the Enlightenment conflation of mathematics with reason itself, the 
epistemological texts of mid-nineteenth-century Britain handled this problem by separating 
algorithmic and semantic aspects of symbols into autonomous spheres.  Keeping algorithm 
carefully apart from meaning enabled the mechanical methods of symbol manipulation 
advocated by Peacock, Babbage, and Gregory to coexist peacefully with a humble and at times 
even reverential attitude toward natural languages.  By way of example, consider Philosophy of 
the Inductive Sciences (1840) by the Cambridge philosopher William Whewell.  Whewell’s book 
contains in its preface a lengthy series of “aphorisms concerning the language of science” that 
is by-and-large directed against the idea of remaking language from the ground up (xlviii).  
According to Whewell, in the “ancient” period, scientific words were formed “casually” based 
on words from common speech, whereas in the “modern” period they are “constructed 
intentionally, with set purpose, with a regard to its connexion, and with a view of constructing a 
system” (xlviii-xlix).  The modern approach, Whewell argues, has the advantage of protecting 
scientific texts from misinterpretation based on the “vague” ideas of common language (lii).  
But, citing Bacon’s The Advancement of Learning, Whewell declares that “the appropriation of 
old words is preferable to the invention of new ones” (lxvii).  Given the difficulties involved in 
introducing words that do not draw upon existing meanings and associations, he argues, 





and if one does find the need to create a new word, he suggests that one should strive to 
preserve the “philological analogies” that exist in a language (cv).  While Whewell allows for the 
coining of terms that violate these analogies when it is scientifically necessary, he advises 
people to strive as much as possible not to disturb the existing order of a language when 
developing scientific terminology.  Language has come, in the second quarter of the nineteenth 
century, to be viewed as the sacred property of a people, and changing it something to be 
lamented rather than celebrated as a step toward enlightenment. 
This deference toward existing linguistic practices contrasts sharply with Whewell’s 
treatment of algebra in his chapter on higher mathematics.  The “philological” concerns 
Whewell discusses in the preface would seem to apply only to words, not to the “arbitrary 
symbols” of algebra (142).  Citing Peacock’s Treatise, Whewell declares that the principle of 
symbolic algebra is “[t]he absolute universality of the interpretation of symbols” (143).  In 
contrast to technical terminologies, the use of which must be preceded by the establishment of 
clear definitions based (ideally) on a thoughtful consideration of the existing linguistic practices 
of the community in which the new words are to be used, algebraic symbols may be used 
without having fixed meanings, provided that the rules for using them are clearly specified.  It is 
the fact that the meanings of algebraic symbols are not determined in advance that enables 
algebraic symbols to “reason for us,” as Whewell puts it, leading mathematicians to new truths 
even in cases in which they do not yet know how to interpret them (143).  As an example of the 
way algorithm may forge ahead of meaning in the use of mathematical symbols, Whewell gives 
the notation for negative numbers, which, “although destitute of meaning according to the 





ways” (142-43).  In spite of his endorsement of symbolic algebra, Whewell still assumes the 
results must be given a meaning in some way—one may use purely symbolic methods to chart 
out new mathematical territories, but one must still tame and cultivate the land before it 
becomes inhabitable.  Whewell’s division of algorithm from meaning suggests a very different 
perspective from the Condillacian view of algebra as a well-formed language that one may 
imagine one day replacing French or English.  The peculiar power of symbolic algebra results, 
for Whewell, Peacock, and other nineteenth-century mathematicians, not from its superior 
clarity, but rather from the fact that it enables a form of ratiocination that works independently 
from the process by which signification is established, and that thus can run ahead as a scout in 
regions where meaning has not yet taken root. 
This division is even more overt in John Stuart Mill’s System of Logic (1843), which is 
notable for being the last major British logic text published before the symbolic revolution 
inaugurated by Boole and De Morgan.  As an addendum to Whewell’s discussion of language, 
Mill offers the following “aphorism”: “Whenever the nature of the subject permits the 
reasoning process to be, without danger, carried on mechanically, the language should be 
constructed on as mechanical principles as possible; while in contrary case, it should be so 
constructed that there shall be the greatest possible obstacles to a merely mechanical use of it” 
(Mill II.292).  The “danger” that mechanization poses, Mill explains, is the potential that, in their 
eagerness to extend the power of algebra to other areas of knowledge, philosophers will lose 
sight of the sensible meanings of the symbols (Mill II.293).  It is possible to produce 
mathematical knowledge without regard for meaning, Mill argues, because of the purely 





cannot be produced through the contemplation of names and definitions alone, and so, 
“instead of contrivances to prevent our attention being distracted by thinking of the meaning of 
our signs, we require contrivances to make it impossible that we should ever lose sight of that 
meaning even for an instant” (II.296).  Like Wilhelm von Humboldt, of whose work Mill would 
later become England’s greatest champion, Mill held that the creation of meaning was 
inherently connected to the linguistic practices of a human community (see I.49; I.207-08).  His 
remarks on language in System of Logic contains a distinct, if unspoken, undertone of anxiety 
about the violence that resulted from the French Jacobins’ attempt to expunge the errors of the 
past from their language and culture.  In express repudiation of Condillac’s program of linguistic 
reform, Mill endorses “the doctrine […] of the Coleridge school, that the language of any people 
among whom culture is of an old date, is a sacred deposit, the property of all ages, and which 
no one age should consider itself empowered to alter” (II.261).  Seen in this context, Mill’s 
aphorism about mechanization is suggesting a division between technical and cultural matters 
as a hedge against the destructive consequences of the Enlightenment’s attempt to remake 
culture on rational principles.  The utility of algorithmic methods must be recognized within the 
circumscribed field of algebra, it suggests, but they also must be kept carefully apart from the 
domain in which meaning is the rightful sovereign. 
For all these attempts to restrict symbolic methods to where they could do no harm to 
culture, mathematics was still threatening to trouble peoples’ views of the world.  The 
hyperbolic geometries that appeared in the 1830s—geometries in which non-parallel lines may 
fail to intersect—were scandalous because they appeared to be logically consistent even 





claimed that, although he had realized the possibility of such a geometry in the 1790s, he did 
not write the idea down until 1831 because he feared it would provoke “the uproar of the 
Boeotians” (quoted by Torretti 53; see Ewald 297).  This fear was not without grounding.  The 
possibility of non-Euclidean geometries continued to disturb people for over a century.  In the 
1928 horror story “The Call of Cthulhu,” H.P. Lovecraft depicts the “geometry” of the alien city 
of R’lyeh as “abnormal, non-Euclidean, and loathsomely redolent of spheres and dimensions 
apart from ours” (166); one of the characters dies by being “swallowed up by an angle of 
masonry which shouldn’t have been there” (167).  Rather than representing our world with 
mathematical precision, the new geometries were seen as describing other realities and (in 
Lovecraft’s view) potentially disturbing ones.  In the early nineteenth century, these anxieties 
found an expression in a proliferation of stories (often embellished or fabricated) about 
mathematicians going mad after losing themselves in worlds of abstraction (Alexander, “From 
Voyagers to Martyrs” 30-31; 43; Kittler, “Take-off” 75-76).  The alien aspects of mathematical 
thought—aspects that mathematicians from Cardano to d’Alembert had attempted to reason 
away—now seemed to be around for good.  By widening and deepening the divide between 
mathematics and the world of daily life, the adoption of formal criteria of validity made it 
difficult to believe d’Alembert’s claim, in the Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopédie, that the 
simplicity and certitude of geometry and algebra would bestow enlightenment upon humanity 
(35), or Condorcet’s vision of a final epoch in which people would work out their political 
differences in an algebraic language.  Even as the certainty of mathematics apparently 
increased, determining what the results meant, in the sense of their significance within a 





The question of how one can draw the honey of meaning from the rock of an 
algorithmic system is central to Boole’s writings on the philosophy of logic.  While Boole 
created what was arguably the most mechanical logic system yet realized by the 1840s, he 
takes the pitfalls of mechanization just as seriously as Mill.  In the preface to his first book, The 
Mathematical Analysis of Logic (1847), Boole quotes Mill’s “aphorism” about the distinction 
between subjects whose languages can be mechanized “without danger” and those that cannot 
(quoted by Boole 2; see Mill II.292).80  For Boole, what renders logic safe to mechanize is the 
belief that it rests on a set of “laws of thought” that govern how one may combine and 
recombine ideas.  Boole sought to secure the meaningfulness of his mechanical methods by 
combining a variant of Kantian thought with a religious faith in the revelatory power of algebra.  
Through his application of symbolic methods to logic, Boole inadvertently—and almost 
certainly against his intentions—made possible the construction of first machines that could 
perform logical deductions with true independence from the human mind.  In his philosophical 
writings, he addressed with an uncommon level of explicitness a question that continues to 
haunt such machines in the twenty-first century: how one can justify trusting a system whose 
workings are alien to one’s own way of thinking. 
 
Journeys Through the Uninterpretable 
 
While it emerged around the time when the boundaries of academic disciplines were beginning 
to ossify, Boolean logic was not a result of intensive disciplinary training.  Growing up in a 





school.  He was, however, fortunate enough to have the time and opportunity to read 
extensively on his own, teaching himself modern and classical languages, reading Kant in the 
original German, and studying symbolic algebra and calculus; by the 1840s, he had established 
himself as a respected scholar without ever earning a degree.  Although he initially planned to 
join the clergy, his religious views early on deviated from Anglican orthodoxy; he gravitated 
toward mathematics, the harmony and abstraction of which comported well with his 
idiosyncratic faith.  In 1849, he was appointed Professor of Mathematics at Queens College in 
Cork, Ireland, where he lived until his death at the age of 49 of an illness he acquired while 
walking in the rain to give a lecture.  A major thread running throughout his work is a concern 
with method, a desire to make reasoning into a more thoroughly rule-based procedure.  His 
first major publication, the 1844 article “On a General Method of Analysis,” was primarily an 
attempt to establish a “perfectly general method” for solving a type of equation that had been 
previously described by Euler and Laplace (227).  His work in formal logic takes a similarly 
methodical approach.81  In The Laws of Thought, Boole claims that his logic surpasses 
Aristotelian logic by offering “a directive method” for answering logical questions—that is, not 
just a set of formal criteria for determining whether a given chain of reasoning is correct (as 
syllogisms provide) but also a rigorously defined procedure for deciding which deductions to 
make (11).  In this method lies one of the major tributaries of the modern computer.  Boole was 
certainly not the first to envision an algebra-like language that would turn all sorts of reasoning 
into a mechanical process, but he showed, in a way that Leibniz, Lambert, and Condorcet had 
all failed to do, how this sort of algorithmic symbol manipulation could really work as a way of 





Boole’s logic system is generally understood to exist at the confluence of two 
intellectual currents in early-nineteenth-century Britain.  One is the spread of symbolic algebra 
in Britain.  Boole encountered the new algebra most directly through the work of his friend 
Duncan F. Gregory, whose 1840 essay “On the Real Nature of Symbolical Algebra” attempts, 
building on the work of Peacock, to clarify the principles on which algebra is based (208; see 
Despeaux 49).82  While Grattan-Guinness notes that Boole never mentioned Peacock in his 
writings (xliv), his attitude toward the relation of algorithm and meaning closely resembles that 
of the Cambridge mathematician in that, for both Peacock and Boole, it was permissible to 
experiment with formal transformations before establishing the meanings of symbols.83  The 
formal turn in algebra laid the groundwork for symbolic logic by showing that algebra could 
admit multiple interpretations apart from the usual one involving numbers.  The other current 
that fed Boole’s work was revival of interest in logic triggered by the publication of Richard 
Whately’s 1826 book Elements of Logic, which was expanded from an entry in Coleridge’s 
Encyclopædia Metropolitana.  In this book, Whately attempts to refute the “prejudice” of the 
Lockean tradition against formal logic by showing that logic can be a “Science” as well as an 
“Art” (1).  Isaac Watts and other eighteenth-century logicians, Whately claims, failed to be 
scientific because, in aiming to teach reasoning in general, they left the bounds of their 
discipline vague; Whately, by contrast, strictly limits logic to dealing with formal relations of 
propositions (10; 37).  Whately inspired a new wave of logic texts that emphasized rigor and 
systematicity to a greater extent than the didactic logics of the Enlightenment and emboldened 





and Augustus De Morgan, another close friend of Boole’s, to develop formal methods that 
departed from the Aristotelian tradition to a greater extent than had been done for centuries. 
Boole’s logical theory, which is mostly unchanged from The Mathematical Analysis of 
Logic (1847) to The Laws of Thought (1854), proceeds from the insight that the nineteenth 
century’s newly flexible system of algebra could be applied to the analysis of logical form.  
While it was not an entirely new idea, Boole is often credited for noticing that and and or 
function in ways that are analogous to multiplication and addition.  Based on this analogy, 
Boole developed a system for representing logical propositions using the symbols of standard 
algebra.  While it is sometimes claimed that Boole created the logic system used by modern 
computers (see Shenefelt and White 205), this is an oversimplification; the logical calculus 
Boole created is somewhat different from and much more complex than what ultimately came 
to be known as “Boolean logic.”84  In Boole’s system, addition represents the combination of 
two mutually exclusive categories85, so that ℎ +  𝑧, for instance, might mean the class of things 
that are either horses or zebras; multiplication represents the intersection of categories, so that 
𝑏𝑟 might represent brown rabbits; and subtraction represents the exclusion of a subcategory, 
so that 𝑠 –  𝑐 might represent snakes that are not cobras.  This system uses 1 to represent 
everything in the universe of discourse and 0 to represent nothing; thus 1 –  𝑠 might represent 
everything that is not a snake.  Boole also presents a second interpretation of his algebra that 
deals with truth values rather than categories; in this interpretation, 1 represents always true 
and 0 never true.86  Both versions of Boole’s system maintain a close analogy with ordinary 
numerical algebra, differing only in the addition of one law: 𝑥(1 − 𝑥) = 0.  This law, which he 





opposite—nothing can be both a snake and not a snake.  Adding this additional law to standard 
algebra makes the logical equations behave somewhat like linear differential equations, 
enabling Boole to develop a general algorithm for solving them.  To adapt one of his examples, 
suppose one is given the premise that “Every poet is a man of genius” (26), and one needs to 
know what this tells us about “men of genius.”87  One represents the premise as 𝑝(1 − 𝑔) = 0, 
which means, more literally interpreted, that the category of entities that are poets (𝑝) and not 
men of genius (1 –  𝑔) is empty; one then solves for g using Boole’s method.88  The result, 𝑔 =
𝑝 + 𝑣(1 − 𝑝), states that the category “men of genius” contains all poets along with some 
indefinite number (represented by v) of other beings who are not poets. 
 Boole discusses the linguistic implications of this system of symbolic reasoning in the 
most detail in his second book on logic, An Investigation of the Laws of Thought (1854).  After 
an introduction explaining his overall purpose in the book, Boole enters into a discussion of 
“signs and their laws” (24).  He defines a “sign” as an “arbitrary mark” with a “fixed 
interpretation, and susceptible of combination with other signs in subjection to fixed laws 
dependent upon their mutual interpretation” (25).  He then attempts to show that a subset of 
such signs—those that express things or qualities of things—follow laws of combination that 
are equivalent to the basic laws of algebra.  The order in which such terms appear, he argues, 
makes no difference; “rivers that are estuaries” means the same thing as “estuaries that are 
rivers” (29).  This equivalence translates to the commutative law, 𝑥𝑦 =  𝑦𝑥.  Likewise, 
“European men and women” means the same thing as “European men and European women,” 
which translates to the distributive law, 𝑧(𝑥 +  𝑦)  =  𝑧𝑥 +  𝑧𝑦 (33).  Boole also shows how if, 





language that are left out of this algebraization, he declares at the end of the chapter, serve 
only “to express some emotion or state of feeling accompanying the utterance of a proposition, 
and thus do not belong to the province of the understanding, with which alone our present 
concern lies” (38).  Boole’s algebraic logic is thus meant to capture all those aspects of language 
that logic has to do with, and do so in a way that is far more amenable to mechanical 
manipulation than natural languages. 
 So far, this argument might not seem too different from Condillac’s claim that all 
reasoning is fundamentally algebraic.  But unlike Condillac, Boole makes a clear distinction 
between the algebraic laws that supposedly govern thought and the grammatical laws that 
govern languages.  The identity 𝑥𝑦 =  𝑦𝑥 is a logical, rather than a linguistic truth for Boole; the 
reversibility of terms is a universal law of thought despite the fact that one cannot ordinarily 
replace brown bear with bear brown in standard English.  Boole uses three quotations from 
Milton’s Paradise Lost to illustrate how a phrase can retain its logical structure even as it 
violates the grammar of the English language: 
“Offspring of heaven first-born.” 
“The rising world of waters dark and deep.” 
“Bright effluence of bright essence increate.”  (Laws of Thought 30) 
The comprehensibility of such inversions results, according to Boole, from “the intimate laws of 
thought” that determine how ideas may be combined in the human mind, independently of the 
strictures imposed by particular languages (31).  This view of things produces a parallel 
between symbolic logic and poetry, since both forms of writing apparently have a degree of 





syntax, according to Boole, is due not to one’s knowledge of any particular language, but rather 
to universal laws of reasoning that transcend linguistic strictures (see also Selected Manuscripts 
70).  The primary feat of Boole’s logical system is to recast these laws in a mathematical, rather 
than a verbal form.  Since the quiddities of natural languages have no bearing on the laws of 
thought, Boole finds it “permissible” to eschew words altogether and express logical truths in 
algebraic notation (28).  As he puts it in the postscript to The Mathematical Analysis of Logic: 
“Language is an instrument of Logic, but not an indispensible instrument” (81). 
 However independent logic is from language, however, one must still be able to 
translate the results of one’s logical computations into meaningful sentences for the system to 
be of any use.  One of the prime dangers of applying algebraic methods to logic, Boole 
concedes in The Laws of Thought, is that such methods might produce expressions that are 
“uninterpretable in that sphere of thought which they are designed to aid” (67).  Such 
uninterpretable statements occur frequently in Boole’s text.  For instance, one of his examples 
begins with the following definition: “Responsible beings are all rational beings who are either 
free to act, or have voluntarily sacrificed their freedom” (94-95).  In symbolic notation, he 
renders this statement as “𝑥 =  𝑦𝑧 +  𝑦𝑤,” with 𝑥 being responsible beings, 𝑦 being rational 
ones, 𝑧 being those free to act, and 𝑤 being those who have voluntarily sacrificed their freedom 
(95).  This equation has a clear interpretation given Boole’s definitions of multiplication, 
addition, and equality.  Yet in analyzing it, he winds up with an equation that does not have any 
well-defined logical meaning: 
1 − 𝑦 =  







While this equation is equivalent to 𝑥 =  𝑦𝑧 +  𝑦𝑤 in ordinary numerical algebra89, it bears no 
logical meaning that can be translated into English, since, unlike the other basic algebraic 
operators, division has no logical counterpart.90  The only way to make sense of it is to 
transform it using Boole’s algorithm, which produces a much longer equation that can finally be 
translated into an English sentence, albeit a less-than-elegant one: “Irrational persons consist of 
all responsible beings who are either free to act, or have voluntarily sacrificed their liberty, and 
are not free to act; together with an indefinite remainder of irresponsible beings who have not 
sacrificed their liberty, and are not free to act” (98). 
The danger of wandering into a realm of uninterpretable nonsense is the price one pays 
for turning logic into a mechanical process.  The possibility of producing expressions that lack 
meanings, Boole explains, is specific to symbolic methods, since “this apparent failure of 
correspondency between process and interpretation does not manifest itself in the ordinary 
applications of human reason” (67).  Boole does not, however, take this as a knock against 
algebraization.  It is valid, Boole contends, to employ symbols “in obedience to laws founded 
upon their interpretation, but without any sustained reference to that interpretation, the chain 
of demonstration conducting us through intermediate steps which are not interpretable, to a 
final result which is interpretable” (69).  As an example that, in his view, proves the rule, he 
takes “the uninterpretable symbol √-1,” which, devoid as it is of any sensible meaning, may 
nonetheless be used “in the intermediate process of trigonometry” (69).  Just as Ohm had 
resolved the difficulties surrounding the value √−1 by giving up on the idea that mathematical 
formulæ always had to represent magnitudes, Boole would give mathematical rigor to logic by 





reasoning at the cost of creating a rift between logic and “ordinary” thought that would have 
been unacceptable for Enlightenment thinkers like Condillac.  Despite Boole’s protestations 
that one must always clearly understand the meanings of the symbols one uses—protestations 
that closely resemble ones Ohm makes in the preface to The Spirit of Mathematical Analysis 
(vi)—this requirement is only really relevant at the beginning and end of the logical process, 
when it is necessary to translate between algebraic notation and the language of another field 
of study.  In the midst of Boole’s algorithm, interpretation is both needless and, in the case of 
“uninterpretable” expressions involving division, futile.  When formal rules lead one into the 
realm of the meaningless, it is only more formal rules that can light the way back out. 
But this return from the abyss of the uninterpretable is only possible if the procedures 
one is using are the right ones.  Boole’s confidence that his deductive algorithm can produce 
meaningful statements in any science is founded on the belief that this particular procedure is 
based on rules that are not arbitrary, but rather are imposed on us from without.  As he puts it 
in an manuscript probably written in 1854, because “methods and processes are truly the 
consequences of laws and do not spring up arbitrarily into existence,” one can presume that 
any complete method rests on a basis that is “not merely empirical or analogical” (Selected 
Manuscripts 53).  This assumption of the non-arbitrariness of algebra enables Boole to turn 
reasoning into a mechanical—indeed, an algorithmic—process without at all embracing 
instrumentalism.  In some of his discussions of method, Boole sounds similar to Coleridge, who 
insisted that the “eternal I AM” must rule over the methods of science; Boole, too, sought to 
give scientific reasoning a method that is motivated by a higher moral purpose.91  But whereas 





the individual to the state, Boole’s method derives its authority from the belief that the human 
mind is directly subject to a divine imperative to reason in a certain way.92  The logical algebra 
can be trusted to produce meaningful results, Boole asserts, because (in spite of its occasional 
incomprehensibility) it is based on the form that correct thought is already—in all times and all 
cultures—ordained to take.93  Given this Universalist rationale, the fact that the algebra 
produces uninterpretable statements could be brushed off as resulting not from the limitations 
of the method, but rather from the finitude of the human understanding.  In an 1855 letter to 
John Penrose, Boole gives “infinite space, eternal duration, […] perfect goodness and purity, 
unchanging rectitude and truth etc” as examples of terms that cannot be given clear and 
distinct meanings, but that one can nonetheless reason about with certainty by following the 
laws of thought (Selected Manuscripts 200).  So long as one uses symbols in “obedience” with 
these laws, one cannot produce anything that is out of sync with the order of nature, however 
little we mere temporal beings may be able to understand the expressions our reckoning 
produces. 
Underlying this theologico-philosophical rationale for trusting algorithms is a vision of a 
harmonious universe in which all the differences that exist in people’s manners of thought are 
superficial.  Logic, Boole suggests in the final chapter of The Laws of Thought, forms a common 
ground that unites all philosophies, religions, and political outlooks, all of which are reduced, in 
his view, to different interpretations of the same fundamental truth.  While Boole was cagy 
about his spiritual beliefs in his own writings, his wife, Mary Everest Boole, recorded and 
expanded on them after his death.94  In her 1884 book Symbolical Methods of Study, she 





of exactly opposite tastes, opinions, and habits of thought harmonized by similar aims and 
views of life” (vii).  This fixation on harmony was a common factor between Boole’s personal life 
and his logical work.  In The Mathematical Analysis of Logic, Boole expresses the “conviction, 
that with the advance of our knowledge of all true science, an ever-increasing harmony will be 
found to prevail among its separate branches” (14); in The Laws of Thought, he takes the fact 
that the same algebra can be used to reason about numbers, things, and facts as evidence of 
the “harmony and uniformity” endowed to the world by its creator (159).  In the reflections at 
the end of the latter work, Boole gestures toward something like the early-modern doctrine of 
harmony between microcosm and macrocosm by speculating that “the constitution of things 
without may correspond to that of the mind within” (417).  This belief in the harmony of all 
things provided Boole with a way of connecting algorithmic systems to the world that did not 
depend on the potentially noisy channel of signification.  Whether or not one can make any 
conceptual sense of the results has no bearing on this analogy between algebra and nature, 
which is, as Boole tells us at the beginning of Mathematical Analysis, purely a matter of form. 
The Leibnizian resonance of these statements about harmony is hard to deny.  Boole’s 
work could be taken as the starting point of a resurgence, after over a century, of Leibniz’s 
dream of turning reasoning into a mechanical process, this time with apparent success.  Yet the 
resemblance between Boole’s views of algorithms and those of Leibniz should not be 
overstated.  Boole does not seem to have known much about Leibniz’s work until after he 
wrote The Laws of Thought, despite the fact that an extensive collection of Leibniz’s papers was 
published in 1840 (Grattan-Guinness xliii).  Mary reports that he reacted with “childlike delight” 





thinking was tempered by a circumscribed post-Whatelyan notion of logic that restrained him 
from placing the sort of blind faith in real characters that spurred Leibniz’s project.  In a 
manuscript fragment, he notes that Leibniz wrote of the power of symbolic logic “in language 
which to those imbued with later and juster views of the functions of Logic must appear 
extravagant” (Selected Manuscripts 188).  For all that Boole’s system resembles that of Leibniz, 
his rigorous division of form from subject matter marks him as distinctly of the nineteenth 
century.  There is no question, from Boole’s perspective, that a logical calculus could 
incorporate an encyclopedic catalogue of things, as Leibniz had envisioned doing with the 
characteristica universalis.95  To the contrary, the unique power of algebra was that, considered 
purely as a symbolic method, it had no reference to sensible things at all. 
The language with which Boole describes this division between logical form and content 
bears the distinct markings of Kantian thought, and, in particular, the first critique’s perceived 
elevation of pure thought over mere understanding.  Boole studied the Critique of Pure Reason 
in detail in the 1840s, and his work contains numerous Kantian-sounding references to the idea 
that logic and mathematics deal only with the conditions that experience must meet rather 
than with the sensory content of any particular experience.96  He represented this study of 
formal conditions as a way of getting at the transcendental truths beyond the empirical.  As 
Cohen points out (91), the Kantian influence is apparent in one of the hundreds of poems Boole 
wrote, a sonnet “To the Number Three”: 
When the great Maker, on Creation bent, 
Thee from thy brethren chose, and framed by thee 





To those whose intellectual gaze intent 
Behind the veil phenomenal is sent 
Space diverse, systems manifold to see 
Revealed by thought alone; was it that we 
In whose mysterious spirits thus are blent 
Finite of sense and Infinite of thought, 
Should feel how vast, how little is our store; 
As yon excelling arch with orbs deep-fraught 
To the light wave that dies along the shore; 
That from our weakness and our strength may rise 
One worship unto Him the Only Wise.  (quoted in M. Boole, Symbolical 17) 
This sonnet, written in the late 1840s, is as much a hymn to the human intellect as to the 
Abrahamic God.  Whereas Stanhope’s comet had stood for something unproblematically 
accessible by means of the senses, Boole identifies “yon excelling arch with orbs deep-fraught” 
with the infinite and eternal.  Our ability to grasp such things lies not in our senses, which are 
finite, but in “pure thought,” through which may gaze at “systems manifold” that exist 
“[b]ehind the veil phenomenal.”  In the final couplet, Boole asserts his confidence that our 
senses and our capacity for “pure thought” will harmonize both with each other and with 
revealed religion.  Mathematics gains its peculiar power, Boole suggests, from the fact that it 
works “by thought alone,” untainted by the influence of the empirical; as such it can lead us 





What is paradoxical in this association of symbolic logic with the “intellectual gaze”—a 
paradox that echoed far and wide in the nineteenth century—is that, at the same time that 
formalization elevated logic to the ethereal realm of pure thought, it also deepened its 
dependence on the physical embodiments of symbols.  While Boole represents mathematical 
reasoning as working independently of the finite human senses, this is only strictly true to the 
extent that one performs that reasoning entirely in one’s head.  When one is using a pen and 
paper, the senses do play a role in the process: one must see the symbols on the page.  Boole’s 
apparent unconcern about the role of vision in symbolic mathematics is a key sign of the shift in 
attitudes toward symbols that accompanied the rise of algorithmic methods in the nineteenth 
century.  What matters epistemologically, for formalists like Boole, is only that one performs 
the operations correctly; what cognitive aids one uses to do it—whether one does it with the 
imagination alone, with one’s eyes and hands, or with a machine—is a secondary consideration.  
As Mill puts it in System of Logic, logic deals only with “how to do the thing,” not “how to make 
ourselves capable of doing it” (I.439; see also II.201-02).97  The formal logic of the nineteenth 
century, starting with Whately, drew much of its revitalized power from an embrace of post-
Enlightenment disciplinary specialization, and, in particular, the creation of a newly sharp divide 
between the formal considerations of logic and the practicalities of putting logical systems into 
use.  From this point on, even for as thoroughgoing an empiricist as Mill, logic would be 
concerned only with articulating the rules by which reasoning is supposed to work, leaving it to 
other disciplines to deal with the messiness of the processes by which people employ these 
rules in practice.  This divide enabled Boole and other thinkers of his time to turn a blind eye to 





unilaterally into the realm of pure reason, even as, from a practical perspective, it was 
becoming ever more dependent on the use of written notations.  To reach truths beyond the 
empirical, within the new epistemic order that succeeded the Enlightenment criterion of 
conceptual clarity, one need only perform the right operations; whether one uses a pen and 
paper to help one out is beside the point. 
This erasure of the materiality of logic constituted a radical reversal of the assumptions 
of Lockeans like Condillac and Stanhope, for whom maintaining a grounding in the senses was 
paramount.  The difference becomes particularly apparent through a comparison of the 
pedagogical approaches taken by the eighteenth-century logicians and those taken by Boole.  
While Boole did not write much on the topic of education, Mary Everest Boole recorded some 
of his views in her writings.  According to an essay she published in 1878, he thought it 
important that children “should spend a great deal of time over some mechanical work which 
could be done without the presence of a teacher, and which they must concentrate their whole 
energies upon, and do with perfect accuracy” (“Home-side” 109).  Students must be taught how 
to work a sum before the rule is explained to them; they are “to obey first and understand 
afterwards” (109).  This pedagogy, which was perhaps inspired by Whately’s remarks about the 
importance of beginning with concrete examples in teaching complex concepts (Whately 16), 
contrasts with Lockean views of education, in which one had to build concepts from the ground 
up through the analysis of simple sensory impressions, and in which the use of strict rules of 
any sort was discouraged (see especially Locke, Some Thoughts 38-39).  While Boole still held 
that learning should begin with the concrete and gradually increase in abstraction (see 





with physical skills of measuring and computation.  By performing the same procedure over and 
over, precisely and mechanically, the student is meant to reach a moment of epiphany in which 
she finally grasps the principle by which that procedure works.98  Epistemologically, this 
approach is founded on the opposite of the Lockean doctrine.  For Locke, the clarity of concepts 
is a necessary precondition for correct reasoning, and no algorithm may be employed until this 
clarity has been established.  For Boole, on the other hand, the algorithm comes first and must 
be trusted to produce, eventually, (hopefully,) a clear understanding in the student’s mind. 
This reversal of the relation between process and meaning granted algorithms a degree 
of authority over human reason that would have been unthinkable just a few decades before, 
when Stanhope’s ivory ball met its bemused reception.99  The amenability of Boole’s philosophy 
of logic to a division of intellectual labor, in which an army of clerical workers mechanically 
perform computations that only the experts understand, is apparent.  Making the leap from 
obedience to understanding might be critical in the cultivation of students’ intellectual 
faculties, but as far as logical validity goes, one can easily drop the understanding step and 
merely require obedience: just about anyone can learn to follow Boole’s procedures and, 
provided that they follow them correctly, they will all get the right answer, whether they 
understand what they are doing or not.  As if in acknowledgement of the fact that some 
students will never progress beyond blind trust, the sonnet “To the Number Three” limits the 
revelation of the starry truth to an unspecified subset of humanity.  This failure of universality is 
much less of an epistemological problem for Boole than it would have been for Condorcet, 
Stanhope, and others in the Lockean constellation because, unlike Stanhope’s Demonstrator, 





it only aims to produce the results.100  The idea that the laws governing the algorithm will reveal 
their self-evidence to anyone who thinks about them enough, crucial as it is to Boole’s 
philosophy, is superfluous from a practical perspective.  Boole’s system works the same 
whether it is a divine being imposing the rules upon us or merely a schoolmaster. 
It would be left to later thinkers to work through the instrumental implications of 
Boole’s ideas.  After The Laws of Thought met with a lackluster reception, Boole attempted for 
several years to write a non-technical book on the philosophy of logic, but he appears to have 
abandoned this project well before his untimely death in 1864.  When Boole’s work finally met 
an audience a few years later, it was his innovations in the use of symbolic notation, more than 
his philosophy, that proved influential.  Important early champions of Boole’s work were the 
English logician and economist William Stanley Jevons, whose 1870 textbook Elementary 
Lessons in Logic presents a simplified version of Boole’s inference algorithm (191-201), and 
John Venn (of Venn Diagram fame), who discusses Boole’s ideas extensively in his 1881 book 
Symbolic Logic and credits him as the first writer to turn mathematical logic into a “system” 
(xxix).  Boole’s work also inspired Gottlob Frege, C.S. Peirce, and Bertand Russell, although all 
three took very different positions than Boole on the philosophy of logic.  Less successfully, 
Mary Everest Boole worked to promote her husband’s ideas about education and religion and 
to push back against the instrumental views of Jevons and other late-nineteenth-century 
logicians who took up the practical aspects of Boole’s work.  In the 1884 book Symbolical 
Methods of Study, she calls the law of duality, 𝑥(1 –  𝑥)  =  0, “the equation of Nirvana,” and 
argues that it represents a state of completion produced through the fusion of opposites (viii).  





calculus were entirely religious, executed in “obedience to the commands of the Pentateuch,” 
and that he only included examples of practical applications “to show that his system was not a 
mere fanciful outcome of religious fervor” (55).  In spite of Mary’s efforts, the theological 
underpinnings of Boole’s work were largely lost in the shuffle as his logical system was 
transformed into the standardized logical calculus that is taught and used today.  Boolean logic 
was fated to be more often encountered as an element of computer hardware than as a system 
of thought, much less a devotional one. 
In practical terms, Boole’s most important contribution was to show that logical 
inference could be done entirely through a mechanical procedure that does not depend at all 
on the meanings of symbols.  The idea of using algebraic operators in logic had, as Venn points 
out, already been explored to some extent by Leibniz and Lambert (Symbolic Logic xxxi-xxxiv), 
and Whately and others had already put forth the precept that logical validity depends solely 
on form; but Boole showed, in greater detail than anyone had before, how a purely algorithmic 
method of deduction could function in practice.  As symbolic logic gained wide acceptance 
among logicians, Leibniz’s dream of a calculus ratiocinatur—an idea that had largely lain 
dormant during the long ascendancy of Lockean thought—returned in force, albeit in 
diminished form.  Starting in 1890, Ernst Schröder extended the ideas of Boole and Ohm into an 
“absolute algebra” that would, he wrote, constitute “a scientific universal language” that would 
fundamentally differ from spoken languages (quoted by Peckhaus, “19th Century Logic” 442).  
Similarly, in his epochal 1879 pamphlet Begriffsschrift, Gottlob Frege described his own logical 
notation as a small step toward Leibniz’s “idea of a universal characteristic, of a calculus 





“ideography” cannot do everything that Leibniz had intended, he nonetheless frames symbolic 
logic as a continuation of the longstanding Baconian quest “to break the domination of the 
word over the human spirit” (7).  This renewed interest in Leibniz’s idea of mechanizing thought 
was buttressed by the establishment of a newly absolute divide between matters of logical 
form and those of interpretation, an intellectual turn that rendered suddenly plausible what 
had once been a utopian dream.  Logic could now concern itself with the algorithmic plane 
alone, leaving the complexities of meaning, culture, and actual human thought to the 
humanistic disciplines. 
While Boole would doubtless have been appalled to see the utilitarian ends to which his 
ideas were applied, his work proved to be a critical turning point in the automation of cognitive 
labor.  In 1869, Jevons used his simplified 
version of Boolean algebra to develop a “logic 
piano” that did, in fact, mechanize the process 
of drawing certain types of logical conclusion 
(Figure 18).  Jevons’s machine, which Harley 
used as a pretext for publishing his 1879 article 
about Stanhope (Harley 193), works by 
eliminating possibilities that are inconsistent 
with a given set of premises (see Barrett and 
Connell; Maas).  Boolean logic also formed the 
basis of a different sort of machine that aimed  Figure 18. Jevons’s "logical machine," as depicted in the 






not to solve logical problems, but rather to turn symbolic logic into a general- purpose model of 
signal processing.  Credit typically goes to the American mathematician C.E. Shannon, later 
known as the founder of statistical information theory, for noticing that Boole’s two-valued 
algebra corresponded to the structure of certain types of electrical circuits.  Shannon’s Master’s 
thesis, “A Symbolic Analysis of Relay and Switching Circuits,” which was written in 1937 and first 
published the next year, shows that the arrangements of switches in an electrical circuit (or, 
equivalently, relays, vacuum tubes, or transistors) can be analyzed and designed using an 
algebraic system similar to Jevons’s version of Boolean logic (2-3; 8).  In effect, Shannon 
replaced the interpretation step that comes at the end of the Boolean algorithm with the 
construction of a circuit.  This connection between logic and switching circuits was an important 
step in the development of modern electronics and, in particular, computers, in the design and 
programming of which Boolean logic still plays a pervasive role.  
While Shannon’s insight was a product of a very different moment from the one in 
which Boole developed his logical system, the path he took was prepared in the nineteenth 
century.  For eighteenth-century empiricists like Condorcet and Stanhope, the construction of 
reasoning machines could only work as part of a broader program of eliminating prejudice and 
developing an enlightened well-formed language.  These Enlightenment systems could be torn 
apart easily with the observation that one’s membership in a human community plays a 
necessary role in establishing the meanings of symbols; such an argument would show that the 
sort of absolute certainty Stanhope wanted to establish would only be possible if people were 
able to throw out all their existing knowledge and start from the ground up.  Boole, Ohm, and 





their standard of validity based on the following of procedures rather than on the clarity of 
concepts, they could separate matters of technical rigor—defining the rules that reasoning 
must follow—from the all-encompassing complexity of Bildung.  This separation was 
undergirded by the subject–object divide that was made available by the broad absorption of 
Kant’s critical philosophy.  The fact that what was supposed to take place in the realm of pure 
thought, as Kant himself would have had it, was now happening on sheets of paper and in 
machines inspired few scruples.  It is one of the great ironies of intellectual history that, by 
separating transcendental reason from sensory experience, the Kantian turn ultimately enabled 
logic to move out of the human mind and into the physical realm.  After the link to the senses 
was cut, mathematical and logical validity came to have less to do with how one thinks than 
with what one does; culture only entered the picture at the practical level of ensuring that 
people are capable of performing the operations correctly. 
While it enabled the creation of ever more complex algorithmic systems, the literal 
mechanization of logic only deepened the rift that symbolic algebra had opened between 
algorithms and other areas of life that still depended on meaning.  Boole confronted this 
possibility with a boldness that is hard to find in later writers, accepting that the processes of 
symbol manipulation may sometimes be impossible to interpret but nonetheless asserting the 
relevance of the algorithms to meaning-making disciplines.  Boole’s use of “uninterpretable” 
expressions was never widely accepted, and it is now generally regarded as problematic among 
logicians (see Marciszewski and Murawski 146-47; Brown 308; c.f. van Evra).  In his early book 
Pure Logic (1864), Jevons criticizes Boole for using “obscure symbols” that lack logical meanings 





than the “dark and symbolic processes” of the Boolean algorithm (66).  Later practitioners of 
symbolic logic mostly followed Jevons on this point, attempting to ensure that, however 
mechanical the use of logic systems became in practice, it was always theoretically possible to 
find meaning in the symbols.  But for the majority of people, turning these mechanical 
processes into literal machines makes the interpretability of algorithms more a comforting 
illusion than a reality.  To the typical user, the inner workings of a computer are just as dark and 
obscure as Jevons found Boole’s system to be.  Instead of attempting to prevent this “failure of 
correspondency between process and interpretation” (Laws of Thought 67), as virtually all 
logicians and mathematicians have done since, Boole embraced the fact that the workings of 
algorithms would sometimes be mysterious.  The religious underpinnings of his work provided 
him with an explicit justification for doing what every computer user tacitly does—placing trust 
in a system that one does not understand. 
In spite of this faith, the rise of the algorithm did not bring the harmony Boole 
envisioned, but rather led to fragmentation.  The development of increasingly complex logic 
machines from the 1870s on brought with it a widening division between those who knew the 
principles on which those machines worked and those who merely used them.  Algorithms 
were no longer required conform to the way people thought; instead, those who wished to 
understand would have to alter their way of thinking to correspond to the algorithms.  The 
ability to discern the meanings of circuit diagrams and computer code became the province of 
engineers and programmers, who could interpret such arcane runes because they had learned 
to think algorithmically.  With the acceptance of this division, one of the key goals of the Radical 





teachings of scientific rationality and serve as a way for “the people” to think in their day-to-day 
life—gave way to the construction of technical discourses that were to some extent alienated 
from other sectors of society. 
 The roots of what came to constitute this technical mode of thought lie in a different 
strain of nineteenth-century thought from the one Boole made his intellectual home—not in 
high-flown notions of pure reason, but rather in the control systems of the factory.  Boole was a 
pure mathematician and a philosopher of logic, not anything like a programmer.  In the 1985 
essay “Algorithmic Thinking and Mathematical Thinking,” Donald E. Knuth, one of the founders 
of computer science, attempts to discern what differentiates his discipline from mathematics, 
which appeared to be its closest neighbor.  Algorithmic thinking, Knuth concludes, is 
distinguished from mathematical thinking in two ways: first, it involves a “notion of ‘complexity’ 
or economy of operation,” and second, it deals with “the dynamic notion of the state of a 
process” (181).  For a pure mathematician like Boole, algorithms are only important as means 
of reaching eternal truths; whether they provide efficient ways of accomplishing practical ends 
is secondary.  But for someone designing a computer system, efficiency is paramount.  The 
manner of thought that Knuth describes as characteristic of computer science can be traced 
back to the industrial efficiency movement of Frederick Winslow Taylor and ultimately to his 
predecessor Charles Babbage, who was not just the creator of famous computing engines, but 
also the author of a treatise on factory management titled On The Economy of Machinery and 
Manufactures.  The next chapter considers Babbage alongside one of his most complex 
interlocutors, Edgar Allan Poe.  Taken together, the writings of Babbage and Poe reveal one of 





Enlightenment notions of progress gave way to industrial ones: the establishment of a deep 
divide between the increasingly small, perhaps even vanishing number of people who are able 






Chapter 6: Babbage, Poe, and the Unruliness of Matter 
 
How many bad machines are suggested every day by men who imagine that levers, wheels, 
pulleys, and cables perform in a machine as they do on paper! 
—Denis Diderot, “Art” (trans. Hoyt) 
 
Metal and Glass 
 
An often-repeated story about Charles Babbage is that a member of Parliament, having heard 
that he had built a machine that could compute numerical tables without the possibility of 
error, approached him with a question: “Pray, Mr. Babbage, if you put into the machine wrong 
figures, will the right answers come out?” (Passages 67).  Babbage claims that he was asked this 
question twice, once by a member of the House of Lords and once by a member of the House 
of Commons.101  “I am not,” he writes, “able rightly to apprehend the kind of confusion of ideas 
that could provoke such a question” (67).  Yet he does concede that, strictly speaking, it is 
possible to build an engine that will produce right answers after wrong numbers are entered.  
An Analytical Engine may be constructed so that one may change the values on the display in 
the midst of a computation, thus making the results appear to be whatever one wishes, right or 
wrong; “yet,” he writes, “after each of these apparent falsifications the engine will be found to 
make the next calculation with perfect truth” (67).102  He thinks, however, that such tomfoolery 
ought to be prevented.  “The whole of the mechanism,” he concludes, “ought of course to be 





it the property alluded to would be useless” (67).  The engine itself, Babbage suggests, cannot 
lie—it will only compute truthful results based on the numbers it is given—but it can be 
configured in misleading ways, and so it must be locked away from the meddling hands of those 
who might wish to use it to deceive. 
The figure of a machine locked in glass captures the intersection of two dimensions of 
Babbage’s views of knowledge.  With his influential theory of the “division of mental labor,” 
which he articulated in his 1832 book On the Economy of Machinery and Manufactures, 
Babbage established a practical separation between the (presumably trustworthy) people in 
charge of designing and maintaining a computing machine and the mere users of its results, 
who had no business messing around with its insides.103  Yet he did not want those insides to be 
hidden—in Enlightenment fashion, he wanted to spread knowledge about how his computing 
machines worked as widely as possible.  While Babbage was sanguine about the possibility of 
reconciling industrial mechanization with the goal of enlightening the populace, his embrace of 
machinery did not always fit together amicably with his Enlightenment aims.  As the example of 
the number wheels that falsify the computation going on behind them suggests, simply 
allowing people to see inside a machine is not necessarily enough to keep them from being 
deceived; the real power belongs to those who hold the keys.  Although Babbage resisted it to 
the last, this divergence between the practical knowledge of engineering and the theoretical 
knowledge of science represented a grave threat to the dream of a unified body of knowledge.  
Once words and ideas give way to wheels and cogs, the Enlightenment project is in jeopardy. 
This chapter examines the epistemological consequences of mechanization by putting 





deception, Edgar Allan Poe.  In both his poetry and his prose work, Poe embraced some of the 
disturbing implications of the embodiment of ideas in matter that Babbage shrugged off.  Poe 
only mentions Babbage by name in one text—“Maelzel’s Chess Player,” which is his attempt to 
debunk the chess-playing Turk of von Kempelen—but he draws on Babbage’s ideas in at least 
three other works.104  Scholarship on the transatlantic connection between Poe and Babbage 
has mostly focused on Poe’s self-consciousness about his status as an author; as a magazine 
writer who had to tailor his work to particular audiences, he faced the charge of manufacturing 
stories like one of Babbage’s machines and, in John Tresch’s reading, he sometimes accepts the 
image of being a poetry-writing machine (“Potent Magic” 290).  My purpose is less to illuminate 
Poe’s authorial position than to show that his distinctive way of thinking about language can 
provide a valuable perspective on the theoretical problems raised by the employment of 
algorithms.  In his later writings, Poe put forth an atomistic cosmology that coincides 
significantly with the one Babbage presents in his 1837 work of natural theology, The Ninth 
Bridgewater Treatise: A Fragment.  But Poe pushes the linguistic implications of this 
mechanistic view of the universe much further than Babbage does, emphasizing the ways in 
which the physical embodiments of words in ink or sound can have effects on the world 
independently of their meanings.  Poe’s work thus contends with one of the implications of 
algorithmic thinking that was most at odds with Enlightenment precepts: that the physical 
processes symbols undergo could take on lives of their own, ultimately eclipsing the importance 
of the symbols’ meanings. 
For Babbage, this possibility arose from treating methods of computation explicitly as 





his work on the Analytical Engines in the 1830s and 40s, I contend that Babbage made an 
important step into algorithmic thinking in the very earliest phase of his work on computing 
machines.  In an overlooked 1822 journal article titled “On the Theoretical Principles of the 
Machinery for Calculating Tables,” Babbage describes a simple algorithm that produces a 
seemingly enigmatic sequence of numbers, then attempts to find a mathematical formula that 
can predict its behavior (H. P. Babbage 216-19).  By doing so, he reverses the procedure that 
had usually characterized the use of algorithms in the eighteenth century: instead of deriving an 
algorithm from known mathematical principles and then using it to solve pre-given problems, 
he begins by constructing an arbitrary algorithm and only then attempts to find a theoretical 
explanation of it.  Rather than founding algorithms on the meanings of the symbols, Babbage 
treated algorithms themselves as the foundation onto which meaning must be built. 
This reversal of the relation of algorithm and meaning, I show in this chapter, led 
Babbage into difficulties that Enlightenment epistemologies were ill-equipped to handle.  
Unlike Boole, Babbage had no religious justification for placing blind faith in the algorithms he 
designed; instead, his position was that computing machines could only be useful as long as 
people were able to understand them well enough to control them.  Babbage grapples with this 
issue most directly in The Ninth Bridgewater Treatise, in which he states, with evident reference 
to his 1822 article, that even very simple algorithms can produce behaviors that are “beyond 
the utmost reach of mathematical analysis” (42).  Until one can attain an analytical 
understanding of such an algorithm, one can only predict its behavior (short of performing it 
and seeing what it does) by means of induction; but Babbage demonstrates that inductive 





Ninth Bridgewater Treatise uncovers a problem that continues to trouble computer scientists in 
the twenty-first century with the development of artificial-intelligence methods whose 
behavior cannot be predicted in any straightforward way, requiring practitioners to use 
experimental methods to study their own creations.  Babbage was one of the first to perceive a 
possibility that has now been realized, that one could set in motion a computational process 
that one cannot truly understand. 
Babbage ultimately recoiled from this possibility.  In his approach to the representation 
of machines, Babbage takes a position similar to the Enlightenment epistemology of Condillac, 
who wrote in Logic that to understand a machine “is to have a thought made up of as many 
ideas as there are parts of the machine itself, ideas that represent each part exactly, and that 
are arranged in the same order” (355).  As he developed his computing machines, Babbage 
went to great lengths to maintain reliable representations of their inner workings, developing 
an elaborate system of “mechanical notation” that analyzed machines into their component 
parts.  In a pamphlet he published on this notation system, he claimed that, if adopted, this 
notation “will form as it were a universal language”—a statement that could be taken as an 
echo of Condillac (H. P. Babbage 240).  But if it is true that algorithms can be unpredictable 
even to their creators, then this sort of analysis is inadequate as a means of controlling them; a 
machine can still surprise even if it is stored in a glass case and one has had the opportunity to 
inspect every single part of it.  Babbage ultimately brushes off these concerns by concluding 
that one should only use algorithms that one can fully control, rescuing his commitment to 






Poe’s treatment of deception is not so reassuring.  Poe denied, like Babbage, that 
machines could be truly intelligent, but he was less confident than Babbage that the 
mathematical sciences would enable human beings to exert total control over matter.  Poe 
presents an influential model of analytical thought in his three tales about the character C. 
Auguste Dupin, who is generally regarded as the first literary detective.  These stories, I argue, 
present a challenge to the confidence of Enlightenment thinkers like Babbage that a well-
formed system of signs is sufficient to prevent deception.  In Poe’s final detective story, “The 
Purloined Letter” (1844), Dupin argues at length that someone who is both “poet and 
mathematician” will have the advantage over a “mere mathematician,” who would fall into the 
villain’s trap on account of being unable to think outside of mathematical rules (Mabbott 
III.986).106  While this passage is commonly read as a criticism of mathematics tout court, it 
quite clearly targets the French Enlightenment tradition that equated analysis with algebra and 
treated mathematics as the epitome of reason itself.  Far from repudiating mathematical 
thinking, Poe’s later work as a whole embraces one of the more disturbing consequences of the 
algorithmic methods that Babbage and other algebraists were developing in the early 
nineteenth century: that symbols can have the power to do things in the world independently 
of our ability to understand their meanings and, indeed, even if they have no meanings at all. 
This poetic critique rests on a modified version of the Romantic view of language that 
became most widespread in the nineteenth century, deriving from Wordsworth, Coleridge, and 
Goethe.  Wordsworth and Coleridge both made statements to the effect that words are things.  
In his note to the poem “The Thorn” in the 1800 edition of Lyrical Ballads Wordsworth suggests 





the passion” (140); Coleridge, in an 1800 letter to William Godwin, states that he “would 
endeavor to destroy the old antithesis of Words & Things, elevating, as it were, words into 
Things, & living Things too” (Letters I.626).  Poe, adding characteristic morbidness and self-
consciousness about his status as an author, wrote that “[w]ords—printed ones especially—are 
murderous things” (Pollin II.236).  For Wordsworth and Coleridge, the claim that words are 
things is positive—words are real things, “too awful an instrument for good and evil to be 
trifled with,” as Wordsworth put it (Literary Criticism 154), not to be discarded blithly in the 
manner in which Enlightenment reformers had sought to do.  By writing that words are things, 
they rebuke linguistic voluntarism of the sort advocated by the idéologues and suggest a 
revision of the Baconian mandate to study things and not words.  But Poe took the idea that 
words are things in a different direction: words are physical things, he suggests, inherently 
possessing no more or less meaning than any other physical things.  What prevents us from 
understanding the power of language is not, Poe suggests, a lack of attention to or respect for 
the cultural heritage that governs meaning; instead, the problem for Poe is the idea of meaning 
itself, which covers over our ignorance of what the linguistic systems we create will do.  This 
attitude toward language fit well with Poe’s affinity for the uncanny, which, indeed, could well 
describe the experience of seeing symbols moving around of their own volition on the wheels 
of a computing machine.  In this way, Poe embraced the turn away from Enlightenment views 
that accompanied the rise of the algorithm to an extent that even Babbage and Boole did not. 
This chapter begins with a discussion of how Babbage negotiated the possibility that an 
algorithm could do things that its creator cannot understand.  Combining French Enlightenment 





sophisticated computing machines yet conceived in his time; yet he held back from admitting 
that such machines could have any agency of their own, insisting that they remain under the 
control of human operators.  I then examine Poe’s response to the potentially deceptive quality 
of machines.  In the Dupin stories, Poe presents an early depiction of forensics—the practice of 
attempting to reconstruct past events by analyzing the material traces that people’s actions 
leave behind.  Yet Poe resists the materialistic implications of this approach, developing a form 
of forensics that is just as skeptical of scientific methods of analysis as it is of interpretive ones.  
I end the chapter and the dissertation by returning briefly to Babbage, examining his writings 
about the Great Exhibitions of the 1850s and 60s.  As people around the world flocked to 
London to see the latest fruits of industry, Babbage made a last-ditch effort to put his 
Enlightenment views into effect; yet his dream of disseminating knowledge universally proved 
to be at odds with the intentions of the organizers.  The mid-century exhibitions signaled the 
emergence of an epistemic division that Babbage and Poe were both, in different ways, trying 
to resist—the division between those with technical knowledge and the mere consumer, who 
had to take some aspects of the workings of machines on trust. 
 
The Hidden Wheel 
 
It was before his arrival at Cambridge, according to his memoir, that Babbage first conceived of 
the idea of creating a universal language (Passages 25).  With characteristic industry, he 
devoted a significant amount of energy to the scheme, producing a dictionary and “a kind of 





Wilkins’s Essay in some detail and concluded, as his authorized biographer writes, that the 
failure of such schemes “was to be attributed to the means which they had adopted, rather 
than to any real difficulty which might exist in the undertaking itself” (Buxton 347).  While 
Babbage soon abandoned the idea of creating a universal language, he took up a different, 
distinctly industrial approach to the Baconian project of eliminating errors.  In 1812 or 13, he 
claims, while he was sitting over a table of logarithms “in a kind of dreamy mood,” he conceived 
the idea of creating a machine that could produce these tables with perfect accuracy (42).  
While none of Babbage’s designs ever saw practical use, he made massive conceptual advances 
over his predecessors, eventually creating the first detailed plans for a general-purpose 
computer with stored programs, memory, and recursive control structures—a project that 
would, Ada Lovelace wrote, provide “a new, a vast, and a powerful language […] for the future 
of analysis” (H. P. Babbage 25).  Yet mechanization raised philosophical issues that the 
empiricist thought of the time was ill-prepared to handle.  In experimenting with the 
development of ever more complex algorithms, Babbage confronted a possibility from which, 
on account of his continuing commitment to Enlightenment aims, he ultimately shrank—that 
people may be able to design and even bring into mechanical being algorithms whose behavior 
is governed by laws of nature that they cannot comprehend. 
In spite of his role in promoting British industrialism, Babbage’s early influences were 
predominantly French.  As the founder of the Cambridge Analytical Society, Babbage was a part 
of the push to introduce the symbolic methods of French mathematicians like Lacroix and 
Lagrange into England.  Some scholars have also traced Babbage’s thinking about language back 





economizing mental labor” to the notion of analysis promoted by Condillac and other 
eighteenth-century French philosophers (640); similarly, Eduardo L. Ortiz argues that one of 
Babbage’s early projects, the development of a new notation for the representation of 
mathematical functions in 1815-16, was influenced by Condillac’s statements about the 
importance of language for science (“Babbage and French Idéologie” 14).107  By the time he 
began his work on computing machines, however, Babbage appears to have turned away from 
the extreme positions of the Condillac school in favor of the more nuanced views of the later 
idéologues.  In an 1821 essay On the Influence of Signs in Mathematical Reasoning, Babbage 
approvingly cites Joseph Marie de Gérando, one of the French philosophers who criticized 
Condorcet’s universal language project in the late 1790s (8-9).  In the chapter from which 
Babbage quotes, De Gérando argues that the certainty of algebra was a result of the special 
nature of the ideas it dealt with, not of its language—a repudiation of Condillac’s late view that 
all reasoning is fundamentally algebraic (2.223).  De Gérando and other French thinkers 
provided Babbage with an appreciation for “the immense power of signs in aiding the reasoning 
faculty,” which he cited, late in life, as one of the reasons for his success (Passages 485), along 
with, critically, a recognition of the limits of algebraic methods. 
But where the idéologues were primarily concerned with programs of social and political 
levelling, Babbage’s watchword was efficiency.  The Cambridge Analytical Society’s one official 
publication, Memoirs of the Analytical Society (1813), suggests that symbolic methods can 
contribute to the “œconomy” of mathematical practice (ii).108  As Simon Schaffer has pointed 
out, Babbage’s work on computing machines is based on the same thinking that led him, in The 





because it separates operations requiring different degrees of skill—an argument that came to 
be known in the field of economics as Babbage’s Principle (Schaffer, “Babbage’s Intelligence” 
209).  A direct inspiration for this economic approach to calculation was the French 
mathematician Gaspard Riche de Prony (see Babbage, Economy 153-63; Hyman 43-44).  
Starting in 1791, with the support of the National Assembly, Prony organized an effort to create 
a massive book of logarithms by dividing the work up among almost a hundred mathematical 
workers, organized into a three-level structure (Daston, “Enlightenment Calculations” 193).  
Babbage learned about Prony’s project while visiting Paris as a young man (H. P. Babbage 339), 
and he later represented the Difference Engine as an improvement upon Prony’s method 
(Economy 157).  Babbage pushed Prony’s idea of applying the division of labor to computation 
in a new direction that would ultimately prove it to be at odds with Enlightenment precepts.  
For Babbage, the development of scientific theories was a separate consideration from the 
carrying out of algorithms; having correct ideas in one’s head was only important for the 
former.  This separation of understanding from algorithm differentiates Babbage from 
Stanhope, who meant the workings of his Demonstrator to correspond directly to the mental 
representations in its users’ heads.  Unlike Stanhope, Babbage did see his computing machines 
as embodiments of reason; instead, the point was to automate the “mechanical” parts of 
mathematical practice that were beneath the dignity of an intelligent being. 
This division is particularly apparent in Babbage’s approach to creativity.  In his memoir, 
he suggests that the key to discovery in science and art alike is generalization: “One of the 
principles of discovery in many subjects is, to generalize from the individual case up to the 





“combining and generalising faculty,” he writes elsewhere, that “gives to human intellect its 
greatest development” (Bridgewater 25).  This notion of generalization may have roots in 
French idéologie; in his essay On the Influence of Signs, Babbage attributes to de Gérando the 
insight that algebraic signs gain their special power by combining simplicity with generality (7; 
see also Memoirs xvi and Buxton 35).  But Babbage’s notion of generalization goes far beyond 
algebra, encompassing a wide range of creative acts.109  He uses it, for instance, as a 
distinguishing factor between fine art and manufacture, writing that “[t]he fine arts idealize 
nature by generalizing from its individual objects: the industrial arts realize identity by the 
unbounded use of the principle of copying” (Exposition 49).  In spite of Babbage’s 
Enlightenment roots, this elevation of the creative faculty above industrial practice bears the 
clear markings of the post-Romantic notion of art in which, as Michael L. Jones puts it, 
“[m]anufacture and creativity were to be divided” (227).  Whether or not there is any sense in 
characterizing a master sculptor’s practice as “generalization,” the idea provided Babbage with 
a distinguishing factor between truly creative work, for which human intelligence was required, 
and the merely “mechanical” forms of mental labor involved in industrial production. 
But it also created a problem that did not arise for sensationalists like Stanhope: if 
algorithm and reason are to be separated, then there is a possibility they might fail to align.  A 
suggestive example occurs in the early pages of his memoir.  As an example of his idea of 
generalization, he explains how he learned to imitate the sermons of one Rev. Charles Simeon: 
Every Sunday I had to write from memory an abstract of the sermon he preached 
in our village.  Even at that period in my life I had a taste for generalization.  





skeleton form, I tried, by way of experiment, to fill up such a form in a sermon of 
my own composing from the text of “Alexander the coppersmith hath done us 
much harm.”  As well as I remember, there were in this sermon some queer 
deductions from this text; but then they fulfilled all the usual conditions of our 
sermons: so thought also two of my companions to whom I communicated in 
confidence this new manufacture.  (Passages 23) 
Babbage recounts that some of the other boys remembered this parody as if it had really been 
delivered by the Reverend, leading to “an awful explosion” that Babbage declines to recount 
(24).  While Babbage’s prankish “experiment” should not be taken too seriously, it is suggestive 
of the way his idea of generalization different from the Enlightenment notion of abstraction.  
One might usefully compare it to an analogous passage in another fragmentary memoir written 
by an inventor, Part One of Benjamin Franklin’s Autobiography (1771).  Franklin, writing almost 
a century before Babbage, describes how he taught himself to write good prose using The 
Spectator of Addison and Steele as a model.  Franklin began by preparing “short Hints of the 
Sentiment in each Sentence,” and then attempting to reconstruct the original passage based on 
these hints (12).  “I also,” he writes, “sometimes jumbled my Collections of Hints into 
Confusion, and after some Weeks, endeavored to reduce them into the best Order, before I 
began to form the full Sentences, and compleat the Paper.  This was to teach me Method in the 
Arrangement of Thoughts” (12).  Franklin wanted to reconstruct passages from their 
component ideas, relying on his reason to guide him to the correct structure at both the 
sentence and paragraph levels.  Babbage, on the other hand, began with the structure and 





Unusual as Franklin’s specific approach to self-teaching may be, it rested on set of 
Enlightenment attitudes toward rationality that were widespread in the eighteenth century, 
and from which Babbage’s notion of generalization represented a departure.  Franklin’s method 
might be compared with the one Condillac advocates in Traité de l’Art d’Écrire (Treatise on the 
Art of Writing), which was part of the course of studies he prepared for the Prince of Parma 
between 1767 and 1773.  There is, Condillac writes, a “subordination that links [ideas] with one 
another,” and the one secret of good writing is to “express sensibly that order, that 
subordination, that linking” of ideas (12; my translation).  Like Condillac, Franklin seems to 
presume that, by means of natural reason, the student will be able to sense what connections 
exist between a set of ideas even if they are jumbled up; his approach, like Condillac’s, 
presumes that there is a single right order in which the sentences should flow, a rational order 
whose light will shine through for the young tyro and Joseph Addison alike.  By contrast, the 
ultimate standard to which Babbage’s exercise tends is simply the style of the Rev. Simeon, 
whether it is good or bad, rational or not.  The “skeleton” he describes is based not on any 
universal standard of reason, but rather on the particular set of existing texts from which he 
abstracted it.  Whether the results are right or wrong in any moral, aesthetic, or logical sense is 
beside the point. 
While his youthful “manufacture” of sermons was essentially a joke, Babbage would go 
on to apply much the same generalizing method to more serious ends.  Although it was not a 
totally original idea, Babbage played a role in popularizing the sort of blank form that is now 
ubiquitous in bureaucracies.110  In The Economy of Machinery and Manufactures, he suggests 





19).  By employing these forms—
which Babbage calls “skeletons” 
here as well—it is possible to  
reduce the time spent writing 
and thus observe without 
interruption (93).  In effect, these 
forms relieve the user of the 
need to think about how ideas fit 
together, making the writing of notes into as automatic a process as possible.  Babbage applied 
much the same generalizing method to computation as well.  In his book on the Great 
Exhibition, he describes an astronomer reducing a series of calculations to “a skeleton form” so 
that the tedious parts of the task “may be executed by persons of very moderate attainments” 
(Exposition 191).  The work of the people who perform the additions, as Babbage represents it, 
is of a mechanical nature, like filling in the blanks on a form based on a set rubric; the need for 
genuine intelligence and genuine creativity is restricted to the people who design the 
algorithms they perform.111  
The potential for such a procedure to go the way of Babbage’s sermon-writing 
experiment—for the mechanical procedures to produce nonsensical results and “queer 
deductions”—is latent in the generalizing method.  In order to maintain its rationality, this 
method requires a hierarchy: the intelligent planner must be firmly in control of both the 
algorithms and the agents performing them in order to ensure the right results.  Babbage states 
at a number of points that computing machines will grant users “control” over the operations 
Figure 19. Part of Babbage’s example “skeleton” for notes taken during factory 





they automate (Passages 113; 123; 148); to maintain this control, he made a special effort to 
ensure the “security” of the machinery—to make it physically impossible for the gears to move 
in any way but the intended one.112  But apart from cases of actual malfunction, Babbage 
encountered a subtler way in which people could lose control over machines.  One can 
understand a computation well enough to implement it mechanically—can even succeed in 
building the machine—without having an adequate theoretical framework to understand its 
behavior.  Technê (τέχνη), knowledge of how to do something, is no substitute for epistêmê 
(ἐπιστήμη), conceptual knowledge about what one is doing.  This is an issue that Stanhope, 
who was only trying to mechanize the well-understood operations of addition, multiplication, 
subtraction, and division along with the syllogistic operations of his logical theory, did not have 
to grapple with.  The possibility of the machine getting ahead of the theory is one of the 
tradeoffs of generalization as a paradigm for invention: one can readily produce new, 
mechanizable algorithms by generalizing the procedures people use, but there is no guarantee 
that one will be able to make sense of the output.  This method, as Babbage discovered while 
manufacturing sermons, can produce the irrational just as well as it can produce the rational. 
This possibility arose in the earliest phase of Babbage’s work on computing machines.113  
Babbage’s first class of machines, the difference engines, were meant to do with brass and iron 
what Prony had done with rooms full of workers, churning out printed numerical tables without 
human intervention through a computational technique known as the method of difference.  
This method, variants of which have been known since the sixteenth century, provides a 






Figure 20. The completed portion of Babbage’s Difference Engine No. 1, assembled in 1832-33. For a 
clear explanation of what the different wheels represent, see Buxton (133-48). Note that, in this 
depiction, moveable shades have been shifted up so as to hide the lowermost number wheels of the 






person to notice that the method of differences could be performed by a machine; the German 
engineer Johann Helfrich Müller had already designed such a machine in 1784, although he 
never attempted to build it (Lindgren 13).  But Babbage attracted far more attention for his 
project than any previous designer of computing machines.  Babbage, along with the expert 
craftsman Joseph Clement and a group of workers typically numbering eight to ten, spent 
approximately eight years (with some pauses) working on what has come to be known as the 
Difference Engine No. 1.115  This machine was supposed to compute mathematical tables and 
automatically typeset its results, eliminating the potential for human error both in calculation 
and compositing.  Between 1823 and the project’s collapse in March, 1833, the British 
government provided him with funding for the project totaling around £17,000—an enormous 
amount of money in the early nineteenth century, far in excess of the funding allotted to any 
other scientific project in the period (Lindgren 60).  Only a part of the machine was finished 
(Figure 20).  The project was not a technical failure—the completed portion, which consisted of 
a small section of the unit that performed the additions, worked perfectly and still does.  But 
for reasons that historians have debated, Babbage and Clement never built the full engine.  
Work stopped in 1833, and the government finally decided to terminate the project in 1842.  
Later in the 1840s, Babbage designed an improved model that he called the Difference Engine 
No. 2, but it was not built until long after his death.116 
Although it is highly limited compared to Babbage’s later computing machines, the 
Analytical Engines, some contemporary commentators viewed the Difference Engine as 
altogether miraculous.  The most detailed contemporary account of the machine was an article 





issue of the Edinburgh Review (H. P. Babbage 51-82).  Near the beginning of the essay, Lardner 
apologizes for Babbage’s failure to make the machine comprehensible to the public: “To bring 
the practicability of such a project within the compass of popular belief was not easy: to do so 
by bringing it within the compass of popular comprehension was not possible.  It transcended 
the imagination of the public in general to conceive its possibility; and the sentiments of 
wonder with which it was received, were only prevented from merging into those of 
incredulity, by the faith reposed in the high attainments of its projector” (51-52).  Such 
expressions of awe at the results of mechanical actions were common in the nineteenth 
century, as Herbert Sussman has noted (“Machine Dreams” 197).  While Lardner’s stated 
purpose in the essay is “to convert the vague sense of wonder […] into a more rational and 
edifying sentiment” (52), his essay did little to dispel the aura of magic surrounding Babbage’s 
attempt “to throw the powers of thought into wheel-work” (51).  Lardner intimates that 
Babbage’s machine had already surpassed its creator’s understanding, at least in certain 
directions: “Equations have been already tabulated by the portion of the machinery which has 
been put together, which are so far beyond the reach of the present power of mathematics, 
that no distant term of the table can be predicted, nor any function discovered capable of 
expressing its general law” (74).  Lardner was not the first to make such claims.  A letter in the 
United Service Magazine for December, 1833, signed “Z. Z.,” states that Babbage’s machine 
“performs calculations, the mathematical laws of which are beyond the present reach of 
analysis” (544).  The Difference Engine was based on well-known and not enormously complex 





miracle, as a machine that could, to an extent that was unprecedented at the time, exceed the 
powers of human thought. 
Some scholars have written off the Lardner article as a piece of puffery.  Hyman 
dismisses Lardner as “a scientific Falstaff” (148), and Michael Lindgren characterizes Lardner’s 
statement that the machine could go “beyond the reach of the present power of mathematics” 
as a “mystification,” a fuzzy claim that obscures the technical details of the machine with a 
“metaphysical fog” (110).  It is true that Lardner’s statement is imprecise, and his article is 
misleading on a number of other points as well.  Yet there was a sense in which Babbage’s work 
on computing machines truly was pushing the limits of the analytical techniques of the time.  
Lardner and the pseudonymous letter-writer appear to be referring to a mathematical puzzle 
that Babbage discussed in an 1822 journal article and, later that year, in a lecture before the 
Astronomical Society (H. P. Babbage 216; 220).  At this time, Babbage was experimenting with a 
prototype difference engine that preceded the planning of the Difference Engine No. 1.  In the 
article, Babbage considers a numerical series inspired by his work on computing engines.  The 
series is similar to an arithmetic progression like 2, 4, 6, 8, in which each number differs from 
the last by a fixed difference; but for each term in this series, the last digit of the preceding 
term is added to the difference.  The first few numbers in the resulting series are 2, 2, 4, 10, 16, 
28, 48.  This series, as Babbage points out, could easily be produced by a difference-engine-like 
machine (216); yet the familiar methods of algebra are insufficient to predict its behavior.  
Babbage has to apply two separate mathematical techniques, one “a kind of induction,” the 
other “quite unexceptionable,” to produce a general method for computing the nth term in the 





particular sort of disconnect between algorithm and theory that would come to haunt the field 
of computer science in the twenty-first century: knowing how to implement an algorithm is 
quite a different thing from knowing what it will do. 
Babbage came closest to acknowledging this epistemic gap in his 1837 book The Ninth 
Bridgewater Treatise.  This short book is a response to a series of treatises on natural theology 
commissioned by the Earl of Bridgewater, who died in 1829.  In his will, the Earl left £8,000 to 
support the publication of books “On the Power, Wisdom, and goodness of God, as manifested 
in the Creation” (quoted in Whewell, Astronomy and General Physics ix).  The Royal Society 
distributed the money to eight writers, each of whom produced a volume in the series.  
Babbage took issue with a statement in William Whewell’s entry denying that the speculations 
of “mechanical philosophers and mathematicians of recent times” can shed any light on “the 
first cause and supreme ruler of the universe” (Whewell, Astronomy and General Physics 334).  
Babbage’s primary purpose is to show that a mathematician (namely, himself) can be qualified 
to write on divine matters, to which end he offers a series of arguments in favor of the 
compatibility of science and religion based, for the most part, on examples taken from his work 
on computing machines.117  While his primary thesis is that a belief in the miracles recounted in 
the Bible is compatible with the idea of a universe governed by inviolable laws, contemporary 
readers took away conclusions that were more about the machines than about the universe, 
and that only reinforced the impression that the Difference Engine was working a sort of magic. 
His first argument uses the Difference Engine No. 1 as an example.  Suppose, he writes, 
that one is presented with a machine that is ticking off the natural numbers, 1, 2, 3, 4.  He 





ask how long you will have counted before you are firmly convinced that the engine, supposing 
its adjustments to remain unaltered, will continue whilst its motion is maintained, to produce 
the same series of natural numbers?” (35).  “After seeing five hundred terms,” he surmises, 
“few will doubt; and after the fifty-thousandth term the propensity to believe that the 
succeeding term will be fifty thousand and one, will be almost irresistible” (35).  But after a 
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 100,100,005 (Ninth Bridgewater Treatise 36) 
 
In such a way, Babbage argues, the laws governing the universe might change—as, in the view 
of some pre-Darwinian evolutionary theorists, most notably Georges Cuvier, they had between 
the time of dinosaurs and the present—without the need for divine intervention.  The laws we 
observe governing the universe, he argues, might only be fragments of a “wider law” that 
encompasses the varying mechanics of all the periods of natural history (42).  But while it is 





important philosophical implications about the Difference Engine itself.  If one lacks an 
analytical understanding of the laws governing a machine, one might attempt to reason about 
its behavior through induction; but induction, at least in the form that Babbage discusses, is not 
an adequate way of predicting the behavior of a general-purpose computing machine.  Quite a 
simple algorithm, as Babbage shows, can stymie it. 
This argument was not merely a thought experiment.  The completed portion of the 
Difference Engine No. 1 included a special feature for demonstrating that a machine can change 
its behavior in mid-run without human intervention, and Babbage delighted in baffling his 
dinner-party guests with it (Passages 66; 387-89).  The impressive effect of the sudden change 
in the machine’s behavior rests on a knowledge gap between the two characters in the 
scenario—the “contriver” of the machine, who knows what is happening inside it, and the 
“observer,” who merely looks at the number wheels (Bridgewater 40; 39).  The Difference 
Engine was specially designed so as to withhold information from the latter; the wheel that 
causes the behavior change was hidden behind “a shade which is never removed, and to which 
the reader’s attention need not be directed” (Passages 63; see Buxton 137).  One can see this 
shade in the engraving reproduced as Figure 2.  As he performed it for his guests, the exercise 
ended with a reveal: he removed the shade and explained what was going on inside the 
machine, collapsing (at least ideally) the difference between contriver and observer and 
dispelling the mystic haze.  But the exposition of the argument in The Ninth Bridgewater 
Treatise contains a hint that, at least in some cases, sliding the shade away might not be 
enough.  Using language reminiscent of Lardner’s, Babbage notes that “[t]he full expression of 





sequence of minor consequences, may indeed be beyond the utmost reach of mathematical 
analysis,” even though such a protean computation may be produced by a mechanism that “is 
itself of the simplest kind” (42; 43).118  Similarly to the Lardner essay, this passage admits the 
potential for a gap to open between between technê and epistêmê, between process and 
theory: designing an algorithm and even implementing it in wheelwork might be far easier than 
understanding its behavior.  Whereas Babbage’s parlor exercise is reassuring, attributing all the 
mystery surrounding the Difference Engine to the shade hiding part of it from view, the passage 
in The Ninth Bridgewater Treatise hints that even the contriver, armed with complete 
knowledge of the wheels and cogs inside, may be unable to predict what a machine will do. 
Babbage gives an even more powerful argument for the potential unpredictability of 
computing machines later in the book, in the unfinished chapter on free will.  In this passage, 
Babbage invites us to imagine a computing machine that begins by producing a series of square 
numbers—1, 4, 9, 16—but switches to producing cubes once it reaches a square number 
ending with the figures 269696.  This event will occur, he points out, “at the 99736th 
calculation; and whether the fact is known to the person who adjusts the machine or not, is 
immaterial to the result” (168).  In this example, Babbage encounters the potential of recursive 
algorithms to produce complex, unpredictable behaviors, a potential that would become a 
major topic of discussion in the twentieth century with the work of Douglas Hofstadter, among 
others.  Since what the machine will do next is determined by the digits of its previous output 
(the machine, as Babbage would say, is eating its own tail), it is not easy to guess ahead of time 
when the program will change its behavior, or even if it ever will.  (Here as in the 1822 article, 





with a handy way to widen the gap between algorithm and theory—a strong illustration of the 
dependence of algorithmic thinking on the Hindu–Arabic numeral system.)  Babbage’s point in 
this chapter is that the universe might be programmed to pause and accept user input at 
certain pre-determined points, thus enabling people to affect its behavior—a reassuring, if not 
particularly compelling, argument for the compatibility of divine design and free will (see 
Forbes-MacPhail 149-50).  Yet one can easily put the pieces together into a different picture 
from which Babbage would likely recoil.  His example of a machine that changes its behavior 
once it produces a number ending in 269696 would seem to suggest that machines can have at 
least a relative kind of free will—since the one who configures the machine does not 
necessarily know ahead of time what the output will be, the machine has the capacity to 
surprise even though it operates based on entirely deterministic rules.  Here Babbage teeters 
on the edge—although he does not take the leap—of admitting the Frankenstein-like possibility 
of a creation outpacing its human creator. 
Babbage later came to regret publishing this passage.  During the 1862 London 
Exhibition, Buxton writes, Babbage discovered that The Ninth Bridgewater Treatise had given 
some readers the impression that the Difference Engine “had been the means of discovering 
certain mysterious laws of numbers, which discovery, without its aid, could never have been 
accomplished” (361).  This was not strictly true, and Babbage took pains to disabuse people of 
the illusion that the Difference Engine “was endowed with mysterious powers” (362).  The 
official position of both Babbage and Lovelace was that, because computing machines could 
only operate by rules that were defined by human beings, they could not create.  “The 





Babbage 44); it can only follow rules that a human being sets up for it, and as such, she argued, 
it cannot be said to think.  Babbage, likewise, states that “the Analytical Engine cannot invent or 
originate anything; though it is capable of following out to an unlimited extent, any laws which 
may be impressed upon it” (Buxton 250).  In spite of these protestations, the repeated 
statements about the “mysterious” properties of computing machines contained a grain of 
truth.  In experimenting with algorithms not based on any known theory, Babbage had 
discovered a possibility that called his rigid distinction between mechanical and creative 
activities into question.  Even if a computing machine only follows pre-determined rules, there 
is no guarantee that the designer will know what the outcome will be.  Whether the machine or 
the designer should get credit for the originality, such methods certainly could produce results 
that were, for all intents and purposes, new.  
Babbage’s attachment to the Enlightenment project held him back from accepting the 
most radical implications of his embrace of algorithms.  Even if it did turn out that brass and 
iron could possess creative power, Babbage’s program of applied science, with its insistence 
that theoretical knowledge remain at the helm of industrial practice, had no place for a 
computing machine with agency.  In The Ninth Bridgewater Treatise, he suggests that the 
unexpected side-effects of generalization, those algorithmic results that defy analysis, can have 
no place in the canon of scientific knowledge until they are tamed by theory: 
When the construction of the [difference] engine was first attempted, I did not 
seek to give it the power of making calculations so far beyond the reach of 
mathematical analysis as these appear to be: nor can I now foresee a probable 





determined to invest the invention with a degree of generality which should 
include a wide range of mathematical power; and I was well aware that the 
mechanical generalizations I had organized contained within them much more 
than I had leisure to study, and some things which will probably remain 
unproductive to a far distant day.  (97-98) 
Those results some people saw as “mysterious,” interesting as they might be, are mere 
curiosities unless they can be brought to bear on practical concerns.  The fruits of generalization 
are only “practically available to human purposes,” in Babbage’s view, to the extent that people 
have learned to control them.  “Numbers,” he later wrote, “are the masters of the weak, but 
the slaves of the strong” (Passages 410).  Babbage thus suppressed the possibility that the 
algorithms we create might prove stronger than the best of us, that they will be able to do 
things that no human being will be able fully to understand. 
But the trap was sprung.  The religious arguments of The Ninth Bridgewater Treatise 
seemed to provide a license for people to view the Difference Engine as a genuine miracle.  At 
one point, he asks us to imagine a computing machine programmed to produce the square 
numbers in order, except that, in a single isolated instance, it produces a cubic number instead 
of a square (94-95).  Likewise, he argues, induction from experience might lead us to the rule 
that no man dies, but the higher law governing the universe could still be, no man dies but 
Christ.  While his main point in this passage is theological, the analogy works both ways: the 
single cubic number in a series of squares, it suggests, is quite literally a miracle, and anyone 
who knows that it will happen is endowed with the power of prophecy.  This claim has very 





mere observer is entirely dependent on the fact that certain parts of the machine are hidden, 
or whether algorithms can actually behave in ways that cannot easily be predicted.  In the 
former case, the appearance of miraculousness is merely a result of the observer’s ignorance—
a conclusion that would not be out of place in the writings of d’Alembert or even Voltaire.  But 
if the gap between algorithm and theory is irreducible, then the miraculous (in Babbage’s 
definition) appearance of machinery cannot be written off as a mere illusion.  The machine, in 
that case, might work in ways that even its designer cannot foretell.  Babbage spent the later 
years of his life trying to convince people that this was not the case, that his machines did 
nothing one could not understand.  Poe, on the other hand, found in the possibility of matter 
getting out of hand a fatal challenge to the dreams of the Enlightenment. 
 
A Mathematician and a Poet 
 
In 1844, Poe published an article in the New York Sun bearing a sensational headline: 
“ASTOUNDING NEWS! BY EXPRESS VIA NORFOLK! THE ATLANTIC CROSSED IN THREE DAYS! 
SIGNAL TRIUMPH OF MR. MONCK MASON’S FLYING MACHINE!!!” (Extra, April 13, 1844, 1).  
“The air,” Poe informs us, “as well as the earth and the ocean, has been subdued by Science” 
(1); a hot air balloon has been contrived that could cross the ocean with unmatched speed.  The 
article was, as one might guess, a hoax, intended to prey on the credulity of both the public and 






Of course there was great discrepancy of opinion as regards the authenticity of 
the story; but I observed that the more intelligent believed, while the rabble, for 
the most part, rejected the whole with disdain.  Twenty years ago credulity was 
the characteristic trait of the mob, incredulity the distinctive feature of the 
philosophic; now the case is exactly conversed.  The wise are disinclined 
to disbelief—and justly so.  The only grounds, in this instance, for doubt, with 
those who knew anything of Natural Philosophy, were the publication of the 
marvel in the suspected “Sun” (the organ of the Moon-Hoax) and the great 
difficulty of running an Express from Charleston, in advance of the mail.  (Doings 
of Gotham 33-34) 
Even though the story was a hoax, Poe suggests, the “wise” should have been open to the 
possibility of its truth.  The only marks against it, according to Poe, are extrinsic to science—the 
fact that it was published in the disreputable Sun and the implausibility of the claim that the 
news had arrived from Charleston, SC ahead of the mail.  To dismiss fantastic reports of 
discoveries and inventions just because they are fantastic, Poe suggests, is a characteristic of 
“the mob,” not of the highly educated reader.119 
Poe’s remarks about the Balloon Hoax registers a broader shift away from the learned 
skepticism that was widespread during the Enlightenment.  In 1760, the Scottish astronomer 
James Ferguson observed that the illiterate tended to take “almost everything […] upon the 
authority of others,” whereas learned people disbelieved things that struck them as 
unreasonable (quoted by Maddaluno 58).  On the continent, Kant characterized trust in 





true enlightenment (Political Writings 54); Turgot claimed that “the less one knows the less one 
doubts” (328), and Diderot, sympathizing more with the mechanic than Turgot did, castigated 
Montaigne and Descartes for being too skeptical about inventions (“Art” 1.717).  But in the 
nineteenth century, such skepticism was buckling under an inundation of scientific discoveries 
that seemed beyond belief.  As Babbage points out in his book Reflections on the Decline of 
Science in England (1830), the mere “strangeness” of a scientific artifact is insufficient grounds 
to doubt its genuineness; natural phenomena are varied, and one cannot rule out the existence 
of things just because they are unfamiliar (176).120  A well-known example was the platypus, 
which was first encountered by Europeans in the 1780s.  The first natural historian to examine a 
specimen, George Shaw, initially believed that it was a hoax, a chimera assembled from pieces 
of a duck and a mammal (Moyal 7).  Yet he was wrong—odd as it looked, the specimen was 
real.  Similar issues arose with machines, since inventors were widely perceived to be 
accomplishing unprecedented things with regularity.  How could one tell real from fake when 
experience was no longer a reliable guide?  For Babbage, the solution was to reveal the inner 
workings of a machine—to put it in a glass case—so as to ensure that people can discern the 
principles on which it works.  But in his later work, Poe offered an alternative response to 
deception that called into question the adequacy of empirical methods, instead suggesting the 
need to combine mathematical knowledge with a “poetic” mode of thought.121  In doing so, he 
challenged not only the universalism of the Enlightenment, but also the division between 
technical and humanistic fields that would eventually take its place. 
Poe’s sole mention of Babbage’s name occurs in one of his earlier essays about hoaxes.  





Literary Messenger, is Poe’s attempt to debunk Wolfgang von Kempelen’s famous chess-playing 
“Turk,” which was being exhibited in the United States by a showman named Johann Nepomuk 
Maelzel (Figure 21).  Poe begins the essay by listing some of the “many and wonderful 
automata” that have already been constructed (318); he ends with Babbage’s Difference 
Engine, which is presumably meant to be the most astounding of all.  This list, which Poe takes 
mostly from David Brewster’s book Letters on Natural Magic (Wimsatt 146n), preempts the 
response that Poe is dismissing the Turk for its novelty alone: many astounding machines, Poe 
Figure 21. “The Turk”—Wolfgang von Kempelen’s supposed chess-playing automaton. As some observers, including 
Poe, surmised, the machine was a fraud—there was a human chess master hidden in a chamber below the board. See 
Shaffer, “Enlightened Automata.” Engraving from Joseph Friedrich Racknitz’s Ueber den schachspieler des herrn von 





concedes, have already been invented.  But he contends that a chess-playing automaton would 
be more astounding than any of the examples he lists; if the chess-player truly is “a pure 
machine,” he claims, then even Babbage’s computing machine “is altogether beneath it” 
(319).122  While Poe’s much-discussed argument that a machine could not play chess is logically 
flawed, his essay nonetheless makes sense as an attempt to negotiate the problem posed by 
the proliferation of inventions that do what once seemed impossible.  Babbage’s Difference 
Engine stands, for the purposes of Poe’s argument, as the pinnacle of what has been 
accomplished; if he can show that a chess-player would be far above it, as he attempts to do, 
then he can rescue the case for skepticism.123  No machine remotely this wondrous has ever 
been built, he argues, ergo we ought to doubt it. 
This argument is founded on a view of the mechanical not fundamentally different from 
that of Babbage.  Poe presumes, like Babbage, that a machine must be governed by a well-
founded scientific theory: “The Automaton does not invariably win the game.  Were the 
machine a pure machine this would not be the case—it would always win.  The principle being 
discovered by which a machine can be made to play a game of chess, an extension of the same 
principle would enable it to win a game—a farther extension would enable it to win all games—
that is, to beat any possible game of an antagonist” (323).  C. E. Shannon would later hold up 
this argument as evidence of Poe’s poor understanding of machines (“Programming a 
Computer for Playing Chess” 2), and it is certainly problematic from a modern perspective—
chess-playing machines can and have lost to humans.  But it would be wrong to chalk it up to 
Poe’s ignorance of the mechanical arts of his time.  Babbage, who understood machinery as 





memoir, and he leaps immediately to the question of how one could make a machine that 
would always win (Passages 466; see Buxton 346).  The thinking is that, in order to mechanize a 
task, one must first reduce that task to a “principle,” and to do this, one must come up with a 
general method to solve the problem.  In the case of chess, this meant a general method to 
win.  Neither the Poe of “Maelzel’s Chess Player” nor Babbage were pragmatist enough to 
accept a machine that was just good enough—both held machine intelligence to a universal 
standard of rationality. 
But this view can only be upheld so long as machines are based on fully developed 
theories that entirely determine the correct way they should behave.  By 1836, Babbage had 
already discovered cases in which a machine could perform operations not based on any known 
principles, and, a year after the publication of Poe’s essay, he would present them to a wide 
audience in The Ninth Bridgewater Treatise.  As Babbage showed with the example of a 
machine that changes its behavior after producing a square number ending in 269696, simply 
knowing how a computing machine is programmed is not necessarily enough to predict its long-
term behavior.  Whereas Babbage shrugged off the difficulties such cases created for 
Enlightenment models of rationality, leaving the conflict between his mechanical methods and 
his Enlightenment aims unresolved, Poe employed the difficulties raised by The Ninth 
Bridgewater Treatise to undermine the faith of industrialists like Babbage in the inevitable 
triumph of mind over matter.  In his later work, Poe presented an alternative paradigm of 
rationality through his much misunderstood claim that someone who is both a mathematician 
and a poet would reason better than a “mere mathematician,” a claim that represents, 





This statement appears in Poe’s third and final detective story, “The Purloined Letter” 
(1844).  While this story contains a number of ambiguities that make it difficult to summarize 
adequately, the surface plot is quite simple.  The Prefect of the Parisian Police approaches Poe’s 
detective figure, C. Auguste Dupin, with a case that is, he says, “very simple indeed” and 
“excessively odd” (Mabbott III.975).  The Prefect reports that the Minister D––––, a known 
miscreant, has stolen a letter from the Queen and is using it to blackmail her.  The police know 
that the letter is in the Minister’s house, but they have searched the building inch by inch, even 
checking for hidden cavities in the furniture, and been unable to find it.  The Prefect asks 
assistance from Dupin, who finds the letter forthwith.  Dupin explains that, while the police 
were right that the letter was hidden in the Minister’s house, it was not “deposited within the 
range of their search” (III.983); instead of hiding it in a secret nook, the Minister altered its 
appearance, making it look like an unimportant letter, and left it in plain sight on his desk.  The 
bulk of the text consists of Dupin’s enigmatic explanations of the method by which he solved 
the puzzle.124  Poe depicts the Prefect as a caricature of an empiricist who is dependent on 
scientific instruments and contemptuous of poets (III.979).  The Prefect is unable to make sense 
of his enemy, Dupin tells the unnamed narrator, because he is too beholden to a single method.  
If the Minister were a “mere mathematician,” he “would have been at the mercy of the 
Prefect,” whose methods were capable of defeating any mode of concealment based on 
mathematical thinking; but since the Minister was both a mathematician and a poet, he was 
able to outsmart him (III.986).  Dupin launches after this remark into an extended diatribe 





called pure algebra, are abstract or general truths”—that is, that they apply algebraic thinking 
haphazardly to areas where it does not belong, such as morality and chemistry (III.987). 
While it is tempting to read this passage in terms of the “two cultures” divide that later 
came (at least in C. P. Snow’s view) to separate science and literature (see Snow, The Two 
Cultures), nineteenth-century attitudes toward mathematics and poetry did not fall out so 
clearly along these lines.  It has long been known that some of Dupin’s statements about 
mathematicians are lifted from Horace Binney Wallace’s 1838 novel Stanley: or, the 
Recollections of a Man of the World (Irwin 358); scholars have also suggested more indirect 
sources for Poe’s attitudes toward mathematics.  John T. Irwin argues that Poe’s conception of 
algebra was influenced by the Cambridge Analytical Society, whose ideas played a role in the 
curriculum of the University of Virginia at the time when Poe was attending (366-67).  Looking 
at the history of the period more broadly, Lynne L. Doty links Dupin’s speech to a supposed 
hostility toward mathematics among the British Romantic poets, who sometimes used it as a 
metonymy for mechanistic rationalism (120).  But the alignment of mathematics with scientific 
rationality was not universal at the time.  One of the early nineteenth century’s most noted 
critics of mathematics was the celebrated English physicist Michael Faraday, a prominent 
investigator of electricity who did his most important work from the 1810s to the 30s.  Faraday 
preferred observation and experiment to the use of algebraic “hieroglyphics,” as he called them 
in an 1851 letter to James Clerk Maxwell (quoted by Cantor 217).  As Cohen points out, Faraday 
was a member of the Sandemanian Church, a Protestant sect opposed to artificial signs and 
languages (129); he thus viewed the divide between algebra and ordinary speech with 





a mechanical activity that blinded people to the true complexities of natural phenomena, which 
could only be truly appreciated through hands-on practice. 
Such views were not exclusive to the Sandemanians.  A more secular critique of 
mathematics than Faraday’s—and one more likely to have attracted Poe’s attention—appeared 
in a notorious 1836 Edinburgh Review essay by the Scottish logician William Hamilton.125  
Hamilton’s primary target in this piece is William Whewell, who had argued in an 1835 
pamphlet that mathematics is a better way to inculcate good reasoning skills than logic.  The art 
of reasoning, Whewell had written, is “taught better by practice than by precept, in the same 
manner as fencing or riding, or any other practical art, would be”; mathematical instruction can 
provide this practice, whereas studying syllogistic rules is like “learning horsemanship by book” 
(Whewell, “Thoughts on the Study of Mathematics” 140).  Taking umbrage at Whewell’s 
criticism of logic, Hamilton contends that mathematical sciences only involve a narrow set of 
mental faculties, and that “the tendency of a too exclusive study of these sciences is, 
absolutely, to disqualify the mind for observation and common reasoning” (“Study of 
Mathematics” 412).  Turning Whewell’s equestrian metaphor around, Hamilton questions 
whether “we shall come best trained to the hunting-field of probability by assiduous 
locomotion on the railroad of demonstration” (414).  Hamilton’s concern is that a student who 
has spent too much time lost in mathematical abstraction, becoming too dependent on the 
artificial aids of symbolic notation, will be incapable of thinking on his or her feet; he thus 
concludes that mathematical studies “exercise only to distort the mind” (450).126 
While Hamilton’s inflammatory tone in this essay did not win him many friends among 





mathematics in the mid-nineteenth century.  Hamilton and Whewell share common ground in 
assuming that mathematics is a specific domain of knowledge defined by dealing with formal 
relations.  Far from holding up mathematics as “the reason par excellence,” as the narrator of 
“The Purloined Letter” puts it, Whewell treats it as one mode of inquiry among many; the 
question he addresses is not whether mathematics is the sine qua non of all reason, but 
whether the skills learned from practicing it can be transferred to other areas.  By the second 
quarter of the nineteenth century, the Enlightenment identification of mathematics with 
reason itself, as exemplified by the later work of Condillac and the social mathematics of 
Condorcet, was decidedly out of fashion; the idea that one could reason about morals in the 
same way one reasoned in geometric proofs—a common claim in eighteenth-century logic 
textbooks—was no longer on the table.  Logic still had some claim to universality, but 
mathematics was falling into its place as one discipline alongside others. 
In “The Purloined Letter,” Poe quite explicitly locates the fading Enlightenment view 
that mathematics is “the reason par excellence” in a Revolutionary French context.  Near the 
start of his diatribe, Dupin laments that mathematicians “have insinuated the term ‘analysis’ 
into application to algebra” (III.987).  “The French,” he tells the narrator, “are the originators of 
this particular deception; but if a term is of any importance—if words derive any value from 
applicability—then ‘analysis’ conveys ‘algebra’ about as much as, in Latin, ‘ambitus’ implies 
‘ambition,’ ‘religio’ ‘religion,’ or ‘homines honesti,’ a set of honorable men” (III.987).  Although 
the narrator states that the story takes place in “18––” (III.974), this attack singles out an 
Enlightenment school of thought that was a trademark position of the first generation of 





algebraic and that all language is subject to reworking at will.  The narrator reinforces the 
French positioning of this view by noting Dupin’s quarrel with “some of the algebraists of Paris” 
(III.987); Dupin further directs attention to Revolutionary trauma by quoting Chamfort, who 
died during the Terror (III.986).  Poe’s source, Stanley, clearly expresses an upper-class anxiety 
about political upheaval, as Irwin notes (359), but the specific references to the French 
mathematical tradition were all added by Poe.  Whereas the narrator of Wallace’s novel 
attributes to mathematics a conservative “tendency to check and chill the airy dreams of 
modern philosophy” (209), Dupin associates algebra with the “wild doctrines” of the 
Enlightenment, as Poe called them elsewhere (Mabbott II.703)—with a naïve universalism and 
an excessive willingness to wrest words like analysis from their etymological meanings so as to 
suit the latest theories. 
The traces of this post-Revolutionary anxiety are not hard to discern in Dupin’s speech 
about mathematicians.  Dupin characterizes the algebraists as “Pagans” (III.988), and he 
suggests that they have a propensity for unwarranted violence: “Say to one of these gentlemen, 
by way of experiment, if you please, that you believe occasions may occur where 𝑥2  +
 𝑝𝑥 is not altogether equal to 𝑞, and, having made him understand what you mean, get out of 
his reach as speedily as convenient, for, beyond doubt, he will endeavor to knock you down” 
(III.988).  While one should not too hastily assume that Poe thought violence was bad—he was 
certainly no moralist—the attitude toward algebra that prevailed among the idéologues went 
directly against Poe’s anti-progressive view of the world.  “I have no faith,” Poe wrote in an 
1844 letter to James Russell Lowell, “in human perfectibility” (Letters I.449); the French 





was anathema to Poe’s sensibility.  A possible reference point for Dupin’s speech is Condorcet, 
whom Poe elsewhere associated with the notion of perfectibility he detested.127  Poe was 
almost certainly unaware that Condorcet had actually attempted to apply algebraic methods to 
morals, but the quantifying spirit Condorcet represented was widely known.  Dupin counters 
such optimism by attributing to the “algebraists of Paris” a dunderheaded inability to see what 
is right before their eyes and accusing them of violently silencing anyone who dares question 
their algebraical dogmas. 
Poe’s alternative to this Enlightenment optimism, at least if we take Dupin at his word, 
is to supplement the mathematical understanding of the world with a poetic sensibility.  “As 
poet and mathematician,” Dupin states, the Minister “would reason well” (III.986).  In the early 
nineteenth century, the idea of fusing the scientific with the poetic was less a disciplinary 
transgression than a commonplace.  Ada Lovelace’s call for a “poetical science” was heeded by 
geologists, chemists, and mathematicians alike (see Forbes-MacPhail).  George Boole not only 
wrote a large volume of poetry, but also reportedly said that a “real mathematician […] must be 
something more than a mere mathematician, he must be also something of a poet” (M. Boole, 
“Home-side” 106); the German mathematician Karl Weierstrass made a similar comment in 
1883 (Anon., Compte rendu 149).  Humphry Davy, Alexander von Humboldt, and Louis Agassiz 
all attempted to infuse a poetic sensibility into their writing about natural philosophy.  Although 
these remarks might resemble the contemporary commonplace that one must consider 
“human factors” while practicing technical fields, the Romantic notions of poetry on which they  
drew were more complex than this.  Poetry, Poe writes in “The Poetic Principle,” is “no mere 





III.7); its defining characteristic is an “airy” or “ethereal” indefiniteness that enables its reader 
to catch brief glimpses of celestial truths that elude the understanding.  Poe’s combination of 
mathematics and poetry does not, then, simply mean an appreciation for both technical and 
cultural factors, for both algorithm and meaning; instead, it means an abdication of the desire 
to make mathematics fit together with a common-sense view of the world at all. 
Poe comes closest to a fusion of the mathematical and the poetic in the most 
problematic of his theoretical texts: the 1846 essay “The Philosophy of Composition.”  This 
essay, at least if taken at face value, is an exposé of those aspects of creativity that are typically 
hidden from the reader of poetry.  Poets, according to Poe in this essay, “prefer having it 
understood that they compose by a species of fine frenzy—an ecstatic intuition,” and recoil at 
having the secrets of their work revealed (Griswold II.260).  Poe aims to change this by “letting 
the public take a peep behind the scenes” at his writerly practices, “in a word, at the wheels 
and pinions” of poetic composition (II.260).  To this end, he describes the whole process by 
which he supposedly wrote “The Raven” (1845).  In contrast to earlier Romantic depictions of 
creativity like Coleridge’s famous account of writing “Kubla Khan” in an opium haze, Poe 
describes the composition of “The Raven” as an entirely rational process in which he was aware 
of the purpose of each decision he made.  He assures the reader that “no one point in its 
composition is referible [sic] either to accident or intuition—that the work proceeded, step by 
step, to its completion with the precision and rigid consequence of a mathematical problem” 
(II.261).  The secret of poetic composition, Poe tells us, is fitting the pieces together in a novel 
way, a process that apparently resembles the work of the mathematician more than the 





Scholars have reached differing judgments both on how serious Poe is being in this 
essay and on what he is saying about the creativity of poets.  The majority opinion is that the 
essay is a satirical takedown of manufactured magazine verse, along the lines of his earlier 
satire of sensation tales, “How to Write a Blackwood Article” (1838); others, however, have 
taken the article as a genuine challenge to Romantic notions of authoriality.  Among the latter is 
Tresch, who takes Poe’s essay as an attempt “to astound the machine-hungry crowds and 
critics by presenting himself explicitly as a poetry-automaton” (“Potent Magic” 289).  But the 
claim that Poe wanted to present himself as a machine does not accord with all of the remarks 
he makes in the essay.  Just before his remark about wheels and pinions, Poe promises the 
reader a peek “at the elaborate and vacillating crudities of thought—at the true purposes 
seized only at the last moment—at the innumerable glimpses of idea that arrived not at the 
maturity of full view—at the fully matured fancies discarded in despair as unmanageable—at 
the cautious selections and rejections—at the painful erasures and interpolations” that go into 
the composition of a poem (II.260).  The process Poe describes here is not a mechanical one, 
with clearly defined rules for how one should proceed from one step to the next, but rather a 
painful process of trial and error.  If it has an analogue in mathematics, it is less computation 
(which had been recognized as mechanical for centuries) than the construction of a 
mathematical proof, a process that often involves dead-ends, frustration, and rethinking of 
one’s goals, and which is almost impossible to reduce to an algorithm.128  Far from presenting 
himself as a poetic version of one of Babbage’s calculating machines, Poe is positioning himself 





The parallel with Babbage’s notion of creativity is reinforced by the way Poe handles the 
relationship of form and content in his account of the writing process.  Just like Babbage’s 
“manufacture” of sermons, the process Poe describes in “The Philosophy of Composition” 
reduces the selection of ideas to the filling in of blanks.  Poe began, he tells us, by selecting the 
form of “The Raven”—the length of around a hundred lines, the use of a repeating refrain, the 
decision to limit the refrain to a single word.  Before even choosing a topic, he decides that the 
refrain will use “the long o as the most sonorous vowel, in connection with r as the most 
producible consonant” (II.264).  The narrative of the poem falls into place as an inevitable 
consequence of these formal choices.  In selecting a word for the refrain, “it would have been 
absolutely impossible to overlook the word ‘Nevermore.’  In fact, it was the very first which 
presented itself” (II.264).  Again, after he deems it best to have a “non-reasoning creature” 
deliver the refrain, “very naturally, a parrot, in the first instance, suggested itself, but was 
superseded forthwith by a Raven” (II.264).  Rather than imagining a situation and then putting 
it into verse, Poe layers on formal constraints that (he claims) largely determine the content for 
him.  The poem is like a machine because each part is calculated to serve a particular purpose 
within the whole, all in the service of producing a singular poetic effect.  Hanging over this 
machine is the poet, who makes up for his lack of “ecstatic intuition” by maintaining complete 
control over how these parts are configured.  The only aspect of the poem to which this control 
does not seem to extend is the selection of individual words and images, which are, in Poe’s 
account, rendered inevitable by their positions within the apparatus of the poem as a whole. 
Disingenuous as Poe’s peek behind the curtains may be, it rests on assumptions about 





on poetics.  At the end of the essay, Poe uses the elevation of form above content to ground a 
distinction between poetry and prose.  To avoid the “hardness or nakedness” of entirely 
naturalistic subject matter, Poe writes, 
Two things are invariably required—first, some amount of complexity, or more 
properly, adaptation; and secondly, some amount of suggestiveness—some 
under current, however indefinite of meaning.  It is this latter, in especial, which 
imparts to a work of art so much of that richness (to borrow from colloquy a 
forcible term) which we are too fond of confounding with the ideal.  It is the 
excess of the suggested meaning—it is the rendering this the upper instead of 
the under current of the theme—which turns into prose (and that of the very 
flattest kind) the so called poetry of the so called transcendentalists.  (II.270) 
Poe’s criticism of the American transcendentalists targets a form of poetry that sought to 
ground truths about the transcendental realm in the natures of the mundane things denoted by 
words.  In the 1844 essay “The Poet,” Ralph Waldo Emerson had positioned poetry as both the 
source of language and the medium by which the spiritual truths it contains can be revealed.  
“The poets,” as Emerson puts it, “made all the words, and therefore language is the archives of 
history, and, if we must say it, a sort of tomb of the muses” (Essential Writings 296).  For Poe, 
the transcendental realm cannot be accessed through such semantic means.  A poem, Poe tells 
us, must have an “under current” of meaning, but to be truly poetic, it must keep this current 
to a mere suggestion.  Add too much meaning, and the poem will lapse into prose.  Poe’s poetic 





more properly, adaptation” of its structure—the intricacy of interrelations that locks each word 
squarely into its place. 
 Some aspects of Poe’s poetic work, especially from 1845 on, bear these claims out.  
Some of the negative criticism of Poe’s poetry has found it to have just the defects that one 
would expect to emerge from the method he describes in “The Philosophy of Composition”—
verse that is excessively assertive in its meter, excessively complex in its patterns of rhyme, 
assonance, and other sound effects, and excessively vague in its meaning.  A particularly 
controversial example is the 1847 ballad “Ulalume.”  This poem employs some of the same 
formal devices as “The Raven,” but in an ostentatious way that has made it a favorite target for 
Poe’s detractors.  The first stanza sets up a pattern of repeated rhyme words that is continued, 
with variations, throughout the poem: 
The skies they were ashen and sober; 
The leaves they were crispéd and sere— 
The leaves they were withering and sere; 
It was night in the lonesome October 
Of my most immemorial year; 
It was hard by the dim lake of Auber, 
In the misty mid region of Weir— 
It was down by the dank tarn of Auber, 
In the ghoul-haunted woodland of Weir.  (Mabbott I.415-16) 
Replete with repetitions, references to nonexistent places, and “atmospheric” imagery, this 





While scholars have found potential sources for the names “Auber” and “Weir,” their lack of 
specific semantic associations seems more the point.  Without clear images to attach to the 
words, one’s attention is drawn powerfully to their sound, their appearance on the page, and 
the unusual rhyme/repetition scheme in which they are enmeshed—in effect, to the 
algorithmic plane rather than the semantic. 
Thematically, “Ulalume” deals with one of Poe’s recurring obsessions—an inescapable 
memory.  The plot of the poem may be summarized as follows.  “In the misty mid region of 
Weir,” the speaker is led down a wooded path by a star that he identifies as Astarte.  Psyche, 
his soul, warns him to leave, but he refuses to take her advice.  At the end of the path, he finds 
the tomb of his dead lover, Ulalume, the memory of whom he had attempted to repress.  The 
speaker reacts to the discovery in the penultimate stanza, which echoes lines from the first: 
Then my heart it grew ashen and sober  
As the leaves that were crispéd and sere—  
As the leaves that were withering and sere—  
And I cried—“It was surely October,  
On this very night of last year,  
That I journeyed—I journeyed down here!—  
That I brought a dread burden down here—  
On this night, of all nights in the year,  
Ah, what demon hath tempted me here?  
Well I know, now, this dim lake of Auber—  





Well I know, now, this dank tarn of Auber—  
This ghoul-haunted woodland of Weir.”  (I.418) 
Read out loud, the poem makes memory an active part of the aesthetic experience as well as a 
theme.  The second and third lines in this stanza recall the corresponding lines in the first 
stanza: “The leaves they were crispéd and sere— / The leaves they were withering and sere.”  
Through its formal devices, the poem places the audience in an analogous position to that of 
the speaker, that of being forced to remember but unable totally to recapture the events of the 
past.  The repetitions induce the listener to recall earlier parts of the poem, while at the same 
time, the variations—“The leaves they” to “As the leaves that”—highlight the disjunction 
between the mementos that exist in the present and the actuality of the past. 
During the Anglo-American Poe revival in the early twentieth century, “Ulalume” was a 
thorn in the side of Poe’s reputation.  In their 1938 book Understanding Poetry, Cleanth Brooks 
and Robert Penn Warren dismissed it as overloaded with “stale devices of mystification” that 
have “little or no real reference to the meaning of the poem” (360).  In a 1930 essay, Aldous 
Huxley singled “Ulalume” out as evidence that, contrary to the judgment of Baudelaire and 
other French admirers, “Poe is not one of our major poets” (158).  The poem, Huxley argues, is 
excessively ornamented, like wearing “[d]iamond rings on every finger” (158), and its insistent 
rhythm provides Poe with “a kind of short cut to musicality”: “He does not have to create a 
music appropriately modulated to his meaning; all he has to do is to shovel the meaning into 
the moving stream of the metre and allow the current to carry it along on waves, that, like 
those of the best hairdressers, are guaranteed permanent” (158).  The poem flagrantly violates 





apparently, female appearance); even less forgivably, one might suspect that, like Babbage in 
his youthful manufacture of sermons, Poe came up with the form first and fashioned the ideas 
to match.  A part of the reason why the poem so offended the Modernist sensibilities of Huxley, 
Brooks, and Warren was its ostentation, but they also emphasized the complaint that it was all 
surface, no depth.  The word meaning comes up again and again in the debate over “Ulalume.”  
In 1963, one of the poem’s defenders, Eric W. Carlson, attempted to rebut Brooks and Warren 
by showing that, “under the surface” of Poe’s vague imagery, “there is a psychological 
meaning” (37).  In an attempt to rescue the poem from critical oblivion, Carlson reads symbolic 
significance into its sounds—Weir resembles weird, Ulalume conveys doom and gloom, Auber 
picks up the association with sober.  Although he disagrees with Brooks and Warren, Carlson 
employs much the same criterion of poetic merit that they do in their note on “Ulalume.”  
Either one can find some way of transmuting Poe’s complex sound patterns into meaning, or 
else the poem must be expelled from the temple of taste. 
This fixation on a single question about Poe’s poem—whether or not it has enough 
meaning to justify its complexity—stems from a mismatch between Poe’s poetics and the 
disciplinary structure in which the New Critics worked.  Literary critics dealt with meaning; 
studying the non-semantic aspects of texts was the business of the white-collar intellectuals 
working at Bell Labs and Bletchley Park, where Britain’s code-breaking operation was based 
during World War II.  Friedrich Kittler has discussed the obsessive attempts to expunge meaning 
from communications engineering around 1900 (Discourse Networks 206-12), a turn that 
crescendoed right around the height of the New-Critical debate over Poe’s poetic merits.  In his 





excludes meaning from his disciplinary purview as an engineer: “Frequently the messages have 
meaning; that is they refer to or are correlated according to some system with certain physical 
or conceptual entities.  These semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the 
engineering problem” (379).  Conversely, thinking about a text without considering its meaning 
was anathema to the New Critics, who defined themselves as humanists in contradistinction to 
engineers.  Poe’s poetry does not dutifully line up on the critics’ side of this disciplinary division; 
from the perspective of New-Critical hermeneutics, “Ulalume” looks more like one of Shannon’s 
switching circuits than like a well-wrought urn.  But Poe’s views on language do not fit well on 
the engineering side either.  While nineteenth-century mathematicians like Boole were laying 
the groundwork for Shannon’s information theory by rigorously separating form from meaning, 
Poe’s poetics suggested an even more radical break with Enlightenment thought—a belief that 
words could have an effect on the world without the need for meaning at all. 
Poe makes this suggestion most explicitly in the 1845 text “The Power of Words.”  This 
work is one of Poe’s “angelic colloquies,” dialogues between incorporeal beings in the afterlife.  
In this dialogue, the wise angel Agathos attempts to convince “a spirit new-fledged with 
immortality,” Oinos, that the words people speak in life possess a creative power that extends 
to the farthest reaches of the celestial realm (Mabbott III.1211).  In contrast to the Lockean 
view that words are arbitrary signs of ideas, Agathos locates the power of words entirely in the 
physicality of sound—in the waves that reverberate in the atmosphere of Earth and the “ether” 
of outer space.  This text is, as Terence Whalen has pointed out, almost certainly based on two 
passages from Babbage’s Ninth Bridgewater Treatise (Whalen 19).129  In a chapter entitled “On 





presents the idea that sound waves echo through the air eternally, preserving a record of every 
word ever spoken (108).  As Babbage puts it, “[t]he air itself is one vast library, on whose pages 
are for ever written all that man has ever said or woman whispered” (112).  There is no direct 
evidence that Poe took the idea from Babbage; it is possible that both writers took it 
independently from Pierre Simon Laplace.130  However, the extent of the similarities between 
the texts of Babbage and Poe suggest otherwise. 
For Babbage, the point was that the existence of a physical record of all that is said and 
done provides a scientific basis for the Christian doctrine of punishment.  In a later chapter, 
Babbage imagines a future state in which people’s senses are more acute then they were in life, 
enabling them to perceive the faint vibrations emanating from past events (164).  Babbage 
depicts this awareness of the past as a form of torment, since it forces people to perceive all of 
the bad consequences of their actions in life.  He contrasts this Hell of remembrance with a 
Heaven in which the soul can essentially undertake scientific research for eternity: 
[I]f, in a future state, we could turn from the contemplation of our own 
imperfections, and with increased powers apply our minds to the discovery of 
nature’s laws, and to the invention of new method by which our faculties might 
be aided in that research, pleasure the most unalloyed would await us at every 
stage of our progress.  Undogged by the dull corporeal load of matter which 
tyrannizes even our most intellectual moments, and chains the ardent spirit to 
its unkindred clay, we should advance in the pursuit, stimulated instead of 
wearied by our past exertions, and encountering each new difficulty in the 





and the irresistable energy resulting from the confidence of ultimate success.  
(165) 
What is odd in this passage is that Babbage seems to envision scientific progress continuing to 
roll on even in the afterlife, as if the only sort of self he could imagine outliving the body is the 
subject of scientific knowledge.  Heaven is not a state of perfect knowledge for Babbage, but 
rather a state in which people are able to perceive the minute vibrations of atoms that no 
worldly instruments could measure, thus providing a widened field of scientific inquiry for 
people to explore forever, blissfully. 
Poe’s text contains echoes of both of these chapters from The Ninth Bridgewater 
Treatise.  Similarly to Babbage, Poe suggests that, while they are not “cognizant of all things,” 
the angelic beings possess a form of “spiritual vision” that is more acute than that of living 
humans (III.1212).  Recalling Babbage’s dream of doing science in heaven, Agathos suggests 
that, “of this infinity of matter, the sole purpose is to afford infinite springs, at which the soul 
may allay the thirst to know which is for ever unquenchable within it—since to quench it would 
be to extinguish the soul’s self” (III.1212); as Babbage characterizes perfect remembrance as a 
hellish state, Agathos tells Oinos that “to know all were the curse of a fiend” (III.1212).  Agathos 
and Babbage also share a fixation on algebra as the way of knowing most worthy of the angels; 
as Agathos puts it, the vibrations created by words are “accurately traceable through the 
agency of algebraic analysis,” which, as it increases in perfection, can approach closer and 
closer to a perfect understanding of the events whose consequences reverberate throughout 





God plays no role after the initial creation, a universe governed by laws that are best 
understood by means of mathematics. 
 Yet Poe was not as optimistic as Babbage about the possibility that scientific knowledge 
would grant people an expanding dominion over matter.  Poe’s “The Power of Words” twists 
Babbage’s image of sounds resounding for all eternity into a thoroughly anti-progressive idea—
an assertion that actions of the past do not fade away, but rather become harder and harder to 
ignore as their waves spread throughout the cosmos.  Unlike Babbage’s chapter, “The Power of 
Words” ends on much the same note as “Ulalume,” with a being who is tormented by the 
memory of a lost love.  Agathos challenges Oinos with a question: “did there not cross your 
mind some thought of the physical power of words? Is not every word an impulse on the air?” 
(III.1215).  Oinos does not answer, but rather asks Agathos why he is weeping as they pass by a 
star, “the greenest and yet most terrible” one they have seen (III.1215).  Agathos replies: “This 
wild star—it is now three centuries since with clasped hands, and with streaming eyes at the 
feet of my beloved—I spoke it—with a few passionate sentences—into birth!  Its brilliant 
flowers are the dearest of all unfulfilled dreams, and its raging volcanoes are the passions of the 
most turbulent and unhallowed of hearts” (III.1215).  This statement, which concludes the 
dialogue, suggests that the power of words works not through signification, but rather through 
a direct identity between matter and the seemingly immaterial.  Words have a “power,” but not 
on account of what people think they mean.  Their ability to create a terrible green star is due 
only to the acoustic properties of sound waves. 
Reading “The Purloined Letter” in this light reveals the breadth of the gap between 





employed analysis as a means of clarifying the meanings of signs, Dupin’s poetic approach 
focuses on the signifiers—the physical traces that his rival could not help but leave behind.  The 
Minister adeptly uses conventional systems of meaning to deceive the police, and it is only by 
treating these systems with suspicion that Dupin can outmaneuver him.  The letter, Dupin tells 
the narrator, is addressed in a “diminutive and feminine hand,” which contrasts with the “bold 
and decided” hand that the Prefect described (III.991); the careless manner in which it was 
placed into the rack, along with the fact that it is partially torn, seem calculated to suggest its 
unimportance; further, the paper is dirty, which Dupin takes as an attempt “to delude the 
beholder into an idea of the worthlessness of the document” (III.991).  Rather than taking these 
apparently intentional signs at face value, Dupin fixates on the creases on the paper, which, he 
claims, “presented the broken appearance which is manifested when a stiff paper, having been 
once folded and pressed with a folder, is refolded in a reversed direction, in the same creases 
or edges which had formed the original fold” (III.992).  Semantic conventions have no direct 
bearing on whether or not this inference holds; instead, Dupin thinks in terms of the physical 
limitations of the medium, about which he can reason with a level of certainty that interpretive 
methods do not allow.   
For Poe, then, thinking like a mathematician and a poet does not mean considering both 
algorithm and culture, a mandate that is now a platitude among designers of computer 
interfaces; instead, it means not thinking in terms of meaning at all.  This notion of the poetic 
would become part of a counter-tradition that has existed in opposition to the idea of culture 
as an organically developing totality.  The influence of Poe’s Dupin tales was most important in 





reassuring than Poe’s ambiguous texts.  Poe’s poetry won the greatest following in France, 
where his work was translated by Charles Baudelaire and Stéphane Mallarmé.  Descendants of 
Dupin’s skepticism toward meaning might also be found in materialist approaches to media 
studies that I previously called computational brutalism—Lori Emerson’s critique of graphical 
user interfaces and the Berlin School of Friedrich Kittler, for whom computer interfaces are 
mere “surface effects” that bely what is really going on inside computers, where “everything 
becomes a number” (Gramophone, Film, Typewriter 1).  These critical approaches treat the 
semantic aspects of computational systems as potentially misleading and emphasize, instead, 
the physicality of the medium.  Like Dupin, they question the primacy of the semiotic 
conventions that govern the ways people understand computers, reminding us that, for all the 
meanings people assign to them, computing machines are just complex arrangements of 
subatomic particles operating according to physical laws. 
But Poe’s own views are just as far from Kittler’s anti-hermeneutic stance as they are 
from Cleanth Brooks’s school of close reading.  In “The Power of Words,” Agathos states that “a 
true philosophy has long taught that the source of all motion is thought—and the source of all 
thought is—” (III.1215); Oinos completes the sentence: “God” (III.1215).  This God is not Boole’s 
benevolent God who gives us laws of thought that will harmonize the world.  Poe’s God is 
unknowable, especially to the living; it is only by means of intuition that we can come close.  
From this perspective, the Berlin School’s confidence that mathematical methods can provide 
authentic access to the reality of technical media is just another delusion; the mathematically 
oriented media scholar is just as blinkered as the Prefect in “The Purloined Letter,” whose 





assimilation both to modern hermeneutics and to modern anti-hermeneutics—to the New 
Critics on one side and to the Berlin School on the other—is indicative of the difference 
between Poe’s Romantic outlook and the disciplinary fragmentation that characterizes 
modernity.  For Poe, as for Wordsworth, poetry and mathematics were two halves of a single 
whole, whereas Kittler worked within a disciplinary formation that alienates the two.  The 
solidification of this formation is the last major event in my account of the rise of the algorithm.  
A key site in the development of the modern disciplinary formation was the series of great 
international exhibitions that began in the 1850s, events in which the Enlightenment dream of 
spreading technical knowledge universally gave way to a newly fractured social arrangement in 
which most people had to entrust technical matters to the experts.  A prominent voice in the 
conversation surrounding them was that of Babbage, who, as one might predict, resisted these 
implications to the last. 
 
Miracles on Exhibition 
 
Although his computing machines were his greatest obsession, Babbage also devoted a 
significant amount of energy, starting in the 1820s, to a polical campaign for science education.  
A key early part of this campaign was the 1830 book Reflections on the Decline of Science in 
England, and on Some of Its Causes, which attempts to explain why British science has lost its 
international prestige since the time of Newton (1-2).  This book was inspired in part by a trip to 
Berlin, where Babbage met Alexander von Humboldt and was impressed by the degree of 





speech by Humboldt in an appendix, presumably in an attempt to promote the German 
approach to science in Britain (Decline of Science 216-21).  The controversy surrounding the 
publication of this book led to the formation of the British Association for the Advancement of 
Science (Hyman 73; 150-56).  But Babbage’s campaign was a lost cause in the face of a growing 
shift toward social compartmentalization in the mid-nineteenth century.  Babbage frequently 
framed his polemics about science in terms of the perceived inferior situation in Britain 
compared to Continental Europe, and his biographer Hyman takes him at his word that the 
problem was the British government’s lack of appreciation for the connections between science 
and industry (102).  Yet the problems Babbage faced were not entirely specific to Britain.  The 
Great Exhibitions heralded a new cultural formation whose implications were global, and that 
Babbage was struggling in vain against: the fusion of industry with consumerism. 
If there is a point of contact between Babbage’s political campaign and his work on 
computing machines, it is in his insistence that the “superintendents” of those machines 
maintain total control over how they run.  The argument of Decline of Science is based on the 
belief that science ought to be at the helm of industry, producing a continuum between theory 
and practice.131  To fulfill this goal, it was necessary to educate people outside of scientific 
circles about the latest discoveries.  For Babbage, it was not the commoner who was shamefully 
unenlightened about science, but the statesman—a point that he made directly in a polemic 
against hereditary peerage, written in 1833 and published in 1856 (A Word to the Wise 5; see 
also Decline of Science 8; Economy v).  He took up the task of spreading scientific and technical 
knowledge to the middle and upper classes directly in his own writings.  The first major division 





manufacturing techniques (3-92).  He ends this section by explaining, in reverse order, the 
series of processes that produced the book presently in the reader’s hands—an apparent 
attempt to give the reader a better appreciation for the dependence of familiar products like 
books on the arts of industry (90-92).  Babbage’s descriptions of industrial machines could be 
seen as an extension of Diderot’s endeavor to write down previously unarticulated mechanical 
knowledge for the Encyclopédie, another project that sought to help epistêmê keep pace with 
technê.132  Yet Babbage lived in a very different political climate from that of the 
Encyclopédistes, and his campaign ultimately proved to be untenable in face of the social 
compartmentalization that industrialism imposed. 
  A key moment in 
this shift was the London 
exhibition of 1851—the 
first of the  international 
industrial showcases that 
eventually morphed into 
the World’s Fairs.  These 
events began in part as 
an offshoot of the British 
Association for the Advancement of Sciences.133  At Babbage’s suggestion, the 1838 and 39 
meetings of the Association were accompanied by exhibitions of industrial products, an 
attempt to promote the harmony of science with industry (Exposition 18-20; Passages 432-33n; 
Hyman 152-53).  While these early exhibitions were not a particular success, England would, a 
Figure 22. The London Crystal Palace as viewed from the Knightsbridge Road. Image by 





little over a decade later, host the first of the great international exhibitions, an event that 
would form an important focal point for the emerging narrative of technological progress in the 
second half of the nineteenth century.  The 1851 Exhibition, housed in a massive glass structure 
known as the Crystal Palace (Figure 22), ran for almost six months in London’s Hyde Park and 
attracted a great deal of attention worldwide.   
 Babbage had little involvement with the Crystal Palace exhibition apart from publishing 
a book, The Exposition of 1851 (1851), which essentially explains, in a rather bitter tone, how he 
would have run the event had he been in charge.  (The London and New York events were 
officially called exhibitions, but Babbage, like his fellow Francophile Walt Whitman, preferred 
the word exposition.)  Babbage’s book, which was written before the exhibition but not 
published until after, suggests that the event should serve as a means of promoting free trade, 
cultural exchange, and the diffusion of knowledge.  The convergence of people upon the Crystal 
Palace, in his view, provides an opportunity to “instruct the consumer in the art of judging the 
character of the commodity he is about to purchase” (129); he hopes that the exhibitions will 
remove the “veil of mystery” covering the principles of manufacture, science, and the fine arts 
(131).  Yet Babbage was sorely disappointed with how the Great Exhibition was managed.  If the 
British Association had retained control over the event, he writes, it “would have found itself 
led by the science of the country” (20); but instead, he feared that it had been taken over by 
scientifically illiterate aristocrats.  The organizers of the later exhibitions did not take Babbage’s 
advice, and he became increasingly resentful. 
The difference of opinion between Babbage and the organizers is apparent from the 





in the Crystal Palace, but his work and its derivatives were displayed in later exhibitions.  The 
organizers of the 1853 New York exhibition requested permission to display the Difference 
Engine No. 1, but the British government declined (Passages 149).  The 1855 Universal 
Exposition in Paris featured a later difference engine built by the Swedish father–son team 
Georg and Edvard Scheutz; it won a gold medal, thanks in part to Babbage’s lobbying (Lindgren 
195).  One of Babbage’s greatest concerns during the exhibition of the Scheutz engine was that 
the spectators have ample opportunity to learn about the principles on which it was based.  He 
was in contact with the Scheutzes, and he had his son Henry prepare plans for the machine so 
that they could be displayed alongside the machine itself (Passages 155; H. P. Babbage 261n; 
see Lindgren 263).  During and after the Exhibition, Babbage also handed out free copies of a 
pamphlet explaining how to read the plans (H. P. Babbage 242).  In Passages, he suggests that 
the engines could be displayed while in use, “in constant but slow motion,” accompanied by an 
attendant who could explain the principles on which they are built (152).  As Hyman points out, 
Babbage insisted on slowing the machines down because fast motion, impressive as it may be, 
made it impossible for spectators to make out the internal structures of the machines (223).  
Babbage’s insistence on running machines slowly and displaying the plans beside them shows a 
desire to keep machines from becoming detached from the ideas they embody in the minds of 
the public—to ensure that people appreciate the theory as well as the machine itself.   
But in spite of Babbage’s hopes, the Great Exhibitions were not particularly concerned 
with spreading technical knowledge.  The displays of industrial machinery were about the 
exhilarating speed, size, and complexity of it all, goals that did not line up well with the 





commissioners were at loggerheads was undeniable by the 1862 exhibition in London.  At this 
exhibition, the completed portion of the Difference Engine No. 1 was finally displayed, almost 
three decades after its construction, and Babbage was far from satisfied with how the 
exhibition treated his work.  In his memoir, he spends almost ten pages criticizing the 
commissioners of the 1862 exhibition (Passages 157-65); among many other complaints, he 
lambasts them for placing the Difference Engine No. 1 in a less prominent location than a 
display of children’s toys, “whose merits, it is true, the Commissioners were somewhat more 
competent to appreciate” (159).  More importantly, in spite of Babbage’s success in finding 
someone qualified and willing to take on the job, the commissioners declined to hire a 
mathematical expert to explain the machine to visitors (158).  The Difference Engine ended up 
“in a small hole in a dark corner,” given neither the glory Babbage thought it deserved nor the 
exposure to understanding eyes of the public (159).  Whether Babbage’s work on computing 
machines was a failure or a success depends on how one views it, but his attempts to influence 
the organizers of the Great Exhibitions certainly did fail, leaving him angry and frustrated.  In 
the years of the exhibitions, he descended into a bitterness that reached its boiling point in the 
1860s, when he undertook a notorious legal campaign against street musicians and other noisy 
“nuisances,” earning himself a reputation as a cranky old man.134   
One reason for the failure of Babbage’s campaign was that the theories behind his 
computing machines were too complex and abstruse to interest the general public.  For all his 
efforts to explain his work, only a fraction of the people willing to listen really came away with 
an adequate understanding of his ideas.  Martineau recounts that, in spite of Babbage’s 





whom he had sacrificed some very precious time, on the supposition that she understood as 
much as she assumed to do,” nonetheless came away thinking it could produce right answers 
from wrong numbers (268).  A later biographical note on Babbage declines even to attempt to 
explain what a difference engine does: “No reader unversed in the higher mathematics need 
attempt to form any idea of the machines, or their methods of working, or even the results of 
their operations.  At least, he is not likely to make much of it if he does” (Fyvie 186).  This is an 
overstatement—the basic idea behind difference engines can be explained in terms of what is 
now high-school-level algebra.  Just about anyone could understand it given a patient enough 
teacher.  But whether those who were not already mathematically inclined would find it worth 
the trouble is dubious.  Most of the non-scientific acquaintances to whom Babbage showed his 
machine were, it would seem from the accounts of contemporaries, content to nod politely and 
stare in wonder. 
Apart from the pedagogical difficulty of explaining the theories behind complex 
machines like the Difference Engine, the social relations of consumer capitalism that were 
beginning to emerge at the time of the first great exhibitions created few incentives for (to 
travesty the seventeenth-century educational theorist Comenius) everyone to learn everything.  
The realities of industrial production meant that only those who either owned their own capital 
or worked in engineering could have much of a role in designing machines.  For the most part, it 
was necessary to use whatever products were available on the market; people in corporate 
offices would design them, those who worked in the factories would deal with the technical 
aspects of production, and everyone else would be mere users.  One of the later exhibitions, 





arrangement by asserting that “SCIENCE FINDS—INDUSTRY APPLIES—MAN CONFORMS” (Tozer 
81).  By this high-Modernist moment, “man” had gone from the producer of scientific 
knowledge to the passive consumer of industrial goods.  Most people were doomed to look at 
machines as if through a pane of glass, marveling at them, perhaps understanding how they 
work, perhaps not, but in any case unable to have much say in how they are configured. 
This notion of science and industry as drivers of cultural change became a foundational 
element of the modern narrative of technological progress.  This narrative only gained in 
strength over the course of the twentieth century.  The 1939 World’s Fair in New York City 
made this forward-looking narrative explicit, taking “The World of Tomorrow” as its official 
theme and including an exhibit called Futurama, produced by General Motors, which was 
supposed to show what the world would look like in twenty years.135  This exhibit included 
some technologies that were actually realized, such as a nationwide motorway system.  General 
Motors created a second Futurama exhibit when the World’s Fair returned to New York in 
1964.  This exhibit, Futurama II, featured a recorded narration promising a glimpse into “a 
future not of dreams, but of reality.”136  The dioramas of Futurama II offer a vision of a world 
tending inexorably toward automation, the expanding exploitation of natural resources, and 
global capitalism.  The course we take, the narrator assures us, will be one “that frees the mind 
and the spirit as it improves the wellbeing of mankind.”  In spite of the claims of some late-
twentieth-century cultural theorists that we have entered a postmodern age in which such 
grand narratives have lost their power, this narrative of technological progress retains a 
significant degree of influence in the twenty-first century.137  If anything, the narrative’s grip 





First World countries, came to face a powerful social imperative to adopt “cool” new 
technologies and media platforms and to discard (except for the purposes of nostalgia or 
contrarianism) such “legacy” forms as the landline phone and the print magazine.   
The rise of the modern narrative of technological progress represents a definitive break 
from the Enlightenment dreams that Babbage continued to defend.  While the idea that 
humankind marches inexorably forward might serve the purpose of giving technology 
meaning—of enlivening it, as Coleridge might put it—it lacks the epistemological egalitarianism 
of the radical Enlightenment.  The teleology of Futurama II tends not toward enlightenment in 
the Kantian sense of independence from authority, but rather toward greater dependence on 
machines and infrastructural systems that one does not necessarily understand.  This is not to 
say that the Enlightenment epistemology Babbage employed came to an end in the nineteenth 
century.  It did not; indeed, the circuit diagrams and flowcharts used in twenty-first-century 
engineering rest on methods of analysis not fundamentally different from the one described by 
Condillac.  But the early idéologues’ utopian dream of making such an analytical language 
universal—of teaching everyone to speak, write and think in the same well-formed language 
with the same set of scientifically rigorous ideas—has moved to the margins.  Technical 
language bleeds into the language of common life and vice versa, but the two are distinct; the 
former can be subject to strict, institutionalized control—“regimentation,” as the twentieth-
century analytic philosopher W.V.O. Quine calls it (Word and Object 143)—whereas the latter 
has a life of its own.  Technical discourses have been shuffled off into a separate sphere from 





This epistemic rift between engineers and consumers is exactly what Babbage was 
struggling to prevent in his campaign for science.  Just as he feared, most people can never fully 
know what is going on inside the machines they use; only the experts truly understand.  The 
compartmentalization that emerged around the end of the nineteenth century only, however, 
realized one half of Babbage’s fears, placing those without technical training in the dark but 
enabling some elements of Enlightenment epistemology to persist in expert discourses.  The 
Ninth Bridgewater Treatise, and especially Poe’s reworking of it, revealed a possibility that 
would, if realized, produce a more total break from the Enlightenment: that no one, not even 
the experts, will fully understand how our machines work.  If practice gets ahead of theory—if 
people begin to deploy algorithms for practical purposes without first learning how to predict 
their behavior reliably—then humanity will be just as helpless as Agathos in the face of the 
terrible green star that he unwittingly spoke into being.  In the present day, as algorithms are 
becoming increasingly entangled with the messy and unpredictable details of culture, and as 
artificial intelligence techniques reach new levels of complexity, the fear that technologists 
have created something they cannot control has entered the public consciousness.  In what 
follows, I consider some ways in which the technical and humanistic perspectives may be 
brought together more fruitfully to respond to the consequences of these entanglements.  In 
order to better take responsibility for the cultural effects of algorithms, I argue, it will be 
necessary to reconcile ourselves to the fact that, once they leave the laboratory and enter the 









[A]nd I thought some good novel humbug, that smacked of the marvelous, that appealed to the 
imagination, that made faith, and plenty of it, a sine qua non, and that was spiced with science, 
or based upon it—for of all the humbugs with which the world has been humbugged since the 
serpent humbugged Eve, and Eve humbugged Adam, and all their sons and daughters have 
since humbugged each other, there is none so glorious, so radiant, as scientific humbug. 
—P.T. Barnum 
 
Culture and the Switching Circuit  
 
If the second half of the nineteenth century was the period when modern disciplinary 
boundaries formed, the past half-century has been fixated on unravelling them.  Calls for a 
blending of technical and humanistic perspectives have been frequent in recent decades, 
coming from engineering and humanities fields alike.  Ted Nelson, a major figure in the 
development of the World Wide Web, makes one such call in his 1980 book Literary Machines.  
Citing C.P. Snow’s 1959 essay on the “Two Cultures,” Nelson contrasts the perspectives of 
“Technoids,” who place an excessive emphasis on mathematics and logic, and “Fluffies,” who 
have “a humanistic background, in literature, history, the arts, etc.” (1/11).  Although one can 
detect that Nelson respects the “Technoids” more, he argues that computational media will 
require a mode of thinking that escapes the dichotomy between the two perspectives (1/13).  





Galloway has pointed out, in the Silicon Valley of the 1990s, it was a running joke that “if you 
wanted a mediocre job at a dot-com, study computer science, but if you wanted to run the 
company, study semiotics” (Galloway, “Interview”); starting a successful technology enterprise 
was recognized to require both technical skill and a knack for “human factors.”  Digital 
humanists such as Stephen Ramsay have characterized themselves as similarly fusing technical 
and interpretive perspectives, something that Ramsay sees as necessary to keep critical theory 
relevant in the technocratic twenty-first century (“Why I’m In It”).  Given the increasing 
entanglement of technology and culture, Poe’s character Dupin, who unites the abilities of a 
mathematician and a poet, is a compelling model for emulation.   
But attempts to create such a fusion have been running into snags.  Confirming 
Habermas’s observation that attempts to recombine the alienated value spheres of modernity 
tend to lord one sphere over the others (“Modernity” 11), projects that claim to blend the 
technical and the humanistic have tended to privilege one of the two.  On the technical side are 
computational brutalists like Kittler, for whom the desire to think about technical issues like a 
humanist is a vice.  In his 1995 essay “There is No Software,” Kittler argues that “the so-called 
philosophy of the computer community tends to systematically obscure hardware by software, 
electronic signifiers by interfaces between formal and everyday languages” (n.p.).  The practical 
implication of this argument is that one should eshew the flashy abstractions of modern 
graphical operating systems in favor of more technical interfaces such as the command line—
Kittler preferred Microsoft DOS—that grant one a more direct view of what is really happening 
inside the machine.  This line of thinking has recurred recently in discussions of the ways 





Interfaces (2014), Lori Emerson argues that the fixation on intuitive, “user-friendly” computer 
interfaces is becoming an “ideology” that “is used quite deliberately to distort reality” (xi); the 
flashy graphics and smooth fonts of Apple Computer interfaces, she argues, give users a less 
authentic engagement with the machine than more technical interfaces like DOS and the UNIX 
shell.  Like Kittler, Emerson advocates making the inner structures of computer systems visible 
to the user, laying bare, as much as possible, the algorithms beneath.  This imperative means, in 
practice, approaching digital texts more like an engineer than like a literary critic in the 
traditional sense. 
At the other end of the spectrum are social constructionists Wendy Hui Kyong Chun and 
David Golumbia, for whom the division between technical and cultural matters is a mere effect 
of power.  Chun and Golumbia have both connected the position of the computer user who is 
given only a partial view of the system to the interpellated subject (Chun, Programmed Visions; 
Golumbia, Cultural Logic).  For Chun, software grants the user a false sense of agency while 
actually constraining his or her actions; the sense that algorithms operate autonomously from 
culture is, from Chun’s perspective, an illusion created by ideology.  Golumbia similarly 
questions whether algorithms can be legitimately separated from the political contexts that 
created them.  This constructionist position is unassailable on its own terms, but it does little to 
remedy the disconnect between humanistic and technical fields.  Golumbia’s approach treats 
the cultural side of the technical–cultural divide as all in all, leaving no common ground on 
which a dialogue with engineers could take place.  The intellectual history of the algorithm that 
I have undertaken in this dissertation can provide, I offer, an alternative framework for 





or the technical perspective nor seek to break down the boundary between them, but rather 
seeks to articulate the function of that boundary more clearly and to open, perhaps, the 
potential for reconfiguring the relation between algorithm and meaning. 
A useful starting point is to consider some of the phenomenological differences 
between technical and humanistic practices.  Programming is manifestly a very different 
experience from, for instance, doing a close-reading of a poem.  As far back as the bronze age 
of computer culture in the 1980s, programmers have reported an experience of intense focus 
that is sometimes referred to as “hack mode.”  As Eric S. Raymond puts it—using an earlier 
sense of the word hacking that refers to any type of problem-solving, not just illicit ones—hack 
mode is “a Zen-like state of total focus on The Problem that may be achieved when one is 
hacking (this is why every good hacker is part mystic)” (“hack mode” n.p.).  In The Art of Unix 
Usability, Raymond and Rob W. Landley equate hack mode with the psychological idea of flow, 
which was originally proposed by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (“Interfaces and Flow”).  As 
Csikszentmihalyi defines it, flow is a pleasurable state in which one loses awareness of space 
and time and devotes one’s full attention to a single activity (Flow: The Psychology of Optimal 
Experience).  Raymond and Landley offer advice on how to design software so as to encourage 
the experience of flow, suggesting, for instance, avoiding pop-up alerts that might jolt users out 
of a flow state (“The Rules of Usability”).  There is perhaps an analogy between “hack mode” 
and the experience of being absorbed in a novel; in both cases, one’s physical circumstances 
seem to drop out of view.  But what comes into focus during the programmer’s flow state is 
very different from what a novel reader would typically be thinking about.  Culture disappears, 





from materiality, language, and other people, except to the extent that other people are 
directly involved with the code on which one is working. 
This experience of culture dropping from view results, I wish to argue, from a set of 
attitudes toward the relation of algorithm and ordinary language that we have inherited, most 
importantly via George Boole, from the semiotic theories of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries.  By way of example, consider the situation of the “Save” item in a “File” menu.  While 
the term’s resonance with salvation has provided fodder for jokes (“Why does Jesus never lose 
his work? Because Jesus saves!”), such punning has no disciplinary relevance to the logic of the 
software, and users must push it aside when it is time to get work done.  Computers are 
constructed in such a way that they respond most usefully to instrumental thinking, and their 
interfaces are designed so as to encourage even the non-technical user to use and interpret 
words related to the machine in ways that correspond to the program logic.  Thus, whatever 
authoritarian connotations one might detect in the presence of a “Submit” button on a web 
form, the best way to ensure that one correctly understands the system is to suppress these 
meanings.  User-interface designers certainly do consider existing semantic practices when they 
select names, but when a misalignment occurs between the way a signifier functions in the 
software and the meanings assigned to it by a culture at large, the technical realm has primacy; 
if one wishes to avoid frustration, one must interpret the word in a way that corresponds to the 
workings of the computer system, regardless of how well or how badly this reading coincides 
with the linguistic practices of one’s community.138 
This distinction between technical and common significations falls out along just the 





century.  The structure of computer languages—at least if we understand them the way 
programmers are trained to—enacts a voluntarist view of the sign much like that of Condillac.  
To give an example, one can name a pair of variables first_name and last_name or 
first_name and mxxxphh5y, and the program will work in exactly the same way.139  The 
names are, as programmers say, arbitrary; considered as signifiers they are voluntary in that 
they can (in theory) be altered at will.  But modern linguistics has followed Condillac’s 
opponent, Herder, in maintaining that signifiers in natural languages are not arbitrary in this 
sense of being intentionally modifiable.  New words, linguistics rightly recognizes, are seldom 
created from whole cloth; they are almost always made from previously existing linguistic 
material, such as roots, affixes, foreign words, and proper names.  If I coined the term large-
jawed bonefish to refer to a newly discovered species of shrub, people would undoubtedly be 
confused.  In that sense, signifiers in natural languages are not entirely arbitrary; even if the 
language as a whole is based on arbitrary symbols, newly coined words rarely lack some trace 
of pre-existing practices.  Saussure calls this sort of partial non-arbitrariness “relative 
motivation” (A Course in General Linguistics 131; see also Humboldt, On Language 77).  These 
historical considerations can affect computer code, too—there are certainly practical reasons to 
use last_name rather than mxxxphh5y, especially if one is working together with other 
programmers—but not at the level of computer logic.  Computer languages are typically 
designed to exclude, as much as possible, the choice of signifiers from having an effect on the 
behavior of a program.  
As hard as it may be to imagine an alternative, this manner of thinking about the 





mathematician like William Oughtred or Leibniz, the value of algorithmic methods was that 
they could represent the world in a way that had nothing to do with the ordinary language of 
human beings.  The appeal of real characters in this view was that their meanings were (it was 
believed) not arbitrary in the way that the meanings of words were.  Perhaps the individual 







𝑎⁄ ) were arbitrarily chosen, but the fact 
that this particular arrangement of characters represents the shape of a chain hanging between 
two fixed points (as Leibniz discovered in 1691) is, in the view of the real character tradition, 
non-arbitrary.140  From this perspective, the choice between last_name and mxxxphh5y is of 
no significance; the meaning of the system does not stem from what is happening in human 
beings’ heads, but rather from the fact that algorithms exist in harmony with the natures of 
things.  In this view, no barrier separates the mechanical processes by which mathematicians 
move characters around from the world of human life; algorithms do not exist in a realm of 
abstraction separate from our world, but rather, as Leibniz put it, provide a way into the 
interior of things.  All one need do to guarantee meaningful results in any domain, from 
mathematics to poetry, is to follow the rules. 
If the real-character tradition aimed to use algorithms to create a non-arbitrary mode of 
signification, Enlightenment theories of the sign went in the opposite extreme, pushing the 
arbitrariness of the signifier much further than modern linguistics does.  At the same time, this 
tradition denied that algorithms themselves could be arbitrary, only accepting algorithmic 
methods that were believed to be grounded in clear and certain principles.  Someone like 
Clairaut, d’Alembert or, especially, Condorcet would have viewed the presence of natural-





unclear concepts into one’s understanding of the system.141  The premise that natural 
languages are insufficiently clear led to an obsession with eliminating all traces of the 
vernacular from mathematical practice, creating, instead, a totally new system of signs that is 
built from the ground up through explicit definitions.  Condorcet may, in fact, have preferred 
mxxxphh5y to last_name—or better yet, he would have preferred to use a numerical code 
representing a position within a universal taxonomy of things.  If culture would have dropped 
out of view in the use of Condorcet’s universal algebra, it was because the ultimate goal of the 
project was to replace culture altogether with something more rational. 
 It was only around the time of Babbage and Boole that something recognizably like the 
autonomy of algorithm and meaning emerged.  In the nineteenth century, mathematics came 
to be viewed as a world of pure form, detached from mundane reality.  For Boole, this world 
was the (pseudo-)Kantian realm of pure reason, in which a level of certainty seemed possible 
that could not be obtained in fields of knowledge tainted by the empirical.  In this view, 
signifiers like last_name serve to mediate between the formal structure of the algorithm, 
which exists in this rarefied realm, and people’s existing modes of thought, providing a way for 
the intuitions people receive from their cultures to guide their mathematical practice.  In this 
post-Kantian view, culture’s role in the design and use of algorithms is subjective and thus 
cannot absolutely constrain the decisions that one makes; culture only takes on an objective 
role when the time comes to relate the algorithmic system to the world of people and things.  
This epistemological divide between, in Boole’s terminology, process and interpretation enables 
the algorithmic aspects of a system to be chosen arbitrarily, irrespective of the already 





For all its practical advantages, this sectoring off of algorithm and culture into 
autonomous spheres has the side-effect of alienating the modes of thought involved in 
technical disciplines from those involved in interpretation.  The problem is that the choices one 
makes in the algorithmic realm can feed back into one’s way of thinking about the signifiers one 
uses.  If one does choose mxxxphh5y rather than last_name, the former string will soon take 
on a meaning in one’s mind—it will come to denote the element of the system to which it is 
attached.  This feedback may take place even if the names one choose are more in line with 
ordinary language: the meanings the labels bear within the code will almost inevitably drift 
away from the words’ ordinary significations in the language from which they are taken.  In this 
way, computers enable one to enter a private linguistic bubble in which one is alienated from 
the practices of the broader community of language speakers.142 
A clear instance of this disconnect has recently surfaced in digital humanities.  In his 
article on the meaning problem, Liu discusses a text-analysis technique known as topic 
modeling, which provides a way of identifying clusters of words called topics that tend to 
appear together within a collection of text (Liu, “Meaning” 414).  These statistical patterns 
sometimes, although not always, correlate roughly with what a human being would recognize 
as the topic of a piece of writing—that is, what a text is about.  The creators of a popular variant 
of topic modeling known as Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) make it clear, in the paper in which 
they introduce the method, that one should not read too much into the word topic: “We refer 
to the latent multinomial variables in the LDA model as topics, so as to exploit text-oriented 
intuitions, but we make no epistemological claims regarding these latent variables beyond their 





to be precise, then one must interpret the “topics” as what they are—variables within a 
statistical model—rather than equating them too readily with what one would ordinarily 
understand to constitute topics.  Among humanists who have adopted this method, the need to 
avoid such overreach sometimes leads to self-conscious writing styles that encapsulate every 
instance of the word topic in scare-quotes.  But without the assumption that the “topics” in the 
model correspond in some way to concepts accessible within the discourse of interpretation, 
the results of topic modeling would seem to be incommensurable with knowledge produced 
through more traditionally humanistic methods. 
In spite of its seeming inevitability, this epistemological gap is not inherent in the nature 
of computation; it results from a complex of assumptions about algorithm and culture that 
crystalized in the nineteenth century.  The systems of Leibniz and Condorcet would not 
manifest the meaning problem, although they both would lead to other, perhaps equally 
troubling problems.  Like Leibniz’s pre-established harmony and Condorcet’s belief in human 
perfectibility, the present arrangement has political stakes.  Leibniz’s system presumes a 
hierarchical society that elevates the “excellent men” who define the rules of systems over the 
mechanics who merely follow those rules.  Condorcet’s language scheme was part of a 
revolutionary program that would respond to the difficulty of interpreting topic models by 
completely replacing the existing notion of topic with a new one based on the mathematical 
model—at least if (and this is a big if) it were plausible to claim that this model rests on the 
undeniable truths of universal reason.  Modernity eschews this revolutionary program in favor 
of disciplinary compartmentalization.  From a technical perspective, culture provides a reservoir 





cultural perspective, technical fields produce new forms that people must either give meaning 
to somehow or else, when they have a choice, reject.  The two perspectives are alienated from 
each other by being founded on incompatible views of which aspects of language are capable of 
arbitrary alteration. 
The epistemologies of Leibniz and Condorcet are not coming back, but it would be short-
sighted to suppose that the present arrangement will last forever.  It is possible that this change 
will happen sooner rather than later.  As of 2018, a disillusionment with Silicon Valley has 
grown in some regions of the popular discourse, a development that may result in a 
reconfiguration of the systems of trust that govern technical knowledge.  On the engineering 
side, the invention of new and somewhat unpredictable forms of artificial intelligence have 
made it more difficult for developers to exert total control over their creations.  These new 
developments create the potential for an epistemological readjustment that could, perhaps, 
enable a more productive interchange between the interpretive and algorithmic perspectives 
than exists at present.  There may not currently be much reason to hope for such an outcome, 
but to decline the attempt to imagine a path to a better world is to concede defeat. 
 
The Incomprehensible Prophecy 
 
In a 2016 interview, the English electronic music duo Autechre discuss the possibility of artificial 
intelligence playing a role in the composition of music.  Autechre is known for being one of the 
first major musical groups to generate elements of their music algorithmically, a practice they 





developed an elaborate system of computer automation that they use in their live 
performances to compose music on the fly.  The interviewer asks the members of the duo, Sean 
Booth and Rob Brown, if they perceive this software as “another entity in the band” besides 
themselves (Booth and Brown n.p.).  They both say yes, but they deny that it is an intelligent 
entity.  “[I]t's not another mind at work in our stuff,” Booth says; “It's just our habits, 
transcribed” (n.p.).  Booth elaborates that the negative reaction some people have to 
automating music production—thinking that the resulting music is “not human”—rests on a 
misunderstanding (n.p.).  “With this kind of algorithmic music, because the algorithms are made 
by people, it is people music”—since the logic of the software is based on human decisions, it 
contains, as the interviewer puts it, “ghosts and psychic residue” from the human beings who 
designed it (n.p.). 
But some new forms of artificial intelligence are going beyond the mere transcription of 
human habits.  In the present day, excitement is growing about deep learning, which is one of 
the most sophisticated variants of a broader approach to AI known as machine learning.  Deep 
learning presents a general set of pattern-recognition methods that can be applied to virtually 
any type of data.143  One of the most common forms of deep learning involves a computational 
model called a neural network, which essentially consists of multiple copies of the same 
mathematical function composed in interlocking patterns into a single, large function; these 
networks are “trained” by adjusting the parameters of those functions so as to approximate a 
desired behavior, such as recognizing whether a given image represents a horse.  The 
excitement over deep learning stems from the fact that it can apparently handle tasks that had 





hard time devising an explicit set of criteria for determining whether an image depicts a horse, 
but having a neural network “learn” the criteria for itself based on a large number of example 
images works remarkably well (although it certainly does not work perfectly).  As of this writing, 
deep-learning techniques have already been adopted in numerous applications, including not 
just image recognition, but also machine translation, voice recognition, and the filtering of 
social media content. 
The rise of deep learning raises a new set of philosophical questions that do not arise 
with regard to algorithms that merely formalize existing human practices.  Some writers have 
explained the power of neural networks with the idea of emergence, which describes the 
process by which complex behaviors can result from systems based on simple elements; an 
important reference point for the idea of emergence is Douglas Hofstadter’s Gödel, Escher, 
Bach (1979), although Hofstadter himself has expressed skepticism about whether deep-
learning systems are truly intelligent (“The Shallowness of Google Translate”).  This 
conversation could be seen as a continuation of the questioning of the nature of intelligence 
that has been a part of the discourse surrounding computing machines going back to Alan 
Turing.  But considered in relation to culture, the rise of machine learning raises a different set 
of issues that belong more to ethics than to the philosophy of mind.  The problem lies in the 
fact that these new techniques enable one to achieve practical goals, such as classifying large 
numbers of images, without the need for a theory that can fully explain how the algorithms are 
functioning.  This gap between practice and theory can lead to the development of software 





Examples of such troubling behaviors have been proliferating in recent years.  In 2017, 
for instance, a group of researchers found a way of creating a 3D-printed object that looks like a 
turtle to human beings, but that one of Google’s image-recognition systems consistently 
recognizes as a rifle (Athalye et al).  This example shows that, while the categories employed by 
the software correspond approximately to human concepts such as turtle, they do not align 
exactly, and the gaps between algorithm and concept can be exploited.  Even more 
concerningly, there have been several widely reported cases of AI systems “learning” to 
discriminate racially, such as a facial-recognition program that failed to recognize African 
American faces (Chen; Garvie and Frankle; B. A. Williams et al).  In his 2018 book Algorithms of 
Oppression, Safiya Umoja Noble argues that the algorithms used by technology companies like 
Google enact what he calls “technological redlining,” a new form of racial profiling masked by 
the putative objectivity of computation (1).  The recurrence of such problems highlights the 
need for systems of accountability capable of mitigating the discriminatory or otherwise 
harmful effects of artificial-intelligence systems.  More pragmatically, it gives technologists an 
imperative to develop, if possible, ways of better controlling their use of AI so as to avoid 
producing such effects unintentionally. 
Such efforts are complicated, however, by the fact that there is, as yet, no generally 
reliable method for predicting how AI systems will behave.  Many neural networks contain 
elements that are, like Boole’s logical quotients, uninterpretable, and researchers have debated 
the extent to which deep learning systems are “black boxes” whose inner workings are 
incomprehensible to humans.144  The need to better understand how AI systems function has 





One method, for instance, uses a second neural network to generate natural-language 
explanations of what is happening in the network used to perform a classification task (Barratt); 
AI practitioners also commonly use visual methods to examine the intermediate steps that 
neural networks take in processing data.  Yet these empirical methods do not provide a 
comprehensive explanation of how deep-learning systems operate, and some aspects of the 
software’s behavior remain (as of this writing) poorly understood.  The AI researcher Naftali 
Tishby discusses this problem in a 2017 conference talk, in which he proposes a theory of 
machine learning that he calls the “Information Bottleneck Framework” (Tishby).  A neural 
network, Tishby hypothesizes, begins by “memorizing” patterns from the data, then selectively 
“forgets” information that proves irrelevant (Wolchover n.p.).  Whether or not this theory 
ultimately proves successful is beside the point.  The fact that its success is still up in the air—
that researchers will go on to test it, revise it, and consider alternative explanations—is a sign 
that, just as Babbage feared, technê has gotten fully ahead of epistemê.  To the extent that a 
fully developed theory of their behavior is still forthcoming, neural networks contain an 
element of what programmers sometimes call “black magic”—techniques that work for reasons 
no one understands (Raymond, “black magic” n.p.).  Using such techniques is generally 
regarded as a bad practice, but it is becoming the law of the land as undertheorized artificial-
intelligence techniques become essential parts of the programmer’s toolkit. 
Even if deep learning is one day fully tamed by theory, the broader issue about the 
changing relation of epistemê and technê remains.  The widespread acceptance of the “black 
magic” of machine learning signals a shift away from the “SCIENCE FINDS—INDUSTRY APPLIES” 





manifest in the rise of new management practices that value quantified results over theoretical 
principles.  In 2001, for instance, a group of programmers published a manifesto for an 
approach to making software that they call agile development.  Agile development values, as 
the manifesto puts it, “Responding to Change over following a plan” (“Manifesto for Agile 
Software Development” n.p.; emphasis in original); the idea is to adapt as rapidly as possible to 
the changing desires of consumers rather than deciding ahead of time what one’s product will 
look like.  A major problem raised by such practice-before-theory approaches to engineering is 
that they provide no clear means of taking responsibility for the effects of one’s choices.  I do 
not mean to single out agile development in particular as a cause of this problem; it is the result 
of broader systemic factors in the present global economy.  The effect of the profit-maximizing 
methods of the technology sector is to create feedback loops in which technological platforms 
like Facebook influence people’s opinions, which in turn prompts a readjustment in the 
technology, ad infinitum, rapidly altering culture in ways that no one can predict with certainty. 
Concerns about these effects broke into the mainstream media in 2016, when the 
unexpected outcome of the US presidential election, among other factors, led to the fear that 
social-media platforms were encouraging political polarization, the spread of misinformation, 
and the radicalization of racism and misogyny.  Chamath Palihapitiya, a former Facebook vice 
president, made one such argument in a seminar at Stanford in 2017, stating that technology 
companies “have created tools that are ripping apart the social fabric of how society works” 
(quoted by Vincent n.p.).  The media discourse on this issue has revolved around the figure of 
the algorithm, which serves, in this context, as a metonymy for the inscrutable forces that seem 





introduced another entity into their musical practice, something analogous has, if we take 
these arguments seriously, happened to our political discourse: an alien voice—the voice of the 
algorithm—has entered the public sphere.  But whereas the members of Autechre maintain 
that their music-making algorithms are grounded in their own sensibilities, the workings of 
social-media filtering algorithms are not so clearly traceable back to the decisions of individuals.  
Recommendation engines are based on data provided by millions or billions of users, some of it 
created for innocuous reasons, some of it concocted with malicious intent.  Making sense of 
this situation is not simply a matter of understanding the technical aspects of the software 
running the platforms, but rather requires the elusive dual perspective from which culture and 
algorithm are both visible.  Whether and how we can understand the effects of these 
technologies on our world will be one of the central problems of the twenty-first century. 
An early foreshadowing of this crisis may be found in the work of Babbage.  In the 
darkness just before the dawn of general-purpose computing, Babbage recognized the 
possibility of building a machine whose behavior one cannot predict.  What held him back from 
embracing this possibility was a narrative of progress that insisted on placing humanity and, in 
particular, science at the helm of the machines we create.  In the final chapter of The Economy 
of Machinery, which presents a more worldly but no less visionary account of humankind’s 
future than The Ninth Bridgewater Treatise, Babbage imagines a coming time in which “the 
dominion of mind over the material world advances with an ever-accelerating force” (318).  
That this dominion is coming, he tells us, is confirmed by the fact that many miracles once 
imagined by poets, such as the taming of wind and fire, have become real on account of 





Babbage writes, legend gives way to science, and “the unruly masters of the poet and the seer 
become the obedient slaves of civilized man” (318).  This aspect of the narrative of progress 
persists to this day in, for instance, the discourse of television commercials.  But it is reaching its 
limits.  Far from being our slaves, the machines with which we coexist are slipping out of our 
individual control and, to the extent that algorithms have gained a role in determining how 
people interact and consume information, becoming our masters. 
In light of the apparent triumph of practice over theory, one might suppose that those 
poets and seers Babbage mentioned will be coming back—that the biggest technological 
changes of the future will not be driven by rational forethought, but rather by intuition and 
imagination.  The thought leaders of Silicon Valley would certainly be glad to take over the role 
of seers, having enthusiastically positioned themselves, since at least the 1980s, as visionaries.  
But ceding this role to technologists would hardly be satisfactory.  As Coleridge would remind 
us, the role of the seer is a fundamentally moral one; to prognosticate requires a vision of how 
the world ought to be.  The problem is not exactly that the prophets of Silicon Valley are the 
wrong people for the job, but rather that, if we are to maintain some hope of a democratic 
future, no one group of people can be trusted with stewardship over the cultural effects of 
technology.  I would like to end, then, by suggesting an alternative way of addressing the ethical 
dimensions of technological change: everyone, not just engineers and technology-industry 
executives, must take some degree of responsibility for what happens at the interface of 
algorithm and culture.  The creators of technology certainly must be held accountable for what 
they do, not least for intentionally designing technologies in ways that encourage addictive 





impossible for anyone, even the most powerful, to gain a full view of the effects that 
technological decisions will have.  In order for society to maintain some degree of 
egalitarianism, ordinary people must also play a role in determining the direction that 
technology takes us, not necessarily by making market decisions—as if one could realistically 
opt out of Google—but rather by reflecting more critically on the ways technology is influencing 
their modes of thought and resisting this influence when they judge it to be pernicious.145  If 
culture exists outside of the voluntary control of any individual, moral agency must be 
distributed. 
The praxis I am suggesting raises an epistemological question: how does one take 
responsibility for one’s engagement with algorithms when one cannot always understand 
them?  One readily available answer is that technical knowledge should be spread far and wide.  
The past two decades have seen a profusion of popular books that aim to demystify computers, 
such as Charles Petzold’s Code: The Hidden Language of Computer Hardware (1999) and Pedro 
Domingos’s The Master Algorithm: How the Quest for the Ultimate Learning Machine Will 
Remake Our World (2015).  A premise of these books is that learning about technology can be 
empowering because it enables one to make more informed decisions.  Domingos argues, for 
instance, that we can take control of how our use of social media affects the advertisements we 
see, what the government knows about us, and (perhaps) our credit ratings (267-76).  Such 
efforts at demystification aim to make computers a bit more like Stanhope’s Demonstrator—a 
bit more transparent.  Spreading knowledge about how computers work is certainly a positive 
step, but supposing that this sort of technical literacy is sufficient to democratize technology 





state in which everyone is enlightened.  A similar problem faces the open source movement, 
which seeks to make the code of software available to the public so that people may examine it 
and create their own modified versions of a program.  Like technical literacy, open source is by 
and large a good thing, but it is not sufficient to head off the oligarchical implications of 
technology.  If the ability to make good decisions were entirely dependent on technical 
knowledge, then those who do not have the ability, time, and resources both to gain this 
knowledge and to put it into use will simply be left behind. 
Rather than waiting in vain for universal enlightenment, a truly egalitarian epistemology 
must be able to function in a world that will always have its dark corners—a world in which we 
can never expect to gain total knowledge of what is going on inside the black boxes of 
computation.  One such approach, I would like to conclude by suggesting, can be derived from 
the resonance that computation has long had with the poetic avant garde.  By poetic, for this 
purpose, I mean any semiotic practice that has license to break the rules of ordinary language 
and explore meaning-making possibilities on the margins of established conventions.  Software 
has this license, at least to the extent that it employs algorithmic logic rather than grammar to 
contextualize the signs that appear in the interface: the words on a computer screen can easily 
gain entirely different meanings from the ones they ordinarily bear.  Thinking about the 
semiotics of computation as poetic, I propose, can serve as the basis for a way of critically 
engaging with computer systems that does not require complete knowledge of those elements 
that are hidden from the user.146  Algorithms only have their present power over culture 
because the belief in the narrative of technological progress, combined with the set of practices 





autonomous algorithmic and cultural realms—enables user interfaces to shepherd people into 
particular ways of thinking.  This situation could be changed with a stronger awareness of the 
ways computation is bending the rules of our languages. 
A poetic view of computation could lead us in multiple directions, not all of them 
particularly democratic.  It was a commonplace in the involuntarist tradition of the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that poets have a special ability to do what ordinary 
persons could not, to alter a language.  Such views had strong footholds in Germany (Herder, 
Humboldt) and the United States (Emerson, Whitman), and Coleridge sometimes came close to 
this position as well.  For Emerson, “the poet is the Namer or Language-maker” (Essential 
Writings 296); in Herder’s view, poetry is the best means of swaying the mysterious agents that 
drive cultural change.  If one replaces the poet with the technologist and overlooks the moral 
component of these arguments, then the result is precisely the modern narrative of 
technological progress: the technologists lead and culture follows.  But this view of poetry is not 
the only one applicable.  One approach that I find promising is to design interfaces that allow 
the signifiers on the screen to drift away from their ordinary meanings, as they inevitably will, 
but to present these signifiers in a way that emphasizes the uncanniness of this drifting—of the 
fact that things are going on with the words on the screen that differ from the way language 
ordinarily works.  Take as an example the 2013 interactive-fiction piece Ultra Business Tycoon III 
by the art-games designer Porpentine.  This highly disturbing game parodies the logic of 
capitalism by casting the player into a “business world” in which everything is defined by 
economic relations.  In one series of events, the player character vomits, and the game dutifully 





the sense that the words on the screen refer to entities that bear only a partial resemblance to 
their real-world counterparts, alien entities that exist in a world operating according to 
different rules from the ones that govern consensus reality. 
The uncanny elements of this game serve, above all, to remind the player of the 
existence of forces beyond what he or she can comprehend or control.  Employing some such 
reminder is, I maintain, critical to breaking out of the technocratic formation that alienates 
computational from interpretive perspectives.  A poetic approach to computation, meaning one 
in which the user maintains conscious awareness of the effects that algorithms have on the 
production of meaning, must rest on the recognition that what happens at the interface of 
computation and culture can never be entirely under the voluntary control of any individual, 
whether user or developer.  Culture cannot, or at least should not, be subject to the sort of 
absolute governance that engineers have sought, since the time of Babbage, to maintain over 
their creations.  If I am right, then it is a desire to maintain total mastery over the situation that 
causes the involuntary aspects of language, which are captured under the category of culture, 
to fall from the programmer’s view.  Reckoning with the cultural effects of algorithms means 







1 Peter’s book appeared in a second edition in 1678 and in two further editions in 1679.  The 
first edition only includes tables for generating hexameter; the subsequent editions include a 
different set of hexameter tables along with a similar set of tables for pentameter.  These 
revised tables were later reproduced in a 1739 book entitled The Curiosity: or, the Gentleman 
and Lady's Library (193-201); similar tables probably inspired by Peter’s were published in a 
variety of other eighteenth-century texts.  All of my quotations are from a 1679 edition that 
includes a somewhat more extensive preface than the first edition.  For a contextual account of 
Peter’s pamphlet, see Ruff. 
2 Chapter 2 includes a brief discussion of chemistry, but my focus is on the way eighteenth-
century chemists reformed their nomenclature, which falls, for my purposes, under the banner 
of semiotics.  I also include a number of discussions of logic, which is distinct from the three 
disciplinary histories by which I have set my scope.  However, the forms of logic in which I am 
most interested overlap heavily with the other disciplines: semiotics in the case of eighteenth-
century empiricist logic, which is often indistinguishable from the linguistic thought of the time, 
and mathematics in the case of nineteenth-century symbolic logic.  In spite of these overlaps, it 
is worth stressing that mathematics and logic constituted two entirely separate disciplines until 
Boole and De Morgan brought them together in the 1840s, and that the convergence of 
mathematical computation and formal logic in computing machines did not happen until the 
twentieth century.  On account of this disciplinary separation, Michael S. Mahoney has warned 
against conflating the histories of calculating machines and logic machines (“The History of 
Computing in the History of Technology”).  Recently, Matthew L. Jones has argued that 
Mahoney’s division depends on too idealistic a view of computing; instead, Jones notes, 
starting in the seventeenth century, “[t]he histories of calculating machines and logic 
intersected time and again—not of necessity, but contingently” (11).  I am interested in 
uncovering broader attitudes toward mechanical processes and their relation to meaning, so I 
cover both logic machines and mechanical calculators; however, it is important to keep in mind 
that thinkers in prior centuries would not necessarily have drawn a disciplinary connection 
between the two. 
3 The exact number and identity of the value spheres differed in Weber’s various articulations 
of this idea.  In, for instance, “Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions,” he 
discusses five spheres, the economic, political, esthetic, erotic, and intellectual (331-57).  In 
“Modernity: An Unfinished Project,” Habermas modifies Weber’s scheme to consist of the 
three value spheres of science, aesthetics, and moral philosophy, which correspond roughly, 
although not exactly, to Kant’s division of pure reason, aesthetics, and practical reason (45).  
See also Oakes. 
4 On the context and reception of Snow’s idea of the “two cultures,” see Porter, “The Two 
Cultures Revisited,” Mosco, “Entanglements: Between Two Cultures and Beyond Science Wars,” 








perspectives on the relation of culture and science, see Levine and Rauch, eds., One Culture: 
Essays in Science and Literature. 
5 Habermas, “Modernity: An Unfinished Project” 38; see Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse 
of Modernity and d’Entrèves and Benhabib, Habermas and the Unfinished Project of Modernity: 
Critical Essays on The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity.  It is also worth mentioning another 
debate about the legitimacy of modernity that took place between the twentieth-century 
German philosophers Karl Löwith and Hans Blumenberg.  Löwith argued that the modern 
notion of history emerged from Christian eschatology, on which grounds he critiqued the 
West’s claims of secularization; Blumenberg defended the legitimacy of secularizing religious 
concepts and thus of modernity itself.  This debate refers to a long-view notion of modernity 
that begins around the Renaissance, and of which Montaigne and Descartes are potential 
founding figures.  The modernity that I discuss here is a narrower one that is characterized by 
the fragmentation of knowledge disciplines and the division of science from culture; this form 
of modernity emerged, at the earliest, around the Romantic period, and arguably was not 
complete until around 1880 or 90.  See Löwith, Meaning in History; Blumenberg, Legitimacy of 
the Modern Age. 
6 My account of eighteenth-century empiricist attitudes toward language is inspired in part by 
Foucault’s discussion of the “regime of representation,” and my section on nineteenth-century 
linguistics draws upon Foucault’s book as well.  However, my account of the seventeenth 
century differs drastically from Foucault’s, which is now generally recognized as problematic 
(see Clauss; Lewis 3-4).  Foucault pays little attention to Leibniz, and although he begins his 
book with a reading of Jorge Luis Borges’s essay about John Wilkins, he makes little attempt to 
understand Wilkins on his own terms.  I also differ from Foucault in considering eighteenth-
century historicism and hermenutics as part of the linguistic thought of the time; Foucault 
mostly ignores these traditions, perhaps because of his preference for French over German 
authors.  Most importantly, Foucault only briefly touches on the changing conceptions of 
“mathesis” in the early-modern period, whereas I intend to show how mathematical practice 
changed in tandem with the broader epistemological changes of the seventeenth to the 
nineteenth century.  My focus on the changing relation of algorithm to meaning ultimately 
leads me in a very different direction from that of Foucault’s archaeology of the “human 
sciences.”  It should be noted that Foucault has also been criticized for failing to account 
adequately for developments after 1850; see Palti, “The ‘Return of the Subject’ as a Historico-
Intellectual Problem” and Kittler, Discourse Networks 278. 
7 My choice of the word empiricist embroils me in a longstanding scholarly debate, so it is 
worthy of explanation.  In the received history of eighteenth-century philosophy, which derives 
ultimately from the work of Thomas Reid, the philosophy of the period was divided into 
rationalists such as Leibniz, who believed that reason could deduce truth from undeniable 
principles, and empiricists such as Locke, who believed that all knowledge was derived from the 
senses.  Immanuel Kant’s great intervention was, in this view, to attempt to fuse these two 
strains of philosophy.  Modern scholars have critiqued the idea that there was an absolute 







Empiricism’”).  As Hans Aarsleff has argued, the assumption that Locke is an empiricist in Reid’s 
strict sense leads to a distorted view of his philosophy, which clearly distinguished rational 
thought from the mechanical following of associations (From Locke to Saussure 130).  While I 
agree with Aarsleff that Locke was not an associationist in the manner of later thinkers like 
David Hartley and La Mettrie, I still find Reid’s distinction between empiricism and rationalism a 
useful rubric for understanding the major currents of eighteenth-century thought.  Empiricism 
means, for my purposes, any philosophy that emphasizes the grounding of knowledge in 
sensory data, whether or not some rational component is additionally required.  Thinkers with 
empiricist leanings in this sense include Locke, Newton, Condillac, and, in my reading, Herder; 
Leibniz and Berkeley do not fit into my definition of empiricism. 
8 Knuth writes, “I tend to think of algorithms as encompassing the whole range of concepts 
dealing with well-defined processes, including the structure of data that is being acted upon as 
well as the structure of the sequence of operations being performed” (“Algorithmic Thinking” 
170).  He represents his inclusion of data structures as a departure from the consensus. 
9 It should be noted that the term algorithm also has a more specific, technical definition in 
Alan Turing’s theory of computation.  For Turing, algorithm refers specifically to a procedure for 
computing a mathematical function; this definition restricts the term to procedures whose 
input is fixed at the beginning, rather than provided through continuous interaction with an 
environment.  Turing’s definition is not directly relevant to the historical period I am covering 
here, but it is worth emphasizing that results from modern theoretical computer science do not 
necessarily apply to everything that could be called an algorithm in the non-technical definition 
I am using.  For a warning about the danger of extending Turing’s theory to where it does not 
properly apply, see Goldin and Wegner, “The Origins of the Turing Thesis Myth.” 
10 See The Algebra of Mohammed ben Musa, trans. Rosen. 
11 An important exception would be the algorithms implemented in the microprogramming of 
computing machines—that is, the design of the physical processes that take place when the 
machine performs operations such as single-digit addition, carrying digits, and so on.  These 
algorithms involve pieces of metal or electronic components rather than characters.  However, 
written notations do often play a role in the design of these non-symbolic algorithms.  Charles 
Babbage went to great lengths to develop a notation system for describing complex mechanical 
systems, thus bringing writing into the practice of microprogramming; similar notations exist 
for electronics.  The procedures for using an abacus are also examples of algorithms that do not 
involve written or printed characters, although one might argue that an abacus involves a 
mechanical representation of characters. 
12 There have been many attempts to frame Leibniz’s work as a predecessor to the computer, 
some more justified than others.  My account emphasizes one thread that links Leibniz to the 
modern field of computer science—he was interested in turning reasoning into a more 
“mechanical” process as a way of circumventing the uncertainty of language.  However, I am for 
the most part more concerned with uncovering the alienness of the ways in which Leibniz and 
other thinkers from before 1900 thought about the relationship of the mechanical to meaning; 







13 It may be assumed that the subjective corresponds to culture and the objective to science, 
but this would, as I discuss in Chapter 4, be a misunderstanding of how these terms functioned 
in the early nineteenth century; for Romantic thinkers, science, literature, and culture all had 
both subjective and objective aspects. 
14 On the relation of meter to technological standardization efforts in the Victorian period, see 
Hall, Nineteenth-Century Verse and Technology: Machines of Meter. 
15 On account of the revival of Leibniz’s intellectual reputation, it is appropriate that, in 1845, an 
English inventor named John Clark created a machine called The Eureka that could create Latin 
verses on the basis of similar principles to John Peter’s versifying system.  The idea was not 
entirely forgotten between the time of Peter and Clark, though; some eighteenth-century 
authors produced other versifying tables on similar principles to Peter’s, although these authors 
seemed to have a more clearly satirical purpose that Peter himself.  See Jason David Hall, 
Nineteenth-Century Verse and Technology: Machines of Meter. 
16 Lev Manovich has also connected computation to the notion of the avant garde, arguing that 
“new media is indeed the new cultural avant-garde” (1); however, his emphasis is more on the 
similarities between graphical user interfaces and Modernist design techniques such as 
photomontage than on notions of historical agency.  See Manovich, “Avant-garde as Software.” 
17 Some promotional materials use the slightly softer phrasing “MAN ADAPTS.” 
18 James Knowlson and M. M. Slaughter use the term universal language to describe Wilkins’s 
scheme; Umberto Eco applies the term philosophical language to both Wilkins and Leibniz in 
The Search for the Perfect Language.  Rhodri Lewis includes Wilkins’s work under the broader 
umbrella of the artificial language.  As Jaap Maat points out in his book Philosophical 
Languages in the Seventeenth Century, these classifications are misleading because the term 
language, in the seventeenth century, referred specifically to forms of communication that 
were primarily spoken, while projects that involved symbols were almost always called 
characters (22-23).  Maat, however, treats this as no more than a terminological confusion, 
assuming that words and symbols are interchangeable for the purposes of seventeenth-century 
semiotics (22).  My argument emphasizes the differences in attitudes towards spoken and 
visual communication at the time.  Accordingly, I have avoided referring to the schemes of 
Wilkins and Leibniz as languages. 
19 Jaap Maat and Andreas Blank have both discussed Wilkins and Leibniz together.  Maat finds 
that Leibniz was heavily engaged with Wilkins’s work while planning the calculus ratiocinatur 
and argues that it should be included in the tradition of universal language schemes as well as 
in the history of logic, in which context it has been studied the most (382).  Blank similarly 
argues that Wilkins was more of an influence on Leibniz than has been acknowledged, focusing 
particularly on how Leibniz dealt with the relation of ordinary concepts to metaphysical ones 
(51). 
20 For instance, Charles Hayes, in the preface to an English-language account of Newton’s 
theory of physics published in 1704, wrote that authors should not seek “empty applause by 
writing in a language not easily attain’d, as if the Knowledge of things and words had a 







Calculus 15-16).  Knowlson argues that this desire to study things rather than words led 
seventeenth-century scholars to resist learning multiple vernaculars, thus reinforcing the desire 
for a universal language (29). 
21 George Dalgarno is one such exception, as Maat points out; in Ars Signorum, he states that 
“the art of audible signs and visible signs is one and the same” (quoted by Maat 44). While Maat 
suggests that Dalgarno realized the equivalence of the two types of signs while undertaking his 
real character project, John Wallis takes credit for convincing Dalgarno of this point in his 1678 
pamphlet Defence of the Royal Society. In a discussion of an early version of Dalgarno’s project, 
Wallis told Dalgarno, according to the pamphlet, that “this Universal Character, must be in the 
nature of a New Language,” in response to which Dalgarno modified his scheme so as “to make 
his Character Effable” (that is, audible) (16). Wallis’s account may not be credible; Rhordri Lewis 
argues that it is not (86-87). In any case, the fact that, as Maat notes, Dalgarno felt the need to 
devote an entire chapter of his book to defending the position that spoken and written signs 
are equivalent (Maat 44) suggests that it ran contrary to the common belief of the time. 
22 In addition to Dalgarno (see the previous note), John Wallis was critical of the idea that a real 
character could overcome the limitations of vocal language. In Defence of the Royal Society, he 
suggests that the scheme is inherently impractical: “For all Persons, to Learn his Character, and 
to have all Books, Written in it; is the same thing as to Translate all Books into One Language, 
and to have this Language learned by All”—something that Wallis takes as self-evidently absurd 
(16). 
23 The Hindu-Arabic numeral system was seen as a major advance over other options because, 
unlike the verbal numeration of English, which requires the creation of additional words as 
numbers get larger (million, billion, trillion), it could express any integer with a fixed set of 
symbols—nine digits (1–9) and one cypher (0), as it was commonly explained in the 
seventeenth century.  See the arithmetic texts of Jonas Moore (1650) and William Leybourn 
(1657) for examples. 
24 See, for example, Rayner, White, Johnson, and Liversedge, “Raeding wrods with jubmled 
lettres;” Jaeger, “Redundancy and reduction;” and Piantadosi, Tily, and Gibson, “Word lengths 
are optimized for efficient communication.” 
25 Some twenty-first century philosophers call this sort of operation extended cognition—the 
incorporation of external objects, such as the pen and paper of the mathematician, into one’s 
mental processes.  See Clark (xxviii). 
26 C.f. Thomas Baker, who defends prolixity in the preface of his book The Geometrical Key 
(1684), arguing that Descartes, “had he not been so designedly concise and curt (as himself says 
he was) tho he hath still many Admirers, yet might he have had more Readers, and fewer 
Commentators” (n.p.). 
27 As Maat points out (330), Leibniz appears to have begun with a plan for a universal character, 
but decided to add a spoken component as well after hearing about Wilkins’s work in the early 
1670s.  Maat argues that Leibniz saw the spoken and written versions as interchangeable; 







a special role in his scheme, because, like algebraic notation, they facilitate certain types of 
algorithmic reasoning that cannot easily be done with spoken words. 
28 The idea of a division of labor between intellectual disciplines runs contrary to the Baconian 
program, in which different areas of study were thought to correspond to different mental 
faculties that coexisted in every human mind.  Valenza argues that, in Britain, this Baconian 
view of the disciplines did not give way to the division-of-labor model until the latter half of the 
eighteenth century with the work of Adam Smith and Dugald Stewart (11-13). 
29 Golumbia argues that Leibniz’s cult-hero status among computer scientists is due in part to 
his political support of administrative centralization (8). 
30 Loemker explains Leibniz’s confidence that calculation could extend beyond mathematics 
with another appeal to ambiguity, arguing that, in attempting to apply the method of logical 
analysis to substances, Leibniz equivocated between an Aristotelian–Stoic view of substances 
and a Platonic theory of forms (16). 
31 Poststructuralists have long noted Locke’s hypocrisy in criticizing the use of metaphor in spite 
of the fact that he uses metaphors frequently himself.  At one point in the Essay, to pick an 
especially egregious instance, he argues that using words without attaching fixed ideas to them 
serves to “break or stop the pipes” by which knowledge is transmitted (454).  However, it 
should be noted that Locke walks back on his criticism of metaphor somewhat in his later book 
The Conduct of the Understanding, which was initially intended to be part of a revised version 
of the Essay; here, he claims that metaphor is acceptable as means of explaining ideas and as 
an “ornament of speech” (73), objecting only to the use of metaphors in the process of 
reasoning.  Nonetheless, Locke has little appreciation for the possibility that figurative language 
could play a role in cognition, as, for instance, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson famously 
argued in Metaphors We Live By. 
32 I say partially algorithmic because the procedure for analytic integration often involves 
substitution methods, which leave some room for judgment.  A typical process of symbolic 
integration consists, in my terminology, of applying a series of procedures that are individually 
algorithmic, but choosing which algorithms to apply generally involves intuition.  The procedure 
for differentiation, at least in simple cases, is readily reducible to a fully deterministic algorithm. 
33 The Analyst 9-14.  Berkeley’s pamphlet is primarily directed against the Newtonian version of 
the calculus, not the Leibnizian one, but this passage includes a discussion of “foreign 
Mathematicians” who follow Leibniz’s approach (9), and Berkeley gives examples of both the 
Newtonian and Leibnizian notations (13). 
34 Suppose for instance, that 𝑦 = 2𝑥.  Then, by following the procedure for derivative, one gets 
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑥
= 2.  By substitution, then, ∫
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑥





.  If one cancels out the two instances of 𝑑𝑥 on 






performing the integrals, gives 1 = 2. 
35 Although the Cauchy–Weierstrass foundation for the calculus is now the standard one, an 







allow the existence of infinitesimals; this work proved that Leibniz’s original approach was 
viable after all, albeit with some modification.  See Robinson, Non-Standard Analysis. 
36 The exact origins of the epsilon–delta formula are somewhat muddled, and Cauchy 
potentially deserves credit for using the formula before Bolzano even though he did not 
explicitly state it.  See Grabiner. 
37 Strictly speaking, Lagrange’s theory had a fatal flaw that would have discredited it by 
eighteenth-century standards had it come to light.  Lagrange tried to base the calculus on the 
idea of a Taylor series, which provides a way of approximating mathematical functions by 
means of polynomials.  It can be proven that Taylor expansions do not exist for all functions, on 
account of which they are insufficient as a foundation for the calculus.  But this was not 
discovered until the nineteenth century.  See Grattan-Guinness, “Babbage” 36-37. 
38 See Hine 42.  One of the most prominent critiques along these lines was made by George 
Berkeley, who argued in The Analyst that the Newtonian calculus rested on absurd assumptions 
about the existence of infinitesimals; see Guicciardini, Development of Newtonian Calculus 39. 
39 Newton appears to make a similar distinction in an undated journal passage titled 
“Restoration of the Ancients’ Solid Loci.”  Against Descartes’s claim to have been the first to 
solve Pappus’s problem, Newton argues that “the Ancients” had already worked out the 
solution to the problem, but had chosen not to reveal it because it could not be clearly 
explained in words (277).  Newton’s reasoning seems to be that symbolic notations existed as 
private means of ratiocination in antiquity, but were not viewed as appropriate for 
communicative purposes and thus were not preserved.  This belief, while not generally 
supported by modern historical research, was widespread in the seventeenth century. 
40 Condorcet is generally perceived as a highly optimistic thinker; from his speeches of the early 
1780s to the Esquisse, he expressed a belief in the inevitability of scientific and moral progress.  
However, as Keith Michael Baker has argued (93-95), Condorcet’s notion of progress was 
rooted in the epistemological modesty of the Newtonian and Lockean traditions, which both 
denied the possibility that human beings could ever attain knowledge of first causes.  
Accordingly, Condorcet’s optimism was tempered by the concern that metaphysical “systems” 
and sectarian “prejudices” might blind people to the empirical truth.  My argument is that he 
came to see language as more strongly implicated in such threats in his late writings. 
41 There were at least a dozen people besides Stanhope who worked on calculating machines in 
the eighteenth century.  Of particular note is the work of the German parson Philipp Matthäus 
Hahn, who designed and built several calculating machines in the 1770s on a plan inspired by 
Leibniz; Hahn’s work was continued by his son and his apprentices.  However, Stanhope was, to 
my knowledge, the only person in the period who attempted to mechanize logic. 
42 My principle source for this account is Robert Harley’s 1879 article.  The first detailed study of 
Stanhope’s demonstrator after Harley appears in Martin Gardner’s 1958 book Logic Machines 
and Diagrams, which offers an interesting analysis of Stanhope’s ideas but contains little 
information that is not in Harley’s article.  Aspray (106-08) and Nilsson (12-13) include very brief 
discussions of Stanhope’s work in their histories of computation; both largely follow Gardner.  







versions of the Demonstrator of which Gardner was unaware (5).  Matthew L. Jones includes an 
insightful study of Stanhope’s work on calculating machines in his 2016 book Reckoning with 
Matter: Calculating Machines, Innovation, and Thinking About Thinking from Pascal to 
Babbage, but only briefly mentions the Demonstrator (197-99).  The most valuable modern 
account of Stanhope’s theory of logic appears in a 1997 article by Jane Wess, which gives a 
detailed account of Stanhope’s philosophical influences. 
43 This skepticism toward formal logic was not new in the eighteenth century; in Elements of 
Philosophy (1656), Thomas Hobbes argues that “they that study the Demonstrations of 
Mathematicians, will sooner learn true Logick, then they that spend time in reading the Rules of 
Syllogizing which Logicians have made; no otherwise then little Children learn to goe, not by 
Precepts, but by exercising their feet” (40).  The analogy between learning to reason and 
athleticism was a commonplace from the mid-seventeenth century until well into the 
nineteenth (see, for example, Whewell, The Mechanical Euclid 144 and Boole, Laws of Thought 
12). 
44 Patrick Baert argues that Habermas’s theory of communication depends on a similar 
assumption: that “there is a neutral algorithm that will enable individuals to decide between 
competing perspectives” (91). 
45 Ideally, at least.  In her 1855 autobiography, Harriet Martineau claims that, while her family 
exclaimed about the comet in the sky, “as big as a saucer,” she could not see it at all (46).  
“Philosophers,” she writes, “may make of it what they may” (46). 
46 Stanhope was not the only one to produce such a feedback system; around 1783, Johann 
Helfrich Müller designed a calculating machine that notified users of certain error conditions 
with a bell, which he regarded as a major improvement over past designs.  See Jones 150-51 
and Lindgren 66. 
47 Perhaps not incidentially, the abandonment of Enlightenment empiricism happened around 
the same time as the transition from gold coins to paper money.  Stanhope himself dealt with 
the anxieties caused by this transition both as a scientist and as a parliamentarian.  In 1775, he 
published a pamphlet discussing means of detecting forgery in coinage (Stanhope, 
Considerations; see Walker 172); around 1811, he invented an “ingenious device for preventing 
forgeries” of bank-notes, as Lord Holland described it (quoted by G. Stanhope and Gooch, 211; 
see also 209).  This project was part of a broader political program in which Stanhope 
advocated in favor of paper currency.  In 1811, Stanhope wrote a bill making it illegal to charge 
more in bank notes than in gold coins of the same face value, which turned out to be one of his 
rare successes in Parliament.  The immediate exigency of the bill was a case brought to 
Stanhope’s attention by a commoner named John Leach.  Leach’s landlord, Peter King, 7th 
Baron King (who would later be known as a biographer of Locke and father-in-law to Ada 
Lovelace) had decided to charge his tenants a higher rate of rent if they paid him in bank notes 
rather than in gold, a practice that the new bill made illegal.  While Stanhope did not support 
making paper money into legal tender, his measure was an important move toward the 







48 See Anon., “A History.”  Leibniz’s original plan was for the Academy to conduct its 
transactions in the German language, which he meant as a way of keeping the language of 
science close to that of the common people and grounding it in the concrete.  The organization 
ultimately deviated from this plan, selecting French as the primary language for its publications.  
Pombo takes Leibniz’s insistence that the Academy use German as evidence of linguistic 
nationalism (136-7).  Whether his advocacy of German as a scholarly language contradicts the 
views that Leibniz expressed in his writings about the characteristica universalis (not to mention 
the fact that he wrote the bulk of his own philosophical work in French and Latin) is a matter for 
debate; in Pombo’s view, the divergent strands of Leibniz’s linguistic work are ultimately 
motivated by a unified concern with the revelatory power of language (193). 
49 The date of this pamphlet is incorrectly listed as 1740 in some library databases, including 
that of the Bibliothèque nationale de France.  This incorrect date would make it the first entry 
in the origin-of-language debate.  However, it was published after Condilac’s Essay and was 
clearly influenced by it.  See Aarsleff, From Locke to Saussure 178. 
50 The English version was a pirated book produced without Michaëlis’s knowledge (see Lifschitz 
40).  It contains a number of translation errors and other anomalies, including misnumbered 
pages.  The translations here are based on the 1769 English version, but I have corrected them 
with reference to the French text, which was approved by Michaëlis himself.  The section from 
which I quote is not included in the German version. 
51 For instance, Kurt Müller-Vollmer argues that, in moving from the sign to signification as a 
practice, Herder “marks a clear break with the representational episteme and its leading 
discourse” (12); on the other hand, Robert Edward Norton argues that Herder’s project has 
“significant affinities to the endeavors of the writers who collectively embody the European 
Enlightenment” (6). 
52 Herder states in the Treatise that he had been unable to obtain a copy of Maupertuis’s 
Reflexions, but he was familiar with Johann Peter Süßmilch’s summary of it (77).  I am not 
making a claim of direct influence. 
53 Herder later developed the idea of Sprachkritik into an alternative to Kantian 
transcendentalism that critiques ordinary language rather than developing a special 
transcendental vocabulary (see Benes 49).  The term Sprachkritik has since been used in a 
number of different ways; see Perspektiven linguistischer Sprachkritik by Bücker, Diedrichsen, 
and Speiß, eds. 
54 The extent of Herder’s influence on later developments in linguistics is the subject of a 
longstanding debate among intellectual historians.  German scholars have traditionally viewed 
Herder as the inaugurator of the form of modern linguistics that reached its full development in 
the work of Wilhelm von Humboldt.  Aarsleff, on the other hand, has firmly denied that Herder 
has any significance for the history of linguistics, arguing that his thought is largely derivative of 
Condillac’s and questioning whether Humboldt was familiar with Herder’s work (From Locke to 
Saussure, 194-99).  Kurt Müller-Vollmer and Michael N. Forster, among others, have attempted 
to refute Aarsleff’s arguments (Mueller-Vollmer 10; Forster 79).  For the purpose of this 







example of an early expression of the view of language that ultimately won out.  I do, however, 
disagree with Aarsleff that Herder’s work is largely derivative of Condillac’s, for reasons that I 
believe I have made clear. 
55 Siskin and Valenza, for instance, have located the origin of the modern intellectual disciplines 
in the eighteenth century, arguing for a continuity between Enlightenment and Romantic 
models of disciplinarity.  Both Siskin and Valenza characterize Wordsworth’s poetic project as 
an attempt to create a space for poets within this disciplinary system.  This position stands in 
contrast to a longstanding scholarly tradition that views Romanticism as a break from 
Enlightenment thought; see, for instance, Marshall Brown’s “Romanticism and Enlightenment.”  
My account emphasizes a particular point of discontinuity between eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century forms of disciplinarity: a separation of technical from “human” factors that 
altered all disciplines in the Romantic period.  See Siskin, “Mediated Enlightenment: The System 
of the World” and Valenza, Literature, Language, and the Rise of the Intellectual Disciplines in 
Britain, 1680–1820. 
56 Wilhelm von Humboldt is perhaps best known for developing the idea of the research 
university, which he put into effect as the founder of the University of Berlin.  The importance 
of Humboldt’s ideas for modern higher education is difficult to overstate, but his influence on 
universities was not widespread internationally until around the end of the nineteenth century; 
thus, his importance for early-nineteenth-century notions of disciplinarity is more tenuous.  My 
focus here is more on his work in linguistics than on his theory of education.  See Anderson, 
European Universities from the Enlightenment to 1914. 
57 There are some aspects of literature that can be standardized, most notably poetic meter.  
Jason David Hall argues that Victorian attitudes toward meter were influenced by the 
standardization imposed by railroads and other new technologies (Machines of Meter 23).  This 
standardization is admissible because meter is, in my terms, a technical matter within the 
discipline of poetry.  The idea of standardizing poetic language at the level of meaning—
requiring poets to use a controlled vocabulary of the sort used in the hard sciences—would be, 
I maintain, anathema to modern notions of artistic creativity. 
58 The closest thing to such a consortium might be the tongue-in-cheek Pacific Order of 
Onomatopoeia Professionals, which in 2017 voted on the best ways to represent certain sounds 
in comics (see tonycliff.tumblr.com/post/160249418912).  This endeavor, apart from being 
largely a joke, deals primarily with orthography, where standardization is more readily accepted 
than in the use of metaphor. 
59 On the history of the idea of literature in a British context, see Eagleton 15-46.  On the 
specific role of British Romanticism in the construction of modern notions of art, see Bourke; 
Pfau; Gamer. 
60 One should be careful to distinguish the discipline of literature itself (that is, of writing poems 
or fiction) from that of literary scholarship or criticism.  The term literature came mostly to 
exclude scientific writing by the late nineteenth century, but the academic study of literature 
has been conceived of as a science in various contexts since that time.  Late-nineteenth-century 







the time, and the Russian Formalists similarly viewed their work as scientific in nature.  In 
German universities, literary studies commonly fall under the heading Literaturwissenschaft 
(literary science).  Finally, some twenty-first-century approaches to literary scholarship, such as 
cognitive cultural studies and some strains of digital humanities, aim to introduce 
methodologies borrowed from scientific disciplines to the study of literature.  My concern here 
is not with the division between the sciences and the humanities within the academy, but 
rather with the division between scientific and literary genres of writing. 
61 On rhetoric manuals, see Howell.  Ann M. Blair discusses florilegia in her book Too Much to 
Know.  It should be noted that drawing one’s quotations from a florilegium was generally 
looked down upon, although the compilers of the books themselves were held in high esteem.  
However, the objection was less to the unoriginality of the quotes compiled in the books than 
to the fact that they enabled people to give the impression that they were more well-read than 
they really were. 
62 All citations of The Prelude are to The Prelude, 1799, 1805, 1850: Authoritative Texts, Context 
and Reception, Recent Critical Essays, eds. Wordsworth, Abrams, and Gill.  I have indicated 
which version I am citing in the paranthetical citations except when it is clear from context. 
63 Bewell and Ferguson have both connected this argument to eighteenth-century accounts of 
the origin of language (Bewell 51-105; Ferguson 17).  While the similarity of terms is apparent, 
Wordsworth’s purpose is, in my reading, rather different from that of Condillac and other 
voluntarists, for whom the purpose of such accounts was to show how language could be 
remade anew. 
64 There has been extensive scholarly discussion of how Wordsworth conceived of poetic 
language and, going back to Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria, debates over how accurately his 
remarks in the preface correspond to the Lyrical Ballads poems themselves.  In one account, 
Wordsworth was attempting to correct the deficiencies he observes in language by developing 
a poetic vocabulary that could adequately express human experience (G. K. Blank 19); in 
another, his poetry ultimately tends toward a reconciliation with the inadequacy of any form of 
language to represent the objects of the affections (Ferguson 95). 
65 Orality also figures in Wordsworth’s poetic project in his use of the ballad form, which 
positions Lyrical Ballads in relation to the eighteenth-century practice of ballad collecting.  See 
McLane. 
66 It should be noted that algebra and geometry were distinguished to a greater extent in 
Wordsworth’s time than they are today.  Wordsworth’s remarks on mathematics in The Prelude 
are specifically about geometry, so it should not be assumed that he took similar views about 
algebra. 
67 Since my use of the term linguistics is open to the charge of anachronism, it is worthy of 
explanation.  Wilhelm von Humboldt drew a distinction between linguistics (Linguistik), which is 
the scientific analysis of languages themselves, and philology (Philologie), which involves “the 
editing of literary monuments” (English 155; German 202).  These terms were not universally 
accepted in the early nineteenth century, although William Whewell was an early adopter of 







linguistics and its French cognate linguistique were not broadly used until after 1850; in 
German, the word Sprachwissenschaft (language science) was more common than Linguistik 
until the late twentieth century.  Nonetheless, I have chosen to adopt Humboldt’s terms as a 
convenient way of distinguishing the study of language itself from the practice of textual 
scholarship.  It should be noted that Humboldt saw himself as practicing both linguistics and 
philology; the two were, for him, complementary. 
68 Ludwig Wittgenstein notes this difference in Philosophical Investigations: “Think of the 
uneasiness we feel when the spelling of a word is changed.  (And of the still deeper feelings that 
questions about the spelling of words have aroused.)  Of course, not every kind of sign has 
made a deep impression on us.  A sign in the algebra of logic, for instance, can be replaced by 
any other one without exciting deep feelings in us. —” (74). 
69 As Brian Rotman points out in Ad Infinitum, modern mathematics “bifurcates its discourse 
into a privileged formal mode and an informal one considered as supplementary and 
epiphenomenal” (7).  The informal mode, in which one explains a mathematical idea by means 
of metaphors, examples, and intuitive concepts rather than developing it through rigorously 
prescribed symbolic procedures, corresponds to the subjective in Humboldt’s theory of 
language. 
70 Humboldt was, as one might expect, critical of the idea of creating a new language from 
scratch; he suggested that this was a mistake on the part of “the great Leibniz,” although he 
also praised Leibniz for considering the inner perspective in the study of language.  See Trabant 
135-37. 
71 Aarsleff made this point convincingly decades ago, although the lesson does not seem to 
have stuck.  That Locke viewed the mechanical association of ideas as irrational is apparent 
from his chapter on “The Association of Ideas” in the Essay, in which he calls association a “sort 
of madness” (354).  See Aarsleff, From Locke to Saussure 29, 130, 173; see also D. F. Norton, 
“The Myth of ‘British Empiricism.’” 
72 In terms of history, Wordsworth is the outlier in this trio.  In his seminal study Wordsworth: 
The Sense of History, Alan Liu argues that Wordsworth’s use of his tour of Europe in his 
narrative of poetic development in The Prelude constitutes an attempt to remove the self from 
history (4-5).  But if Wordsworth wants to deny history, he does not enact this denial in the 
same manner as Enlightenment narratives like Condorcet’s Sketch, in which the state of 
enlightenment stands at a culminating point at which past practices cease to be binding on 
future ones.  Wordsworth’s attempt to root poetic diction in nature precludes the possibility of 
making an absolute break from the organically developing practices of a people.  See also 
Manning. 
73 Boole and Babbage did not meet in person until 1862, which was late in both of their careers 
(Hyman 249).  Although Babbage disagreed with Boole on some points (see Grattan-Guinness 
xliv), he wrote on his copy of Boole’s Mathematical Analysis of Logic, “this is the work of a real 
thinker” (quoted by Hyman 244).  Boole cites Babbage in passing in his 1860 textbook Treatise 
on the Calculus of Finite Differences, noting that “[i]n the state to which it has been brought, 







a branch of analysis to permit of our attempting here to give more than a general view of its 
objects and methods” (208; see 224).  While George Boole did not show much interest in 
Babbage’s calculating machines, his wife, Mary Everest Boole, was an admirer of Babbage’s 
work and wrote about it in several of her books. 
74 The current standard biography of Boole is Desmond MacHale’s The Life and Work of George 
Boole: a Prelude to the Digital Age; a classic analysis of his thought from the perspective of 
contemporary logic is Hailperin’s book Boole’s Logic and Probability.  Almost all of the scholarly 
literature on Boole focuses narrowly on explicating his views and evaluating the technical 
aspects of his mathematical and logical theories.  One of the very few exceptions is Daniel J. 
Cohen’s insightful study of Boole in Equations from God: Pure Mathematics and Victorian Faith 
(77-105), to which I am indebted for my understanding of Boole’s religious background.  
Cohen’s overall argument is that Boole’s interest in symbolic logic stemmed from a desire to 
find common ground among competing religious sects; Cohen does not engage in detail with 
Boole’s philosophy, which I have set out to do here.  There has also been some scholarship on 
Boole’s influence on late-nineteenth-century economic thought, motivated primarily by the fact 
that one of Boole’s early champions, William Stanley Jevons, was also an important economist 
(see Maas; Cook). 
75 On Boole’s attempts to navigate the sectarian conflicts at Queens College, Cork, see Cohen 
79-97. 
76 To be clear, this word appears in a discussion of a different problem in which the imaginary 
numbers do not cancel out.  T. Richard Witmer translates sophistica as “sophisticated” in his 
English edition of the Artis Magnæ, while Pycior translates it as “sophistic” (20).  I have chosen 
Pycior’s translation because, from context, it is clear that Cardano is referring not the difficulty 
of the case, but rather to the fact that the expression cannot be interpreted either numerically 
or geometrically.  The value √−15, he writes, “is far from the nature of a number and from that 
of a line, though somewhat closer to the latter.  This truly is sophistic (sophistica), since with it 
one cannot carry out the operations one can in the case of a pure negative and other” numbers 
(220).  Cardano goes on to conclude that the imaginary solution “is as refined as it is useless” 
(220). 
77 In Elements of Algebra, Euler states that “negative numbers are less than nothing” (5).  
Euler’s book was published after d’Alembert’s entry for “Négatif.” 
78 On the history of the Analytical Society, see Wilkes, “Herschel, Peacock, Babbage and the 
Development of the Cambridge Curriculum”; Becher, “Radicals, Whigs and Conservatives: The 
Middle and Lower Classes in the Analytical Revolution at Cambridge in the Age of Aristocracy”; 
and Grier, “The Inconsistent Youth of Charles Babbage.”  The consensus is that, in its short 
existence as an active organization, the society failed in its goal of reforming the Cambridge 
curriculum; however, some of the members later gained positions of influence at Cambridge, 
and symbolic methods were eventually accepted there. 
79 For an account of the context surrounding the composition of Peacock’s book, see Fisch, “The 
Making of Peacock’s Treatise.”  Fisch argues that, in the first edition of the book, published in 







difference between the symbolic methods of Babbage and the Pauline epistemology of 
Maseres and Frend (168); Peacock did not, in Fisch’s account, embrace fully symbolic methods 
until around 1840. 
80 Boole misquotes the passage slightly, substituting “obstacle” for “obstacles” and “mere” for 
“merely.”  Boole also modifies the punctuation in a way that does not significantly affect the 
meaning.  The other early editions of Mill’s book, as far as I have been able to gather, do not 
contain any variations in this sentence, so the changes are likely Boole’s. 
81 On the possible connection between Boole’s work on differential equations and his logic, see 
Laita, “The Influence of Boole’s Search for a Universal Method in Analysis on the Creation of his 
Logic.” 
82 Other important influences include William Rowan Hamilton and Arthur Cayley, who were 
developing algebraic systems that worked with arrays of numbers rather than individual 
numbers, and that obeyed different laws than ordinary algebra; see MacHale 65-66. 
83 Even if Boole did not read Peacock’s writings, Peacock certainly exerted an indirect influence 
upon Boole by means of Gregory’s essay, which is framed as an attempt to clarify and further 
develop Peacock’s ideas.  On Gregory’s influence on Boole, see Laita, “The Influence” 52. 
84 For an overview of the difference between Boole’s system and modern Boolean logic, see 
Hailperin, “Boole’s Algebra Isn’t Boolean Algebra.” 
85 The requirement that categories be mutually exclusive is a major difference between Boole’s 
system and most later versions of Boolean logic.  This requirement is a necessary consequence 
of the analogy Boole maintains between symbolic logic and algebra.  One can prove this as 
follows.  Suppose that x and y are logical variables and 𝑥 + 𝑦 is a logically meaningful 
expression.  Then, by Boole’s definition of logically meaningful, it must obey the law of duality, 
so that (𝑥 + 𝑦)(𝑥 + 𝑦) = 𝑥 + 𝑦.  Expanding this and applying the law of duality again, one gets 
𝑥 + 2𝑥𝑦 + 𝑦 = 𝑥 + 𝑦 ⟹ 2𝑥𝑦 = 0 ⟹ 𝑥𝑦 = 0.  The latter equation means, logically 
interpreted, that x and y are not both true, Q.E.D.  Boole’s exclusive interpretation of 
disjunction is inconvenient in practice, and most later systems of algebraic logic, including the 
Russell–Whitehead notation that has become the standard, deviate from Boole on this point; 
however, in doing so they create a greater divergence between symbolic logic and ordinary 
algebra than Boole intended.  Boole addresses this issue directly in an 1856 manuscript titled 
On the Foundations of the Mathematical Theory of Logic and on the Philosophical Interpretation 
of its Methods and Processes (Selected Manuscripts 91-92).  See also Jevons, Pure Logic 72 and 
Hailperin, Boole's Logic and Probability 87-96. 
86 It is often claimed that Boole used 1 to represent true and 0 to represent false (see, e.g., 
MacPhail xvii), but this is not strictly accurate.  In the truth-value interpretation, 1 and 0 are 
only used for logically necessary truths or falsehoods, and variables representing contingent 
propositions like “It is raining” or “Now is night” have values other than 1 or 0.  The 
interpretation of 1 and 0 is one of the few points on which Boole changed his mind between 
Mathematical Analysis and The Laws of Thought.  In the 1847 version of his theory, 1 means 
true in all circumstances and 0 means false in all circumstances.  In the 1854 version, he 







this change very clearly, but it appears to be because introducing the idea of time into the 
interpretation enables him to connect 1 to the idea of eternity, thus making the religious 
implications of his theory more apparent.  See Mathematical Analysis 48-50 and Laws of 
Thought 162-67. 
87 Boole’s inference algorithm is primarily intended to determine what properties a thing must 
have based on a given statement; as such, it works somewhat like solving an equation.  
Corcoran and Wood argue that this aspect of Boole’s system rests on the logical fallacy of 
conflating solutions of equations with logical consequences (111-14); however, Brown has 
disputed this point (307). 
88 This is how one might work out the problem in detail.  We have 𝑝(1 − 𝑔) = 0.  One can 
express g as a function of p in the general form 𝑔 = 𝑣𝑝 + 𝑣′(1 − 𝑝), where v and v’ are 
unknown values.  Expressing the equation in this form is possible regardless of how g and p are 
defined because of the law of duality, as Boole demonstrates.  We substitute this into the 
original equation, getting 𝑝(1 − (𝑣𝑝 + 𝑣′(1 − 𝑝))) = 0 ⟹ 𝑝(1 − 𝑣𝑝 − 𝑣′(1 − 𝑝)) = 0 ⟹ 𝑝 −
𝑣𝑝2 − 𝑣′𝑝(1 − 𝑝) = 0.  By the law of duality, the third term vanishes and the exponent 
disappears from the second, so we have 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑝 = 0 ⟹ 𝑣𝑝 = 𝑝.  Substituting this into the 
general form of g gives us 𝑔 = 𝑝 + 𝑣′(1 − 𝑝).  I removed the prime mark from v’ in recording 
the result for clarity.  Boole’s use of v to represent indeterminate quantities is widely regarded 
as problematic, since it appears to be a variable even though it does not behave as one; see 
Hailperin, Boole's Logic and Probability 97-98. 
89 In modern algebra, this is only true if 𝑧 +  𝑤 ≠  0.  However, Boole was working in an 







play important roles in Boole’s algorithm.  See Laws of Thought 156. 
90 In a manuscript written some time after The Laws of Thought, Boole discusses an “inverse” 
mental operation “by which from the conception of a given class of things we ascend to the 
conception of some larger class from which the given class would be formed from the mental 
selection of those individuals which possess a given property” (Selected Manuscripts 58).  This 
“inverse operation” would seem to correspond to division in the logical calculus.  Boole writes 
that this operation “has no verbal symbol or equivalent construction in language” and is “only 
conceivable by means of that operation of which it is the inverse”—that is to say, the 
composition of attributes (58).  Thus it would seem that, at least at the point when he wrote 
this manuscript, he believed that division corresponded to an operation that can occur in the 
human mind, but that cannot be expressed in ordinary language.  This argument is problematic, 
however, because there is no guarantee that the “larger class” he discusses is unique; indeed, 
there could be infinitely many classes that satisfy this definition of 𝑝 / 𝑞.  Boole does not treat 
division as corresponding to a mental operation in The Laws of Thought.  Hailperin developed 
an alternative interpretation of Boolean quotients using Venn diagrams and the mathematical 
idea of a multiset (Boole's Logic and Probability 109-12); Frank Markham Brown has criticized 








91 See, for instance, his 1851 address The Claims of Science, in which he argues that the senses 
alone can only produce “a mere collection of facts,” but the mind “feels the pressures of 
impulses, it is conscious of the existence of powers and faculties which urge it to reduce the 
scattered details of its knowledge into form and order” (quoted in MacHale 111; 112).  This 
impulse to organize knowledge, he indicates later in the talk, must not be pursued at random, 
but rather must serve “the true welfare of our species,” which “essentially contains a moral 
element” (114).  Whether or not there was any direct influence, the resemblance to Coleridge’s 
“Essays on the Principles of Method” is apparent. 
92 The religious aspects of Boole’s thought are not incidental to his philosophy of logic; without 
the faith that the laws of thought are imposed by divine will, his system lacks a foundation.  
One can tell that the laws of thought are correct, he argues in the manuscript quoted above, 
because they generate a correct method for reasoning.  But how can one tell that the method is 
correct without already knowing the laws of logical validity?  Since Boole has no notion of a 
metalogic or metamathematics in which to judge the correctness of method, he falls into 
circular reasoning at this point without the deus ex machina of religious faith.  See Grattan-
Guiness xli. 
93 Boole attempts to back up the claim that his laws of thought are universal in the last chapter 
of The Laws of Thought, in which he detects traces of his laws of unity and duality in ancient 
thinkers like Heraclitus and Pythagoras (411-13).  This passage is one of the moments in Boole’s 
writings in which the connection between his logical theory and his Unitarian religious views is 
most apparent. 
94 Although Mary’s writings should treated with some caution in drawing conclusions about 
George Boole, scholars have often turned to them for evidence as to his views on religion, 
education, and other matters that he did not address much in writing.  Luis M. Laita argues, 
based on a comparison of her writings and his, that her representations of his views are 
basically accurate (“Boolean Algebra and its Extra-Logical Sources: the Testimony of Mary 
Everest Boole”).  
95 The separation of form from meaning distinguishes Boole from other seventeenth-century 
real character schemes as well.  Daniel J. Cohen compares the work of Boole and De Morgan to 
that of Wilkins, arguing that “[t]he Victorians who founded modern mathematical logic may 
have judged John Wilkins’s system defective, but they clearly emulated his basic idea and 
strongly agreed with the motivation behind it” (27).  This is true to the extent that both Boole 
and Wilkins saw written notations as means of resolving sectarian strife, but Boole’s work 
contains no hint of the sort of hierarchical catalogue of things that forms the heart of Wilkins’s 
scheme. 
96 The Kantian resonances are most apparent in his later writings on probability theory, in which 
he refers to a series of theorems about the properties of statistical data as “conditions of 
possible experience” (Studies in Logic and Probability 319).  Boole certainly differs from Kant in 
his conception of the transcendental realm, given his focus on algebraic relations rather than 







and conceptual truth in terms of the Kantian division between pure reason and understanding, 
legitimately or not. 
97 The comparison with Mill should not be taken to indicate that Mill’s views on the definition 
of logic were the same as Boole’s; specifically, Mill made a sharp distinction between logic and 
psychology, whereas Boole did not.  Cook argues (340) that Mill’s definition of logic influenced 
Boole’s reception at Cambridge, leading John Venn and the economist Alfred Marshall to 
overlook the possibility that Boole’s laws of thought could serve as a model of the human mind.  
Jevons’s interpretation of Boole does not follow Mill on this point, nor did Boole himself.  
However, Boole did clearly distinguish between logical truths, which are normative, and the 
truths of natural philosophy, which are merely factual; thus, even if he did not separate logic 
from what he understood to constitute “psychology,” he did (like Mill) distinguish logical 
concerns from the empirical facts of human behavior.  See also Maas 614-16. 
98 In the first pages of The Laws of Thought, Boole suggests a rationale for expecting the 
understanding of logic to come in a sudden burst of insight.  Boole’s example is Aristotle’s 
dictum de omni et nullo—the principle that if something is true of a category, then it is also true 
of any subcategory of that category.  The logical truth of this principle, he argues, “is made 
manifest in all its generality by reflection upon a single instance of its application”; the fact that 
one need not offer multiple examples to convince people of its truth is evidence that it “is 
founded upon some general law or laws of mind” (4).  Bornet argues convincingly that this 
passage is directed at Mill’s argument in System of Logic that logical truths are founded on 
induction (Bornet l).  Whereas Mill would argue that adding more examples strengthens the 
induction and thus provides further evidence of the truth of the principle, Boole holds that one 
can perceive the truth of the principle with certainty all at once. 
99 In this regard, Boole’s logic system is, like Stanhope’s calculating machine, an example of 
prescriptive technology.  In the lecture series published as The Real World of Technology, Ursula 
M. Franklin makes a case that technology has become increasingly prescriptive since the 
Industrial Revolution, being designed not just to help workers complete tasks, but also to exert 
control over their actions (18).  Prescriptive technology, she argues, encourages a “culture of 
compliance” in which workers are given a single correct way to do something rather than 
having room to make their own decisions (19). 
100 Boole does suggest, in the introduction to Mathematical Analysis, that one may only use 
symbolic methods if one has “an ability to expand the abbreviated forms of reasoning which 
they induce, into their full syllogistic development” (10).  Yet the use of uninterpretable 
expressions seems to render the “full syllogistic development” of the reasoning his system 
enables impossible.  In its actual design, Boole’s logic system is more concerned with producing 
answers in a methodical way than with making the reasoning behind them comprehensible to 
people. 
101 Harriet Martineau also tells a variant of this story in her discussion of Babbage in her 








102 From this passage alone, it is not apparent whether Babbage means that the calculation will 
be made truthfully with regard to the new numbers just entered, or whether the machine will 
return to the original computation without regard to the interference.  In a manuscript that 
Babbage prepared for Wilmot Buxton’s unfinished biography, Babbage makes it clear that the 
latter is the case (Buxton 249).  See also Exposition 188. 
103 On Babbage’s ideas about the division of labor, see Shaffer, “Babbage’s Intelligence”; Sun, 
“Machinery and the Factory System”; and Ozgur, “Babbage’s Legacy”. 
104 Apart from the discussion of Babbage in “Maelzel’s Chess Player,” Poe alludes to the 
Difference Engine without mentioning Babbage’s name in “The Thousand-and-Second Tale of 
Scheherazade (1845).  Poe’s “The Power of Words” (1845) is based on a theme taken from 
Babbage’s Ninth Bridgewater Treatise, as I discuss below.  Part I of Poe’s Marginalia series (first 
published in 1844) contains a discussion of “[a]ll the Bridgewater treatises” that Jerome J. 
McGann convincingly argues is a reference to Babbage’s unofficial entry in the series (see 
McGann 44). 
105 Ivor Grattan-Guinness argues that a key aspect of Babbage’s work is his “algorithmism” 
(“Babbage as an Algorithmic Thinker” 34).  Babbage’s algorithmic thought, according to 
Grattan-Guinness, combines three elements: thinking about repetitions and combinations of 
processes, employment of algebraic methods, and belief in the importance of signs for 
reasoning (34).  Two other aspects of algorithmic thinking that Grattan-Guinness does not 
include in his definition, but that bring Babbage closer to the modern discipline of computer 
science than his precursors, are treating computations as physical systems possessing changing 
states and considering the efficiency of computational processes.  Babbage viewed his 
computing engines and treating numbers like physical things, moving them around like grain in 
a mill (Hyman 166), and using language strongly reminiscent of modern computer science, he 
wrote about operations that “cost” certain amounts of time (Buxton 264). 
106 Most citations of Poe’s writings are to The Collected Works of Edgar Allan Poe, ed. Mabbott, 
The Collected Writings of Edgar Allan Poe, ed. Pollin, and The Works of the Late Edgar Allan Poe, 
ed. Griswold.  In parenthetical citations, I refer to these three editions by their editors’ names. 
107 In Ortiz’s account, the influence of Condillac was limited to the earliest phase of Babbage’s 
career, ending around 1821, when Babbage cites de Gérando’s book (“Babbage and French 
Idéologie” 14).  Ortiz leaves open the question of whether French idéologie had an influence on 
Babbage’s later work on computing machines, although he does suggest, in a later essay, that 
Babbage’s continued references to the idea of “language” in his later work may derive from this 
early French influence (“On the Impact” 74). 
108 This book was officially a collective production of the Analytical Society, but Babbage and 
Herschel were the only members who contributed to it.  Hyman argues that the preface, from 
which I take the quotation, was written primarily by Babbage (25-26n).  See also Grier 8-9. 
109 Richards argues that the notion of generalization employed by British mathematicians of the 
early nineteenth century differs from the notion of abstraction, which served a somewhat 
analogous role for French mathematicians in the period, in that generalization rooted the 







Babbage’s anxiety about the potentially unruly results of generalization, which I discuss below, 
might be seen as a symptom of his tradition’s aversion to methods that lack conceptual clarity. 
110 Sometimes Babbage is credited with inventing the form; as of August 24, 2017, the 
Wikipedia article for “Form (document)” states that “[i]t is believed that the form was 
conceived by mathematician and inventor Charles Babbage,” with a direct citation of Babbage’s 
Economy of Machinery and Manufactures as its only source.  It is not true that Babbage was the 
first to use blank forms; Blair and Stallybrass, for instance, discuss several instances of forms 
used for administrative purposes in the early 1600s (144).  However, Babbage did offer 
influential arguments for the use of forms as an economic expedient.  For instance, Campbell-
Kelly argues that Babbage’s discussion of the “division of mental labor” in Economy influenced 
the development of British census forms starting in 1841 (27-29).  For general discussions of the 
history of paperwork, see Kafka, The Demon of Writing and Gitelman, Paper Knowledge; for a 
broader account of the way management techniques like Babbage’s contributed to the 
standardization of human subjects for statistical purposes in the Victorian period, see Poovey, 
Making a Social Body. 
111 Babbage claims at multiple points in his work that the design of machines and algorithms 
cannot be mechanized, but rather requires human intelligence (Decline of Science 126; 
Economy 292; Passages 472).  Against this reading, Ashworth suggests in his article “Memory, 
Efficiency, and Symbolic Analysis: Charles Babbage, John Herschel, and the Industrial Mind” that 
Babbage saw the human mind as operating much like the Analytical Engine (649); Maas makes 
a similar claim, albeit more guardedly (593).  Ashworth’s support for this claim mainly comes 
from Wilmot Buxton’s unfinished 1872-80 “memoir” of Babbage.  In the passage Ashworth 
cites, Buxton claims that, with the construction of the Difference Engine, “[t]he marvellous pulp 
and fibre of a brain had been substituted by brass and iron” (48).  Elsewhere, Buxton includes a 
lengthy quotation from Hobbes’s Leviathon claiming that all reasoning consists at base of 
addition and subtraction (155); he suggests that, if Hobbes is right, then we may represent all 
that may be represented in ordinary language in algebraic notation and accordingly subject it to 
the processes of the Analytical Engine (156).  However, as Buxton acknowledges, this 
Hobbesian (or rather pseudo-Hobbesian, seeing as Hobbes himself was viciously opposed to 
symbolic algebra) musing is mere speculation, and it is not based on the recorded views of 
Babbage himself (156).  Babbage’s own writings do not bear out the claim that he viewed the 
human mind as working like a computing machine, as Green (43) and Purbrick (21) have 
demonstrated. 
112 One type of misbehavior that Babbage and his associates had to fend off was the possibility 
that the wheels would land inbetween digits, thus producing ambiguous or invalid results—
what Matthew L. Jones calls the “keeping-it-digital problem” (29).  Jones discusses the 
approaches that Babbage and others took to this problem in his monograph Reckoning with 
Matter: Calculating Machines, Innovation, and Thinking about Thinking from Pascal to Babbage. 
113 For an overview of the technical aspects of Babbage’s work on computing machines, see 







difference engines within the broader history of mathematical table-making, see Swade, 
“Unerring Certainty.” 
114 The interested reader can find an accessible explanation of the details in Babbage’s Passages 
(49-57).  The basic method of differences can only be used for polynomial functions, but it can 
be extended to other types of function using approximation methods.  Babbage thought that 
Taylor’s theorem could be used to extend the method of differences universally, but this 
approach does not work in all cases, as was proven in Babbage’s time by Augustin-Louis Cauchy 
and William Rowan Hamilton.  Babbage seemed to have been unaware of these developments, 
at least as of 1827.  See Grattan-Guinness, “Babbage as an Algorithmic Thinker” 36-37. 
115 In spite of its name, the Difference Engine No. 1 was not Babbage’s first attempt at 
constructing a difference engine; he completed a smaller, working prototype in 1822, which has 
since been lost (Passages 47; Lindgren 43; Roegel).  Note that the description of the Difference 
Engine No. 1 in Lardner’s 1834 essay is inaccurate and will lead to confusion if one attempts to 
reconcile it with the engraving. 
116 A team working at the London Science Museum began building a version of the Difference 
Engine No. 2 in 1985 and completed it in 2002.  See Swade, “The Construction of Charles 
Babbage's Difference Engine No. 2.” 
117 Babbage was interested in the supernatural from a young age.  In his autobiography, he 
describes a youthful attempt to raise the devil by drawing a circle on the floor with his own 
blood, stepping into it, and reciting the Lord’s Prayer backwards (Passages 10-13); at 
Cambridge, he and some of his friends formed a Ghost Club, which sought to collect evidence 
regarding the existence of ghosts (Passages 34).  Among the many artifacts he collected were a 
set of “wooden fortune cards, of the time of Queen Elizabeth,” which he permitted the 
Cambridge Antiquarian Society to print in an 1843 collection of early English literature (Wright 
and Halliwell 249).  While Hyman represents Babbage’s experiments with magic as scientifically 
hard-minded efforts to test supernatural claims (14), Babbage’s fascination with the occult 
clearly went beyond any rationalist desire to debunk superstition.  His argument in The Ninth 
Bridgewater Treatise does not so much lord science over a belief in the supernatural as suggest 
that the two are compatible. 
118 Based on this similarity, Lindgren argues that the paragraph about the machine going 
“beyond the reach of the present power of mathematics” in Lardner’s 1834 essay was in fact 
written by Babbage himself (Lindgren 109). 
119 C.f. Tresch, who links the readers that Poe manipulated in the Balloon Hoax to the idea of a 
mass audience that was emerging with the production of large-scale newspapers like the Sun 
(“Potent Magic” 283-84). 
120 This passage perhaps derived from the same thinking as one of Babbage’s best-known 
economic arguments, that the difficulty of verifying the genuineness of goods can affect their 
price.  See Economy 101-11. 
121 Poe’s shift away from conventional notions of reason over the course of his career has long 
been recognized.  As David Ketterer puts it in The Rationale of Deception in Poe, Poe evolved 







allied with imagination is valued in an ambiguous concept of intuition” (xiii).  I follow Ketterer in 
distinguishing early from late Poe. 
122 This move is clearly influenced by Brewster, who lists various automata before declaring that 
“they sink into insignificance when compared with the automaton chess-player” (321). 
123 Heyward Ehrlich notes that, in this passage, “Poe held up his idea of Babbage’s ‘pure 
machine’ as an infallible standard” (113).  However, it should be clarified that Babbage’s 
Difference Engine is not itself the standard of intelligence for Poe, since Poe explicitly states 
that Babbage’s engine is “altogether beneath” any being that can play chess (319).  This is a 
point on which Poe differed from his source, David Brewster, who placed Babbage’s machine at 
the top of the hierarchy of intelligence; see Tresch, “Potent Magic” 286. 
124 Scholars have long noted that the methods Dupin describes in “The Purloined Letter” and 
“The Murders in the Rue Morgue” are inadequate to explain his seemingly superhuman ability 
to determine other people’s thoughts.  Irwin argues that Dupin represents a childish desire “for 
mental dominance, the wish for the world to conform absolutely to our dreams, for thinking to 
make it so” (xvi).  Jonathan Elmer contends that Dupin’s solution of the mystery “offers the 
Minister—and indeed, all those who later inhabit the third witnessing position—the fantasized 
witnessing of his own conception,” a sort of self-witnessing that is precluded by the structure of 
democratic subjectivity (196).  I am not setting out to defend the coherence of Dupin’s 
methodological statements, but I do take them as a genuine attempt on Poe’s part to convince 
his readership of the superiority of a poetic mode of thought to Enlightenment empiricism. 
125 Poe was a regular reader of the Edinburgh Review, which he obtained in a pirated edition 
produced by the New York publisher Theodore Foster (see Hayes 94).  He wrote a précis of the 
July, 1835 issue for the Southern Literary Messenger (December, 1835, 82-89); he quoted from 
articles in later issues of the Review in several places in the 1830s and 40s.  
126 The view that Whewell defends—that mathematical study can serve as a means of 
developing reasoning skills that can then be transferred to other areas—had been established 
for centuries.  Joan L. Richards argues that this view of mathematics as an “exemplary” science 
had existed in both Britain and France in the eighteenth century, but went out of style in France 
in the early decades of the nineteenth (“Rigor and Clarity” 301).  A century before the 
Whewell–Hamilton dispute, George Berkeley had questioned the exemplarity of mathematics 
in his pamphlet The Analyst (1734), arguing that one might be skilled in mathematics and yet 
“unqualified to decide upon Logic, or Metaphysics, or Ethics, or Religion” (53-54). 
127 In the early story “Some Passages from the Life of a Lion,” also known as “Lionizing,” the 
narrator encounters an assortment of “lions and recherchés” at a dinner party.  Among them is 
“a human-perfectibility man,” who “quoted Turgot, Price, Priestly, Condorcet, De Stäel, and the 
‘Ambitious Student in Ill Health’” (Mabbott II.176). 
128 Technically, it is possible.  One could write a program that goes through every possible 
mathematical text and checks whether it is a correct proof of a given theorem.  If a proof exists, 
this program would eventually find it, even though it might take billions of years.  However, 
such a program would be unable to determine that a theorem is unprovable; if so, its search 







demonstrated that there is no general way around the latter problem; no algorithm can be 
found for determining the proveability of a statement.  While the work of Church and Turing 
put a damper on the project of creating a universal theorem-proving machine, effective proof-
generating algorithms are possible within certain restricted domains.  On the history of such 
efforts, see Stephanie Dick’s dissertation After Math: (Re)configuring minds, proof, and 
computing in the postwar United States. There is also a class of program called proof assistants 
which are only partly automated, requiring occasional hints from a human operator; the idea 
(of which Babbage would certainly approve) is to have the machine take care of all the tedious 
parts of the proof while the human operator supplies the intuition needed to overcome the 
most difficult hurdles.  See Bertot and Castéran. 
129 Babbage and Poe were not the only ones to discuss this idea.  Buxton argues that Babbage’s 
may have taken this idea from the Indian philosophy of Mimansa Darsana (Buxton 343); there is 
also a similar idea in Geoffrey Chaucer’s Hall of Fame, although Babbage appeared to be 
unaware of this at the time when he wrote The Ninth Bridgewater Treatise (Hyman 141).  The 
idea of spoken words echoing for all eternity seems to have struck a chord with people in the 
nineteenth century, because it was adopted by a number of other popular writers.  Apart from 
Poe, Charles Dickens discussed it in an 1869 speech (Hyman 140n); Nathaniel Willis and Edward 
Hitchcock adapted it into speculations about light waves, which he applied to understanding 
photography (Becher 40-41); and the Ohioan proto-science-fiction writer Florence 
McLandburgh used it as the basis for her 1876 short story “The Automaton Ear” (7-43).  Steven 
Connor argues, with particular reference to McLandburgh, that Walter Benjamin’s image of the 
Angel of History can also be linked back to this nineteenth-century trope (121). 
130 Babbage cites Laplace’s 1812 book Theorie Analytique des Probabilités in support of the 
claim that the vibrations of individual atoms are governed by mathematical laws just as planets 
are (Bridgewater 110n).  Poe was familiar with the Theorie Analytique des Probabilités (see 
Holman 33), so he may have taken some of the inspiration for “The Power of Words” directly 
from Laplace.  However, Laplace only uses the image of vibrating air particles to illustrate the 
fact that we must use probablistic methods in cases where we are ignorant of the precise truth, 
and he does not speculate much about the implications of the idea for the remembrance of the 
past (iv).  From the similarities that I discuss below, I conclude that Poe likely borrowed from 
Babbage’s book. 
131 It should be noted that Babbage’s notion of progress was not quite the same as the 
Enlightenment one.  Buxton claims that Babbage rejected the idea of human perfectibility, 
preferring philosophies that bore practical fruit (351).  As Tamara Ketabgian has noted, 
Babbage’s notion of progress had to do more with supplementing the human body with 
machines than with improving people (The Lives of Machines 29).  Babbage’s work as a whole is 
directed toward practical inventions that compensate for the weaknesses of human minds and 
bodies.  For instance, in 1831, he had logarithm tables printed in ten different colors of ink so 
that he could find out which color was least fatiguing on the eye (Buxton 308; see Lindgren 61); 
the preface his 1841 book of tables explains his extensive efforts to find a table layout and 







132 An often-cited text related to Didérot’s project is his entry for “Art” in the Encyclopédie, 
which proposes a “general treatise on the mechanical arts” that would put them on a level with 
the liberal (1.714; my translation).  Babbage’s program of applied science differed from 
Didérot’s project in that Babbage elevated the roles of industrialists and scientists over that of 
the factory worker based on the division of labor.  See Schatzberg, “From Art to Applied 
Science.” 
133 There were also smaller exhibitions in London in the eighteenth century, which Babbage 
attended as a child (Passages 17; see Maddaluno).  France held industrial expositions in the 
earlier nineteenth century as well, most notably in 1844; see Hahn 34-36. 
134 For instance, an unflattering 1906 account of his life calls him a “rather ugly, egotistical, and 
crotchety old mathematician” and declares that the scientific manner in which he catalogues 
street nuisances “has a slightly comical appearance” (Fyvie 192; 201).  In the 1960s, Babbage’s 
campaign against street noise led one of his biographers, Maboth Moseley, to dub him an 
“irascible genius” (Moseley 21).  Hyman later pushed back against Moseley’s characterization 
and cast the street-noise campaign in more a positive light (Hyman 246); yet Moseley’s epithet 
seems to have stuck.  Babbage’s great-great grandson, Dr. Neville F. Babbage, examined the 
mathematician’s autopsy report and found that he had kidney problems and arterial disease, 
which may have accounted for his sensitivity to noise and irritability late in life (M. R. Williams, 
“Last Word” 12). 
135 The 1939 fair’s vision of the future had as much to do with American democracy as it did 
with technology; apart from the General Motors exhibit, the fair included a diorama of a future 
city called the “Democracity” and a 65-foot statue of George Washington.  The nationalistic 
implications of this vision were overt; the Fair included an artificial version of Niagara Falls that 
represents, the narrator of a promotional newsreel tells us, the “the forward march of America, 
resistless as a torrent’s flow.”  See 1939 NEW YORK WORLD'S FAIR NEWSREEL "WORLD OF 
TOMORROW" 72342. 
136 Futurama II took the form of a ride that led spectators through a series of dioramas.  The 
visuals of the ride are preserved in a promotional film that has been uploaded to YouTube 
under the title '64-65 NY World's Fair FUTURAMA Ride Video; this film features the same 
recorded narration that was played during the ride.  An audio recording of the actual ride made 
by a visitor is available at “Welcome to Futurama II.” 
137 For instance, see Jean-François Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge 
(1979) and Frederic Jameson’s Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (1991).  
On the continuing ubiquity of the conviction that progress is inevitable, see Gray, “An Illusion 
With a Future.” Two important studies of the idea of progress broadly considered are J. B. 
Bury’s The Idea of Progress (1920) and Robert Nisbet’s History of the Idea of Progress (1980). 
138 This doubling is well understood in computer science, especially in the subfield of Human-
Computer Interaction (HCI).  A classic account of the role of the semantic plane in computer 
systems is Peter Bøgh Andersen’s 1990 book A Theory of Computer Semiotics.  Drawing on the 
semiotic theories of Louis Hjelmslev, Roland Barthes, and Umberto Eco, Andersen’s book aims 







meaning, interpretation, and aesthetics on the agenda of computer science” (4).  From the 
perspective of Hjelmslev’s variant of structuralism, Andersen argues that “we must normally 
view natural language [computer] interfaces as clever and useful illusions, as semiotic systems 
that masquerade as another system”; this “disguise technique” makes a computer interface 
“parasitic upon English,” since interface symbols like “New” and “Save” resemble English words 
even though they actually work within a different language system (13).  As a way of facilitating 
reasoning about how computer interfaces relate to natural-language practices, Andersen 
recommends “a methodology that separates technical implementation from communicative 
purposes” (13).  This separation, I am arguing, was rendered possible by the 
compartmentalizartion installed by Boole; Andersen’s HCI theory is thus dependent on 
epistemological presuppositions that we have inherited from the nineteenth century.  Terry 
Winograd and Fernando Flores discuss this issue from a different perspective in their 
Heideggerian study of HCI, Understanding Computers and Cognition (1987); programmers and 
users, they argue, think about computers in terms of a hierarchy of increasingly abstract “levels 
of representation” that become more similar to ordinary language at the same time that they 
become increasingly detached from the physical workings of the machine (86).   
139 In certain types of programming language, the variable names are stored in memory, and 
thus the change would, in fact, have a minor effect on the physical state of the computer while 
the program runs.  There are also ways of accessing variable names within a running program in 
some languages, although this would not usually be considered a good practice.  In general, 
modern programming languages are designed so as to render the choice of names as 
inconsequential as possible to the logic of the system. 
140 This curve is called the catenary.  I chose to present it in modern notation for the sake of 
simplicity; Leibniz presents the equation in a more complex form that includes both symbolic 
notation and Latin.  Christiaan Huygens and Johann Bernoulli derived the equation 
independently around the same time Leibniz did; all three of their solutions were published in a 
single issue of Acta Eruditorum.  See Leibniz, “De linea […].” 
141 This particular way of thinking was best-established in France, although it gained some 
English adherents, including Stanhope, after 1789.  Another strain of English thought, 
exemplified by Francis Maseres and William Frend, similarly valued conceptual clarity, but drew 
more on a Pauline epistemology that did not necessarily support the idea of making a radical 
break with the past.  If I am judging correctly, Maseres and Frend would be resistant to any uses 
of algorithms that caused words to drift away from their ordinary significations. 
142 Is computer code thus the private language that Wittgenstein argued was impossible?  Not 
exactly.  Wittgenstein’s argument was against the possibility of a language that was in principle 
incomprehensible to anyone but its creator because it represents sensations that cannot be 
communicated.  Since the private meanings created in programming stem not from 
incommunicable sensations, but rather from the logic of the system, which is there for anyone 
to understand (however difficult understanding it may be in practice), computer code is only 
contingently private; thus Wittgenstein’s argument does not apply.  See Wittgenstein, 







143 The current standard text on this method is Deep Learning (2016) by Ian Goodfellow, Yoshua 
Bengio, and Aaron Courville. 
144 On this issue, AI researchers may be divided rougly into three schools of thought.  One 
school maintains that, because machine-learning methods do not rest on humanly 
comprehensible concepts, they cannot produce genuine knowledge.  A prominent advocate of 
this position is Noam Chomsky, who argues that machine learning can only identify statistical 
patterns in data but cannot provide a way for researchers to understand what those patterns 
mean (Cass).  At the opposite extreme is a group of applied machine-learning practitioners, 
many of them working in industry, who embrace the employment of algorithmic models as 
“black boxes,” judging them only by the accuracy of the predictions they make.  The statistician 
Leo Breiman, for instance, argues that academic statisticians’ insistence on interpretability 
leads to the development of “irrelevant theory” and prevents them from working on exciting 
problems that can only be dealt with using machine learning (Breiman 199; 200).  A third school 
takes a middle-ground position, maintaining that neural networks need not be black boxes, but 
rather can be made interpretable with the aid of visualization techniques. 
145 Another possible response would be to call for the nationalization of social media platforms, 
search engines, and other elements of technological infrastructure so that they may be held 
accountable to the electorate.  I am not opposed to nationalization in general, but given the 
tendency of these technologies to create cultural feedback loops by influencing people’s 
opinions, I do not believe that allowing people to vote on technological decisions would 
improve the situation I am discussing, although it may be desirable for other reasons. 
146 It is worth a note about how the practice I am suggesting relates to the academic subfield of 
critical code studies.  In particular, Rita Raley’s essay “Code.surface || Code.depth” critiques the 
idea that one can “trace a computing operation down to a foundation, bottom, or core” (n.p.).  
Critical code studies typically involves applying the techniques of hermeneutics to computer 
code, a practice that sometimes blurs the lines between code and poetry.  My purpose is to 
suggest ways in which people can think more critically about their own use of technology 
without having to dig into the technical details of how computers work, so I am not suggesting 
that people read computer code; my approach focuses more on how people interact with user 
interfaces and how those interfaces are designed.  The poetic reading practices I am suggesting 
could, however, be applied to code considered as a part of an interface for programmers, 
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